Does the brain really "cause" consciousness?

[Magical Realist]

You are again appear to be confusing illusory with it being somehow "non-real", rather than merely leading to a different understanding of what "real" means.
Does an illusionist disappear from stage the moment you realise that he is performing illusions rather than the magic it appears?
Are your observations/evidence not the same whether you think it real magic or illusory? The only difference is in ones interpretation of those observations/evidence - and perhaps from a practical point of view it makes no difference to you.
Does your brain suddenly stop seeing optical illusions?
Do mirages not still appear even though you know them to be different than what they appear?

If you wish to argue this line of materialism logically ending up in solipsism you're going to have to do a good deal better than just saying so - and at least start with your logical analysis.

Since it is your thesis that consciousness, and by extention all of its contents, are illusions, the burden lies on you to account for the phenomenal realness of its qualia. The redness of the apple, or the sharp unpleasantness of pain. How iow can a brain generate such a vivid and consistent hallucination in the first place? As a dualist I accept qualia as real as I do chairs and oranges. They are givens of my experience. YOU are the one attempting to reduce them to physical processes not me. How then does an electrical cascade of synapses in the brain cause something so unlike itself like a quale of redness or sweetness? Isn't the synaptic cascade only causing other synapses to fire? How can it possibly be causing two such logically disparate things at the same time?

 

[Magical Realist]

"Why should there be conscious experience at all? It is central to a subjective viewpoint, but from an objective viewpoint it is utterly unexpected. Taking the objective view, we can tell a story about how fields, waves, and particles in the spatiotemporal manifold interact in subtle ways, leading to the development of complex systems such as brains. In principle, there is no deep philosophical mystery in the fact that these systems can process information in complex ways, react to stimuli with sophisticated behavior, and even exhibit such complex capacities as learning, memory, and language. All this is impressive, but it is not metaphysically baffling. In contrast, the existence of conscious experience seems to be a new feature from this viewpoint. It is not something that one would have predicted from the other features alone.


That is, consciousness is surprising. If all we knew about were the facts of physics, and even the facts about dynamics and information processing in complex systems, there would be no compelling reason to postulate the existence of conscious experience. If it were not for our direct evidence in the first‑person case, the hypothesis would seem unwarranted; almost mystical, perhaps. Yet we know, directly, that there is conscious experience. The question is, how do we reconcile it with everything else we know?"---David Chalmers, "The Conscious Mind: In Search Of A Fundamental Theory", pgs 4,5.

 

[Billy T]

... That is, consciousness is surprising. If all we knew about were the facts of physics, and even the facts about dynamics and information processing in complex systems, there would be no compelling reason to postulate the existence of conscious experience. If it were not for our direct evidence in the first‑person case, the hypothesis would seem unwarranted; almost mystical, perhaps. Yet we know, directly, that there is conscious experience. The question is, how do we reconcile it with everything else we know?"-...

We can either admit we have no explanation of how a complex interconnected set of switches (neurons) achieves consciousness OR

we can pretend we know and give a name to the cause (for example call the cause "luos," which we are at an equal loss to telling anything definitely known about it other than various different assumptions and postulates made by different cultures.) Some postulate luos is eternal, and cannot cease to exist even when your body is dust. Others postulate that luos is recycled to make consciousness in other people when your body is dust, some say luos is a part of god in each of use, etc. etc. - There is no limit to what can be and is postulated to be the nature of luos as luos can not even be shown to exist.

Some even think luos explains more if re-named by spelling it backwards!

It is much like the doctor “explaining” how his sleeping pills work by saying: “They contain a narcoleptic agent.” Re-naming is not explaining but a good smoke screen to avoid admitting you don´t know how consciousness is achieved. It is a hard, currently unsolved, problem.

 

[Syne]

We can either admit we have no explanation of how a complex interconnected set of switches (neurons) achieves consciousness OR

we can pretend we know and give a name to the cause (for example call the cause "luos," which we are at an equal loss to telling anything definitely known about it other than various different assumptions and postulates made by different cultures.) Some postulate luos is eternal, and cannot cease to exist even when your body is dust. Others postulate that luos is recycled to make consciousness in other people when your body is dust, some say luos is a part of god in each of use, etc. etc. - There is no limit to what can be and is postulated to be the nature of luos as luos can not even be shown to exist.

