Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

"The theorem does not assert that some higher-degree polynomial equations have no solution. In fact, the opposite is true: every non-constant polynomial equation in one unknown, with real or complex coefficients, has at least one complex number as a solution
Of course, if it is mathematical it can be calculated. Every mathematical equation can be calculated. The problem is knowing all the causal mathematics in play.

Question: is it possible to know all the causal mathematics necessary all the time to make a predictive calculation? We can't even calculated the mathematics in a local thunderstorm, can we? Let alone the mathematics contained in a cosmic cloud!
Can we calculate all the mathematics in a local thunderstorm?
If not, then all discussion about mathematical abilities becomes moot, no?
 
Last edited:
"The theorem does not assert that some higher-degree polynomial equations have no solution. In fact, the opposite is true: every non-constant polynomial equation in one unknown, with real or complex coefficients, has at least one complex number as a solution
Of course. That is not the problem. The existence of a solution is not at issue - the finding of a solution is.

It asserts that they cannot, in theory, be solved (in general).
You have to solve them, to predict. And you can't. So you cannot, even in theory, predict exactly. See how that works?
These solutions can be computed to any desired degree of accuracy using numerical methods such as the Newton–Raphson method or the Laguerre method, and in this way they are not different from solutions to polynomial equations of second, third, or fourth degree.
Indeed. That's what the word "approximate" means - as you can read in my post, above, whenever you get around to addressing what I posted.
Approximations cannot perfectly predict, or describe for that matter - the entire enterprise is intellectually equivalent to perpetual motion and the like.
The theorem only shows that there is no general solution in radicals that applies to all equations of a given degree greater than 4.
And that prevents prediction.
Because it hasn't been assumed, it has been concluded.
It was concluded from its assumption. You have seen that explained and demonstrated and displayed several times now - slow learner?
Concluding what you assume is invalid argument. It's also bizarre, especially after it has been pointed out several times - the crippling effects of the supernatural assumption are nothing if not obvious.
You continue with this "illustrative" example despite being provided with rebuttals as to why it isn't.
Isn't what?
As repeatedly noted, with quotes and so forth, you have never even addressed the example, let alone "rebutted" it. By the evidence you cannot even paraphrase it - despite its simplicity, all your dealings with it have begun with flagrant misrepresentation.

But you have another opportunity - why not give it a try? A driver approaches a traffic light - - - -
To make sense, you want to avoid backwards causality (the future color of the light has no influence on present realilty, for instance - there's no reason to mention it), and keep this central aspect in mind:
Nonsupernatural freedom does not depend on doing other than has been determined.
 
Last edited:
Of course. That is not the problem. The existence of a solution is not at issue - the finding of a solution is.
Solutions can be found.
It asserts that they cannot, in theory, be solved (in general).
Note your caveat of "in general".
Solutions don't need to be solved generally in order to be solved.
Solving using non-general means is entirely acceptable.
Your assertion relies on solutions needing to be general, and that is quite absurd.
Even the wiki article you linked to expresses that they can be solved.

You have to solve them, to predict.
But you don't need to solve them in radicals, or generally.
A numerical solution is all that is required.
And you can't. So you cannot, even in theory, predict exactly. See how that works?
What is it that you're failing to grasp?
A general solution does not mean that it can't be solved, only that there is no general solution.
All that is required for prediction is a possible solution, numerically arrived at or otherwise.
Your belief that it need be a general solution is just wrong.
Plain and simple.
Laughably so.
The universe can, and does, work to infinite degrees of accuracy.

Indeed. That's what the word "approximate" means - as you can read in my post, above, whenever you get around to addressing what I posted.
I am addressing it, your incorrect claim.
Debunked.
And that prevents prediction.
No, it doesn't.
It really doesn't.
It was concluded from its assumption.
No, it was concluded from deductive reasoning of two premises, neither one allowing valid conclusion of what you are claiming.
You have seen that explained and displayed many times now.
Slow learner?
Concluding what you assume is invalid argument.
Actually it's entirely valid, not that it is what has been done.
Or do you need reminding of what a valid argument is, along with the difference between conclusion and assumption?
Your inability to recognise question-begging as a valid argument is telling.

The rest of your post... just more of the same nonsense from you, I'm afraid.
So back on ignore you go.
Ah, well.
 
Even the wiki article you linked to expresses that they can be solved.
But not by humans. Not because we cannot handle the mathematics. We can't handle ALL the unknown universal mathematics.
Baldeee said:
The theorem only shows that there is no general solution in radicals that applies to all equations of a given degree greater than 4.
How far into the future do you believe this allows us to make predictions? A day? One second? 4 quantum moments?

p.s. 4 degrees of calculations is necessary to arrive ata single predictive instant in 4 D spacetime.
 
