James R said:
Sorry that I've been a little late in my replies.
I suppose they try to follow through on the logical consequences of their basic assumptions and philosophy. And they probably try not to be inconsistent. Whether that makes them any more rational than other people is questionable.
Do you find your agnosticism to be more rational than theism?
Also, generally speaking,
everyone tries to follow through the logical consequences of their basic assumptions and philosophy. From bank robbers to pedophiles to politicians etc etc. But as you have probably seen, atheists on this forum often state matter of factly that they are more rational than theists. But this is illogical, is it not, since atheists are operating on the logical implications of their assumption that a God concept is superfluous even as theists do the same for their assumptions?
It is possible to weigh up the pros and cons of the US keeping soldiers in Iraq. On one side we have monetary and human costs. On the other side, we have the potential consequences of law and order completely breaking down in Iraq. etc. etc. I'm not making the argument that "it can't hurt" for America to stay in Iraq, because there's an obvious down side to that. The question is: does the good outweigh the bad? Of course, this particular example is a topic for another thread.
Who determines what the 'pros' and 'cons' are for America? And by what invariable standard I wonder?
Aah. And the basis for humanism is not self interest, you say. What obligates humanists to act selflessly then? If there is no obligation, then what is the point in being a humanist?
Nothing obligates anybody to adopt one set of philosophical propositions over another. What is the point? Maybe it gives people a banner to unite behind. It brings together a group of people with common ideas.
If you believe in the Christian god, what's the point of identifying yourself as Catholic or Baptist or whatever?
Affiliating oneself with a Christian denomination implies an agreement with the major theologies of that denomination. So that you know Baptists don't confess to priests and Catholics don't dance in church. But it doesn't make sense to put it that way: that a person converts to the Baptist brand of Christianity in order to 'unite' with the Baptist church.
But that might be a strawman so I'll be more specific:
Adopting a philosophical proposition in order to 'belong' reeks of herdism. And genuflecting to the herd mentality is not rational, is it?
Ok, you win. It's not completely selfless. But then, nothing is, is it?
Is selfishness rational? It seems that in order for humanistic actions to remain rational, selfishness must be rational as well. But saying selfishness is rational opens up a giant can of worms for dinner.
So. Is it?
I suspect that utilitarian ideas are fairly common in humanist philosophy, though I don't pretend to be an expert.
For a bunch of rationalists, all the sources I have looked at our incredibly nebulous about what standard is used.
They believe that "moral values derive their source from human experience." Since most believe that an afterlife is non-existent, they regard life here on earth to be particularly precious. They are highly motivated to alleviating pain and misery around the world. Many are active in refugee, human rights, anti-death penalty, environmental groups, etc.
http://www.religioustolerance.org/humanism.htm
I'm going to have to agree that there is probably a utilitarian approach since I don't see why else they should be against dictatorships. But then again, in the very same document, there is an emphasis on 'individuality'. I'm not sure how you can champion both individuality and the group without running into logical inconsistencies.. but, hey, that's "rationalism" for you.
Every chain of logic has a set of premises, which are taken as fundamental and unquestionable. From those premises, which you may call "irrational" (depending on how you want to define the term), the "rational" arguments follow.
I don't remember claiming that humanists are entirely rational...
Well, I guess you shall have to clarify what you mean by "rational".
Hehe..
Like I said earlier, everyone is rational if we think of it in terms of conclusions following from premises. Hitler's conclusions followed perfectly from his premises after all. Thus, it seems prima facie that the only way to determine 'rationality' is by validating the premises. But this too is false. For somebody to say Hitler's
premises were irrational is absurdly circular since, necessarily, they must hold the assumption that their own premise is
rational and anything that does not agree with it is not. In other words, "Hitler's assumptions that the Jews were inferior is irrational because I myself assume that there is no such thing as racial inferiority." The circularity of "my line of reasoning is more reasonable than your line of reasoning" is unworkable so as to disqualify the practice of determining whether a system is rational by determining whether it's primary assumptions are rational.
This is why I have preferred to use internal consistency as a standard for determining rationality. In this way, I have no say over whether or not a system is "rational" or not but rather the system
proves itself to be rational or irrational. For example, if Hitler were to pardon some Jews and treat them very well, this would be inconsistent with his own assumptions so that we could call him "irrational" - but
by using his own system. Or maybe we can look at Hitler's own ethnicity and if he is not of the "master race" (as they say he was not), then we can call him irrational since he did not exterminate himself.
What we are not trying to determine is whether the humanist is consistent with his own assumption that he must use reason
and reason alone (thereby excluding all methods which are 'irrational') to solve human problems. And the beauty of the matter is that we don't even have to bicker over what is 'irrational' in such context; given the humanist's assumptions, anything he does which produces logical inconsistency within his own system is necessarily irrational. In this case we don't even suffer the possibility of being arbitrary.
But this of course includes the presumption that logical inconsistency is not logical. I doubt anyone would disagree with me that if
P1) A = A
P2) A = B
C1) A != B
(From the premise that A = B, it is concluded that A must therefore not be equal to B)
The system is internally inconsistent and therefore illogical.
The question is: does praying 5 times a day to a stone give reliable results? If so, then it is a good strategy. If not, maybe doing something else would be "more rational".
