Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

You have. You have denied the existence of the capabilities involved, for example. You called them "illusions".
Not the process, the freedom. This has been explained to you, and others, repeatedly. Yet you seem to see the word "illusion" and run amok with it.
Yes, it is. That is where the degrees of freedom are involved, where the willed behavior is chosen, and so forth.
That is indeed where the flexibility is, but there is no freedom within it - and the issue is whether there is freedom in that process, not whether the process exists or not. So no, the issue is not with the process but with the nature of the freedom within that process.
You were being willfully stupid, and denying things in front of you. I did not, for example, post the act of stopping as the example - that was you,
Mwa ha ha ha!! Seriously? After all the countless times you have tried to use that example you are now saying that I was the one who posted it? Oh, wow, you just get funnier each day! Search for "traffic light" in the search function above and see who first used it in these threads.
moving the timeline to cover your avoidance of the central issue. ("A driver approaches a traffic light - - - - " You guys have never - not once - dealt with that situation. You have always changed some key detail, screwed up the basics).
That situation has been dealt with over and over again. No key detail was changed, although key details were identified that you perhaps missed. No basics were screwed with.
And you accuse me of denying things in front of me! Oh, the irony!
It most certainly does not. It begs the central questions and avoids the main issues of nonsupernatural freedom.
There is zero question begging, as explained to you many times, and as you yourself have amply demonstrated each time you have tried to show it as an assumption and failed (other than with your dishonest reformulation).
The only freedom it points to as lacking is supernatural freedom - the decider not doing what it "must" do, the decider doing something different in exactly the same circumstances, etc. Unfortunately, that is your definition of freedom itself, your assumption of the nature of "genuine" or "actual" freedom - that supernatural ability.
I haven't defined anything as supernatural. It certainly is concluded as not possible in a deterministic universe. But I guess if I define "freedom" to be something else, maybe we can get comfortable that it indeed exists. Shall we do that? Oh, wait, you already have.
Just a pity that I don't see any freedom in your definition. And just as you say that the definition originally used was not granted, yours certainly isn't. Deal with it and move on. If you want to discuss your notion, go for it. Noone is stopping you.
You choose to argue against the weakest presentation. And you mistake the nature of QQ's proposals, accordingly.
No, I try to treat his words as he intends them, and debate him on that.
(In your derision you also miss the fact that his side comments are occasionally telling - for example, that your relegation of observation to "illusion" relegates the observer as well, and all their "conclusions" and "determinism", thereby obviating your entire argument and viewpoint at one stroke. I made that same observation, back a ways - used a metaphor: snake eating its tail.)
So despite I, and others, clarifying again and again and again, what we mean by "illusion" in this context (i.e. along the lines of appearing to work contrary to the impossible), you (and others) continue to use it differently. So while I and others consider the freedom in our free will to be illusory (because it appears to offer the freedom that is concluded as being impossible in a deterministic universe) such things as the observer, conclusions, determinism, are not illusions. There is no appearance of what has been concluded as impossible. That is why QQ's comments to Baldeee in that regard are simply wrong, and nothing more than an exercise in avoidance.
For you to also argue the same, despite the numerous explanations of the use of the word in context, shows how little you have actually been paying attention to the conversation over the various threads.
Discussing QQ's theory is what I'm doing - starting with putting it on more solid conceptual footing. He - like you - assumes that freedom by definition cannot exist in a deterministic universe, that obedience to natural law precludes freedom. As with the naive materialists generally, that assumption screws up his arguments from the gitgo; in his case, his attempts to find a loophole via the "self" - because of that assumption he has to separate that self from the universe to find freedom in it, and he has no clear way of doing that.

But you don't have to accept that confused framing and vocabulary, simply for the advantage it gives you in argument - you could consider his points from a stronger basis.
I could consider them to be about who will win the upcoming Rugby World Cup, but that would be as fallacious. As said, I will wait for QQ to actually explain his theory, his position, his arguments, in a manner that I can understand and that makes sense to me. Until then, if I see a contradiction I will raise it with him. If I think he has misunderstood something, I will tell him. If I think he has muddled his thinking, I will point that out. If his house is built on quicksand, it is not for me to insist he move it to a place he might not want it to be. It is up to him to recognise on what he has built his house and to move it. Maybe for him it is not quicksand. Maybe it is just a thin layer of shifting sands but sound bedrock underneath, and he actually knows what he's talking about. But to tell him what he should be thinking, how he should be formulating what he is trying to get across? No, you're not here to discuss with QQ.
 
