I still find several problems with this. Firstly, I do not how quantum entanglement equates with compression. It seems to me to indicate that time and/or space is simply another emergent property of force interaction just as matter is.Originally posted by J.P.
If the universe is closed, the "information" or entangled quantum states cannot leak out of the closed system. So the density of entangled quantum states, continually increases, as the entropy must always increase.
Each quantum-wave intersection corresponds (I think) to processed information. The energy is re-quantized, so the total energy of a system is a constant. Information is compressed and matter shrinks.
Even given his proposition that this 'quantum compression' results in our perception of an expanding Universe such a relative expansion would be universal, thus we would observe an expansion between all objects, from the quantum to the celestial. Yet this is not what we observe.
Re the link, I am not going to pretend to be able to handle set theory to a point where I am able to mathematically counter his argument. However, I do see several theoretical issues here as well:
Such would require a deterministic relationship, not a nondeterministic one. Nondeterministic phenomena would simply be noise in the system and while it might randomly affect perception it would not correlate to any other phenomena.Nondeterministic recognition can help to explain the ability of an acceptor to rapidly sieze certain kinds of higher-order phenomena, or even interact with higher-order agencies ordinarily insensible to it.
Indeterminacy does not equate to "free will" only randomness. If we accept that indeterminacy does play a significant role in the output it is, once again, only the generation of noise in the system, which would confound prediction but does not equate to an independent operator. That which we desire to understand as 'free will' is more likely to be a function of deterministic self-recursion. Complexity (and some random input perhaps) only give the illusion of "free will" but provide no basis for truly independent self-determinism.Suppose instead that M has nondetenninistic output capping mn, where state-transition may or may not be deterministic. Then the prediction of output entails control of mn by the predictor. To win a game of prediction, one must now control mn as well dn Sn to the extent chat it is output-critical; one must take over where the probabilistic mn leaves off. Since whichever control the transducer has over itself resides in mn and dn, one must in effect deprive it of self-control. The relevance to "free will" is obvious.
Sorry but I don't see where he's escaped Godel's theorem. All he seems to be saying here is that we are confined to a closed system described by an open system. I see two problems. One, how is it that we can express Godel's theorem if our system is not open. And two, we still wind up unable to explain the larger system. ML simply winds up describing this unknowable meta-system as God. He's come no further than the mystics 5000 years ago. It's interesting and fun but it really doesn't explain anything useful.What the theorem forces by juxtaposing truth and derivability (or consistency and completeness) is a hierarchical stratification of classes of truth functions and the inferential syntaxes which parametrize them. This stratification follows that of G, fractionating computative reality along with the "truth" to which it corresponds. ...
Some of what he says is interesting (once deciphered) but I find nothing new or particularly valuable in it. Certainly nothing that even comes close to the TOE.Trust me, Langan knows what he is talking about, more than I do.
~Raithere