Some even think luos explains more if re-named by spelling it backwards!

It is much like the doctor “explaining” how his sleeping pills work by saying: “They contain a narcoleptic agent.” Re-naming is not explaining but a good smoke screen to avoid admitting you don´t know how consciousness is achieved. It is a hard, currently unsolved, problem.

You seem to have backpedaled from your own assertions and painted his as more than I have seen him argue, apparently in justification. Where has anyone denied the problem of consciousness is just that?

 

[Magical Realist]

We can either admit we have no explanation of how a complex interconnected set of switches (neurons) achieves consciousness OR

we can pretend we know and give a name to the cause (for example call the cause "luos," which we are at an equal loss to telling anything definitely known about it other than various different assumptions and postulates made by different cultures.) Some postulate luos is eternal, and cannot cease to exist even when your body is dust. Others postulate that luos is recycled to make consciousness in other people when your body is dust, some say luos is a part of god in each of use, etc. etc. - There is no limit to what can be and is postulated to be the nature of luos as luos can not even be shown to exist.

Some even think luos explains more if re-named by spelling it backwards!

It is much like the doctor “explaining” how his sleeping pills work by saying: “They contain a narcoleptic agent.” Re-naming is not explaining but a good smoke screen to avoid admitting you don´t know how consciousness is achieved. It is a hard, currently unsolved, problem.

You're speaking out of ignorance. Chalmers postulates no such spurious cause to consciousness. You really should acquaint yourself with his views before criticizing them. Key words: natural supervenience vice logical supervenience.

 

[spidergoat]

So do you think there is personal responsibility, or is it "false"?

Both. It's necessary within the context of society, and it's essentially false.

 

[Syne]

Both. It's necessary within the context of society, and it's essentially false.

Self-contradictory nonsense where you seem to conflate personal responsibility with social mores.

 

[Sarkus]

Here we go again with the habitual redefining of words into non-existence. In point of fact mental has a very well-understood and clear definition, and it in no way suggests synonomy with words like "process" and "activity". If that were the case then we could describe heat , or photosynthesis, or the decay of radioactive elements, as mental phenomena. Mental in fact is well understood to be antinomious to physical and material. When I say illusion is a mental phenomenon, I am saying it is not physical or material. It is mental. It occurs entirely IN the mind, and not just from the pov of the mind. That's why we consistently and intelligibly say humans have illusions and not rocks and trees and tricycles. IOW, it is NOT a material process.

All we mean by calling something mental is that it is related to the mind. It in no way infers anything with regard it being material or non-material. By calling something a mental process does not prove anything nor provide evidence for anything, other than where we locate the activity. By claiming mental to be non-material is to beg the very question being asked. The key is what gives rise to the mental - and some say it is material processes, and oaths claim existence of some non-material thing.

Asserting the existence of mental phenomena like illusions is precisely acknowledging the existence of non-material phenomena. There is simply no way around this..

No, there isn't if you beg the question as you do and start with the a priori assumption, as you seem to do, that mental equates to non-material.

I concede that the mind probably is a process, perhaps more a spatio-temporal structure than a material one. But the essential distinctive meaning of the word "mind" is not just as process. It is as defined entirely distinct from matter and has been understood that way for centuries. If you want to redefine it go ahead, but don't expect people to have any idea what you're talking about when you use the term.

The mind is not defined as entirely distinct from matter! It makes no claim to being either material or non-material. It is defined as a label that covers many functions (eg consciousness) but does not suggest how those functions arise. Yes, in the past there was an overwhelming popularity for mind/body dualism, with the religious notion of soul thrown in to support. But as we understand the universe better, the laws that govern etc, some conclude that such views, while possibly useful in some regards (such as forms of material dualism), are irrational if one holds to the notion of non-materiality.
And there is no need to define... You just need to widen the scope of your reading beyond dictionaries seemingly aimed at children.

By admitting the existence of consciousness, even if only as an illusion or hallucination, you have already acknowledged the existence of immaterial realities. Space, time, numbers, equations, the quantum vacuum, qualia, geometric forms, etc. Reality as given is teeming with instances of immaterial entities. Oh, and don't get paranoid. I use "entity" in its defined sense as any THING that exists.

And I would argue that the only place such things exist is as properties of matter or as conceptions within our consciousness - ie the result of material interactions... They are therefore material.