Well, time to learn something.
I look forward to it. Only you've offered nothing thus far. And you've simply been wrong, and dishonestly so on occasion.
The definition is assumed. It is a premise. And it excludes freedom from a deterministic universe, which we have also assumed.
The exclusion is only concluded, not assumed. Even you have failed (your dishonest attempt aside) to go from the two premises to the exclusion without reaching it as a conclusion. If one defines Socrates as a human, and all humans to be mortal, surely that is also simply defining Socrates as a mortal, right? And thus to conclude that Socrates is a mortal is simple question-begging, right? In fact, every single valid argument, according to you, would be question begging, because the conclusion will be within the premises.
Three threads I've had to endure your pointless fallacious prattle about this. Three threads. And you accuse me of being obsessed!
We assumed no supernatural actions, nothing doing other than it must.
Once again, you can only conclude that to do other than one must is supernatural once you have concluded that within the universe in question it is impossible to do other than one must. So no, we have not assumed no supernatural actions. What is it about this most basic of logical syllogism baffles you so, that you confuse conclusion for assumption.
You defined freedom as doing other than one must. Hello?
And Socrates was defined as human. Hello!
So your "conclusion" (not the one you actually arrived at, the one visible to readers, but your present assertion of what you meant) was assumed from the beginning.
OMG! You now accept that the conclusion was arrived at. That it has been visible to readers from the get go. Including you. And STILL you accuse me of assuming it. WTF is wrong with you? For you to keep insisting that the conclusion was assumed within the definition is, given that you have here openly admitted that it is actually a conclusion and that you knew this from the outset, just simply gobsmacking in how dishonest you have been.
But hey, for someone who must think it question begging to conclude that Socrates is mortal, maybe it is just stupidity on your part. But stupidity that has steamrollered through three threads.
It doesn't become a conclusion by being combined with another premise. It remains an assumption.
The definition, yes, but the conclusion that it is impossible remains the conclusion. In and of itself that definition of freedom is not impossible. In a deterministic universe it is impossible, as concluded. In a universe in which there is no "must" it is not, for example. So FFS enough of your bs already! Go argue with someone else about how one question begs that Socrates is mortal! Because that's what you're doing. That's what you've openly admitted you're doing given that you've admitted that it was a conclusion arrived at, and a conclusion visible to all readers from the get go.
Only the conclusion is a conclusion. Go back and read your arguments, or Baldee's clearer explication. Your conclusions are about determinism, the implications for freedom you then assume (later) to have been "concluded", automatically, without argument - yet more evidence of the role that assumption plays in naive materialism, if any were needed.
There is argument. I suggest you go back and read them. The logic of it was accepted rather early on, and given that we have since been talking about deterministic universe almost exclusively, and it had been concluded from such an early point that such freedom was impossible within a deterministic universe... well, you get the picture, I'm sure.
You never - nowhere, not once - justify, argue for, or even notice as an issue, your definition of freedom as a supernatural ability, your supernatural assumption.
Two reasons: 1. the definition is neutral with regard whether it exists or not. It is only when coupled with a deterministic universe that one can conclude that it doesn't exist in such. So there is no reason to justify the definition as a supernatural ability, because it in and of itself is not. 2. the supernatural doesn't exist! Why identify something that doesn't exist as being supernatural? The freedom, as defined, is concluded as not existing, and that is as far as one needs to go. If it is concluded that it doesn't exist then it doesn't exist.
But you then bring up that we're saying it is therefore supernatural. This whole issue of the supernatural is nothing but an utter red-herring you have perpetrated in each thread.
 
Two reasons: 1. the definition is neutral with regard whether it exists or not.
It is not neutral with regard to whether freedom is supernatural. It directly defines freedom to be supernatural. That is the supernatural assumption. It is not granted. It's a bad, unworkable, medieval presumption.
Once again, you can only conclude that to do other than one must is supernatural once you have concluded that within the universe in question it is impossible to do other than one must.
There is another way: you can assume that within the universe in question it is impossible to do other than one must. That's what everybody here did - including you.
We have all explicitly assumed your definition of a deterministic universe, remember? Your definition of a deterministic universe is an assumption of every post in this thread by everyone.
So no, we have not assumed no supernatural actions.
Yes, we have. You and everybody. It's your definition of a deterministic universe that we agreed to assume.
For you to keep insisting that the conclusion was assumed within the definition is, given that you have here openly admitted that it is actually a conclusion and that you knew this from the outset, just simply gobsmacking in how dishonest you have been.
Pointing to your assumptions is dishonesty?
OMG! You now accept that the conclusion was arrived at.
? I was gently - sort of - mocking you for obliviously "arriving at" a conclusion you had first built into your definitions and assumptions.
WTF is wrong with you?
Apparently, I'm being too polite to people who can't read English or follow simple arguments - it just confuses them.
I will try to be more clear, in the future.
Mwa ha ha ha!! Seriously? After all the countless times you have tried to use that example you are now saying that I was the one who posted it? Oh, wow, you just get funnier each day! Search for "traffic light" in the search function above and see who first used it in these threads.
My example was clearly posted.
Your various attempts to change it, in every single response to it you posted

- from a driver approaching a light of unknown color to a driver stopping at a red light, for example above, which you are apparently too fucking stupid to even notice is a major change involving the central issue -

are all documented.

You have never - not once, anywhere - dealt with that example as posted. Neither has Baldee, Write, or any of the naive materialist cadre here.
(And bizarre as this sounds, we are gradually being forced to recognize that this may be because they simply don't comprehend it. It doesn't register. The issues involved are invisible to them. They don't know what it's an example of, or why it was posted. The supernatural assumption has shorted their brains somehow. I did try to make things simple, but responses like this comical knot-jamming keep showing up - this is just lately, dozens of posts and three threads in, and look at it:
The freedom, as defined, is concluded as not existing
Whatever the roots of that comedy, they aren't in having followed the argument or considered the examples. You appear to have forgotten even which assumption you don't want to admit having made (hint: it wasn't nonexistence of freedom).
The definition, yes, but the conclusion that it is impossible remains the conclusion.
Built into the definition - which we did not agree to, which was not granted, and which was and remains a central undecided issue.
That form of argument is called "assuming the consequent", and it is a logical fallacy.
That approach - pretending to settle an argument by reframing it, defining the terms to suit yourself - is essentially political.
In and of itself that definition of freedom is not impossible.
You have posted that deflection several times. Do you remember the routine correction?

Here it is again: Freedom is supernatural only - by definition, by assumption - in your posts. You make that assumption.
Meanwhile, in all the arguments here, your definition of a deterministic universe has also been assumed.

So you have made two assumptions, in your argument: that freedom is supernatural only, and that nothing supernatural exists. The second was granted, the first is a central issue of debate and argument on this thread.
If one defines Socrates as a human, and all humans to be mortal, surely that is also simply defining Socrates as a mortal, right? And thus to conclude that Socrates is a mortal is simple question-begging, right?
If the question at hand were whether or not all men are mortal, or whether Socrates was a man, then yes - of course, that argument would beg the question. Just as yours does here.
" You have. You have denied the existence of the capabilities involved, for example. You called them "illusions". "
Not the process, the freedom. This has been explained to you, and others, repeatedly.
Not the process or the freedom, in that sentence: the capabilities.
It's a short sentence, and "capabilities" was the only object noun in it. You can't have missed it.
The contents of my posts are not interchangeable with whatever screwed up shit pops into your head. When I point out that you have also denied the entire process on occasion, and you have most diligently and repeatedly denied the freedom involved, I will use those terms - count on it.
Remember the situation you have yet to address: "The driver approaches a traffic light- - - - "
It overlaps QQ's aberrant "self determination" setup. Consider the driver as a "self", and what the driver determines as the effects of what they do - to their self or anything else in the universe.
 
