The Bomb
- Thread starter kenworth
- Start date
That isn't really true. There are a number of battlefield applications where a nuclear weapon could be used to great tactical success, and with little to no danger to friendly forces and noncombatants. Nuclear weapons, despite all their associated brouhaha, are merely very large explosive devices.
Without having read into it any further, the argument that Hitchens seems to be making is equally valid for a hand grenade as it is for a nuclear weapon. The point is that civilians are not combatants, nor are they heads of state. They have no direct part in the process of making war, so they should be spared from its consequences as much as possible. You probably won't find many people who disagree with that. Arguments arise when people start trying to figure out the coefficient that successfully balances protection of civilians with accomplishing mission objectives and protection of combat forces. Obviously, where you stand there depends a great deal on who you are.
Of course, extenuating circumstances abound in warfighting. The right thing to do at the time doesn't always seem like the right thing to do after the dust has settled. In those awful, critical moments, it always boils down to a judgement call by whoever is in command. Interpreting those critical decisions, like Truman's and Stimson's, needs to be done in a context that takes into account everything that was formative to their decision. Hindsight is always 20/20.
Well, that's it for you then, dummy. If you don't care about your personal integrity then I've no reason to read ANYTHING else you say. :bugeye:
Welcome to my ignore list, you little insignificant twerp! Perhaps you'll develop some sense of responsibility for your words when you finally grow up.
i cant really think of an occasion where nuclear weapons can be used without certain civilian casualties unless you are attacking a base in the middle of nowhere,which isnt what has happened on the 2 occasions when they were used.
Well, exactly. Collapsing al-Qaeda cave networks during the Battle of Tora Bora (Afghanistan, late-2001) is one area I have a little professional familiarity with. Instead of low yield tactical weapons (B61-11), which could have accurately caved entire groups of tunnels deeply into their inner chambers, we had to painstakingly deliver ordnance that was either not anywhere near as powerful (BLU-109) or not nearly as accurate (BLU-82). Absent the presence of nearby non-combatants, precision low-yield nuclear strikes would have been the better way to go tactically. They would have led to a complete mission sooner and more in strongly our favor. Despite these advantages, nobody would have even considered authorizing a nuclear release. The last time they did was, to my knowledge, 40 years ago during the Battle of Khe Sanh. That was under conditions much more dire, and they didn't consider it long for fear that the press might find out about it and scream bloody murder. Why would we give up such a devastating tactical advantage? Why would the threat of public and international response be such a powerful deterrent? The answer is simple: nuclear weapons are politically dangerous in all cases, but tactically dangerous only in some cases. Not many cases, as I said, but we have special weapon systems built for missions just as unique, like the RIM-116. (How many times in the last 20 years has one of our ships came under cruise missile attack? How many times have we had to cave a bunker?)
This kind of gets back to what I was saying about the "associated brouhaha" of nuclear weapons being worse than their physical effects. The way that nuclear weapons entered the public's consciousness has a lot to do with the way they are perceived. What can glass the better part of a city can also be used to move large amounts of earth, as was demonstrated in Operation Plowshare. In the end, Plowshare was abandoned for political reasons, not technical ones. Why? Because the public opinion of nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent, nuclear technology as a whole, was shaped by the attacks that produced Japan's surrender, and the Cold War nuclear winter/fallout scares that affected everyone's way of life and feeling of personal safety for decades. That was their experience with it, and when it came time to vote, the scientists and engineers who actually understood the facts were woefully outnumbered by people who felt the way they did based mainly on emotion. In a way, it was like today's "creationism" debates.kenworth said:
Note that I am absolutely not advocating that we should have used battlefield nukes in 2001/2002. The penalties would have been too great. But they also would have been categorically political and diplomatic, not tactical.
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Buffalo Roam
Registered Senior Member
:roflmao: and pray tell what alternative universe did this history come from?
Now how about some facts, like citation of incident?
America went to war with Japan?
Again what drugs are you taking, must be some good shit, to come up with that alternative to history.
The Panay incident was a Japanese attack on the United States Navy gunboat Panay while she was anchored in the Yangtze River outside of Nanjing on December 12, 1937.
On 12 December 1937, Japanese naval aircraft were ordered by their Army to attack “any and all ships” in the Yangtze above Nanking. Knowing of the presence of Panay and the merchantmen, the Imperial Japanese Navy requested verification of the order, which was received before the attack began about 13:27 that day. Although there were several large American flags flown on the ship, as well as one painted atop the cabin, the Japanese planes continued strafing and bombing the area around the Panay. Panay was hit by two of the eighteen 60-kg (132 pound) bombs dropped by three Yokosuka B4Y Type-96 bombers and strafed by nine Nakajima A4N Type-95 fighters.[1] The bombing continued until Panay sank at 15:54. Three sailors were killed, and 43 sailors and 5 civilian passengers wounded.
