Wow, so you claim you can read minds and tell people what they intended when they wrote something? That's amazing.
I don't claim anything of the sort.
I simply by go what you wrote.
If that wasn't what you intended, then that speaks to an inability to adequately convey what you intended.
Or...
...you really think that a determinism that appears wholly indeterminate is the exact same thing. That something being red is the same as something being both red and green at the same time. Okay, if you say so.
Appearance is irrelevant.
Reality is what it is, irrespective of how it appears to us.
If a deterministic system
appears indeterminate, as many do to us, for example, then that would be due to the system's complexity beyond our ability to discern the cause and/or the laws at play.
But if a system is deterministic, that is the same determinism at play regardless of complexity, whether or not it
appears indeterminate or not.
And we are assuming here a deterministic universe.
So irresepective of the complexity of the system, irrespective of how the system
appears, it has the same deterministic property as the simplest of deterministic systems.
Do you think both compatibilism and incompatibilism require the presumption of determinism in all domains?
Only the relevant domains in which one is questioning whether freewill exists or not.
It is irrelevant, therefore, whether one presumes that all domains are deterministic or not.
i.e. the question can be rephrased as: can freewill exist in a deterministic domain?
If one thinks that freewill is not compatible then one is an incompatibilist.
If one thinks that freewill is compatible with determinism then one is a compatibilist.
I can only assume you're a compatibilist, if you don't get how that's begging the question.
I am an incompatibilist, and I don't think it is begging the question.
I have a notion of what freedom requires, and it is only when one pairs that premise with the premise of a deterministic universe (or the relevant domain in which freewill exists being deterministic) that one can conclude that freewill is not compatible.
There is no assumption of such, and thus one is not begging the question of it.
Why do you think it is?