We're back... "baby"
Ironically, this was what I asked you. Your response:
Well, we mustn't forget that my stance on a revised ontogenetic deadline without personhood - as a more reasoned position than DF - was dragged into this debate by the thread starters and tacked up to PAF. There's been an ongoing attempt to make the two things equivalent, or to make my deadline proposition misogynistic, or murderous, or the like. I still haven't got an admission that this isn't so; and it is in the midst of this that you joined the fray. A consequence of the process of debate, no doubt. Ah well.
Well, I could start by pointing out that a fetus is already two of the above: alive and undeniably a member of Homo sapiens sapiens. Why does the physical location rank so highly? Is this a case of property rights or trespass or something? Surely the fetus' lawyers could file for tort in such an instance, unless you're a tacit supporter of Stand Your Womb, which I have to admit in seriousness has a certain resemblance to DF. I think we might do better to establish a better, more reasoned threshold. Even Bells appears to recognise a kind of personal limit for abortion, although based on the aesthetics of the typical mother.
I answer you with your own words here re blank assertion:
My observation was this:
You're taking up a personhood argument here yourself. I leave the danger of that to yourself, but I don't think the argument really requires it.
That the thing inside or outside the living human being is another living human being. How is the newly-born fetus itself different from that prior to or much past birth? In what way is it different?
Possibly. But I don't think we need to dredge up personhood simply to have an intermediate deadline. Case in point:
If one wants to call that an aesthetic, then so be it: choose a new one based on a rational appreciation of mutual maternal-fetal welfare, but don't forget that this presumable aesthetic did serve to protect women for quite some time.
Another blank assertion - the question was, if you found the observation in error, ->how so<-?
Ironically, this was what I asked you. Your response:
It has nothing to do with personhood issues - all of your focus on Roe vs Wade, for example, is beside the point unless you are addressing the effects of declaring personhood in the womb on that landmark of reasonableness. And you aren't.
Well, we mustn't forget that my stance on a revised ontogenetic deadline without personhood - as a more reasoned position than DF - was dragged into this debate by the thread starters and tacked up to PAF. There's been an ongoing attempt to make the two things equivalent, or to make my deadline proposition misogynistic, or murderous, or the like. I still haven't got an admission that this isn't so; and it is in the midst of this that you joined the fray. A consequence of the process of debate, no doubt. Ah well.
Based on the "medical circumstance" of being alive, being human, and not being inside somebody else. This seems bizarre to you?
Well, I could start by pointing out that a fetus is already two of the above: alive and undeniably a member of Homo sapiens sapiens. Why does the physical location rank so highly? Is this a case of property rights or trespass or something? Surely the fetus' lawyers could file for tort in such an instance, unless you're a tacit supporter of Stand Your Womb, which I have to admit in seriousness has a certain resemblance to DF. I think we might do better to establish a better, more reasoned threshold. Even Bells appears to recognise a kind of personal limit for abortion, although based on the aesthetics of the typical mother.
No, it doesn't.
I answer you with your own words here re blank assertion:
Another blank assertion - the question was, if you found the observation in error, ->how so<-?
My observation was this:
Well, if you're going to call personhood at 36-week C-section, this does in essence abrogate the rights of the woman.
You're taking up a personhood argument here yourself. I leave the danger of that to yourself, but I don't think the argument really requires it.
What is so freakishly difficult about recognizing the significance of the distinction between the inside and the outside of a living human being?
That the thing inside or outside the living human being is another living human being. How is the newly-born fetus itself different from that prior to or much past birth? In what way is it different?
I'm beginning to think the lady was simply stating fact, when she said that if men got pregnant abortion would be a sacrament of the Christian Church.
Possibly. But I don't think we need to dredge up personhood simply to have an intermediate deadline. Case in point:
The Supreme Court was careful to not grant personhood to the fetus at any time.
If one wants to call that an aesthetic, then so be it: choose a new one based on a rational appreciation of mutual maternal-fetal welfare, but don't forget that this presumable aesthetic did serve to protect women for quite some time.