On January 26, 1938, during the Rape of Nanking, John M. Allison, at the time consul at the American embassy in Nanking, was struck in the face by a Japanese soldier.[2] [3] This incident is commonly known as the Allison incident. Even though the Japanese apologised formally on January 30 (after the Americans demanded they do so), this incident, together with the looting of American property in Nanking that took place at the same time, further strained relations between Japan and the United States, which had already been damaged by the Panay incident less than two months earlier.
Buffalo Roam
Registered Senior Member
The U.S. did not extend aid to China untill 1940-41, and Japan abrogated the existing treaty of commerce with the United States in January, 1940,
At the outset, U.S. officials viewed developments in China with ambivalence. On the one hand, they opposed Japanese incursions into northeast China and the rise of Japanese militarism in the area, in part because of their sense of a longstanding friendship with China. On the other hand, most U.S. officials believed that it had no vital interests in China worth going to war over with Japan. Moreover, the domestic conflict between Chinese Nationalists and Communists left U.S. policymakers uncertain of success in aiding such an internally divided nation. As a result, few U.S. officials recommended taking a strong stance prior to 1937, and so the United States did little to help China for fear of provoking Japan.
In 1940 and 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt formalized U.S. aid to China. The U.S. Government extended credits to the Chinese Government for the purchase of war supplies, as it slowly began to tighten restrictions on Japan. The United States was the main supplier of the oil, steel, iron, and other commodities needed by the Japanese military as it became bogged down by Chinese resistance but, in January, 1940, Japan abrogated the existing treaty of commerce with the United States. Although this did not lead to an immediate embargo, it meant that the Roosevelt Administration could now restrict the flow of military supplies into Japan and use this as leverage to force Japan to halt its aggression in China. After January 1940, the United States combined a strategy of increasing aid to China through larger credits and the Lend-Lease program with a gradual move towards an embargo on the trade of all militarily useful items with Japan.
The Japanese Government made several decisions during these two years that exacerbated the situation. Unable or unwilling to control the military, Japan’s political leaders sought greater security by establishing the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in August, 1940. In so doing they announced Japan’s intention to drive the Western imperialist nations from Asia
At the outset, U.S. officials viewed developments in China with ambivalence. On the one hand, they opposed Japanese incursions into northeast China and the rise of Japanese militarism in the area, in part because of their sense of a longstanding friendship with China. On the other hand, most U.S. officials believed that it had no vital interests in China worth going to war over with Japan. Moreover, the domestic conflict between Chinese Nationalists and Communists left U.S. policymakers uncertain of success in aiding such an internally divided nation. As a result, few U.S. officials recommended taking a strong stance prior to 1937, and so the United States did little to help China for fear of provoking Japan.
In 1940 and 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt formalized U.S. aid to China. The U.S. Government extended credits to the Chinese Government for the purchase of war supplies, as it slowly began to tighten restrictions on Japan. The United States was the main supplier of the oil, steel, iron, and other commodities needed by the Japanese military as it became bogged down by Chinese resistance but, in January, 1940, Japan abrogated the existing treaty of commerce with the United States. Although this did not lead to an immediate embargo, it meant that the Roosevelt Administration could now restrict the flow of military supplies into Japan and use this as leverage to force Japan to halt its aggression in China. After January 1940, the United States combined a strategy of increasing aid to China through larger credits and the Lend-Lease program with a gradual move towards an embargo on the trade of all militarily useful items with Japan.
The Japanese Government made several decisions during these two years that exacerbated the situation. Unable or unwilling to control the military, Japan’s political leaders sought greater security by establishing the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in August, 1940. In so doing they announced Japan’s intention to drive the Western imperialist nations from Asia
Lol. Any particular reason the Russians would want to do that? I mean the Poles do have good vodka
Lol. Any particular reason the Russians would want to do that? I mean the Poles do have good vodka
They just announced it on the news.
The Pentagon is probably masturbating itself at the prospect of more righteous war.
Don't hold your breath waiting on it, BR. He's nothing but little punk kid that rewrites history to suit his agenda. He's also one of only two on my ignore list because nothing he says can be taken as truth. (And I really, really hate LIARS!!!)
I could have sworn it was you who was another re-hasher.
i cant find the article i read about america carrying out a few isolated bombing runs in china.
these books are kinda interesting
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0306810352/americanherit-20
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0743201299/americanherit-20
i love how this has turned into a massive conspiracy,i have no agenda.i am interested in debate however the first reply in this thread successfully derailed it from its intended topic.as very often happens.