Risk Analysis

[NMSquirrel]

Bible Jesus doesn't teach that it's OK to sit around and philosophize endlessly,

jesus did..

That's what I did. I took religion (Christianity at least) out for a proper genuine spin. A couple of my friends have to and had similar experiences.

this is loaded with assumptions..too many to bother with..

<edit..stupid DBS..(Dumb Blonde Syndrome) attention was on the reply,forgot to combine replies>

Meaning: For a person who joins religion later, say, at age 30, their cognition and morality are at the level for 30-year-olds, while their faith is at the level of 2-year-olds. Understandably, there will be internal discord.

I'm not saying this to belittle anyone. It's simply how it is - if one takes up something later in life, one is a newcomer at it, regardless of how old and experienced they otherwise are.

i got into God around 30, i'm now 48, and how true that..

 

[universaldistress]

this is loaded with assumptions..too many to bother with..

I think you need to do better here. Don't be slack. Why don't you address his point?

 

[wynn]

I agree that a theist might try to convince me that my moral objection is just hubris, just part of my damnable revolt against the Lord.

But the fact remains that I'm not willing to surrender my conscience and my sense of ethics quite that easily. The wager just doesn't smell right to me.

Those theists in favor of the wager are in fact expecting people to abdicate the very capacities that those same theists are expecting the people to rely on in order to come to the conclusion that the wager is reasonable (and that a particular brand of theism is the one and only right one).
This is insanity, obviously.


Moreover, it is not uncommon in various religious doctrines and personal testimonies of believers to point out that being religious for the sake of the promised rewards is a lesser kind of religiosity.
There are thus theists who agree with atheists on this point.

 

[Mind Over Matter]

Common sense. The natural sciences. The social sciences.
That which is not divine reasoning.




That would depend on the brand of his mundane reasoning.

I'm all for common sense.

 

[wynn]

I'm all for common sense.

Are you saying that by means of common sense one can assess whether something is divine or not?

 

[Mind Over Matter]

The argument from Pascal Wager's:

"I confess it, I admit it. But, still, is there no means of seeing the faces of the cards?" Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc. "Yes, but I have my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to wager, and am not free. I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe. What, then, would you have me do?"

True. But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavour, then, to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness. "But this is what I am afraid of." And why? What have you to lose?

Lot's of people are critical of Pascal's wager, will comment endlessly on it, and never take the time to read it. I am always amazed by that.

I only wish people would read 233, that would be sufficient to address 90% of the comments made against it.
***
I think I see his wager as just one of his many thoughts, but we will never know, since he did not have a chance to organize them into a book.
***
Also, see Pensee 226:

What say [the unbelievers] then? "Do we not see," say they, "that the brutes live and die like men, and Turks like Christians? They have their ceremonies, their prophets, their doctors, their saints, their monks, like us," etc. If you care but little to know the truth, that is enough to leave you in repose. But if you desire with all your heart to know it, it is not enough; look at it in detail. That would be sufficient for a question in philosophy; but not here, where everything is at stake. And yet, after a superficial reflection of this kind, we go to amuse ourselves, etc. Let us inquire of this same religion whether it does not give a reason for this obscurity; perhaps it will teach it to us.[15]

That seems to confirm his intention in writing the Pensees... He was anticipating Sartre and the inevitability of commitment.

 

[keith1]

Pascal's wager seems to have been thoroughly debunked here.

Add the data that the most devout god-worshipers in the U.S. are in the southern states, where corresponding data shows interestingly, the highest levels of death from disease, and an unfair, almost spooky level of bad luck, bad weather/natural, and man-made calamities, etc.

 

[wynn]

MoM-
The passage you quote makes no difference for me.

 

[Yazata]

The argument from Pascal Wager's:

Lot's of people are critical of Pascal's wager, will comment endlessly on it, and never take the time to read it. I am always amazed by that.

I only wish people would read 233, that would be sufficient to address 90% of the comments made against it.

I assume that 233 is your first quotation, so let's look at it.

"I confess it, I admit it. But, still, is there no means of seeing the faces of the cards?" Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc.

He seems to be alluding to deism there. They are the ones who question the credibility of special revelations and hence 'can't see the faces of the cards'. But Pascal, in his newly heightened religiosity, feels the pull of scripture and tips his hat to it.

"Yes, but I have my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to wager, and am not free. I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe. What, then, would you have me do?"

I'm not sure what that means or who "you" is. God? Or perhaps he's addressing part of himself. This sounds like a cry of pain. Who or what ties his hands and closes his mouth? When he writes that he is "so made that he cannot believe", he seems to be suggesting that he still hasn't succeeded in throwing off all of his previous deist doubts.