Last edited:
But not by humans. Not because we cannot handle the mathematics. We can't handle ALL the unknown universal mathematics.
The issue is a theoretical one, not whether it is humanly possible.
It is fully accepted that predictability is practically impossible.
The issue here is IF one knows the current state, and IF one knows the laws, then is the future state predictable or not.
It doesn't need to be solved via a general solution, as absurdly required by others, just solvable in theory.
If solvable then it is theoretically predictable.
That's really all there is to it.
 
I guess the bit I mentioned about our present inability to accurately examine all aspects of the fundamental realms went right over your head. Since we can’t accurately perceive the dynamics at play in these domains, the only tool any interpretation of QM has to use at the moment is probability. Just because we can’t see what’s going bump in the night, there’s no need to assume that ghosts are throwing dice.
The only reality that we can perceive is deterministic, so where are your empirical examples that show it to be otherwise? Go ahead and describe your interpretation of the theory of human choice. Looking forward to your synethesis.
Only certain interpretations of QM consider it incomplete. You trying to apply your sense of "accurately" from your classical domain experience to QM is, well, quaint. Many interpretations accept that our probabilistic knowledge of QM is fundamental, and that that's actually how particles behave/exist. Can't be helped if that's beyond you. You seem stuck, echoing Einstein's sentiment that "God doesn't play dice" just because you can't fathom "spooky action at a distance". You literally mention "throwing dice" and "ghosts". Maybe you need to catch up with modern science.

See, you even admit to prioritizing the "reality that we can perceive", as if that alone makes the classical domain special. That's anthropocentrism, not far removed from the demand that the Sun revolves around the Earth. What's your empirical examples that the choices "we can perceive" are any less real than the rest of reality? After all, if you prioritize things solely on our anthropocentric perceptions, you need to explain the conflict of why one perception is valid while another is not.


There is only one kind of determinism, irrespective of the domains one sees it applicable to.
That is why the second sentence has no bearing on your implication of "kind of determinism".
Wow, so you claim you can read minds and tell people what they intended when they wrote something? That's amazing.

Or...

They're not different different kinds of determinism, only different domains of applicability.
Whatever you see as deterministic has that same deterministic quality.
Red is still red even if you only paint one thing red rather than everything.
So I guess "meh" it is.
...you really think that a determinism that appears wholly indeterminate is the exact same thing. That something being red is the same as something being both red and green at the same time. Okay, if you say so.

It is where the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists begin.
Since there is no agreement even at that level (there are more than a few compatibilists among us) it is where we have begun.
Feel free to participate if you're not too tired.
Do you think both compatibilism and incompatibilism require the presumption of determinism in all domains? I can only assume you're a compatibilist, if you don't get how that's begging the question.
 
The issue is a theoretical one, not whether it is humanly possible.
It is fully accepted that predictability is practically impossible.
The issue here is IF one knows the current state, and IF one knows the laws, then is the future state predictable or not.
It doesn't need to be solved via a general solution, as absurdly required by others, just solvable in theory.
If solvable then it is theoretically predictable.
That's really all there is to it.
The main problem is the universe itself does not offer a fixed baseline. It is a dynamical construct and all calculations relative to the universe are changing every single moment. We can't even calculate how big the universe is, let alone it other dimensional mathematics.

We are stuck with "relativity" and a few known"constants", whether we like it or not.
 
Wow, so you claim you can read minds and tell people what they intended when they wrote something? That's amazing.
I don't claim anything of the sort.
I simply by go what you wrote.
If that wasn't what you intended, then that speaks to an inability to adequately convey what you intended.
Or...
...you really think that a determinism that appears wholly indeterminate is the exact same thing. That something being red is the same as something being both red and green at the same time. Okay, if you say so.
Appearance is irrelevant.
Reality is what it is, irrespective of how it appears to us.
If a deterministic system appears indeterminate, as many do to us, for example, then that would be due to the system's complexity beyond our ability to discern the cause and/or the laws at play.
But if a system is deterministic, that is the same determinism at play regardless of complexity, whether or not it appears indeterminate or not.
And we are assuming here a deterministic universe.
So irresepective of the complexity of the system, irrespective of how the system appears, it has the same deterministic property as the simplest of deterministic systems.
Do you think both compatibilism and incompatibilism require the presumption of determinism in all domains?
Only the relevant domains in which one is questioning whether freewill exists or not.
It is irrelevant, therefore, whether one presumes that all domains are deterministic or not.
i.e. the question can be rephrased as: can freewill exist in a deterministic domain?
If one thinks that freewill is not compatible then one is an incompatibilist.
If one thinks that freewill is compatible with determinism then one is a compatibilist.
I can only assume you're a compatibilist, if you don't get how that's begging the question.
I am an incompatibilist, and I don't think it is begging the question.
I have a notion of what freedom requires, and it is only when one pairs that premise with the premise of a deterministic universe (or the relevant domain in which freewill exists being deterministic) that one can conclude that freewill is not compatible.
There is no assumption of such, and thus one is not begging the question of it.
Why do you think it is?
 
