Isn't it obvious? Different religions worship different gods. Some have one god, some have many. Some don't have gods, as such, but ancestor spirits or animistic spirits. In other words, the various specific truth claims they make are different, and in many cases contradictory. Either there is one god or many. Either god lives on that mountain or god lives in the sky. etc.
So you are saying that there is no way to contextualize these developments from the simple to the more complex ?
That there is no way to think about the question of god that contextualizes all these different approaches?
To claim compatibility, you would have to resort to much more general statements, such as "religions believe there are supernatural entities (one or more)". But concentrating on one or two general common features ignores the vast features that various religions do not have in common.
In short, animism involves understanding that there is something greater than one's self, polytheism involves attributing narratives to such greater entities and monotheism involves detailing the philosophical positions of such a position.
Fit all this into differing cultures and their attendant needs interests and concerns and you have a variety of responses to the question of god
Scientific ideas of authority are somewhat different from religious ones. To explore that particular issue properly would require much more time and effort than I have available. The question is an important one in the philosophy of science, so at this point I can only urge you to read an introductory text on that topic.
Its not really that different.
Theory always precedes practice ... what to speak of conclusions.
And for the sake of succinct knowledge distribution, one can talk of certain conclusions despite not having done the groundwork for them (even if one happens to be a professional in the field ... since its the nature of specializing that other paths are not open to one).
But there is demonstrably more to the daughter than just the foot. Whereas with God, you seem to be simply assuming that there's more to the universe than what we can see via empiricism.
tacit investigation, by its very nature, demonstrates its limits.
What to speak of god, even the president of america (in a certain sense) defies "standard empiric investigation" (IOW you only get to see him on his terms ... and not, say, on your personal skill an d aptitude in opening a dozen doors and catching 3 elevators (or whatever the schematics of the building he is residing in demands).
IOW the power of tacit investigation starts to diminish when you start talking about things that contextualize the seer on account of its superior qualities.
It sounds like you're saying that God is only knowable through direct personal experience. Is that right?
that is the best, but if you can talk somewhat confidently about exactly who the president is, what his duties are and a host of other things despite never having met him in person, you can understand other channels through which such knowledge is distributed.
As for your point about empiricism, I would say that science is about model-building. There are many things posited by scientific theories that we cannot directly observe, including electrons, quarks and black holes. The question of whether an electron is "real", let alone part of a "larger reality" is somewhat beside the point. Electrons are a useful device for helping us to understand our world.
Once again, that's fine, for as long as one is dealing with tacit ideas.
IOW when one starts trying to borrow from the authority of electrons, quarks and black holes in order to say something about the "larger reality" (such as "god doesn't exist), its then one has a problem.
Now, it could be that you're arguing that God is similarly a useful device to help explain our world, but I don't think that's what you're arguing at all. You seem to be claiming that God is real, but we can't prove it. So, it comes down to a statement that you personally feel like God is real. And that's the most you can say.
I am simply saying that there is a great deal that not only
isn't proved by tacit investigation, but
can't be proved by tacit investigation ... IOW tacit investigation simply doesn't work on problems of "greater reality"
I still don't understand what these "explicit terms" of your actually are. For example, you use the example of a cup of flour. Is a cup of flour an explicit term? It sounds like you think it is. But I'll get to that in a moment.
a cup of flour is explicit (or more specifically, "flour" is ... since "a cup" is a tacit qualifier).
I am not convinced that we have any experience of a cup of flour, let along of God, that cannot be confirmed by empirical means, at least in principle.
In principle?
I'm guessing you mean "in general" ... which is what tacit terminology is all about ...
It is true that my individual experience of the smell of a rose cannot yet be fully quantified or reproduced, but that is only because we don't yet know enough about how my brain works and how sensory perceptions interact with the psychological experience. I see no reason to conclude that a rose, or a cup of flour, has any mysterious essence that science cannot capture, at least in principle.
On what authority do you say "cannot yet"?
Especially since a cup of flour cannot be "fully investigated", much less "fully reproduced" (much less the apparatus which grants you cognitive awareness of a cup of flour ... which must be an infinite number of times more complex).
When it comes to God, many people claim to have personal experiences of God. Probably you're one of them. But I am not convinced that your categorisation of such experiences as direct perception of the "explicit" is correct. I think that such experiences are essentially explainable in the same way that the smell of the rose is explainable.
Many people make many sorts of claims about many things.
Generally there are frameworks we use to determine the integrity of such claims but that's kind of a separate and quite involved topic ... but needless to say there is no basis for saying variety in such claims automatically translates into "they are all right" or "they are all wrong".
Even an explanation of smelling a rose is limited.
For instance if a person smells a rose and says "that smells nice" and if a computer has a sensor that detects the aroma of a rose which in turn activates a voice response that says "that smells nice", has the same thing occurred,
in principle?
Every description or recording of an experience leaves something out.
