Atheism is a belief.

[Sarkus]

What about believing I can (choose to) run to A B or anywhere? What if I lost my legs in some accident, and now I'm in a motorised wheelchair? I would then need to believe I can (choose to) drive my battery-powered vehicle to some destination.

You can certainly choose to believe you can choose, if you are doubtful that you have the ability to make a choice.
Do you?
Do you have a doubt that you can choose, such that you need to believe you can choose before you do?
I can choose - I have done so on innumerable occasions that it is now a fact that I have the ability to chose. No belief necessary.

The third choice is also a belief, right? Choosing to believe that you can disbelieve, for whatever reason you so choose.

Choice and belief are the same thing, or choice is made because you believe (something).

If you think choice and belief are the same thing then I refer you to any dictionary that you wish or care to look at.

Please feel free to come back when you understand the difference between the two.

 

[Frud11]

The third choice is also a belief, right?

No. You assert this, but you cannot specify what it is a belief in.

Yes I CAN. It's a belief if, or when, you don't believe (in) something. The choice to disbelieve something is also a belief in its truthfulness, or relevance.
You're the one who has this back to front.
NOT believing A, is NOT the same as not knowing anything about (the existence of) A.

If you DON'T believe the A exists, this is because you don't believe the evidence supports it's existence.

You're confusing the actuality of A (it's existence in the world, or an explanation of its existence, or an observed phenomenon), with believing that its ontology is real, or actual.
Belief is choice. You select a belief.

You can't not select a belief and have a "non-belief", in something that you know exists (even if there is little evidence of it).

It's possibility or probability, and expectation.
Like that pea under the cup--does it exist? If so, is it still under one of the cups (or have you palmed it to try to deceive me)?
I expect, then, that this pea that I saw you place under one of two cups is still under one of two cups. Therefore there is exactly a 1 in 2 chance of selecting the cup with "the pea" under it. Or I might doubt its existence because I also know you are good at palming objects, or you're a trained "magician".

...it is now a fact that I have the ability to chose. No belief necessary.

It's a fact NOW? This implies it wasn't a fact THEN? When did you find out that you have this ability?

No belief is necessary to have this ability? You are free of any belief, including any belief that you are able to make choices?

You appear to have chosen to believe that you don't need to believe...?

P.S. Dictionaries are all very well, but you may have noticed that they use other words to define word entries (in an alphabetic list).
But then, you don't believe in meanings, or anything else, you just choose a word for no reason, or something.

 

[Sarkus]

f you DON'T believe the A exists, this is because you don't believe the evidence supports it's existence.

This is AGNOSTICISM - not ATHEISM.

Atheism per se is NOT a belief - it is a LACK OF BELIEF.

Other reasons / beliefs might give rise to one's atheism, but ATHEISM is merely a lack of a very specific belief.

You are confusing belief in other things as being somehow part of atheism - when all they might be are causes for one's atheistic position.
It matters not if I happen to believe in tooth-fairies, or in Santa Claus, or whether I believe there is a Martian flag somewhere on the North polar ice-cap.

Belief is choice. You select a belief.

Sure - and I choose not to have the very specific positive-belief that God exists - hence ATHEIST.
This might be due to other beliefs, understandings, choices, interpretations etc, as stated.

You can't not select a belief and have a "non-belief", in something that you know exists (even if there is little evidence of it).

Isn't the point of not having the belief that you DON'T KNOW whether it exists or not?

Is Agnosticism a "belief"? Possibly you could argue it.
Is Atheism a "belief"? Only for those that categorically believe that god does not exist.
For those of us who do not believe in either the existence or non-existence - it is NOT a belief but a lack of the very specific belief one requires to be an atheist.
Yes, it's a choice - based possibly on other beliefs or on pure apathy, but it is still a lack of a belief.

You appear to have chosen to believe that you don't need to believe...?

And you appear to have moved onto generalities of belief when the topic is concerning a very specific belief, which I don't have.

 

[sowhatifit'sdark]

To me behavior matters.

Abstract positions have little to do with life.

If an atheist simply does not believe, and tends to bring this up when questioned or when exploring a position, and tends to only get pissed off at religious people who are, in their estimation, being immoral, well that is one thing.
If an atheist feels the urge to tell anyone who believes in things not currently verified by scientific research that they are a fucking idiot - either openly or implicitly getting this across to the other person - or sets themelves up as a kind of missionary - heading into sites or discussion forums to 'show those irrational people that their interpretations of their personal experiences are stupid' - it doesn't really matter to me if, when pressed, they say "I think there is insufficient evidence" and 'atheists, at least ones that are not strong have no belief." I can't really take their position definition seriously.
I think intent is important and behavior is belief.
Of course there are many shades of gray and of course religious people have a long history of proselytizing, at least from the big monotheisms, in any case. And of course there are other ways of being a shitty discussion partner.

But atheists, in this sort of discussion, get very irritated by 'believers' refusal to simply admit that, gosh, every atheist here, for example, simply does not believe in God, when it seems like, if one follows discussions, something more is going on. Perhaps not so much in the thread dealing with the definition of an atheist, but in other discussions relating to religious or supernatural issues.