True. But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavour, then, to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions.

This seems to be an accusation directed towards reason, since it's what has brought him to "this". It isn't clear what 'this' is, but it likely refers to the existential predicament that he feels has trapped him. So if it's reason that got him into trouble, then he isn't going to be looking to reason to rescue him by increasing proofs of God. He needs to look elsewhere for the answer, to his passions, to his affective side.

You would like to attain faith and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it.

I assume that he's addressing himself in the third person there, along with others like him who want with all of their hearts to have calm and confident faith but can't seem to find it.

Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc.

But the people that Pascal so envies, the people who placidly go to church, who perform the religous practices, and who believe so easily, were never people like Pascal. They aren't intellectuals, they were never deist-style rationalists, and few if any of them have any sense that they are throwing dice into the dark.

Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness. "But this is what I am afraid of." And why? What have you to lose?

And that's a very peculiar way to end. Does Pascal really dream of (and perhaps dispair of ever being capable of) deadening his own acuteness? The fear he refers to here seems to the fear of surrendering one's critical intelligence.

My impression is that this isn't really a straightforward presentation of the "wager" argument at all. Maybe he provides that elsewhere in another of his written 'thoughts'. This quoted one seems to be a rather eloquent and moving expression of his own inner struggles.

 

[wynn]

That seems to confirm his intention in writing the Pensees... He was anticipating Sartre and the inevitability of commitment.

You are speaking with the benefit of hindsight.

And you seem to be alluding to Sartre's eventual renunciation of his existentialist philosophy and turning to Christianity.
(Supposedly Camus had made arrangements for a baptism too shortly before his death.)


I agree that commitment is inevitable, but it is not clear to what or to what extent.

This is an issue that is very much alive for me. It may sound proud, but I would gauge Pascal's stance to be one I was at until about two years ago.
I, too, thought "Well, just close your eyes and jump" - and at the time, it made sense, and I did it. But not for long. My "religious experiment" felt too much like a charade, it was a brute act of will, devoid of heart.
What Pascal says there simply strikes me as too simplistic.

 

[wynn]

Endeavour, then, to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions.

"By the abatement of your passions" could be parallel to instructions we find in Eastern traditions. Namely, that first one must control one's mind, and then one can endeavor for higher realization.
But they don't talk about "convincing oneself" - that is not the issue there.

Adi Da (of all people), taught that the basic difference between Western and Eastern culture is that a Westerner tends to ask "Does God exist? What is the proof of God's existence?", while the Easterner will not ask such questions, but instead ask "How can I get out of samsara?"

I find that "Does God exist? What is the proof of God's existence?" is a hopeless outlook, a quest that can never really be completed.

 

[Yazata]

"By the abatement of your passions" could be parallel to instructions we find in Eastern traditions. Namely, that first one must control one's mind, and then one can endeavor for higher realization.

Is Pascal concerned about controlling passions generally? Or is he mainly concerned with subduing the skeptical passions that prevent him from enjoying a placid and easy faith? Would Pascal favor abatement of passionate faith?

 

[wynn]

If I believe in God and am wrong - then I have lost nothing
If I don't believe in God and am wrong - I lose much.

I can't quite put my finger on it yet, but there is something wrong with this, besides what has already been pointed out.

 

[wynn]

Is Pascal concerned about controlling passions generally? Or is he mainly concerned with subduing the skeptical passions that prevent him from enjoying a placid and easy faith? Would Pascal favor abatement of passionate faith?

From what seems to be evident from the text, he wants to subdue the skepticism.

One thing that I find peculiar about some people (theist or not) is that they seem to view cognitive and character qualities as commodities somehow, as things one can use at will.

Note Elle Woods' graduation speech:

It is with passion, courage of conviction and strong sense of self that we take our next steps into the world, remembering that first impressions are not always correct. You must always have faith in people. And most importantly you must always have faith in yourself.

- as if "courage of conviction", "strong sense of self" and "faith in others" and "faith in yourself" would be things one can direct at will.

 

[rpenner]

As the former Data Security Officer for one of the world's largest government agencies, I have considerable formal training and experience with risk analysis and risk management.

I like your tear down of Pascal's Wager.

You seem to be feeding the notion that Walter Wagner's and Eric Johnson's "risk management" ideas with respect to the Large Hadron Collider lack weight.


http://scienceblogs.com/startswithabang/2011/05/the_future_of_colliders_beyond.php (Quoting Wagner from May 2009)

Eric E. Johnson "The Black Hole Case: The Injunction Against the End of the World" Tennessee Law Review, 76 819-908 (2009).

