Re: Apprendi v. New Jersey (#99-478) 530 US 466 (2000)
Dissenting from the majority, Justice O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer, acknowledged:
Even the dissent seems to have no serious qualm with the idea of "hate crime" legislation itself. O'Connor's dissent repeatedly refers to an offense committed with the intent to intimidate because of race, and never takes issue with that core idea.
Hate crimes pertain to crimes based on human aspects demarcated by civil or human rights. To deny one's civil rights according to a "protected" status: a dyke can no more shoot a man for being a man than a neo-Nazi can shoot a black man for being black.
Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Rehnquist, makes no mention of race or hate crimes in general, and focuses on procedural issues.
One of the reasons the Court takes so little issue with hate crime legislation per se is that in the context of civil rights, there is a compelling reason to pointedly stand against specific forms of violation.
"An offense intended to intimidate because of race". The phrase gives us some insight into the nature of what defines a hate crime. A "hate crime" sets out essentially to use a specific crime against a person or property as a method of violating civil rights based on certain acknowledged categories.
See Also -
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in deciding Pisciotti (S04A0798) and Botts (S04A0799) v. State (October 25, 2004), in overturning a hate-crime statute, noted:
Again, we see that the courts acknowledge the compelling interests of states to demarcate hate crimes according to their nature.
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Notes:
Dissenting from the majority, Justice O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer, acknowledged:
Thus, apparently New Jersey could cure its sentencing scheme, and achieve virtually the same results, by drafting its weapons possession statute in the following manner: First, New Jersey could prescribe, in the weapons possession statute itself, a range of 5 to 20 years’ imprisonment for one who commits that criminal offense. Second, New Jersey could provide that only those defendants convicted under the statute who are found by a judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual on the basis of race may receive a sentence greater than 10 years’ imprisonment . . . .
. . . . Thus, consistent with our decision in Patterson, New Jersey could cure its sentencing scheme, and achieve virtually the same results, by drafting its weapons possession statute in the following manner: First, New Jersey could prescribe, in the weapons possession statute itself, a range of 5 to 20 years’ imprisonment for one who commits that criminal offense. Second, New Jersey could provide that a defendant convicted under the statute whom a judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, not to have acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual on the basis of race may receive a sentence no greater than 10 years’ imprisonment . . . .
. . . . Because I do not believe that the Court’s “increase in the maximum penalty” rule is required by the Constitution, I would evaluate New Jersey’s sentence-enhancement statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. §2C:44—3 (West Supp. 2000), by analyzing the factors we have examined in past cases. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S., at 242—243; McMillan, 477 U.S., at 86—90. First, the New Jersey statute does not shift the burden of proof on an essential ingredient of the offense by presuming that ingredient upon proof of other elements of the offense. See, e.g., id., at 86—87; Patterson, 432 U.S., at 215. Second, the magnitude of the New Jersey sentence enhancement, as applied in petitioner’s case, is constitutionally permissible. Under New Jersey law, the weapons possession offense to which petitioner pleaded guilty carries a sentence range of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment. N.*J. Stat. Ann. §§2C:39—4(a), 2C:43—6(a)(2) (West 1995). The fact that petitioner, in committing that offense, acted with a purpose to intimidate because of race exposed him to a higher sentence range of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. §2C:43—7(a)(3). The 10-year increase in the maximum penalty to which petitioner was exposed falls well within the range we have found permissible. See Almendarez-Torres, supra, at 226, 242—243 (approving 18-year enhancement). Third, the New Jersey statute gives no impression of having been enacted to evade the constitutional requirements that attach when a State makes a fact an element of the charged offense. For example, New Jersey did not take what had previously been an element of the weapons possession offense and transform it into a sentencing factor. See McMillan, 477 U.S., at 89.
O'Connor (99-478)
Even the dissent seems to have no serious qualm with the idea of "hate crime" legislation itself. O'Connor's dissent repeatedly refers to an offense committed with the intent to intimidate because of race, and never takes issue with that core idea.