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No, it is impossible because we have stipulated that we are discussing a deterministic universe. Within that universe it is impossible to have freedom as defined. You even agreed to that!
And so you chose to argue against the weak presentation, in which QQ not only used aberrant and confusing definitions of terms such as "self-determination" but (crucially) agreed to accept the supernatural assumption, the "definition" of freedom you use as a logical premise: that freedom in a deterministic universe means - by definition - the ability to contravene natural law, break the causal chain, do other than what one must do. (Notice that QQ - who has made the same assumption - thinks that Sarkus has not posted any clear definition of freedom. That assumption seems to be lethal to reason).

Freedom is thereby defined/assumed to be supernatural, only, by QQ and you, and since we have assumed the supernatural does not exist (we assumed a deterministic universe) the bogus "conclusion" follows.

The stronger form, in which QQ's observation of the ability of the universe to produce a "self" that includes self-referential determinations of event makes the degrees of freedom possessed by such an entity significant, you simply and arbitrarily ignore.
If it is defined so as not to be contradictory to how the universe works then it no problem. If it is contradictory then it does not exist.
It is observed, along with how it works. Adjust your definitions/assumptions accordingly, in a science based forum.
Two reasons: 1. the definition is neutral with regard whether it exists or not. It is only when coupled with a deterministic universe that one can conclude that it doesn't exist in such
Your definition is not neutral with respect to whether freedom is supernatural. It directly defines it to be supernatural.
 
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At this point in the "debate" with Sarkus, I must congratulate iceaura, both for his persistence and patience in trying to get a simple point about "freedom" through to Sarkus through carefully pointing out every time that Sarkus imports his supernatural assumption about freeedom into the argument. I think my own patience in trying to get the point across is almost exhausted, which is why I'm not participating in the discussion as much.

Here's Sarkus's argument, in a nutshell:

1. Free will is impossible if the universe is deterministic.
2. The universe is deterministic.
3. Therefore, free will does not exist.

That's all that we've had from Sarkus and Baldeee on the topic of free will, once you boil it all down.

Now, Sarkus has spent most of his time in this thread complaining that his conclusion (3) is not an "assumption" but a real conclusion. This is the case, he insists, because he requires the two premises (1) and (2), and not merely premise (1). And he's right in this purely logical sense.

Given this, then, we might well ask what all the back and forth argument is all about. It's all cut and dried, isn't it? All we need is Sarkus' simple syllogism, set out above, and that wraps it up for free will.

iceaura, myself, Sarkus and Baldeee have all agreed to accept premise (2) above, from the start of our discussions on the topic of free will. It is important to point out that at no time has iceaura or myself ever shifted from the position that we accept premise (2). It therefore strikes me as very strange indeed that Sarkus has spent so much time trying to hammer home the truth of premise (2), even though that has never been questioned.

The point of contention in the discussion is all with premise (1). It is in that premise that what iceaura has been referring to as Sarkus's "supernatural assumption" lies.

Sure, if we assume premise (1), and we all agree on premise (2), then we can trivially arrive at point (3) as a "conclusion". We can also agree about Sarkus's technical point that the conclusion (3) is not in itself an assumption, but a conclusion drawn from premises 1 and 2, as a matter of logical deduction.

I would suggest at this point that we no longer need to waste time debating whether the conclusion (3) is an "assumption" or "conclusion". We can all agree, I am sure, that in the trivial sense (3) is a conclusion that logically follows from (1) and (2).

What we need to unpack is the real point of contention, which is premise (1). That premise is indisputably an assumption - an axiom - in the above syllogism. But what reasoning - if any - leads Sarkus and Baldeee to postulate premise (1) as axiomatic in the first place?

It must hinge, first of all, on what is meant by "free will". Let me try to set out what I assume the reasoning is to justify Sarkus's premise 1, then:

1*. The will is free if and only if it acts in a non-deterministic manner.
2*. If the universe is deterministic, then the will cannot act in a non-deterministic manner.
1. Therefore free will is impossible if the universe is deterministic.

I suspect we can all agree that this syllogism is logically valid in construction. Sarkus and Baldeee have also, in effect, spent a lot of words in the various discussions insisting that assumption 2* is reasonable. And, once again, I note that premise 2* has been accepted by iceaura and myself from the start of our discussions.

So, again, we ought to be able to short-cut the discussion and take one further step back, to consider how Sarkus and Baldee justify premise 1*.

This might be repetitive, but let's be clear. I think we all agree on the following:
1**. If a process follows the laws of physics (science), it is deterministic.
2**. The human will follows the laws of physics.
3**. Therefore, the human will is deterministic.

So we have:
1*. The will is free if and only if it acts in a non-deterministic manner.
1*': The will is not free if it acts in a deterministic manner. [Follows from 1*]
3**. The will acts in deterministic manner.
3*** Therefore, the will is not free.

This, I believe, is a fair summary of Sarkus's and Baldeee's argument against free will, such as it is. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

The real point of contention is premise 1*', i.e. the assumption (and it is an assumption) that the will is not free if it is deterministic.

iceaura and I hold that premise 1* is a mistake. The problem is not the "if", but the "only if" part of the premise. The "only if" part is the supernatural assumption, focussed down and isolated from the rest of the argument (which we all agree on, I hope).

Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that premise 1* is true. If that is the case, then it follows that the only way the will can be free is if it can act non-deterministically. But if we accept 1**, above, then the only way the will can act non-deterministically is if 2** is false; otherwise we are forced to the conclusion 3** and therefore inevitably 3***.

But 2** being false means the will doesn't follow the laws of physics. In that case the will is supernatural, where by "supernatural" we mean "not in accordance with the laws of physics".

