It
seems to me that part of the issue that the discussion is looking past is found in an aspect of religious fundamentalism, especially in the case of redemptive faith:
• The assumption that a faith is correct above all others can be rooted in many different principles, but in the case of redemptive religion, that principle is the utmost, the highest in the Universe, the most important thing in all creation.
"Atheistic fundamentalism" often seems to be that vicious and belligerent atheism that leads me to the sarcastic question of whether or not someone argues with Dickens. It is such a jealously-devoted anti-identification against this or that God that it plays persecutory politics to such a point that one cannot possibly read the beginning or end of
A Tale of Two Cities without damning Dickens as a blithering idiot awash in contradiction and false principles:
• "
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times." (Right, Charlie--which one was it? It can't be both!)
• "
It's a far, far better thing I do than I have ever done. It's a far, far better rest I go to than I have ever known." (To borrow a phrase from Lisa Simpson, "What does that even
mean?")
In either case, such objections would require a certain lack of figurative vision; the atheism that would "argue with Dickens" is distinctly marked by that lack.
There is also the idea of "atheistic fundamentalism" that coincides with something like I was discussing about the wrongness of molesting children: It's a perspective that will accept no contradiction as rational, but is non-theistic (atheistic) inasmuch as God has nothing to do with the principle.
And in the case of
this seeming adoption of a superior philosophy, what differs from the religious-fundamentalist idea is the lack of an asserted justification by the highest value in the Universe that applies to the entirety of a person's perspective.
The sad thing is that in the constant reorganization of the house, I've managed to lose track of a book I often mention,
Pious Passions, by Martin Riesebrödt, which includes in its introduction an attempt to discuss a proper sociological definition of fundamentalism. It is a fairly difficult question to answer, but mere blind faith in a paradigm does not actually equal fundamentalism; I suppose that was in the back of my mind when I responded the first time--the topic definition seems to include more under the banner of fundamentalism than the nitpickety, inaccurate definitions of 1980s sociologists.
Nonetheless, what theistic "blind faith" includes that non-theistic "blind faith" generally lacks is an overarching organizational principle dependent on an unprovable assertion of the nature of ultimate reality--e.g. God.
As Wes noted:
Wesmorris said:
. . . sure it's all a leap of faith, but "faith in reason" is a leap of zero distance... and when you're talking about faith in things like that, minimizing the distance of the jump is important, or it becomes necessary to start rejecting stimulous as invalid (because along with your faith comes expectation)
The only nit to pick is that faith in reason is subject to limitations of perception and assimilation; Wes' faith in reason may serve him well, but faith in reason in the hands of an idiot can be just as dangerous as faith in God.
And while perception and assimilation are subject to error, issues lacking the assertion of an overarching organizational principle dependent on an unprovable assertion of ultimate reality tend to remain more aloof from one another, which undermines the necessary coincidence of the situational result with the cohesive organizational assertion. Atheistic issues may provide some interesting conflicts of interest leading to the appearance of irrationality, but those conflicts are not
necessarily similar to the consistent refusal of perception and assimilation according to God's demands.
So even the fundamentalism I would extend outside the religious arena is
different from the theistic version.
But such is diverse humanity.
