Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

When you disregard the effects of the whole to highlight the effects of the local, you’re essentially practicing ignorance.
I never do that.
Then stop trying to impose qualities on a determined system that are inconsistent with its definition.
I never do that.
The ability to know the future by way of complete knowledge of the present in a determined universe doesn’t imply backwards causality.
Claiming events in the future change the current status of observed physical systems does imply backwards causality. That's what you do.
This information would allow for the revelation of all past or future events in a determined universe.
No, it wouldn't. The math forbids it, as does the current physics.
And that's irrelevant anyway. It makes no difference whether the future is revealed or not.
, but like I mentioned to iceaura above, when the state of one entangled element determines the state of the other, how is this not considered an example of cause and effect, i.e., causality?
It doesn't.
And if it did, it would not involve cause and effect - cause has to precede effect, by definition, and that does not happen when the wave function collapses. All the states change simultaneously.
Some interpretations of QM are considered to be indeterministic, while others are not.
That doesn't make any difference. Indeterminism is irrelevant here. The fact that you guys keep bringing it up illustrates the depths of your confusion.
The only way I can hope to correct your errors in regards to qualities of a determined system is to continue to illustrate them
You haven't yet managed to handle even the one simple illustration I provided - the driver and the light - let alone anything approaching the general qualities of a determined system.
. No one is disputing that capabilities exist, only that any that do must be consistent with the requirements of a determined system.
Now you are forgetting your own posts.
You and Baldee and several others have repeatedly and explicitly denied that unemployed capabilities ever existed in the assumed causally deterministic universe - you call them "illusions", etc.

Meanwhile, since they are observed whenever anyone looks and your repeatedly posted conceptions of what a determined system allows cannot handle that fact, you might better spend your time looking into adjusting your obviously mistaken and muddled conception of what a determined system requires.
Specifically: You keep assuming that to have freedom a decision must defy deterministic physical law and its cause/effect sequences; that deterministic cause and effect eliminates freedom.
That assumption cripples your thinking rather badly.
 
The question is not what kind of freedom but what kind of determinism.
The kind of determinism involved here has been assumed - stipulated by all, in advance. It is not in question.

That's useful, because it clarifies the issues - it highlights the irrelevance of the "kind" of determinism involved, and focuses the attention of the careful on the nature of freedom, which is relevant.
 
Baldeee Capracus,
Perhaps taking a peek at the definitions of
Philosophy
And
Dogma
Might help you understand why self determination is fundamentally required for any philosophical discussion about the philosophy of determinism.
 
When a decision is made, that act becomes determined (willed.) This does not mean we do not have a choice: there is a difference between choice and will. One can choose how to act (what to will) but that will then becomes determined.
 
The question is not what kind of freedom but what kind of determinism. Classical domain determinism doesn't really speak to mental or quantum states. Considering Libet has been debunked, there is no longer even that paltry evidence for deterministic decision making. So what domains, other than the classical, may be deterministic is still up for speculation (barring ideological presumption).
There is only one kind of determinism: where the effect is completely determined by the cause.
This excludes quantum considerations of probabilistic outcomes, or any other indeterministic nature.
But no matter what other domain than the classical you think may be deterministic, it is the deterministic nature that is key.
We have premised this nature from the outset of this discussion.

The question is then very much what kind of freedom.
And the answer one arrives at, compatibilist or incompatibilist, will depend on what kind of freedom you are considering, not what kind of determinism.
 
He's been Iggied long time in this neck of the woods

:)
Tempting though that approach is, I remain open to the possibility that one day he will post something of value.
And I wouldn’t want to miss such a special day by having him on ignore.
At the moment, though, other than cherry picking the points he responds to, and arguing against a straw man, his argument is akin to saying that one can escape an inescapable room just by saying that one has escaped it.
No substance, just hot air.
So I eagerly await the day there is something more from him.
 