Thus we see that premise 1* - that the will is only free if it is non-deterministic - is equivalent to the assumption that the will can only be free if it is supernatural.

Note well that premise 1* remains an assumption that must be justified. Sarkus's and Baldeee's argument against free will stands or falls on this assumption. Without it, the conclusion 3*** is not sustainable.

So Sarkus and Baldeee now have their work clearly set out. Their argument will be persuasive if and only if they can show if that the will can only be free if it is supernatural. To do this, they must persuade us that there is no room for any "natural" freedom of the will. More specifically, they need to show that there is no room for a deterministic "freedom".

iceaura, from the start, has been arguing that there is a lot of wiggle room available for "natural" (i.e. deterministic) freedom of the will. He has given clear examples of circumstances in which such natural freedom is apparent.

During the discussions, Sarkus (at least) has said that the natural freedom in iceaura's examples is an "illusion". It is important to realise that it is not sufficient to argue that this kind of freedom is illusory because it is deterministic. That is just a re-statement of premise 1*, which is the point that Sarkus and Baldeee need to establish.

The task is clear. Let's see if Sarkus and/or Baldeee can advance their argument. Let's see if they can avoid wasting more time arguing about premises that have already been accepted by their opponents.
 
So Sarkus and Baldeee now have their work clearly set out. Their argument will be persuasive if and only if they can show if that the will can only be free if it is supernatural. To do this, they must persuade us that there is no room for any "natural" freedom of the will. More specifically, they need to show that there is no room for a deterministic "freedom".
well stated...
 
At this point in the "debate" with Sarkus, I must congratulate iceaura, both for his persistence and patience in trying to get a simple point about "freedom" through to Sarkus through carefully pointing out every time that Sarkus imports his supernatural assumption about freeedom into the argument.
At this point in the “debate” I am surprised that anyone other than Iceaura can be blinkered enough to still think it is an assumption, despite demonstrably being a conclusion (unless one dishonestly reformulates the argument, of course).
I think my own patience in trying to get the point across is almost exhausted, which is why I'm not participating in the discussion as much.
Fallacious argument, but thanks. Your willing or otherwise, your claimed lack of patience, is irrelevant. And if you claim it is not intended as an argument, then why post it. Appeal to emotion, perhaps? Clearly, if you’ve lost patience then you must be right, I guess?
Here's Sarkus's argument, in a nutshell:

1. Free will is impossible if the universe is deterministic.
2. The universe is deterministic.
3. Therefore, free will does not exist.

That's all that we've had from Sarkus and Baldeee on the topic of free will, once you boil it all down.
You mean once you ignore everything else they have said,

Now, Sarkus has spent most of his time in this thread complaining that his conclusion (3) is not an "assumption" but a real conclusion. This is the case, he insists, because he requires the two premises (1) and (2), and not merely premise (1). And he's right in this purely logical sense.[/quote]While that is my conclusion, it is not my argument. Or at least not in its entirety. You see, I never started with (1) as the premise. That is your mistake. It is iceaura’s mistake, the one he has repeated ad infinitum it seems (other than when reformulating the syllogism entirely).
iceaura, myself, Sarkus and Baldeee have all agreed to accept premise (2) above, from the start of our discussions on the topic of free will. It is important to point out that at no time has iceaura or myself ever shifted from the position that we accept premise (2). It therefore strikes me as very strange indeed that Sarkus has spent so much time trying to hammer home the truth of premise (2), even though that has never been questioned.
Try reading the thread, JamesR, rather than what you think are the highlights. I have been stressing not the truth of premise (2) (because it is not true) but merely that it is the premise, and only in situations when it is apparent that one is trying to assert something else. For example when QQ is trying to sneak in indeterminism.
The point of contention in the discussion is all with premise (1). It is in that premise that what iceaura has been referring to as Sarkus's "supernatural assumption" lies.
...
What we need to unpack is the real point of contention, which is premise (1). That premise is indisputably an assumption - an axiom - in the above syllogism.
Yet since you are dishonestly analysing an argument that is not mine (you have simplified it so as to wrap up a previous argument into your premise (1)) it is not surprising you are reaching the conclusion you want to reach.
Premise (1) as you call it is a conclusion that stems from the definition of freedom and the nature of determinism. To thus wrap that up as a premise, and to think it is considered an axiom of all things, is simply deliberately fallacious on your part.
But what reasoning - if any - leads Sarkus and Baldeee to postulate premise (1) as axiomatic in the first place?
None. Neither of us consider it axiomatic (although I hope I am not doing Baldeee a disservice by saying as much on his behalf).
It must hinge, first of all, on what is meant by "free will". Let me try to set out what I assume the reasoning is to justify Sarkus's premise 1, then:

This, I believe, is a fair summary of Sarkus's and Baldeee's argument against free will, such as it is. Please correct me if I'm wrong.[/quote]Sure, you are wrong. Correct in parts, though. It actually all stems from the definition of freedom: along the lines of “ability to do otherwise”. And from the nature of determinism, where it can be shown that there is no such ability to do otherwise, hence predetermination etc. If you want me to unpack how determinism does not allow the ability to do otherwise then let me know, but that much I would hope should be accepted with minimal fuss?
So:
P1: Freedom is the ability to do otherwise
P2: A deterministic system does not allow the ability to do otherwise
C: A deterministic system is not free

See, the issue is not whether the process of freewill exists. It does. It is a question of whether that process is free.
And if we assume that the will is a deterministic system then from C above...

