No. I even stated that the reason I did not make any comment was that Buffett & and the Harvard study were just restating points I had made long ago.
And yet the entire ensuing discussion has centered on how that is not the case. You immediately go on to disclaim the specifics of Buffet's statements, and restrict them to only long-term bonds in a short, atypical period. And the fact remains, at this point unchallenged by you, that your Harvard link doesn't bear on the causal relationship that is the foundation of your predictions and policy prescriptions.
So it looks an awful lot like you should have written some actual commentary, and not just done a link dump. This kind of thing is exactly among the reasons why link-dump posts are bad form.
Yes, I would like to see data proving I was wrong, but note I was more careful than Buffett was.
So, for the record: you aknowledge that Buffet's statement about the historical performance of Treasury Securities is factually incorrect?
I.e. I am sure that if you go back in time far enough and / or include new issues with less than 10 years to maturity, then yes you can show that investing in Treasuries did (contrary to Buffett´s unqualified statements) at times yield increases in purchasing power,
Buffet specified a particular time period (196-whatever till today). That's the quote you chose to present - without any qualifications from yourself - and that's the period I used. If you want to move the goal-posts now, well, you're going to be seen to be moving the goal-posts.
If you want to have a discussion about the specific conditions today that result in the particular combination of inflation expectations and US Treasury Security prices, at particular maturities, today then we can do that. But that's necessarily going to be a detailed look at a variety of atypical, temporary factors and not a lesson in the effects of borrowing writ large. The graph that you included in the post in question shows that the returns have been positive in recent times, and have only just barely dipped into negative territory very recently, after all.
but until you can show that for new issues of 10 or more years maturity, purchased in the last four years (when I first noted they were a sure way to loss purchasing power), I will continue to believe that I have never made a false statement on this.
Hey, whatever it takes you protect your ego, I guess. Let's just note that all these restrictions you've added significantly reduce the import of the assertions in question. The idea that certain classes of T-bills might give negative expected real returns for a period of a few years in the midst of atypical global economic conditions is a far, far less impressive statement than the sweeping generalizations about government paper eating purchasing power as a matter of consistent historical certainty (which is what you chose to lead with in the Buffet quote you selected to present without any qualification or caveat).
Mainly becuase some years ago when I made the claim that US could not recover with debt of 90% of GDP you challenged me for the basis of that claim. - I could not find that study (still cannot) but the Harvard study comes quite close, singling out 90% as the break point, above which GDP does decline in their extensive data set.
That's not what the study says. It doesn't note any GDP declines. It's about reduced growth rates. And it doesn't say anything about causation - for all we know, it's the reduced growth that leads to the higher debt load, and not the other way around. It doesn't say anything about "recovery," nor have you given a clear definition of what you mean by that.
I even eventured (my opinion) as to why this is true. to quote from my earlier post:
"... but a large part of the cause, I think, is that the government borrowing for interest and principle repayment is "crowding out" the funds needed by industry etc. to invest for productive use. ..."
That hypothesis doesn't explain the effect it's supposed to address: you're hypothesizing a relationship between the rate of borrowing and growth, not a relationship between the total level of debt and growth. A country could well sustain a debt load well above 90%, but not do much of any borrowing (so the debt load isn't growing, just sitting above 90%), in which case your proposed mechanism says GDP growth should be fine - which defies the result of the study. Likewise, a country with low overall debt load (say, 5% of GDP) could go on a borrowing binge. According to your mechanism, then, they should see a big reduction in GDP growth - again, in defiance of the results of the study.
So, the study doesn't support your original contention, doesn't bear out your proposed mechanism of interaction, and doesn't say anything at all about causation. It does not, at the end of the day, lend weight to your position overall.
Yes with some hesitation I can accepted that, but unless you first copy and re-post what I said, I fear that my POV may not be accurately stated by you for your attack. - Can you understand why if you wish to attack my POV, you should first post a quote of me making the statement you wish to attack?
(Go back as many years as you like for the quotes.
I'm not going to accept any homework assignments from you. I'm going to continue to rely on my ability to read, recall and interpret. If we encounter an instance in which you feel I'm misrepresenting your views, then you will be free to point that out and define your own position as you see fit. This is how adults interact.
At this point, I'm also going to add that you have a reputation for revising your position while claiming that it hasn't changed (often via semantic gymnastics and self-serving reinterpretations of standard terms), and then deflecting by insisting that you were misrepresented. So, don't expect much sympathy for such claims unless you can substantiate them unequivocably.
As you note, I have had a quite constant POV.
Pet fixations that are impervious to data or reasoning
do tend to be very constant, in general.
The major theme of which is China is rising and the US is declining with dollar collapse possible any time China is willing to pay the price,
You realize that China only holds about 10% of American debt, right? And an even smaller portion of the dollars in circulation? You really think that size stake is big enough to tank the dollar? I don't.
And you drastically underestimate the costs to China of throwing away their foreign exchange reserves. China is a developing country with serious structural vulnerabilities. They'd be crazy to destabilize their whole system that way - and certainly, the CCP, of all governments, would never be so reckless.
which is steadily decreasing as the years passes. So much so that there will come a day when it is to China´s long term economic advantage to take that ONE TIME hit for the lower cost of its imports EVERY YEAR, with financially broke US and EU not significant bidders for the imports China needs.)
You're talking about a hypothetical future time when China has become a fully-developed country with a consumption economy. In the first place, that's decades away. In the second place, by the time that happens China will have already left behind its position as a major holder of US paper. Indeed, they've already put the brakes on the accumulation of such as they've transitioned into more of a middle-income status.
Basically, your scenario is more of the same have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too thinking that you're famous for. There's no scenario in which China has both the incentive to tank the dollar and the ability to do so. This is exactly why trade is different from war - it's not a zero-sum game. The USA would never have been content to borrow huge sums of money from China in the first place, if doing so didn't also create for China a clear incentive to maintain the value of the dollar.
For rest of your post we agree. - As I said the Harvard study only notes the correlations in a very extensive body of economic data. It does not attempt to state cause and effect relationships - In so complex a field, they are mainly just opinions , but both of us do offer ours from time to time and when they differ, we must just accept that.
Not when one interpretation is demonstrably incorrect, as yours are here. There is nothing about sloppy, biased reasoning leading to nonsense interpretations that I am obliged to "accept." We are dealing in questions of fact and logic, and not any kind of purely subjective "opinions" here.
I use my understand of these cause and effect relations to make some rather astounding predictions.
And if we compare those to what's actually occurred, we are left unimpressed with your predictive power.
Notwithstanding your persistent revisionism to pretend otherwise, of course, but nobody buys into your self-serving reframings.
You tend to be more cautious.
The difference is not one of "caution." You seem to imply that I fundamentally agree with you, but then scale back the severity of my expectations out of some kind of dispositional timidity. That is not the case. Rather, the difference is that I am cognizant of the structural factors and incentives that militate against the sort of dramatic, emotional scenarios you enjoy fantasizing about.
The issue is that you are caught up in your fantasies of America being "punished" for your pet peeves, and so tend to come unmoored from sensible, objective analysis. I speculate that this tendency stems from a desire for external validation of your decision to expatriate many years ago. This whole line of ideation looks for all the world like a revenge fantasy against American friends/family who disapproved of (or maybe, mocked) your decision to expatriate and reasons for doing so (probably many of these same people still roll their eyes when you launch into these tirades during holiday visits, I would guess). You'd be better off just having it out with them directly, rather than making SciForums into your personal China-Eats-USA fantasy blog.