But we only know that we can determine the state of one element from the state of the other, not that there is actually any causal relationship.
If I fire two streams of identical streams of 1s and 0s to two separate places, does that mean me looking at one bit in one place is a cause for the same bit in the other stream being determined?
E.g. if I look at a bit and see it as a "1" does that mean I have determined the same bit in the other stream to also be a "1"?
Determined as in known it to be the case, yes, but not as in caused it to be.
i.e. there is no causal relationship between the two streams, but both streams are the result of the same cause.
I get what your’re saying, it’s that the state of one entangled particle CAN be determined by revealing the state of the other, which then reinforces my other contention that it’s not necessarily particle interaction that determines such unity, but the inherent fundamental nature of the universal whole.
We're not making a case for a deterministic universe, though.
We have simply stipulated it to be the case in the abstracted universe.
Once we have done that, and analysed whether freedom of will is compatible with that, we can start to look at whether, for the incompatibilist, indeterminism creates conditions that could then allow freedom.
I’m just calling reality as I see it, just like everyone else is in this thread does to support their take on the issue. If I can rationally do both, I’ll continue to try.
The question is not what kind of freedom but what kind of determinism. Classical domain determinism doesn't really speak to mental or quantum states. Considering Libet has been debunked, there is no longer even that paltry evidence for deterministic decision making. So what domains, other than the classical, may be deterministic is still up for speculation (barring ideological presumption).
Universal determinism is a component of legitimate variants of QM, and relationships between neurological processing and awareness aren’t really relevant to the issue at hand. If reality is truly deterministic in nature, then freedom of any kind is nonexistent.
I never do that.
Your posting says otherwise.
Claiming events in the future change the current status of observed physical systems does imply backwards causality. That's what you do.
Assuming a deterministic universe implies that the past, present and future have only one prescribed outcome, they are immutable, they can’t be changed, so there is no way for one state to change another. But hypothetical complete knowledge of any state allows for the complete knowledge of any other state.
No, it wouldn't. The math forbids it, as does the current physics.
And that's irrelevant anyway. It makes no difference whether the future is revealed or not.
The math forbids what? A hypothetical proposition regarding the general nature of reality? It’s done all of the time in physics. A key aspect of determinism is that complete knowledge of the past and present allows for complete knowledge of the future, so I would say that is most relevant to this discussion.
It doesn't.
And if it did, it would not involve cause and effect - cause has to precede effect, by definition, and that does not happen when the wave function collapses. All the states change simultaneously.
Well now your arguing that the deterministic whole rather than the entangeled particle is the root of causation, which has been my contention all along.
That doesn't make any difference. Indeterminism is irrelevant here. The fact that you guys keep bringing it up illustrates the depths of your confusion.
If the macro world is obviously deterministic, and the micro world can be presumed to be as well, where then is there any refuge for the theoretical practice of choice?
You haven't yet managed to handle even the one simple illustration I provided - the driver and the light - let alone anything approaching the general qualities of a determined system.
Back to your tail chasing imagined example of choice at a traffic light in a deterministic reality that outlaws it.
Now you are forgetting your own posts.
You and Baldee and several others have repeatedly and explicitly denied that unemployed capabilities ever existed in the assumed causally deterministic universe - you call them "illusions", etc.
We denied the employment of capabilities that aren’t allowed in a deterministic system.
Meanwhile, since they are observed whenever anyone looks and your repeatedly posted conceptions of what a determined system allows cannot handle that fact, you might better spend your time looking into adjusting your obviously mistaken and muddled conception of what a determined system requires.
It’s very simple, a determined system implies that all action results from preceding action. When this is applied universally, it translates to the collective past and present determining the collective future. See the implicate relationship between the various states?
Specifically: You keep assuming that to have freedom a decision must defy deterministic physical law and its cause/effect sequences; that deterministic cause and effect eliminates freedom.
That assumption cripples your thinking rather badly.
To have freedom, a decision must have an outcome not constrained by determinism. In other words, if the universe is deciding your actions through determinism, then you didn't freely make those actions.
 
I’m just calling reality as I see it, just like everyone else is in this thread does to support their take on the issue. If I can rationally do both, I’ll continue to try.
Fair enough.
For what it’s worth, I think reality is inherently indeterministic, such as my limited understanding of QM allows.

We denied the employment of capabilities that aren’t allowed in a deterministic system.
It may be simpler than that, and just a matter of semantics.
I.e. to you and me something is a capability if, at that moment, we are able to do it.
Given that we can only do one thing at any given moment, and that what we do has been predetermined, there is no genuine capability to do anything other than what we do.
To others, capability is simply the range of theoretical outputs from a range of theoretical inputs.
If, given the right future input, one can output X, then X is seen by them as a current capability.
But that’s the crux... “if”.
In a determined system there is no “if” about future inputs other than as part of a subjective assessment we make due to lack of knowledge.
There will only be one possible input, predetermined from the start, and all the rest are simply imagined cases of “if”.
Counterfactual considerations compared to the one that actually transpires.
 
The kind of determinism involved here has been assumed - stipulated by all, in advance. It is not in question.