Much like every metonymic investigation of a subject leaves something out
And that includes memory, by the way. It's partly a matter of the space required to store the information. Thus a written description of a rose is probably not as complete a description as a photograph of a rose, which is not as complete as a video recording, which is not as complete as a smell-o-vision recording, etc. But this is a technological issue, not a fundamental failure of our potential capacity to capture an experience.
I'm not sure you have understood the point.
The explicit offers
everything of an object.
The tacit offers
something of an object.
So whatever technological manner you may wish to frame the subject of a rose,
the rose itself will have superior qualities (on account of it
actually being a rose - ie the explicit article) compared to whatever you manage to scrape together empirically.
IOW it exists as the object of your perceptions and has (practically) unlimited qualities
Your piano example is interesting. Obviously, people are taught all the time (or learn otherwise) to play the piano. Again, I am not convinced that knowledge of the "explicitness" of playing the piano is necessary to learn how to play the piano. I'm not convinced there is any more to playing the piano than what is empirically accessible, at least in principle.
Learning how to play the piano is the basis for a book on how to learn to play the piano.
IOW its technically not possible to get more (at least in terms of learning how to play the piano) from reading a book about it as opposed to
actually learning it.
IOW the tacit follows the explicit ... simply because the explicit is
the actual reservoir of qualities for the "realness" of an object.
Sorry to harp on the same point, but I don't see any way in which associating a red dress with a loved person is in any way inaccessible to empirical investigation.
I was using it as an example of it not being practical to break down our experience of them into parts ... and how our experience of them
shape values ( as opposed to being the sum quality of values)
In fact, studies have been done on the way that people tend to regard objects as being "special" because they have an association with a person. For example, many people, when told that a particular jacket was once worn by Adolf Hitler, will refuse to wear it. It's a bit like a superstition.
So if I spat on a jacket that you associate with your beloved on account of them regularly wearing it , you don't think you would in any way be "superstitiously swayed" by that?
There are obvious reasons why the death of a loved child is more significant to a person than the loss of the services of a particular mechanic. I don't think you need to invoke the "explicit" to explain that.
One of which is that there is only "one child" but "numerous mechanics".
IOW in one scenario there is only one active principle giving rise to all other values ("I love my child") but in the other there are numerous (" I need someone to fix my car")
I think that once you reduce a cup to its individual molecules or atoms, you're looking at it on a different level that largely obviates its "cupness". I don't believe there is an "essence of cup of flour" beyond what we see, touch, taste, smell and so on.
The fact that we are finding newer and newer qualities from a cup of flour (or problems with the existing qualities we previously didn't have problems with) clearly indicates that there is some "essence" beyond what we see, touch, taste, smell and so on
But it seems to me that you're referring to an end to the process of possible simplification of the cup of flour. The flour is made of molecules of this and that. The molecules are made of atoms. The atoms are made of electrons and protons and neutrons. The protons are made of quarks. The quarks are... what?
I think you imagine that we can continue this process forever, breaking the quarks into smaller and smaller pieces, and we'll never get to the bottom. Therefore, you conclude, there's an "explicit" substance that reductionism can't find. I have two problems with that. One is that I don't think that matter is a bottomless heirarchy; in fact I suspect we're about one step from the bottom at our current state of knowledge.
This notion has a long, long history .... but that aside, this sounds more like a philosophical assertion than a scientific one (IOW it doesn't draw from the authority of empiricism)
The other problem is that I don't see any evidence for the kind of tacit/explicit discontinuity that you assert exists in all things. I don't believe that a cup of flour is anything more than the sum of its constituent parts, whatever they are. There's simply no reason to believe that there's anything more to it, as far as I can see.
the tacit discontinuity is simply when one asserts something explicit on its authority.
For instance you just made an explicit claim/statement above :
I don't think that matter is a bottomless heirarchy; in fact I suspect we're about one step from the bottom at our current state of knowledge.
If you are making this statement on the authority of empiricism, you have made a mistake since metonyms never give you the whole picture (granted you are of the opinion that science will bust this someday, somehow ... but as things stand at the moment, it hasn't).
Moreover, and this is important, I don't think there's any way for a person such as yourself to have direct access to the "explicit" cup of flour you say exists.
I never said I could ... Infact I even likened it to a dog swimming the length of the pacific ocean without assistance
When it comes to God, I suppose you would say that it is God who puts the "explicitness" into that cup of flour. And it seems that the only access we have to God, according to you, is through this same kind of unprovable direct perception.
Actually there are several different ways of approaching the notion/problem/nature of explicit terms.
For instance you just made an explicit claim above that is
certainly unprovable by direct perception (reaching the limit of the micro-cosm etc etc) ... and I guess you didn't require God (at least in a way that you are conscious of) to do it.
So how did you do it?
Actually my point about tacit investigation, the role of metonomy etc has simply been to show how these things really don't play a major role in determining how we frame the essential problem of "reality".