I have also been quite clear that if one takes another notion of freedom then one can reach different conclusions. Presumably you are omitting that from your analysis?
The real point of contention is premise 1*', i.e. the assumption (and it is an assumption) that the will is not free if it is deterministic.
No, it is most definitely a conclusion, one that stems from the definition of “free” and the nature of determinism within a system. As per above.
The definition of freedom assumed does not preclude its actual existence. So one can not say, as iceaura (and you) constantly bleats, that is to assume the supernatural. It is only when coupled with the second premise (deterministic system) that one can conclude that it does not exist within such a system.
It is only when you, as you have done here, wrap up that conclusion into a following argument, and assume that to be the starting point, can one claim it to be an assumption. But that is, as clearly demonstrated here, wrong.
iceaura and I hold that premise 1* is a mistake. The problem is not the "if", but the "only if" part of the premise. The "only if" part is the supernatural assumption, focussed down and isolated from the rest of the argument (which we all agree on, I hope).
Alas your comments now are losing any relevance, based as they are on your incorrect analysis.
The argument is actually over the definition of “free” being used. Iceaura has claimed it to be assuming the supernatural, I disagree. And as can be seen above, I am right: it is only when combining the definition used with the nature of determinism can one assess whether something can be “free” (as defined) or not.
Of course, given that you are mixing and merging arguments it’s easy to make conclusions from one into assumptions of another, and then decry them for being assumptions.

Hopefully this will put to rest the rather ruinous focus on the fallacious claim of “assuming the supernatural”. Somehow I doubt it will.

... (to be cont’d)
 
... part 2

iceaura, from the start, has been arguing that there is a lot of wiggle room available for "natural" (i.e. deterministic) freedom of the will. He has given clear examples of circumstances in which such natural freedom is apparent.
He has provided examples of a process at work. A process no one disputes. He has, at no stage, provided any notion of freedom within that process that is not also within a thermostat (which Baldeee, then I, badged as being a trivial notion of freedom as a result). And all he has offered by way of differentiation between the nature of freedom between the will and the thermostat is an appeal to complexity.
Despite your lengthy yet inaccurate analysis, the argument has always been about what it means to be “free”. And while iceaura (or others) simply bleats about the notion used “assuming supernatural freedom” the discussion with him will get nowhere. He has offered “degrees of freedom” as an alternative, which, as stated, leaves a thermostat being “free”, but crucially it is still unable to do otherwise.
But from the outset I have maintained that a different notion of “free” will get you to a different conclusion. So you trying to claim a higher ground for iceaura because he has offered a different notion and reached a different conclusion does bring a smile to my face.
During the discussions, Sarkus (at least) has said that the natural freedom in iceaura's examples is an "illusion". It is important to realise that it is not sufficient to argue that this kind of freedom is illusory because it is deterministic. That is just a re-statement of premise 1*, which is the point that Sarkus and Baldeee need to establish.
And since your 1* is not an assumption either of us have made... your analysis needs revisiting.
It is “illusory” because it appears to offer something (an ability to do otherwise) that has been concluded to be impossible in a deterministic universe. Just as a magician’s trick is an illusion when it appears to defy physics.
No, we need to establish nothing. The logic speaks for itself. It is not illusory as a process. It is not illusory if one takes the notion of “free” that iceaura is using. It is “illusory” with regard the “free” as defined in the original argument that Baldeee put forth, and that he and I, and others, are considering, the notion that “free” is the ability to do otherwise.
The task is clear. Let's see if Sarkus and/or Baldeee can advance their argument. Let's see if they can avoid wasting more time arguing about premises that have already been accepted by their opponents.
No one is arguing about premises that everyone accepts. Only when the opponent appears to be wandering away from what has been accepted will those premises be reminded to them. Sometimes it is necessary to show how something they have said goes against a logical implication of one of those accepted assumptions. If you see that as wasting time, so be it. But maybe this discussion can progress without need to mention those accepted premises if everyone can abide by those premises and the logical consequences of them.

There is also no need to advance my (or Baldeee’s) argument. It is what it is. The position is clear. The flag is in the ground. It remains despite fallacious arguments to the contrary, it remains despite accusations that it assumes a supernatural freedom, it remains despite everything thrown at it thus far. Maybe the rebuttals against it can instead advance?

Alternatively, and here’s an idea I haven’t offered at least a dozen times before: maybe if people want to discuss a different notion of freedom they do just that, and stop trying to attack a position that doesn’t use that different notion. Splendid would that be, eh? People not fallaciously arguing against a position they don’t seem to want to continue discussing, and moving on to a notion they do. But instead we just get repeated claims of “supernatural assumption” and nothing new.

But on a side point, why are you, as iceaura has done beforehand, using QQ’s thread to continue a discussion that is better suited to the two previous threads on the matter? Being a moderator, are you not effectively telling QQ that the focus of the thread is no longer important compared to you and iceaura continuing your fallacious claims?
 
Neither of us consider it axiomatic (although I hope I am not doing Baldeee a disservice by saying as much on his behalf).
No disservice noted here.
I think your entire post/s is pretty much spot on.
Saves me having to rip it apart as well.

As you say, the issue has always been one of the definition of “freedom”, as “ability to do otherwise/ other than what one must” or words to that effect.
This definition in itself is not an assumption of the supernatural.
As you rightly point out, it is only when an additional premise is brought in with regard the nature of the universe can one say that in such a universe that notion of freedom does not exist.
A conclusion, quite clearly.
Yet even on the question of the definition I originally began with, examples were subsequently given that were claimed to show just such an ability, which suggested all the while that the definition had been accepted.
However, when issues such as predetermination or counterfactuals where raised to highlight how the “ability” was actually no such thing and merely an appearance/illusion of the ability, and that what were they were talking about was no different than the freedom seen in a thermostat (able to switch on or off), well, I think it was clear we lost most of the room.
Ah, well.
As you highlight, it is odd that rather than simply go to another room to discuss what they want to, they keep popping in to have another go with the same already-rebutted arguments, and the same old “supernatural assumption” malarkey, irrespective of which thread it is.
Easier, at that point, to simply ignore.
You should give it a go, although I admire your persistence and patience in the matter in clearly explaining to them their mistakes and how their reasoning is fallacious.
I also find it humorous that it is expected of us to “advance their [our] argument”. :)
Toward what, exactly?
A position we don’t hold? ;)
 
Certainly you can. You don't need an ignore list built into the software in order to ignore somebody's posts.
so true and unfortunately we are seeing a lot of it in this thread...
More specifically, they need to show that there is no room for a deterministic "freedom".

is the bit of reasoning they are unable to deal with unfortunately.. not for our benefit but for theirs..for their own edification.
 
