Objective reality: How do we know it exists ?

[thinking]

actually I find your thinking far more ancient

since you cannot explain how oxygen exists but is not perceived

 

[glaucon]

actually I find your thinking far more ancient

since you cannot explain how oxygen exists but is not perceived

Are you Bishadi in disguise? I wonder this because it's obvious you cannot read.

I did not say that oxygen doesn't exist.

 

[thinking]

Originally Posted by thinking

why ? what does Hume say about a forest ?

look just think about this with Reason

does the forest exist no matter what we call this expanse of vegatation ?

I just can't think that you would walk into a forest and conclude it doesn't exist , it makes no sense ”

In brief, Hume is responsible for noting that inductively derived conclusions are always uncertain.

That is Reason.

esse est percipi

no this is not Reason or applied Reason

in the case of the forest I hardly think that Hume would be so confused as to think the forest doesn't exist

if he did then Hume is not someone I would quote

 

[Enmos]

lol

No.

I was trying to determine what you meant by your answer, as it could be interpreted in two ways...

Were you asserting that the objects of the environment we encounter are independent of the mind, and therefore that is how we define "objective"

Or, are you saying that given our experience of said environment, we call this to be "objective"?

Everything that is not construed by the mind is objective.
So that would be option one

 

[glaucon]

Everything that is not construed by the mind is objective.
So that would be option one

OK.
But then you're stuck back at the old empiricist/phenomenologist limit: as far as you can tell, everything is construed by the mind......

 

[wise acre]

OK.
But then you're stuck back at the old empiricist/phenomenologist limit: as far as you can tell, everything is construed by the mind......

And we certainly cannot describe anything that is not. What words would we use? How would we take out the 'taint' of perception and metaphor.

I think one of our big problems is that we rely so much on seeing....

Subject .............................Object
(air)​

So we think of the air in a sense as nothing. So there we are on the left and there's the thing on the right. So if I close my eyes the object is still there - and pretty much the same - on the other side of the air. LOL.'

We reimagine this set up from the side so to speak. And since it is visual we are confident we can do this without losing anything.

But in fact when we shift to 'objective' views of our subjective experience - iow when we look at it from the side - we are doing something

ENTIRELY DIFFERENT.

In fact what we call the object in that diagram is much more intimate with us. The moment we shift to the side an look at the tableau, we are making an error. If we could do this objectively, the object would not be the same at all, stripped as it would be of all sensory filtering and interpretation. Or perhaps rather than stripped it would have all these other ways of experiencing the object present - infrared, sonar, muliple vantages and so on.

It seems to me objectivity would have to be ALL possible experiencings.

 

[Enmos]

And we certainly cannot describe anything that is not. What words would we use? How would we take out the 'taint' of perception and metaphor.

Which is kind of the point.

I think one of our big problems is that we rely so much on seeing....

Subject .............................Object
(air)​

So we think of the air in a sense as nothing. So there we are on the left and there's the thing on the right. So if I close my eyes the object is still there - and pretty much the same - on the other side of the air. LOL.'

We reimagine this set up from the side so to speak. And since it is visual we are confident we can do this without losing anything.

But in fact when we shift to 'objective' views of our subjective experience - iow when we look at it from the side - we are doing something

ENTIRELY DIFFERENT.

In fact what we call the object in that diagram is much more intimate with us. The moment we shift to the side an look at the tableau, we are making an error. If we could do this objectively, the object would not be the same at all, stripped as it would be of all sensory filtering and interpretation. Or perhaps rather than stripped it would have all these other ways of experiencing the object present - infrared, sonar, muliple vantages and so on.

That's not how I imagine it. But the point should be made that one cannot imagine it as it really is.

It seems to me objectivity would have to be ALL possible experiencings.

It seems to me objectivity would have to be NO 'experiencings'.

 

[Enmos]

OK.
But then you're stuck back at the old empiricist/phenomenologist limit: as far as you can tell, everything is construed by the mind......

Solipsism.. ? :bugeye:
I challenge you to explain how solipsism can be true i.e. how it can be without an 'outside'.

 

[Billy T]

Solipsism...I challenge you to explain how solipsism can be true i.e. how it can be without an 'outside'.

I think the burden of proof is the other way: By definition, solipsism does not need an "outside." Is there any proof that there is an "outside"?
I assume there is, as most do, but that seems to be only an assumption without firm proof.
Bishop Berkeley, 300+ years ago argued there is no "outside" and in 300 years of trying, no one has found fault / error in his argument.