That's useful, because it clarifies the issues - it highlights the irrelevance of the "kind" of determinism involved, and focuses the attention of the careful on the nature of freedom, which is relevant.
There is only one kind of determinism: where the effect is completely determined by the cause.
This excludes quantum considerations of probabilistic outcomes, or any other indeterministic nature.
But no matter what other domain than the classical you think may be deterministic, it is the deterministic nature that is key.
We have premised this nature from the outset of this discussion.

The question is then very much what kind of freedom.
And the answer one arrives at, compatibilist or incompatibilist, will depend on what kind of freedom you are considering, not what kind of determinism.

Slow reflexes around here.
Never implied that any other domain was deterministic, only that other domains, likely more fundamental than the classical, are not.
So the question stands. It which domain does the freedom originate?
 
Universal determinism is a component of legitimate variants of QM, and relationships between neurological processing and awareness aren’t really relevant to the issue at hand. If reality is truly deterministic in nature, then freedom of any kind is nonexistent.
Since all valid interpretations of QM make the same predictions, their differences are not empirical.
 
Slow reflexes around here.
Never implied that any other domain was deterministic, only that other domains, likely more fundamental than the classical, are not.
So the question stands. It which domain does the freedom originate?
Since all valid interpretations of QM make the same predictions, their differences are not empirical.
Then why assume that such fundamental domains are not deterministic when there’s no substantiation either way? If determinism is empirically demonstrable in the classical sense, and may be in the most fundamental sense, then determinism from an experiential point of view would be the more valid position.
 
Then why assume that such fundamental domains are not deterministic when there’s no substantiation either way? If determinism is empirically demonstrable in the classical sense, and may be in the most fundamental sense, then determinism from an experiential point of view would be the more valid position.
All of the empirical evidence of QM only points to indeterminism, while only certain interpretations of QM reproduce determinism, through hypotheses which are not empirically testable.
 
Never implied that any other domain was deterministic…
And I never said you did.
Your exact comment was: “The question is not what kind of freedom but what kind of determinism.
For one to ask “what kind...” one is usually implying there to be more than one kind.
At least in English.
I was merely pointing out to you that there is only one kind.
There is either determinism, or there isn’t.
There are not two or more kinds of determinism, just determinism.
So to ask “what kind of determinism” is to misunderstand that.
…, only that other domains, likely more fundamental than the classical, are not.
Then perhaps you should have written that rather than make an implication you didn’t intend?
Anyhow, for purposes of this discussion those other domains, those that aren’t deterministic, are irrelevant.
We have premised a universe that is deterministic.
The question is whether freedom is possible in a deterministic universe.
Some kinds of freedom can (e.g. found within “degrees of freedom”) but others can not (e.g. any notion requiring genuine alternatives rather than imagined counterfactual alternatives).
Where those notions may “originate” is irrelevant.
 
All of the empirical evidence of QM only points to indeterminism, while only certain interpretations of QM reproduce determinism, through hypotheses which are not empirically testable.
The empirical evidence of QM doesn’t necessarily point one way or another, it only shows that since uncertainty exists in the ability to accurately examine these fundamental realms, probability is employed to obtain practical descriptions. The actual nuts and bolts of what actually occurs at those levels is what’s open to interpretation.

Even if we accept that realty is indeterministic, it only swaps determined human action for random human action, neither of which can be considered free.
 
Tempting though that approach is, I remain open to the possibility that one day he will post something of value.
And I wouldn’t want to miss such a special day by having him on ignore.
At the moment, though, other than cherry picking the points he responds to, and arguing against a straw man, his argument is akin to saying that one can escape an inescapable room just by saying that one has escaped it.
No substance, just hot air.
So I eagerly await the day there is something more from him.
then addressing the question I raised may be a start...
What prevents the universe from predetermining and supporting the capacity for humans to have genuine choices to self determine?
Where every possible genuine choice is predetermined to be genuine?

So far you failed in your attempt to understand the nature of objectivity.
Example: X is X ....why?
You approach The laws of Thought/philosophy as a dogma, when in fact they are fully and logically justifiable.
You failed to answer anything that actually addresses the issues involved.
You demonstrate that you are just a cog in a machine incapable of rational thought. (rational thought requires genuine freedom to choose)

The only thing you have succeeded in doing is proving how useless your limited version of deterministic dogma is in explaining anything other than religion and other dogmatic belief systems.
You are supporting secular and religious extremism and I wish to thank you for the insights offered.
Example:
"You can do nothing other than God's will"
compared to:
"You can do nothing other than what the universes starting conditions require you to do."


