lightgigantic:
First up, thankyou for taking time to write a lengthy and interesting reply to my post. I have learned more about metonymy from your post.
the best path of intelligence is always that of simply hearing from the right authority.
Who is the right authority when it comes to the many different gods? Each religion has its own set of authorities. And as I noted in my first reply to this thread, religions are largely mutually incompatible with one another. Should I consult an authority on the Greek mythos of Zeus and friends? Or an authority on the middle-eastern god Baal? Or an authority on the Aztec gods? Or the Christian God?
It seems that none of these authorities can give me reliable evidence of the existence of any god, especially given that many of them would deny the existence of the others' gods.
However, given that this path may not be open to us for various reasons (like for instance we might be puffed up with our own supposedly great intellectual prowess), there are more "scenic" routes available through practically any of the avenues given
As a scientist, I'm uncomfortable with arguments from authority - religious ones in particular, for the reasons I've given above. I'm unwilling to believe based on faith in some authority or other. That leaves me with little option but to apply my intellect, supposedly great or otherwise. So, I tend to look at the evidence.
Moving on...
Most metonymies are so common we never notice them.
Take for example, someone showing you a photograph of the face of a little girl and saying "That's my daughter." You smile and never think that you've used a metonymic process to comprehend that the face of a person stands for the whole person. Imagine you had been shown a picture of the girl's foot and they had said "That's my daughter!"
I'm not convinced that the mug shot actually "stands for" the daughter herself. Nobody ever mistakes the photograph for the girl herself. When you're showing a photo, there's no need to say "That's a photo of my daughter". "That's my daughter" suffices - although the former sentence is still often heard. As for the face standing in for the daughter instead of the foot, that's a matter of human interest more than anything else. "This is a photo of my daughter's foot" is not likely to be as engaging to the average person as "This is a photo of my daughter's face".
So, I'm not sure at this stage that there's much more to metonymy than a feature of the use of language, in that metonymy merely seems to be the use of the word representing part of an object or thing to represent the whole thing. The face of the daughter represents the daughter, but only in a shorthand way of speaking.
Maybe I'm still missing something important....?
Can you think of any empirical claim that isn't framed by a threshold of the macro or micro-cosm (like, say a portrait of one's daughter that isn't framed by the edge of the photo)?
I don't really know what you mean by "framed by a threshold of the macro or micro-cosm". Do you mean anything more complicated than that human-scale objects are made of tiny parts and exist in a larger cosmos? Since that is necessarily true of all such objects, of course I can't think of any such object that isn't "framed" in that way.
Perhaps you can give me an example of a claim that isn't framed by the threshold you're talking about, and tell me what kind of a claim it is. Please don't use God as an example, though, because as I understand it you're trying to use this line of discussion to show me how God isn't empirical. I assume there must be things other than God that lack the framing you're talking about.
A "tacit" term is one that exists purely in relation to other tacit terms . The fact that empiricism can only deal with things with a necessarily incomplete picture of things (much like a photo is an incomplete image... yet serves its purpose well enough to say "this is my daughter " or whatever) means that it deals (exclusively) with tacit terms. This is why all empirical definitions suffer from regress.
Again, I have to ask what kind of system of knowledge
can deal with the "complete picture of things". We are human beings. We can't pay attention to everything at once.
If I had to describe [this] right hand of mine, which I am now holding up, I may
say different things of it: I may state its size, its shape, its color, its tissue, the
chemical compound of its bones, its cells, and perhaps add some more particulars;
but, however far I go, I shall never reach a point where my description will be
completed: logically speaking, it is always possible to extend the description by
adding some detail or other.*
In his book The Tacit Dimension, scientist Michael Polyani writes that
perception has inexhaustible profundity containing boundless undisclosed,
perhaps yet unthinkable, experiences.* In other words, we always perceive more
than we can tell. Polyani argues that most of what we know in life is tacit as
opposed to explicit: it cannot be captured in words or even in symbols.
Having read only this from him, I am inclined to disagree with Polyani. I don't think that perception (by which I mean human perception - perhaps he doesn't) has "inexhaustible profundity..." I think that our perception is limited. And I can't think of any examples of things we can perceive yet not describe in some way. Can you?
A common experience of something explicit could be a very dear and close friend to whom we are bound by affection - our experience of them is something indivisible (IOW there is no meaningful way to break down our experience of them into a series of parts which we could then extrapolate to other people or objects as a substitute) and even a partial experience of something of them (like say hearing their voice recorded) is capable of "taking us back" to the taste or savoring of our previous estimation of their essence.
Again, I disagree. I think that such an experience can be broken down into a series of parts. After all, that dear and close friend is such a friend for various reasons, which we can express. And other close friends are probably close friends for similar reasons; thus we extrapolate to other people etc.
Let me know if you need me to explain why hearing the recording is not technically a metonym (at least for a person who has had direct experience of the person speaking) and why someone viewing a photograph of another's daughter they have never met is a metonym.
All this metonym stuff is interesting enough, but I don't really see what it has to do with the failures of empiricism or, going way back, to the actual topic of the thread. So, it seems I may need you to explain in more detail.
And I'm not sure what you mean by the "essence" of something like a cup of flour.
Well I guess one would say it was made up of approximately x grams of grains which results in approximately x million particles of wheat flour and which then goes on and on to a guess at how many quarks, etc until the subject disappears into experimental ideas on advanced physics (ie we reach the threshold of our empirical micro-cosmic investigation of things.
Do you think that a cup of flour has an "essence" beyond what you have listed here?
What I'm most interested in, I think, is what "essence" of the cup you think is beyond the reach of empiricism. And why that essence should matter to us.
What system of acquiring knowledge will give me reliable knowledge about what a cup of flour is "essentially"?
Do you think it could be a very powerful microscope, which could detect the ultimate fundamental, totally indivisible element of existence?
Or do you think the boundaries of the microcosm are practically limitless?
A very powerful microscope would give me empirical knowledge, but you're claiming that things have an "essence" beyond empirical knowledge. Or am I misinterpreting you?
My personal hunch is that the microcosm is not limitless. You can't keep cutting matter into smaller and smaller pieces forever. I am reasonably confident that there's a simplest substrate at the bottom - something like superstrings, perhaps. How about you?