The same sort of analysis translates easily to an injunction context, in which we can ask whether the benefits outweigh the costs. We can calculate the price of risk in a particular endeavor, and then add that to the costs in order to compare the sum to the expected benefit. Using P and L from the Hand formula, the price of risk, R, is calculated as:

R = PL (Eq. 1)

Let’s try plugging in a few numbers to see what turns up in the black-hole case. First, let us assume that since the Earth and everything on it is the sum of all value for humanity, there is no price worth paying to absorb that loss. Thus, the value of L is infinite.

Next we need to assign a numerical value for the probability. Let us take, for the sake of argument, Giddings and Mangano’s assessment that there is “no risk of any significance whatsoever” from the LHC in terms of a planet-devouring black hole.
...
So let’s insert an incredibly tiny number in there—something that, in terms of human experience, has “no . . . significance whatsoever.” Let’s try one in one trillion.
...
Quite to the contrary, in both Equation 2 and Equation 3, P equals “no risk of any significance whatsoever.” The only difference is in how we translate these words into numbers. In either case, we are taking Giddings and Mangano at their word.

Walter Wagner in Federal Appeals Court, June 17, 2010 (Unofficial transcript at http://sciforums.com/showthread.php?p=2571435#post2571435 ) :

11:11: WW: No, that's not what I'm saying. The standing arises from the fact that this activity in Switzerland will affect me here in the United States, even here in Hawaii where the suit was filed because this .. should it create this kind of a condition of creating strangelets it would affect me here in Hawaii. And that's what gives me standing. Not the fact that they're doing something in Switzerland, but that what they're doing in Switzerland can affect me here in Hawaii. That's what gives us standing.

11:45: J2: There's an element of speculation there, is there not?

11:48: WW: It's a fifty-fifty so far as we know. There's an element of speculation on the part of Doctor Sancho as well.

http://sciforums.com/showthread.php?p=2494393#post2494393

... we do not expect magic unicorns to form at the LHC.

But (playing by Eric Johnson's rules) we cannot rule out that the LHC will produce magic unicorns which will save the future of humanity. Eric Johnson does not argue that unknown is unknown, but argues that unknown is unbounded risk -- yet it could also be unbounded benefit. Neither is expected.

So EJ takes the whole of his ignorance of what will happen everywhere in the world, throws away hypothetical events that don't have a LHC tie-in, parameterizes this on the real number line, and throws away the positive numbers and then sloppily inserts (negative) infinity into the discussion. That's the abuse of math I was speaking about. What he would really want to do is integrate a probability distribution over the whole of the real line. Such a thing is done all the time in math and often with finite results, but when you start with only ignorance, of course your answer is going to be meaningless.

The question of balancing risk versus reward is meaningless until you have numbers all-around.

 

[Mind Over Matter]

But this is what I am afraid of.

My impression is that this isn't really a straightforward presentation of the "wager" argument at all. Maybe he provides that elsewhere in another of his written 'thoughts'. This quoted one seems to be a rather eloquent and moving expression of his own inner struggles.

You have completely misread the passage. Back up and start over. The passage in quotes is the atheist speaking to Pascal, not Pascal speaking about an inner struggle within himself.

 

[Mind Over Matter]

MoM-
The passage you quote makes no difference for me.

Have you read the pensees, in particular 233 in its entirety? You seem to be dodging that question. Maybe it makes no difference to your concern, because I provided a quote that is out of context to rest of the wager argument.

 

[wynn]

You have completely misread the passage. Back up and start over. The passage in quotes is the atheist speaking to Pascal, not Pascal speaking about an inner struggle within himself.

And we are telling you that to us, it seems like superficial reasoning.

 

[wynn]

Here's 233 in entirety, and what seems like its continuation 234:


233. Infinite--nothing.--Our soul is cast into a body, where it finds
number, dimension. Thereupon it reasons, and calls this nature
necessity, and can believe nothing else.

Unity joined to infinity adds nothing to it, no more than one foot to
an infinite measure. The finite is annihilated in the presence of the
infinite, and becomes a pure nothing. So our spirit before God, so our
justice before divine justice. There is not so great a disproportion
between our justice and that of God as between unity and infinity.

The justice of God must be vast like His compassion. Now justice to the
outcast is less vast and ought less to offend our feelings than mercy
towards the elect.

We know that there is an infinite, and are ignorant of its nature. As
we know it to be false that numbers are finite, it is therefore true
that there is an infinity in number. But we do not know what it is. It
is false that it is even, it is false that it is odd; for the addition
of a unit can make no change in its nature. Yet it is a number, and
every number is odd or even (this is certainly true of every finite
number). So we may well know that there is a God without knowing what
He is. Is there not one substantial truth, seeing there are so many
things which are not the truth itself?