The main problem is the universe itself does not offer a fixed baseline. It is a dynamical construct and all calculations relative to the universe are changing every single moment. We can't even calculate how big the universe is, let alone it other dimensional mathematics.

We are stuck with "relativity" and a few known"constants", whether we like it or not.
Again, you are stuck on what is possible or feasible for humans.
It is nothing to do with what is humanly possible, so move on from that.
It is a matter of what is theoretically possible IF you know the current state perfectly, and IF you know the laws perfectly (and obviously IF you can calculate faster than reality proceeds).
If you can't start with those assumptions, you're not looking at the right question with regards predictability.
 
Again, you are stuck on what is possible or feasible for humans.
It is nothing to do with what is humanly possible, so move on from that.
It is a matter of what is theoretically possible IF you know the current state perfectly, and IF you know the laws perfectly (and obviously IF you can calculate faster than reality proceeds).
If you can't start with those assumptions, you're not looking at the right question with regards predictability.
No, I'm not stuck, you are. I agree completely with the definition of determinism. After all it does not address humans but the workings of the universe...:)
 
No, I'm not stuck, you are. I agree completely with the definition of determinism. After all it does not address humans but the workings of the universe...:)
But noone disagrees that humans can't accurately predict the future.
It is simply not disputed, yet you continually bring it back to the human perspective.
What is disputed is whether the flow of the deterministic universe can theoretically be predicted from knowing perfectly a single state and the laws.
Nothing to do with humans.
 
But noone disagrees that humans can't accurately predict the future.
It is simply not disputed, yet you continually bring it back to the human perspective.
What is disputed is whether the flow of the deterministic universe can theoretically be predicted from knowing perfectly a single state and the laws.
Nothing to do with humans.
Who then does the "theoretical predictive knowing", if not humans? The Universe?
 
Last edited:
You keep repeating that assumption. You seem unable to extricate yourself from it - you even deny observed reality in its defense. You have never - not once - considered the degrees of freedom we observe in human decision making and willful action - despite being provided with a simple and illustrative example you could use at any time (driver approaching light).
Something to ponder: Why is it that you guys have never - not once - considered that obvious, simple, and clearly illustrative example of human decision making capabilities as posted?
Consider the obvious, there is no freedom in a deterministic system. Human consideration of possibilities, human choice, human action, are all universally scripted behaviors. If all of the elements that comprise human choice are dictated by a determined universe, then there is no actual choice, only a determined perception of choice.
By using equations whose solutions can only be approximate - a theoretical fact the mathematicians have proved.
The point is that contrary to your assertion, math doesn’t prohibit the postulation of anything.
Unless you have a computer the size of the universe.....:)
You’ll have to check with iceaura to see if math will allow for that hypothetical proposition.
Problem

You cannot see the last dominoes

You might might might barely from the NOW moment see a few moments ahead and, perhaps from educated guesses, based on previous experiences, a bit further

The further ahead you try to predict means you are further from your initial prediction starting point and less able to know what new dominoes are being added

If the Universe was sentient it should be able to make the end prediction, but I would even doubtful about that

The uncertainty about the future does not mean it has not been determined, just that it is not knowable

:)
The predictability in a determined system is contingent on the degree of knowledge of that system. In the case of a system composed of dominos, past, present, and future will all contain the same set of dominos, only their positions will change. With complete knowledge of that system, the time and position of any part of the set will allow for the determination of the position of any other part of the set. While complete knowledge of a set of dominos would be practically possible, I doubt that no entity would have the capacity to do such a feat on a universal scale, although you may be on to something with the notion of a sentient universe.