Evidencing the presence of the non-material is as simple as evidencing the presence of the material. Just observe it. Both are given parallel irreducibles of our daily experience. Your little game of redefining words to support your agenda of materialist monism just won't work on me. I know what words mean and I know what I experience firsthand. We are no more justified to dismiss mind as illusory than we are to dismiss matter is illusory. They are both there from the start.

there is no redefining words, and your claims of such are pathetic. You think you know what words mean, but you're failing to look any closer than the surface.

Activity as in energy? Yes..it is non-material. Einstein showed that energy CAN be converted into matter and vice versa, but they are not the same thing. There is a real given difference between the two.

If you hold energy to be non-material then we are talking from rather different positions, as I hold it to fall within the term "material" - it being a quantity of the physical. It is not that Einstein showed that you can convert one to the other, he showed that they are equivalent.
So when materialists refer to the material realm they are including all physical quantities and properties thereof.
But then you knew that as you know what things mean.

 

[Sarkus]

Since it is your thesis that consciousness, and by extention all of its contents, are illusions, the burden lies on you to account for the phenomenal realness of its qualia. The redness of the apple, or the sharp unpleasantness of pain. How iow can a brain generate such a vivid and consistent hallucination in the first place? As a dualist I accept qualia as real as I do chairs and oranges. They are givens of my experience. YOU are the one attempting to reduce them to physical processes not me. How then does an electrical cascade of synapses in the brain cause something so unlike itself like a quale of redness or sweetness? Isn't the synaptic cascade only causing other synapses to fire? How can it possibly be causing two such logically disparate things at the same time?

To most of this, all I can say is that I don't know how such things work. But that in itself does not invalidate the analysis and conclusion drawn.
Further, you place the onus of proof upon me when it is you who is postulating something for which we have no evidence of... The non-material thing that somehow interacts with matter yet leaves no discernible trace beyond that which we would observe in the absence of such a non-material thing.

 

[Sarkus]

You're speaking out of ignorance. Chalmers postulates no such spurious cause to consciousness. You really should acquaint yourself with his views before criticizing them. Key words: natural supervenience vice logical supervenience.

Chalmers postulates an explanation for what he refers to as strong emergence. He is a dualist only in as much as he postulates property dualism - two kinds of properties. This is rather different than substance dualism, that pits material against non-material.

 

[Billy T]

You're speaking out of ignorance.

Then tell one thing in post 363 that I said which is false.

Chalmers postulates no such spurious cause to consciousness.

I assume by "spurious cause to consciousness" you mean a non-material agent, often calls a spirit or soul. If that is what you mean, yes –Chalmers, believes as I do: that the cause of consciousness is the activity of the brain. (No "soul" required.)

Chalmers main claim to fame is being the first to describe consciousness as the "hard problem;" however, he like many others, does have some ideas about how a physical system could achieve consciousness. What most distinguishes his POV is to adopt experiences as a new fundamental, irreducible property of matter, in a theory he calls: “The double-aspect of information.”(Section VII.3, page 26)*

Chalmers is careful to note that although this is a modified form of dualism, it is:
“… an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory. We simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how experiences arise from physical processes.” (From Section VI, page 20)*
-----------------
* Chalmers gave the key note address at the 1994 landmark conference "Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness." He then wrote the “key note paper” in the book Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem assembled by Jonathan Shear, which reports on this conference. I.e. after Chalmers “set the stage” 24 other experts at the conference commented on what Chalmers had said and they have their POV recorded in Shear´s book also. Finally, Chalmers formally replied to them, but only as the last chapter of Shear´s book, not much at the conference.

The Section and page reference I gave above are to this book. You can read large parts of it for free at:
http://books.google.com.br/books?id...#v=onepage&q=Papers by David Chalmers&f=false

And I suggest you do that as you are sadly misinformed if you think there is any significant difference between my POV and that of David Chalmers. I.e. Both Chalmers and I believe consciousness is an information process in the brain without any of the conventional dualism ´s “soul” needed for explaining it.

You really should acquaint yourself with his views before criticizing them. Key words: natural supervenience vice logical supervenience.

LOL – A statement from one who knows very little about Chalmers´ POV which is very close to mine!