Hate crimes pertain to crimes based on human aspects demarcated by civil or human rights. To deny one's civil rights according to a "protected" status: a dyke can no more shoot a man for being a man than a neo-Nazi can shoot a black man for being black.
Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Rehnquist, makes no mention of race or hate crimes in general, and focuses on procedural issues.
One of the reasons the Court takes so little issue with hate crime legislation per se is that in the context of civil rights, there is a compelling reason to pointedly stand against specific forms of violation.
"An offense intended to intimidate because of race". The phrase gives us some insight into the nature of what defines a hate crime. A "hate crime" sets out essentially to use a specific crime against a person or property as a method of violating civil rights based on certain acknowledged categories.
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See Also -
The Supreme Court of Georgia, in deciding Pisciotti (S04A0798) and Botts (S04A0799) v. State (October 25, 2004), in overturning a hate-crime statute, noted:
OCGA § 17-10-17 enhances a criminal sentence where the fact finder determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected a victim or the victim's property as the object of the offense "because of bias or prejudice." Id. at (a). We recognize that persons of ordinary intelligence may understand the dictionary definition of the words "bias" and "prejudice." However, because of the broad signification of these words and the absence of any specific context in which a person's bias or prejudice may apply in order to narrow the construction of these concepts, we find that OCGA § 17-10-17 fails to provide fair warning of the conduct it prohibits. Unlike the statute addressed in Mitchell, supra, which singled out for enhancement specific bias-inspired conduct "thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm" based on the perceived harm that results from crimes motivated by these prejudices, e.g., the greater likelihood that bias-motivated crimes will "provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest," id., 508 U.S. at 487-488, the broad language in OCGA § 17-10-17, by enhancing all offenses where the victim or his property was selected because of any bias or prejudice, encompasses every possible partiality or preference. A rabid sports fan convicted of uttering terroristic threats to a victim selected for wearing a competing team's baseball cap; a campaign worker convicted of trespassing for defacing a political opponent's yard signs; a performance car fanatic convicted of stealing a Ferrari--any"bias or prejudice" for or against the selected victim or property, no matter how obscure, whimsical or unrelated to the victim it may be, but for which proof beyond a reasonable doubt might exist, can serve to enhance a sentence. Absent some qualification on "bias or prejudice," OCGA § 17-10-17 is left" so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" Payne v. State, 275 Ga. 181, 183 (563 SE2d 844) (2002). Accordingly, we hold that OCGA § 17-10-17 is too vague to justify the imposition of enhanced criminal punishment for its violation.
We conclude further that OCGA § 17-10-17 may not be upheld because it "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications. (Cit.)' [Cit.]" Thelen v. State, 272 Ga. 81, 82-83 (526 SE2d 60) (2000). OCGA § 17-10-17 "leaves open . . . the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against." United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (41 SC 298, 65 LE2d 516) (1921).
We are by no means condoning appellants' savage attack on the victims in this case or any conduct motivated by a bigoted or hate-filled point of view. We further recognize that the Legislature may appropriately decide, as a general matter, that "bias-motivated offenses warrant greater maximum penalties." Mitchell, supra, 508 U.S. at 486. However, as drafted, the broad language of OCGA § 17-10-17 fails to comport with the ascertainable standards required by the due process rights guaranteed by our State and Federal Constitutions.
Hunstein
Again, we see that the courts acknowledge the compelling interests of states to demarcate hate crimes according to their nature.
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Notes:
Apprendi v. New Jersey - See Legal Information Institute: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-478.ZS.html
Botts and Pisciotta v. State - See Georgia Supreme Court: http://www2.state.ga.us/Courts/Supreme/pdf/s04a0798.pdf (Note: file is .PDF download), approx. 40 kb)
Botts and Pisciotta v. State - See Georgia Supreme Court: http://www2.state.ga.us/Courts/Supreme/pdf/s04a0798.pdf (Note: file is .PDF download), approx. 40 kb)