You can't ignore a site administrator...
Why would I do that?
I thought James post was pretty strong. Very close to the mark.
It doesn’t surprise me that you do think that.
Unfortunately it starts from incorrect beginnings, and as a result the bulk of it ends up pretty irrelevant.
See Sarkus’ reply to it.
(There are a couple of places his [quoting] goes awry slightly, but it is clear enough.)
 
Sarkus:

P1: Freedom is the ability to do otherwise
P2: A deterministic system does not allow the ability to do otherwise
C: A deterministic system is not free
Clearly we need to unpack "the ability to do otherwise".

As the driver of a car approaches a traffic light, the light might be green or red. Before seeing the colour of the light, the driver has not decided (chosen) whether he will stop or go through the lights. Upon seeing the light, he makes a choice: stop or go through.

Let's suppose he is a law-abiding citizen, who chooses to stop when he sees red and go when he sees green. Notice, first, that the driver is not a thermostat. He makes a willed choice to hit the brake pedal, or not. If he makes no choice, then he is not carrying out an act of will at all and the question of free will becomes irrelevant, as it is in the case of the thermostat. Our question is not whether two outcomes are possible (stop or go, switch on the heater or switch it off). We all agree on that. The question is whether a willed outcome is free or not.

So, the driver is approaching the light, but hasn't seen its colour yet. At this point in time it is possible that he will choose to stop, or that he will choose to go through the lights, depending on what colour the light is when he sees it.

We observe as a matter of experience that drivers, in the typical course of events, are able to either stop or go through the lights. They also report that their actions in stopping or going through are actions that they choose.

At the moment of decision, then, does the driver have the "ability to do otherwise"? If not, then it would seem that he will have no choice but to stop (say), even if the light turns out to be green when he sees it. If he has no ability to do otherwise just before he makes his choice, then it becomes meaningless to say something like "The driver might stop, or he might go through, depending on whether the light is red or green." Why would people use such language if the "ability to do otherwise" was not present and in active play at the relevant time?

Suppose that the light is red and the driver stops the car. Would it mean anything for the driver then to say "If the light had been green rather than red, then I wouldn't have chosen to stop?" If there really was no ability to do otherwise at the point of decision, such an utterance by the driver would be nonsensical, not to mention superfluous.

Your argument, of course, is that because the universe is deterministic (by assumption), the light was always going to be red, and the driver was always going to stop, and therefore the driver never had the "ability to do otherwise". But there's an unstated assumption in that statement, and it infests your entire argument about "ability to do otherwise".

The assumption is, of course, the supernatural assumption. As the driver approaches the light, at the point of choosing, we ask the question: what would it take for the driver to have the "ability to do otherwise" - i.e. what would be necessary to create in the driver the ability to choose the opposite to what he in fact chooses?

I answer this question as follows: the driver, before seeing the colour of the light, already has the ability to do otherwise. Before he sees the light, he doesn't know whether he will choose to stop or to go. So, he has the ability to do either. The fact that there is only one outcome in the end is largely irrelevant - it's just a causal consequence of making the particular choice he decides to make.

Your answer, on the other hand, is that before seeing the light, the only way the driver could have "the ability to do otherwise" would be if the driver somehow acquired the supernatural ability to break the laws of physics and thereby change the colour of the light from red to green, along with the corresponding choice that he is about to make.

So your argument:

P1: Freedom is the ability to do otherwise
translates as "Freedom is the supernatural ability to break the laws of physics"

P2: A deterministic system does not allow the ability to do otherwise
"A deterministic system does not allow anybody to break the laws of physics"

C: A deterministic system is not free
"Therefore, a deterministic system (e.g. the will) is not free"

This is precisely equivalent to my earlier summary of the sticking point in your argument, as:

1*. The will is free if and only if it acts in a non-deterministic manner.

My version simply wraps up your version of the argument into one statement, but in both cases the supernatural assumption is there as a premise, that assumption being that the only way the will can be "free" is if it is supernatural.

The rest is detail, which I'll get to in the next post.

Suffice it to say that you can deny your supernatural assumption all you want, but it's built into your argument against free will every way you set it out.
 
(continued....)

Sarkus:

I have also been quite clear that if one takes another notion of freedom then one can reach different conclusions. Presumably you are omitting that from your analysis?
No. It is central to my analysis. If you define freedom as meaning one must act supernaturally, then in a world bound by natural law there can be no freedom.

It's not your reasoning that's wrong. It's your assumptions.

You've identified exactly what problem is: what you need is "another notion of freedom". Work out what that is and you might make progress on the subject of free will. As things stand, you're stuck in the rut of thinking that free will must be some weird "illusion" because you assume it's incompatible with the laws of physics, essentially. Refusing to let go of that view puts blinkers on you to the extent that the idea of true free will makes no sense.

The definition of freedom assumed does not preclude its actual existence. So one can not say, as iceaura (and you) constantly bleats, that is to assume the supernatural. It is only when coupled with the second premise (deterministic system) that one can conclude that it does not exist within such a system.
This is you trying to wriggle your way out of the problem you've created for yourself.

If, as you claim, your definition of freedom (or, equivalently, "the ability to do otherwise") does not preclude its actual existence, then you should be able to suggest a non-supernatural form of freedom that might do the trick.

Previously, if I recall correctly, I asked Baldeee the same question. He couldn't come up with anything, beyond vaguely waving his hands at an unspecified, completely hypothetical "non-deterministic natural process" that he couldn't name. Maybe you can do better and suggest a non-supernatural process that might allow the actual existence of freedom as you define it. On the other hand, I actually think that's impossible, given that your definition imports the notion that the only "real" freedom must be supernatural.
 
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(continued...)