We know then the existence and nature of the finite, because we also
are finite and have extension. We know the existence of the infinite
and are ignorant of its nature, because it has extension like us, but
not limits like us. But we know neither the existence nor the nature of
God, because He has neither extension nor limits.

But by faith we know His existence; in glory we shall know His nature.
Now, I have already shown that we may well know the existence of a
thing, without knowing its nature.

Let us now speak according to natural lights.

If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having
neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then
incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is. This being so, who
will dare to undertake the decision of the question? Not we, who have
no affinity to Him.

Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for
their belief, since they profess a religion for which they cannot give
a reason? They declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is a
foolishness, stultitiam; [28] and then you complain that they do not
prove it! If they proved it, they would not keep their word; it is in
lacking proofs that they are not lacking in sense. "Yes, but although
this excuses those who offer it as such and takes away from them the
blame of putting it forward without reason, it does not excuse those
who receive it." Let us then examine this point, and say, "God is, or
He is not." But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide
nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is
being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or
tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can
do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can
defend neither of the propositions.

Do not, then, reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you
know nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having made, not this
choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who
chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The
true course is not to wager at all."

Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which
will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see
which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and
the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your
knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun,
error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather
than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point
settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in
wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain,
you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without
hesitation that He is. "That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may
perhaps wager too much." Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of
gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one,
you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would
have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you
would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your
life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and
gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being
so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be
for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you
would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one
life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances
there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy
life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life
to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss,
and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; where-ever the
infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against
that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all. And
thus, when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve
his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as
the loss of nothingness.

For it is no use to say it is uncertain if we will gain, and it is
certain that we risk, and that the infinite distance between the
certainly of what is staked and the uncertainty of what will be gained,
equals the finite good which is certainly staked against the uncertain
infinite. It is not so, as every player stakes a certainty to gain an
uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite certainty to gain a finite
uncertainty, without transgressing against reason. There is not an
infinite distance between the certainty staked and the uncertainty of
the gain; that is untrue. In truth, there is an infinity between the
certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But the uncertainty of the
gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the
proportion of the chances of gain and loss. Hence it comes that, if
there are as many risks on one side as on the other, the course is to
play even; and then the certainty of the stake is equal to the
uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from fact that there is an
infinite distance between them. And so our proposition is of infinite
force, when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are
equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain. This is
demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths, this is one.

"I confess it, I admit it. But, still, is there no means of seeing the
faces of the cards?" Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc. "Yes, but I have
my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to wager, and am not
free. I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe. What,
then, would you have me do?"

True. But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings
you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavour, then, to convince
yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of
your passions. You would like to attain faith and do not know the way;
you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it.
Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all
their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would
follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow
the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the
holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you
believe, and deaden your acuteness. "But this is what I am afraid of."
And why? What have you to lose?

But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will lessen
the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks.

The end of this discourse.--Now, what harm will befall you in taking
this side? You will be faithful, humble, grateful, generous, a sincere
friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have those poisonous
pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others? I will tell
you that you will thereby gain in this life, and that, at each step you
take on this road, you will see so great certainty of gain, so much
nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last recognise that you
have wagered for something certain and infinite, for which you have
given nothing.

"Ah! This discourse transports me, charms me," etc.

If this discourse pleases you and seems impressive, know that it is
made by a man who has knelt, both before and after it, in prayer to
that Being, infinite and without parts, before whom he lays all he has,
for you also to lay before Him all you have for your own good and for
His glory, that so strength may be given to lowliness.

234. If we must not act save on a certainty, we ought not to act on
religion, for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an
uncertainty, sea voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at
all, for nothing is certain, and that there is more certainty in
religion than there is as to whether we may see to-morrow; for it is
not certain that we may see to-morrow, and it is certainly possible
that we may not, see it. We cannot say as much about religion. It is
not certain that it is; but who will venture to say that it is
certainly possible that it is not? Now when we work for to-morrow, and
so on an uncertainty, we act reasonably; for we ought to work for an
uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance which was demonstrated
above.

Saint Augustine has seen that we work for an uncertainty, on sea, in
battle, etc. But he has not seen the doctrine of chance which proves
that we should do so. Montaigne has seen that we are shocked at a fool,
and that habit is all-powerful; but he has not seen the reason of this
effect.