 

[glaucon]

Solipsism.. ? :bugeye:
I challenge you to explain how solipsism can be true i.e. how it can be without an 'outside'.

The good Billy T got to this before I did:

I think the burden of proof is the other way: By definition, solipsism does not need an "outside." Is there any proof that there is an "outside"?
I assume there is, as most do, but that seems to be only an assumption without firm proof.
Bishop Berkeley, 300+ years ago argued there is no "outside" and in 300 years of trying, no one has found fault / error in his argument.

Well said Billy, and quite correct.

Enmos, you seem to have misunderstood solipsism.
It's not strictly an ontological question, it's an epistemological one. Whether or not there is an 'outside' (or an 'inside', or either..) is wholly irrelevant. The point is that from a formal position, one can have little 'faith' in anything beyond that which is intimate.

 

[wise acre]

Which is kind of the point.

Of? (I wasn't disagreeing with Glaucon, if that's what you mean:

That's not how I imagine it. But the point should be made that one cannot imagine it as it really is.

I hoped that was implicit in what I wrote.

It seems to me objectivity would have to be NO 'experiencings'.

Which means basically, amongst other things, that we can never be objective nor can we describe things objectively.

So this leaves open the question what it means when we say it exists. What does this statement do? How can it be tested?

 

[glaucon]

...
So this leaves open the question what it means when we say it exists. What does this statement do? How can it be tested?

Very well put.
And you're completely correct: it is those two very questions that represent hope (if there is any at all...) of being able to (at least) make use of the very concept of objective reality.

This is exactly what I was insinuating here:

Correct ? You mean objectively ?

...
Or, are you saying that given our experience of said environment, we call this to be "objective"?

 

[wise acre]

Very well put.
And you're completely correct: it is those two very questions that represent hope (if there is any at all...) of being able to (at least) make use of the very concept of objective reality.

I thought of something amusing:

Objective reality = the sum totalt of all subjective experiences

But of course this is an objective that is wholly other than the one Enmos is talking about.

I wouldn't say I believe that formula, but I find in a pleasing thought.

An empiricist is, it seems to me, not so far away from that position. But he (usually) wants to organize and prioritize within that sum. And he is very fond of what seem like the same subjective experiences. (I realize the italisized term is redundant, but it does seem like something is missing if you only have one term)

 

[glaucon]

Again wise acre, I have to agree with all you say.

Just a few comments:

Objective reality = the sum totalt of all subjective experiences

Rather than amusing, this is what I think the case to be.

This is why I was stressing earlier the references made to how we define objective reality, and to what we call objective reality.

I think that the concept itself can only make sense in a semantic sense; what we choose to define objective reality as, is in fact it. So, in a sense, we generate objective reality in a stipulative manner, by cognitive consensus.

Now, none of this is to say that we all actively create reality 'with our minds'; I'm no Bishop Berkeley. I do not deny material reality (being a Materialist, that would be silly of me...), but it is to say that outside of a linguistic and conceptual scope, the term "objective reality" is nonsensical.

But of course this is an objective that is wholly other than the one Enmos is talking about.

I suspect you're correct.

An empiricist is, it seems to me, not so far away from that position. But he (usually) wants to organize and prioritize within that sum.

Good point.
It's this hierarchizing activity that (to me..) differentiates a pure empiricist from a pure phenomenologist (but that's another whole discussion...)

...
And he is very fond of what seem like the same subjective experiences. (I realize the italisized term is redundant, but it does seem like something is missing if you only have one term)

Right.
Again, it's that activity, that selection of commonalities, drawn from individual experiences, and recast and reduced into something new, something 'sanitized of subjective bias', that ultimately moves them right back to being a lot like old school Rationalism
(again, I go astray but: it is in that act of reification where the empiricist stops being an empiricist, and becomes a Rationalist; he begins from what he can experience, and then induces too far, beyond the scope of those experiences..).

I'm babbling now...

 

[wise acre]

Now, none of this is to say that we all actively create reality 'with our minds'; I'm no Bishop Berkeley. I do not deny material reality (being a Materialist, that would be silly of me...), but it is to say that outside of a linguistic and conceptual scope, the term "objective reality" is nonsensical.