BTW if you Google search "the hard problem" the third hit is:
Consciousness: Creeping Up on the Hard Problem a 2004 book by Jeffrey Alan Gray with the following as the little “teaser blurb” which Google posts right in the search results list:
“ This important new book analyses the issues and reviews the evidence from both introspection and experiment. To many its conclusions will be surprising and even unsettling: The entire perceived world is constructed by the brain."

That bold is exactly my POV, published in 1994. I.e. what we directly experience is a construct mainly made by the parietal brain. We do this so we can experience an excellent copy of the external world in real time by projecting ahead the sensory data slightly - just enough to compensate for the small fraction of a second the various stages of neural processing require (up to 0.3 seconds for weak external stimulus as brain pulls the information up out of the neural noise.) Having this real time model of the external world, greatly improves ducking a thrown rock or spear – The first tribal group to develop this Real Time Model, exploded out of Africa, and eliminated all other humanoids, including the bigger brained, stronger Neanderthals. (I have previously called this model the Real Time Simulation as "simulation" prevents "model" from being understood as static, but many find accepting that parietal brain makes a simulation hard to believe, so perhaps "model" is a better term, despite lack of implying it is a time dynamic model.)

 

[Billy T]

While I was writing post 371 replying to Magical Realist, Sarkus also replied to him in posts, 368, 369 & 370. I just want to note that I completely agree with what Sarkus said in these three replies.

Magical Realist does not seem to understand much of what Chalmers states. I.e. does not recognize the Chalmers´ Dualism is property dualism and has nothing to do with some postulated "soul." Chalmers believes that there are two aspects to information and one is an irreducible property of matter the information is embodied in. - Not very different from Searle`s POV, which I also tend to agree with.

Both Chalmers and Searle strongly doubt (as I do) that it could be possible to construct consciousness in a man-made machine, and lack of a "soul" for the machine is NOT the reason why. Even if it were possible to give qualia and consciousness to a machine, we could never know we had done that. Not even if the machine said:
"Yes I am conscious and feel pain, etc." - It could still be just a well made p-zombie.

 

[wellwisher]

If we come back to hardware, neurons are different from computer memory. Neurons, at rest, exist at highest potential. The pumping and exchange of cations, within the neuron, results in a membrane potential, as well as a concentration gradient of cations. When neurons fire these potentials decrease, but are quickly reestablished by the neuron via cationic pumping and exchange.

What is useful about this high energy rest situation is the neuron membrane, at rest, has both energy and entropy potential. The natural potentials wants to lower the membrane potential, and it also wants to balance the cations on both sides. There is a spontaneous potential to fire, which is driven by both energy needing to lower and (cationic) entropy needing to increase.

The entropy aspect is important to consciousness because it spontaneously adds an element of randomness, so there is deviation from the status quo.

Neurons are highly wired with other neurons. If we scale up the need to lower energy and increase entropy within a large groups of neurons, this means some random variations will also occur within circuit pathways. The brain is physically equiped with a slight randomizing foundation which is needed for consciousness. While consciousness uses both hardware and software. The hardware creates an accident/deviation waiting to happen, while the software funnels this down certain preferred pathways so deviation has a context.

Time changes everything because the spontaneous randomness, built into neurons, will constantly tweak the memory. This makes us feel alive.

 

[spidergoat]

Self-contradictory nonsense where you seem to conflate personal responsibility with social mores.

What's the difference? It only seems contradictory because we live in an environment of illusion. I'm willing to address what's appropriate within that environment because we have no choice but to interact with other people who buy into it, even if it's false.

 

[Magical Realist]

Then tell one thing in post 363 that I said which is false.I assume by "spurious cause to consciousness" you mean a non-material agent, often calls a spirit or soul. If that is what you mean, yes –Chalmers, believes as I do: that the cause of consciousness is the activity of the brain. (No "soul" required.)

Chalmers main claim to fame is being the first to describe consciousness as the "hard problem;" however, he like many others, does have some ideas about how a physical system could achieve consciousness. What most distinguishes his POV is to adopt experiences as a new fundamental, irreducible property of matter, in a theory he calls: “The double-aspect of information.”(Section VII.3, page 26)*

Chalmers is careful to note that although this is a modified form of dualism, it is:
“… an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory. We simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how experiences arise from physical processes.” (From Section VI, page 20)*
-----------------
* Chalmers gave the key note address at the 1994 landmark conference "Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness." He then wrote the “key note paper” in the book Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem assembled by Jonathan Shear, which reports on this conference. I.e. after Chalmers “set the stage” 24 other experts at the conference commented on what Chalmers had said and they have their POV recorded in Shear´s book also. Finally, Chalmers formally replied to them, but only as the last chapter of Shear´s book, not much at the conference.