All these persons have seen the effects, but they have not seen the
causes. They are, in comparison with those who have discovered the
causes, as those who have only eyes are in comparison with those who
have intellect. For the effects are perceptible by sense, and the
causes are visible only to the intellect. And although these effects
are seen by the mind, this mind is, in comparison with the mind which
sees the causes, as the bodily senses are in comparison with the
intellect.


http://www.ccel.org/ccel/pascal/pensees.txt

 

[wynn]

Our soul is cast into a body, where it finds
number, dimension. Thereupon it reasons, and calls this nature
necessity, and can believe nothing else.

None of this has been agreed upon with the atheist.

That "our souls are cast into a body" is something that is not universally accepted, yet it is necessary to go with Pascal's wager.

Atheists usually believe that we are our bodies, or at least that when the body dies, there is nothing more to us, to life.
So from this perspective, it is also meaningless to be concerned about what might happen to one after death.

So firstly, as far as the wager goes, it would need to be established that "our soul is cast into a body".

Unity joined to infinity adds nothing to it, no more than one foot to
an infinite measure. The finite is annihilated in the presence of the
infinite, and becomes a pure nothing.

That sounds like SciWriter reversed.

We know that there is an infinite, and are ignorant of its nature.

This has not been established either.

As
we know it to be false that numbers are finite, it is therefore true
that there is an infinity in number. But we do not know what it is. It
is false that it is even, it is false that it is odd; for the addition
of a unit can make no change in its nature. Yet it is a number, and
every number is odd or even (this is certainly true of every finite
number). So we may well know that there is a God without knowing what
He is. Is there not one substantial truth, seeing there are so many
things which are not the truth itself?

If one doesn't know what something is, what point is there in saying that it is and that one knows it is?

Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which
will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see
which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and
the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your
knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun,
error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather
than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point
settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in
wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain,
you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without
hesitation that He is. "That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may
perhaps wager too much." Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of
gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one,
you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would
have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you
would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your
life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and
gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being
so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be
for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you
would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one
life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances
there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy
life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life
to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss,
and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; where-ever the
infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against
that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all. And
thus, when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve
his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as
the loss of nothingness.

For it is no use to say it is uncertain if we will gain, and it is
certain that we risk, and that the infinite distance between the
certainly of what is staked and the uncertainty of what will be gained,
equals the finite good which is certainly staked against the uncertain
infinite. It is not so, as every player stakes a certainty to gain an
uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite certainty to gain a finite
uncertainty, without transgressing against reason. There is not an
infinite distance between the certainty staked and the uncertainty of
the gain; that is untrue. In truth, there is an infinity between the
certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But the uncertainty of the
gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the
proportion of the chances of gain and loss. Hence it comes that, if
there are as many risks on one side as on the other, the course is to
play even; and then the certainty of the stake is equal to the
uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from fact that there is an
infinite distance between them. And so our proposition is of infinite
force, when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are
equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain. This is
demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths, this is one.

This is the passage that is usually referred to as Pascal's Wager.

234. If we must not act save on a certainty, we ought not to act on
religion, for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an
uncertainty, sea voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at
all, for nothing is certain, and that there is more certainty in
religion than there is as to whether we may see to-morrow; for it is
not certain that we may see to-morrow, and it is certainly possible
that we may not, see it. We cannot say as much about religion. It is
not certain that it is; but who will venture to say that it is
certainly possible that it is not? Now when we work for to-morrow, and
so on an uncertainty, we act reasonably; for we ought to work for an
uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance which was demonstrated
above.

My problem with PW is that it takes too much at once, too much in one step.
There is no real sense of graduality.

In comparison, in some Eastern traditions, they would expect a person first to gradually come to a point of mundane goodness, for mundane happiness' sake (which is something people can generally understand and strive for), and only after they have stabilized themselves at that level, begin to endeavor toward higher spiritual topics.

Abrahamic religions, on the other hand, expect people to make an enormous commitment right at the beginning, a commitment they do not understand and do not really know how to act on it on a daily basis.

Abrahamic religions are like enrolling an infant into kindergarden, grade school, highschool and college all at once, before the child even began attending to kindergarden.
So from the beginning on, the child already feels the pressure of being successful at college - even if that is still far away in the future, and all the requirements for it yet need to be fulfilled.

Although this perspective in Abrahamic religions is understandable - they have no notion of (serial) reincarnation, and are strictly limited to this one lifetime. With such an outlook, it indeed seems all or nothing, now or never.
With such an outlook, it is also easy to come to the point of presuming certainty about God.

(There is a parallel to this in those Western Buddhists who do not believe in reincarnation - they believe they will attain nirvana in this lifetime for sure, and it seems this also leads them to believe they have already attained it, even with very little practice and sins and impurities still in full bloom.)