[iceaura] has provided examples of a process at work. A process no one disputes. He has, at no stage, provided any notion of freedom within that process that is not also within a thermostat (which Baldeee, then I, badged as being a trivial notion of freedom as a result).
You must have missed the entire discussion of degrees of freedom. How is that possible?

It's not that surprising that you equate the thermostat with the human decision-maker, given that neither is supernatural and you require the supernatural for free will. I guess there's no point digging into the nitty gritty of the complexity of a system. All you need to do is work out whether it is natural or supernatural and you're done. If natural, then no free will. Finished. Like I said, what you need is a better definition of freedom.

And all he has offered by way of differentiation between the nature of freedom between the will and the thermostat is an appeal to complexity.
And since that's not supernatural, it can't do the job for you.

And since your 1* is not an assumption either of us have made... your analysis needs revisiting.
It is “illusory” because it appears to offer something (an ability to do otherwise) that has been concluded to be impossible in a deterministic universe. Just as a magician’s trick is an illusion when it appears to defy physics.
Exactly. To have free will, one must be able to defy physics, in your formulation. Nothing less than that will suffice. The supernatural assumption.

No, we need to establish nothing. The logic speaks for itself.
There's no problem with the logic. It's the assumptions. Faulty premises lead to unreliable conclusions. Garbage in, garbage out.

Alternatively, and here’s an idea I haven’t offered at least a dozen times before: maybe if people want to discuss a different notion of freedom they do just that, and stop trying to attack a position that doesn’t use that different notion. Splendid would that be, eh?
We can't start to have that discussion unless you can recognise that freedom does not require the supernatural. While you remain oblivious to your own assumptions, progress is impossible.

But on a side point, why are you, as iceaura has done beforehand, using QQ’s thread to continue a discussion that is better suited to the two previous threads on the matter? Being a moderator, are you not effectively telling QQ that the focus of the thread is no longer important compared to you and iceaura continuing your fallacious claims?
There are at least two other threads I could move some of this stuff to. Some of it is mixed up with QQ's stuff, so if I move it there will be judgment calls made as to what best fits where. I'm not completely opposed to the idea of moving parts of the discussion to a more appropriate thread. Which one would you suggest?
 
Clearly we need to unpack "the ability to do otherwise".
Clearly, but since you are just going round the houses and adding nothing new to what has been argued, and rebutted, before, I refer the honourable gentleman to the previous posts on the matter.
But to humour you on specific points:
The assumption is, of course, the supernatural assumption.
You are continuing the same fallacy as before, despite best efforts to show you that you are wrong. It is a conclusion. It is only when you couple the definition used with the assumption of the deterministic universe can you conclude that the freedom does not exist. Or, as you and iceaure would rather say "it assumes the supernatural".
As I pointed out to iceaura, one can no more state is an assumption than one can say that defining Socrates is human is to assume up front that he is mortal. No. It is only when you combine the premises can you end up with the conclusion of that freedom not existing.
What is it with regard this that you're not able to grasp? What is it that causes you to insist, as iceaura has done before you, that it is an assumption?
As the driver approaches the light, at the point of choosing, we ask the question: what would it take for the driver to have the "ability to do otherwise" - i.e. what would be necessary to create in the driver the ability to choose the opposite to what he in fact chooses?
In a deterministic universe we have concluded that it is not possible to have the ability to do otherwise. Period. End of story. Of course, change the definition of the notion of "free" then you can reach any conclusion you want. That much was stated at the outset.
I answer this question as follows: the driver, before seeing the colour of the light, already has the ability to do otherwise.
And you'd be wrong, for all the reasons already given in the three threads on the matter thus far. Of course, you have simply stated that the person is different to a thermostat, but you have failed to do anything but beg the question you are trying to answer in doing so. A thermostat similarly already has the same notion of ability to be on or off depending on the temperature. This is trivial, and is not a matter of freedom but flexibility. A thermostat reacts to inputs in the only way it can. Similarly a human reacts to inputs in the only way it can. It can not do otherwise. What we perceive as an ability is therefore just that: a perception, an illusion.
Before he sees the light, he doesn't know whether he will choose to stop or to go. So, he has the ability to do either.
Lack of knowledge doesn't create the ability. The action the driver takes is set in stone. So your reasoning here is a non sequitur.
The fact that there is only one outcome in the end is largely irrelevant - it's just a causal consequence of making the particular choice he decides to make.
Sure, he goes through a process of choice, a process that noone has denied. But the choice is just the manner of converting the input into the one output that it was always going to be, that it was predetermined to be from the outset. The person didn't know that, so if anything that merely highlights that our sense / illusion of "free" is due to lack of knowledge, not that the lack of knowledge creates an ability.

But hey, I'm just repeating what has been repeated many times before. Repeating it here won't get you any further.
Your answer, on the other hand, is that before seeing the light, the only way the driver could have "the ability to do otherwise" would be if the driver somehow acquired the supernatural ability to break the laws of physics and thereby change the colour of the light from red to green, along with the corresponding choice that he is about to make.
I'm content to stop at saying it is not possible. No need to invoke what everyone has confirmed does not exist.
So your argument:

P1: Freedom is the ability to do otherwise
translates as "Freedom is the supernatural ability to break the laws of physics"
What do you not understand of such basic logic that you end up utterly butchering what I have said???
The translation you put here is simply absurd, as you can only conclude that once you have also premised the nature of the universe. Until you do that, how do you know what the laws of physics are, or how they operate (deterministically or indeterministically).
To continue this pathetic line that you are peddling is disappointing in the extreme. And you wonder why I get frustrated!
This is precisely equivalent to my earlier summary of the sticking point in your argument, as:
And you have adequately detailed the horrendous flaw in your thinking that led you to the incorrect analysis. Well done. Now please correct it.
Suffice it to say that you can deny your supernatural assumption all you want, but it's built into your argument against free will every way you set it out.
Suffice it to say that you can continue your fallacious analysis all you want, but it's not going to get you anywhere, nor endear yourself to those you are conversing with.
 