The Section and page reference I gave above are to this book. You can read large parts of it for free at:
http://books.google.com.br/books?id...#v=onepage&q=Papers by David Chalmers&f=false

And I suggest you do that as you are sadly misinformed if you think there is any significant difference between my POV and that of David Chalmers. I.e. Both Chalmers and I believe consciousness is an information process in the brain without any of the conventional dualism ´s “soul” needed for explaining it. LOL – A statement from one who knows very little about Chalmers´ POV which is very close to mine!

BTW if you Google search "the hard problem" the third hit is:
Consciousness: Creeping Up on the Hard Problem a 2004 book by Jeffrey Alan Gray with the following as the little “teaser blurb” which Google posts right in the search results list:
“ This important new book analyses the issues and reviews the evidence from both introspection and experiment. To many its conclusions will be surprising and even unsettling: The entire perceived world is constructed by the brain."

That bold is exactly my POV, published in 1994. I.e. what we directly experience is a construct mainly made by the parietal brain. We do this so we can experience an excellent copy of the external world in real time by projecting ahead the sensory data slightly - just enough to compensate for the small fraction of a second the various stages of neural processing require (up to 0.3 seconds for weak external stimulus as brain pulls the information up out of the neural noise.) Having this real time model of the external world, greatly improves ducking a thrown rock or spear – The first tribal group to develop this Real Time Model, exploded out of Africa, and eliminated all other humanoids, including the bigger brained, stronger Neanderthals. (I have previously called this model the Real Time Simulation as "simulation" prevents "model" from being understood as static, but many find accepting that parietal brain makes a simulation hard to believe, so perhaps "model" is a better term, despite lack of implying it is a time dynamic model.)

Oh so when you quote Chalmers and then go off on some rant demonstrating the absurdity of the notion of the soul we are somehow supposed to contrue this as you agreeing with Chalmers? You need to more clear in your statements. If you are materialist then own it. But don't start trying to pretend you are suddenly on Chalmers' side of the question when you've been brownnosing Sarkus every step of the way thru this thread. You are not a dualist if you think consciousness can be reduced to material processes. It's as simple as that..

 

[Magical Realist]

To most of this, all I can say is that I don't know how such things work. But that in itself does not invalidate the analysis and conclusion drawn.
Further, you place the onus of proof upon me when it is you who is postulating something for which we have no evidence of... The non-material thing that somehow interacts with matter yet leaves no discernible trace beyond that which we would observe in the absence of such a non-material thing.

I admit mind exists as self-evidently as matter. The evidence for the existence of mind is overwhelming. You'd like mind to disappear by redefining it as, at times something physical, and at other times as something mental called an illusion. This is called redefining a problem out of existence. But the problem is still there. There is mind. And there is brain. Somehow they interact. All of our experience proves this. If you can't acknowledge this problem then that's another more personal problem. But that's one you'll have to solve on your own.

 

[Sarkus]

Oh so when you quote Chalmers and then go off on some rant demonstrating the absurdity of the notion of the soul we are somehow supposed to contrue this as you agreeing with Chalmers? You need to more clear in your statements. If you are materialist then own it. But don't start trying to pretend you are suddenly on Chalmers' side of the question when you've been brownnosing Sarkus every step of the way thru this thread. You are not a dualist if you think consciousness can be reduced to material processes. It's as simple as that..

You appear to be equating numerous concepts under a single banner of dualism merely because it has dualism in its label... Or at least that is how your arguments appear.
It is possible to hold that everything is material yet still hold to some form of dualism, such as property dualism etc.
Dualism is generally in reference to substance dualism or Cartesian dualism, where one holds that there are two substances: matter and non-matter. But one can be a dualist and still hold that everything is material, but that there are for example differing properties of that matter that require separation, eg when complexity arises such that the ontology of physics is insufficient to constitute what is there. Personally I see this as merely a gap in current knowledge, but others (such as Chalmers) consider the gap unbridgeable and so require the dualism with which to understand and progress. But it remains a wholly material concept in this regard. (I do not know Chalmers' arguments for holding the view he does, so can not dispute his view, only say that it is not a view I share, as I do not conclude that such a gap is unbridgeable: I am agnostic on the matter).