Yes, but only because I don't see praying to a stone as giving tangible benefits to anybody, except perhaps on an individual level, and it doesn't do it for me. (Ok, I admit, I haven't tried.)
Neither have I, except that one time when I really really wanted..
Well what you are saying is that when something gives "reliable results" then it is rational. But that definition cannot be used to determine whether Nazis weres rational or not. It also fails the test of
impartiality. Many Christians believe that God answers their prayer, and when He doesn't do so at beck-and-call it is due to His own patience and wisdom. You might say this is dubious reasoning and therefore "unreliable", but to the Christian, God is by definition reliable. His lack of promptness in answering prayer is therefore full demonstration of His
reliability; God didn't answer the prayer immediately because He had a better plan.
You must admit that these conclusions drawn from the Christian's premises are
logically flawless. They follow quite perfectly. You are then left with arguing that your line of reasoning is more reasonable than their line of reasoning.
Hence our need for an internal consistency test.
An atheist would certainly argue that religion is not the "right" path. A short-term goal might have been achieved (getting off drugs), but at what cost? How does the cost-benefit equation stack up? And should we even be looking at the question as one of cost-benefit anyway, since that in itself presumes a utilitarian view? Such questions are a bottomless pit.
The 'benefits' are usually acknowledged universally. Both atheists and theists will probably agree that getting off drugs or booze is a 'benefit'. But they will obviously not agree on what the "costs" are.
This disagreement between atheists and theists over what are 'disadvantages' of religious conversion require that the atheist (for burden of proof) provide a rational standard for determining whether something is a disadvantage or not. As you know, this is quite impossible and so there will yet be bickering over whose line of reasoning is more reasonable.
The main point I am trying to get across to people (atheists and rationalists especially) is that reason cannot be used to show that a line of reasoning is more reasonable. The very attempt to do so is itself circular and therefore unreasonable.
I was telling Raithere in another thread about how little difference there is between atheists and theists, both of whom seek happiness, fulfillment, long life, stability, and most importantly for them, "truth". So that apart from the basic assumptions employed in the quest to attain these things, there is little to differentiate both parties.
Maybe so, but I'm happy to accept a flawed philosophy if it can be shown that it produces demonstrably better outcomes than other flawed philosophies. What do you think?
Same thing as above; one man's meat is another man's poison. What may be good for someone may not be good for you. Your personal qualifier is "
demonstrably better".
I do wonder what rational standard you use to demonstrate that a philosophy is "better" than another philosophy.
If you, as a rationalist, are able to tell me this then.. We can use that rational knowledge to end ALL strife between disagreeing parties by rationally determining which party's view is "demonstrably better".
But if you fail, that is, if you have no standard, then that means you are being inconsistent and therefore irrational yourself. (Hehehe..) For to operate without a set standard is, by definition, to be logically inconsistent. That itself is the basis for mathematics and physics, I expect.
So.
What is it?
Modern societies are too interdependent to be broken down into smaller groups in the way you seem to be suggesting. Do you think that going back to small group subsistence farming would really help? Do you think it is even possible to go back?
Secondly, there already are smaller groups within our compex societies. Nobody is a member of just one group. You are probably a member of a group of work colleagues, a family group, a group of friends, perhaps a sporting group, as well as a citizen of your country (a much larger group).
Well, I think all things are possible. But, as we are generally resistant to change (especially on such a major scale), people will not want to go back (even if it's in their best interest).
My proposed solution is really simple. The simpler the societies, the simpler the groups, the simpler the people. Et voila, a lot of problems are diminished. Of course, you might argue that new problems will crop up, but that is of no concern to me since they would be the same "problems" our forefathers faced, and they certainly didn't cry and whine because there were no reality shows or penicillin. But then again. A herd of people is like a grouping of mules: dead set on resisting change in direction.
Who says I abstain from religion?
There are many reasons why somebody might abstain from religion, some of which have nothing to do with belief in god(s). For example, one might disagree with some of the teachings of religion.
Well, I expect MacM would beg to differ. I've heard all about you and your religion of relativity and Einstein-worship, MacM knows your secret!
Seriously though, you don't abstain from religion?
Either way, people abstain from religion for reasons. And because they believe the reasons justify atheism, they do in fact become atheists; the same applies for theism. So that everyone believes his reasons justify his actions. A single mother might bet all her money in Las Vegas and her reasons could be "I have nothing to lose" or "I feel lucky" or "I'm drunk so what the hell anyway" etc etc. These all, to her, are reasons why she should wager her savings. To someone else, they might be invalid reasons, but that doesn't stop the mother from believing her reasoning justifies her actions.
But how can we know that the atheist's reason for abstaining for religion or the mother's reason for betting are 'reasonable' without ourselves making an assumption which is necessarily unreasonable?
As I said before, everybody starts with a set of basic assumptions. Logic comes later. For that reason, I think a belief in God is rational, provided you start from a particular point.
Which "point
", for example?
Good question, but you'd need to be more specific for me to answer.
Surely, there are things which you consider 'reasonable' and therefore attract you, and there are things which you consider 'unreasonable' and therefore repel you.
How do you determine whether something is 'reasonable' without being circular (for logical inconsistency is a mark of being unreasonable)?