No. It is central to my analysis. If you define freedom as meaning one must act supernaturally, then in a world bound by natural law there can be no freedom.
Noone has defined it as having to act supernaturally. Period. Deal with it, not some butchered version you have come up with.
You've identified exactly what problem is: what you need is "another notion of freedom".
Why do I need another notion of freedom? Do you normally reach a conclusion, not like it, and then redefine what words mean until you get a warm and fuzzy feeling? No, I have a notion of freedom I am quite content with. And the logic concludes that it does not exist in a deterministic universe. From there we can perhaps start to understand exactly what we experience as this illusion of having a free choice etc.
Work out what that is and you might make progress on the subject of free will. As things stand, you're stuck in the rut of thinking that free will must be some weird "illusion" because you assume it's incompatible with the laws of physics, essentially. Refusing to let go of that view puts blinkers on you to the extent that the idea of true free will makes no sense.
Utter rubbish. I am not the one in a rut. It seems very much that you and iceaura are as you can't seem to stop coming up with fallacious analysis and reasoning by way of criticism. And who are you to determine what is "true free will"? Is it that you don't like the notion of it being an illusion with regard the notion of freedom as defined?
This is you trying to wriggle your way out of the problem you've created for yourself.
No it's not! It was stated in the initial argument put forward by Baldeee. It is a conclusion, plain and simple. By itself one can not claim it assumes that it exists or not. It is actually you, and iceaura, that are trying to wriggle your way out of this fallacious accusation you have repeatedly thrown around these threads about the incompatibilist position. You are trying to backtrack and now agree that it is a conclusion, but then trying to avoid having to back down in such a shame-faced manner you simply merge that conclusion into the assumptions. Disgraceful behaviour.
If, as you claim, your definition of freedom (or, equivalently, "the ability to do otherwise") does not preclude its actual existence, then you should be able to suggest a non-supernatural form of freedom that might do the trick.
No, that is not a requirement, and it is disingenuous to require it for the logic to stand, and for the conclusion to stand as such. I have no idea what other indeterministic universes are capable of. But that doesn't mean it isn't a possibility. And unless you can show that it is an impossibility, you have no leg to stand on here.
You must have missed the entire discussion of degrees of freedom. How is that possible?
You don't think a thermostat has a degree of freedom??? Note, I said that he has failed to offer any notion that is not also found in a thermostat. Degrees of freedom are. So no, I missed nothing.
It's not that surprising that you equate the thermostat with the human decision-maker, given that neither is supernatural and you require the supernatural for free will. I guess there's no point digging into the nitty gritty of the complexity of a system.
I'm all for someone to show how complexity actually provides a nature of freedom that is not found in a thermostat, but all we have had are appeals to complexity, hand-waving about logical levels. Nothing else. You want to offer more, go for it.
All you need to do is work out whether it is natural or supernatural and you're done. If natural, then no free will. Finished. Like I said, what you need is a better definition of freedom.
Why? I make no assumption at the outset that free will is free, and the conclusion I reach is that it is not. Does that mean the phenomenon disappears? No. It means the understanding of it differs, that is all.
And since that's not supernatural, it can't do the job for you.
Your flippancy is pathetic. If iceaura actually manages to put together something other than an appeal to complexity, perhaps there would be something to discuss. But so far? No. And are we to just gasp at the word "complexity" and treat it as the God of the gaps in this regard? Maybe you are happy to?
Exactly. To have free will, one must be able to defy physics, in your formulation. Nothing less than that will suffice. The supernatural assumption.
It's the conclusion, JamesR. If you can't see that by now then you are in as much of a coffin in this matter as iceaura. It would be a rut, but most people can get out of those.
There's no problem with the logic. It's the assumptions. Faulty premises lead to unreliable conclusions. Garbage in, garbage out.
What is garbage, exactly, about "ability to do otherwise"? Is it only when you get to the conclusion that it can't exist in a deterministic universe that you consider it garbage?
We can't start to have that discussion unless you can recognise that freedom does not require the supernatural. While you remain oblivious to your own assumptions, progress is impossible.
I am not oblivious to the assumptions I have made. Nor am I oblivious to the nonsense that you are peddling, as evidenced in our conversation thus far.
But what is this "we" you are talking about? I'm not stopping people discussing such things if that is what they want to do. I have no particular intention of discussing a notion of freedom found in a thermostat, as I have already said countless times. But why does that stop other people having that discussion? All I've ever been doing is answering criticism of the position I have, and explaining why I think their analysis of it is flawed. So go and have that other discussion, JamesR, I'm not going to stop you.
There are at least two other threads I could move some of this stuff to. Some of it is mixed up with QQ's stuff, so if I move it there will be judgment calls made as to what best fits where. I'm not completely opposed to the idea of moving parts of the discussion to a more appropriate thread. Which one would you suggest?
The obvious one would be the "does physics disprove the existence of free will?" thread. That's the one I think already filled with the same fallacious nonsense that you and iceaura are regurgitating, so may as well just add it there.
 
In a deterministic universe we have concluded that it is not possible to have the ability to do otherwise. Period. End of story.
We have not. and that is the point.
Only you and Baldeee and other devoted hard determinists have. ( fatalists)
We are arguing that we can have the ability to do other wise, with out "violating the laws of physics" in a deterministic universe.

Compare three statements:

  1. In a deterministic universe we have concluded that it is not possible to have the ability to do otherwise. ( NOT possible -Hard determinism)
  2. In a deterministic universe we have concluded that it is possible to have the ability to do otherwise. (possible - Compatibilism)
  3. In a deterministic universe we have concluded that it is essential to have the ability to do otherwise. (Essential - Co-determinism)
WE have not agreed with your conclusion which is why there is debate.

You may be prematurely presuming agreement with your hard deterministic conclusion, when in fact it is your conclusion that is in dispute.

btw I am still trying to figure out how a hydrogen atom or any other particle... , can effect my decisions in such a devastating fashion....:)
 
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