 

[Sarkus]

I admit mind exists as self-evidently as matter. The evidence for the existence of mind is overwhelming. You'd like mind to disappear by redefining it as, at times something physical, and at other times as something mental called an illusion. This is called redefining a problem out of existence. But the problem is still there. There is mind. And there is brain. Somehow they interact. All of our experience proves this. If you can't acknowledge this problem then that's another more personal problem. But that's one you'll have to solve on your own.

Sheesh. I have never claimed mind does not exist, nor have I tried to make it disappear by redefining it. Illusions exist. Do you not understand that? But an illusion does not exist as it appears to be but as something else. A magician on stage that performs illusions does so by making things appear different than what they actually are. If you don't believe in magic then you know that the appearance differs from the reality. But you seem to think that I am trying to make the magic-trick disappear, rather than merely recognising that the true nature differs to the appearance.
It really is no more complicated than that.
No, it is not wordplay. No, I am not trying to redefine anything. An illusion still exists. The mind exists. Consciousness exists. But my position is that, as illusions (which I conclude them to be), they are different than what they appear to be, even if I can not in anyway experience them differently as a result of that knowledge, so pervasive and perfect is the illusion.
But you seem to think that by calling them an illusion means that we think they no longer exist, that the magician on stage suddenly disappears because we realise that he is not really performing magic. The magician is still there, still performing tricks and we still observe them in the same way, but our understanding is different.

 

[Magical Realist]

You appear to be equating numerous concepts under a single banner of dualism merely because it has dualism in its label... Or at least that is how your arguments appear.
It is possible to hold that everything is material yet still hold to some form of dualism, such as property dualism etc.
Dualism is generally in reference to substance dualism or Cartesian dualism, where one holds that there are two substances: matter and non-matter. But one can be a dualist and still hold that everything is material, but that there are for example differing properties of that matter that require separation, eg when complexity arises such that the ontology of physics is insufficient to constitute what is there. Personally I see this as merely a gap in current knowledge, but others (such as Chalmers) consider the gap unbridgeable and so require the dualism with which to understand and progress. But it remains a wholly material concept in this regard. (I do not know Chalmers' arguments for holding the view he does, so can not dispute his view, only say that it is not a view I share, as I do not conclude that such a gap is unbridgeable: I am agnostic on the matter).

I don't know if mind is a substance or a property. I know it exists and is logically irreducible to matter unless we want to redefine matter to include it somehow. But then matter must be a very magical thing indeed! Perhaps trees believe it's going to rain. Or maybe mountains have delusions of grandeur. I don't rule out mental properties inhering in matter. There was a time when I was even an avid fan of Whitehead's panexperientialist metaphysics of process and reality. But even in that case there is no ontic reducibility of mental to material. The dualism remains intact, which is what distinguishes it from a monism where ontically there is only matter or mind and nothing else.

 

[Sarkus]

I don't know if mind is a substance or a property. I know it exists and is logically irreducible to matter unless we want to redefine matter to include it somehow. But then matter must be a very magical thing indeed! Perhaps trees believe it's going to rain. Or maybe mountains have delusions of grandeur. I don't rule out mental properties inhering in matter. There was a time when I was even an avid fan of Whitehead's panexperientialist metaphysics of process and reality. But even in that case there is no ontic reducibility of mental to material. The dualism remains intact, which is what distinguishes it from a monism where ontically there is only matter or mind and nothing else.

What is your argument from claiming that that it is ontic reducibility? At the moment all you have put forth, in pages upon pages of responses, is personal incredulity. You have offered no logic to support your position, other than spouting that it self-evidently exists, and is not matter. Chalmers certainly considers it so but his is not the only position.

For those of us that don't know whether it is or not, to me the rational position is to assume that it is ultimately reducible (based on Occam's razor etc) based on the evidence that we do have, until such time as we come across arguments or evidence to the contrary. We acknowledge the gap, but we don't make stuff up that is untestable and unfalsifiable just to sate our requirement for answers.