I found this odd/interesting. If reality is the sum of all experiences, wouldn't the fundamental stuff be experience. And is this material? To be a materialist don't you have to be objective in the sense I was guessing Enmos was. Reifying out portions of experience and saying that these are the objects, out there.

My experience is not material-like. Even my experience of solid materials is a shifting ________________

and language gets problematic there.

 

[glaucon]

and language gets problematic there.

Yes, we're treading into murky waters. The language difficulties do tend to grow.

I found this odd/interesting. If reality is the sum of all experiences, wouldn't the fundamental stuff be experience.

Ahhh. But to say that is to presume that there is (ontologically..) a "fundamental stuff"... This would be an essentialist position, which I cannot abide (both logically and in the traditional sense). Why do you feel the need for there to be some 'essential' thing at all?

And is this material?

Material is the media within which (and by) we experience.

To be a materialist don't you have to be objective in the sense I was guessing Enmos was. Reifying out portions of experience and saying that these are the objects, out there.

I say no to the former, and yes to the latter.

So, not objective in Enmos' sense (because on epistemological grounds we cannot..), but from a purely pragmatic consideration, supported by the undeniable utility of inductive theorization (a la SM), it behooves us to behave such that yes, there are things 'out there' (but.. only those things we allow into our TOR, granted access by fit via our inductive systems).

 

[wise acre]

Ahhh. But to say that is to presume that there is (ontologically..) a "fundamental stuff"... This would be an essentialist position, which I cannot abide (both logically and in the traditional sense). Why do you feel the need for there to be some 'essential' thing at all?

I actually felt you raised the issue with the self-label 'materialist'.

Material is the media within which (and by) we experience.

To me that sounds like objective speak. You have posited something which is not experience which we experience and called it matter.

I say no to the former, and yes to the latter.

So, not objective in Enmos' sense (because on epistemological grounds we cannot..), but from a purely pragmatic consideration, supported by the undeniable utility of inductive theorization (a la SM), it behooves us to behave such that yes, there are things 'out there' (but.. only those things we allow into our TOR, granted access by fit via our inductive systems)

.

But why reify. I mean I can see the use of reifying 'objects'. But why imply an essential substance. Can't you avoid that since you seem biased against such things?

Materialism seems very heavily to indicate WHAT reality is made of? Even your use of 'within' above seems a call to talking about what is outside? Do we need to? And why material? Why not energiism? Fieldism? Tensionsim? Dynamism? Fluctuationism?

And yes, I realize that energy is included in the material in Materialism, but it seems a vastly less reifiable term to me. I feel it also matches experience better.

 

[Enmos]

Of? (I wasn't disagreeing with Glaucon, if that's what you mean:

No, I didn't mean that. It's just that you pointed out the obvious.

I hoped that was implicit in what I wrote.

Yup, I was agreeing.

Which means basically, amongst other things, that we can never be objective nor can we describe things objectively.

True.

So this leaves open the question what it means when we say it exists. What does this statement do? How can it be tested?

That depends on what you accept as valid test results.
The point of this thread was not to describe objective reality to begin with. See OP.

 

[Enmos]

I think the burden of proof is the other way: By definition, solipsism does not need an "outside." Is there any proof that there is an "outside"?
I assume there is, as most do, but that seems to be only an assumption without firm proof.
Bishop Berkeley, 300+ years ago argued there is no "outside" and in 300 years of trying, no one has found fault / error in his argument.

Enmos, you seem to have misunderstood solipsism.
It's not strictly an ontological question, it's an epistemological one. Whether or not there is an 'outside' (or an 'inside', or either..) is wholly irrelevant. The point is that from a formal position, one can have little 'faith' in anything beyond that which is intimate.

I disagree. The burden of proof is on those that claim solipsism, just like the burden of proof is on those that claim god exists.
And Glaucon, I can't fathom why you said that it's irrelevant whether or not there is an 'outside'.

 

[wise acre]

That depends on what you accept as valid test results.
The point of this thread was not to describe objective reality to begin with. See OP.

yes, I know that. But I'll bet you can think of the parallel. You are positing the existence of something that cannot be tested. IOW no test can show 'it' is there, since any test still leaves open the question. All tests will simply provide more repeatable phenomena, they cannot disprove solipsism.
So you have something
transcendent,
undescribable
and which cannot be confirmed by testing.

Sound familiar?

I am not saying solipsism is correct, by the way.