Same deal yes?
 
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And I never said you did.
Your exact comment was: “The question is not what kind of freedom but what kind of determinism.
For one to ask “what kind...” one is usually implying there to be more than one kind.
At least in English.
I was merely pointing out to you that there is only one kind.
There is either determinism, or there isn’t.
There are not two or more kinds of determinism, just determinism.
So to ask “what kind of determinism” is to misunderstand that.
Then perhaps you should have written that rather than make an implication you didn’t intend?
Anyhow, for purposes of this discussion those other domains, those that aren’t deterministic, are irrelevant.
We have premised a universe that is deterministic.
The question is whether freedom is possible in a deterministic universe.
Some kinds of freedom can (e.g. found within “degrees of freedom”) but others can not (e.g. any notion requiring genuine alternatives rather than imagined counterfactual alternatives).
Where those notions may “originate” is irrelevant.
The exact comment was: "The question is not what kind of freedom but what kind of determinism. Classical domain determinism doesn't really speak to mental or quantum states."
Sorry for presuming you'd read/link the second sentence to the "kind" in the first. Some people do seem to assume determinism is universal, across all domains. If you don't consider unlimited and domain-restricted determinism a difference of kind, meh.

So you've presumed unlimited determinism, across all possible domains? That would seem to be begging the question. Yawn.


The empirical evidence of QM doesn’t necessarily point one way or another, it only shows that since uncertainty exists in the ability to accurately examine these fundamental realms, probability is employed to obtain practical descriptions. The actual nuts and bolts of what actually occurs at those levels is what’s open to interpretation.

Even if we accept that realty is indeterministic, it only swaps determined human action for random human action, neither of which can be considered free.
Since deterministic interpretations must still rely on probabilistic tools, regardless of the underlying reality, deterministic QM is only assumed, whereas indeterministic QM is empirically evidenced by the necessary means.

No one said all reality was indeterministic, which means there's an interplay between classical determinism and quantum indeterminism. Indeterminism does not mean random, nor is any choice a single quantum event.
 
Since deterministic interpretations must still rely on probabilistic tools, regardless of the underlying reality, deterministic QM is only assumed, whereas indeterministic QM is empirically evidenced by the necessary means.
I guess the bit I mentioned about our present inability to accurately examine all aspects of the fundamental realms went right over your head. Since we can’t accurately perceive the dynamics at play in these domains, the only tool any interpretation of QM has to use at the moment is probability. Just because we can’t see what’s going bump in the night, there’s no need to assume that ghosts are throwing dice.
No one said all reality was indeterministic, which means there's an interplay between classical determinism and quantum indeterminism. Indeterminism does not mean random, nor is any choice a single quantum event.
The only reality that we can perceive is deterministic, so where are your empirical examples that show it to be otherwise? Go ahead and describe your interpretation of the theory of human choice. Looking forward to your synethesis.
 
Looking forward to your synethesis
I know not addressed to me but seems suitable for me to come in with what has been running running around in my skull

Deterministic - pick a fallen domino, look at the one that knocked it over, keep going back further. You will come to a few places in the line going back where it appears more than one domino has knocked down a single domino with no way to determine which, if any, was the dominant domino causing the fall

In that situation either split yourself in two and follow both paths back, or just pick one

Eventually you might come to the domino representing the T-Rex that tripped over the ant and decide that's far as you need go. Going back closer to the Big Bang seems redundant

OK Universe is totally deterministic

This is another idea I come up with involving what we perceive as random events ie I'm thinking something like the half life of a substance

While we calculate the half life of the substance we have no way to determine WHICH atom will pop a proton

So the question becomes "Is popping a proton random? in the not even nature (the Universe) "knows" which and when and why any particular proton will pop?"

We know half the number will do so (even that is a approximation) within a certain period (which is also a approximation) and in no discernible pattern

Can it be inferred such a random process is such? and if so is it capable of disrupting the fall of dominoes?

Over to you lot

:)
 
Deterministic - pick a fallen domino, look at the one that knocked it over, keep going back further. You will come to a few places in the line going back where it appears more than one domino has knocked down a single domino with no way to determine which, if any, was the dominant domino causing the fall
The thing about universal dominos is that every one of them is made up of more dominos that tell their stories as well. When you have access to all of those stories, you have a complete history of everything, and that complete history delineates a predictable determined future.

I got this statement from a fortune cookie, so it’s got to be true.
 
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