Is the Universe Conscious?
https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/universe-conscious-ncna772956
Only certain interpretations of QM consider it incomplete. You trying to apply your sense of "accurately" from your classical domain experience to QM is, well, quaint. Many interpretations accept that our probabilistic knowledge of QM is fundamental, and that that's actually how particles behave/exist. Can't be helped if that's beyond you. You seem stuck, echoing Einstein's sentiment that "God doesn't play dice" just because you can't fathom "spooky action at a distance". You literally mention "throwing dice" and "ghosts". Maybe you need to catch up with modern science.
No interpretation of QM is considered complete, since all are handicapped by the uncertainty of measurement and composition of subatomic matter. Currently there is no way to validate the assumptions made by any interpretation of QM regarding the random or deterministic nature of subatomic domains.
See, you even admit to prioritizing the "reality that we can perceive", as if that alone makes the classical domain special. That's anthropocentrism, not far removed from the demand that the Sun revolves around the Earth.
For entities like humans that rely on their powers of perception to acquire knowledge, what’s the alternative? Telepathy? The reality that we can perceive has nothing to do with anthropocentrism, and everything to do with our ability to receive information through our senses. If randomness at the macro level is assumed to be a product of insufficient perception of behavioral dynamics, then why wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume the same for the lack of perception inherent at the micro level?
What's your empirical examples that the choices "we can perceive" are any less real than the rest of reality? After all, if you prioritize things solely on our anthropocentric perceptions, you need to explain the conflict of why one perception is valid while another is not.
Because the behavior that you call human choice is assumed to be dictated by the same deterministic rules that dictate the behaviors of the rest of the perceived entities in our reality. If you’re trying to argue an exemption from those rules, that would be an actual case of anthropocentrism.
 
Who then does the "theoretical predictive knowing", if not humans? The Universe?
Recall: the claim raised was that prediction is theoretically impossible, irrespective of the perfection of one's knowledge.
The issue has never been about whether humans, with their limited knowledge, can predict.
It is a theoretical matter, not a practical one.
It doesn't matter what/who does the prediction, only whether it is theoretically possible or not, IF one had perfect knowledge, etc.
 
Recall: the claim raised was that prediction is theoretically impossible, irrespective of the perfection of one's knowledge.
No, no..... The claim was raised because no humans can know all the mathematics. The universe does not need to know the maths at all. It performs all functions without a scientific theory of any kind.

"Limited knowledge" is a peculiar limitation of "brained" organisms. There is no theoretical authority, because not all the potentials are knowable by anyone trying to identify them. The best we can do is "guess", never "know"!
The "Shadow knows", is mere speculation and semantic obfuscation.

It can't be done, the universe is too big and there are parts of the spacetime which never will be in the grasp of anyone's experience. That includes all possible alien intelligences in existence.

We can arrive at a TOE, but it will be forever speculative and unprovable by any comprehensive scientific methods.
What's the difference between Quantum Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics? It's fundamental in concept altogether, yet they both yield a Schrodinger's Equation.

If anything, Bohmian Mechanics comes closest to the proposition that the universe is and acts as a Wholeness. i.e. "Spooky action (knowledge) at a distance"
Bohmian mechanics, which is also called the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the pilot-wave model, and the causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, is a version of quantum theory discovered by Louis de Broglie in 1927 and rediscovered by David Bohm in 1952. It is the simplest example of what is often called a hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics.
In particular, the usual measurement postulates of quantum theory, including collapse of the wave function and probabilities given by the absolute square of probability amplitudes, emerge from an analysis of the two equations of motion: Schrödinger’s equation and the guiding equation. No invocation of a special, and somewhat obscure, status for observation is required.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-bohm/
 
Last edited:
No, no..... The claim was raised because no humans can know all the mathematics.
Perhaps talking cross purposes, but the claim I am discussing is this one:
"It [maths] forbids perfect knowledge from yielding perfect prediction, regardless of the determined nature of the future. You can't predict the future by knowing all about the past and present."
Perhaps you are thinking of another claim that is limited to humans, because this one isn't.

As Capracus put it: "the issue isn’t what we can predict, it’s what could be ideally predicted given complete knowledge and the ability to wield it."
If you continue to only refer to humans then you're simply not addressing this issue.
 
As Capracus put it: "the issue isn’t what we can predict, it’s what could be ideally predicted given complete knowledge and the ability to wield it."
If you continue to only refer to humans then you're simply not addressing this issue.
No, I'm talking mechanics and cited two theories which provide a baseline for establishing the mechanics of expression in reality which theoretical might be able to explain the knowledge required to ask the question.

To speak of an ideal without at least knowing what that ideal constitutes (total knowledge?) is mere speculation, because humans cannot conceive of an ideal knowledge. If we could we could answer the question ourselves.

Does an ideal Universe employ "knowledge" or "mathematical precision of information sharing"?
Do you call a universal mathematical function as exercising "knowledge"?
 
No, I'm talking mechanics and cited two theories which provide a baseline for establishing the mechanics of expression in reality which theoretical might be able to explain the knowledge required to ask the question.
So you're not addressing the issue, then.
Okay, fair enough.

I know you want to drag the thread to discussing "reality is maths", but please, take that to another thread.
It has no place here beyond the nature and discussion of determinism and free will.

So, again, "if one has perfect knowledge...."
 
Back
Top