Not with all atheists by any means.

I just read some US poll results related to the election.
Some very large % said they could imagine voting for a black presidential candidate. An nearly as large % said the could imagine voting for a woman. When they estimated their fellow americans willingness the %ages went way down. Way down.
Racism and sexism are out there and exist, but they are never here.

 

[Frud11]

Atheism per se is NOT a belief - it is a LACK OF BELIEF.

NO, it is a belief, that you have no good reason (due to a lack of evidence) to believe something--theism. LACK OF BELIEF in A or B implies the existence of A or B.

You cannot have a "non-belief". Having a non-belief is like saying you can use "non-money".
What you have, is a belief in the non-existence of something--you don't see it. This, of course, doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or that there is no evidence.
No evidence at all--lack of any sign or signal or pattern-means no (possibility of) belief or disbelief. Absence of belief is absence of anything that suggests belief. Disbelief is still belief.

 

[sowhatifit'sdark]

NO, it is a belief, that you have no good reason (due to a lack of evidence) to believe something--theism. LACK OF BELIEF in A or B implies the existence of A or B.

You cannot have a "non-belief". Having a non-belief is like saying you can use "non-money".
What you have, is a belief in the non-existence of something--you don't see it. This, of course, doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or that there is no evidence.
No evidence at all--lack of any sign or signal or pattern-means no (possibility of) belief, or disbelief. Absence of belief is absence of anything that suggests belief. Disbelief is still belief.

This is actually a good point, especially since most atheists, including weak ones, in addition believe that believers despite whatever personal experiences they have, also lack sufficient evidence.

This does not mean that they belief there is no God,
but it does seem to mean they believe
currently all belief in God is irrational and based on insufficient evidence.

I rarely see an atheist who leaves open the possibility that someone could be making a rational decision to believe in God based on their own experiences and the atheist is simply is pointing out that these experiences cannot be used to prove the existence of God to the atheist.

In other words
there is no difference between
not being able to prove it to me
and
insufficient evidence.

If you cannot prove it to me, your belief is unfounded/irrational.

This seems to me to be absolutely a belief.
I have now added a point to Fru11's. I do think his more restricted point also hold, again, with the proviso that it is not a belief that there is no God.

 

[Sarkus]

NO, it is a belief, that you have no good reason (due to a lack of evidence) to believe something--theism.

Yes - and this is AGNOSTICISM - NOT ATHEISM.
Their AGNOSTICISM might lead to ATHEISM - it might even lead to THEISM - but it is NOT (A)THEISM but a separate issue entirely to the question in hand.

LACK OF BELIEF in A or B implies the existence of A or B.

Rubbish - it implies the POSSIBILITY of the existence of A or B.

You cannot have a "non-belief". Having a non-belief is like saying you can use "non-money".
What you have, is a belief in the non-existence of something--you don't see it. This, of course, doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or that there is no evidence.
No evidence at all--lack of any sign or signal or pattern-means no (possibility of) belief, or disbelief. Absence of belief is absence of anything that suggests belief. Disbelief is still belief.

If this is honestly what you hold true then you really do need to get yourself a dictionary, as well as an understanding of basic logic.

You are confusing "Non-Belief in A" with "Belief in Non-A".
If you can not see the difference between these then there is little point in continuing.

 

[Sarkus]

This is actually a good point, especially since most atheists, including weak ones, in addition believe that believers despite whatever personal experiences they have, also lack sufficient evidence.

I think they hold that the "personal experiences" have more rational interpretations than that which leads the believer to God - and the inability of that person to be able to explain their "personal experience" adequately leads further to the rational position held by the atheist.
But bear in mind that a "rational position" is not necessarily a "correct position".

This does not mean that they belief there is no God,
but it does seem to mean they believe
currently all belief in God is irrational and based on insufficient evidence.

But this is not ATHEISM - this is AGNOSTICISM - and as we have tried many many times previously - the two are distinct matters.
I, for example, am an Agnostic Atheist.
My "absence of belief in God" (i.e. my Atheism) is due in no small part to the fact that I have no personal evidence of God (i.e. my Agnosticism).

I rarely see an atheist who leaves open the possibility that someone could be making a rational decision to believe in God based on their own experiences and the atheist is simply is pointing out that these experiences cannot be used to prove the existence of God to the atheist.

This is done throughout the forum.
That people have had personal experiences is not in question - but we do discuss the interpretation of those experiences - as it is the interpretation that is rational / irrational - not the experience itself.

If you cannot prove it to me, your belief is unfounded/irrational.

Almost - but I would say "if you can not prove it to me - for me to hold your belief would be unfounded / irrational".
I would only claim someone else's belief as generally unfounded / irrational if their interpretation of their evidence is clearly irrational (e.g. if their belief is founded on an interpretation that a four-wheeled vehicle is an edible fruit).

 

[Frud11]

I have no personal evidence of God

Do you believe this, or you think you don't? If you think you don't believe it, then what are you saying?
You're trying to say that there is no possibility of the existence of God, because you have no personal evidence--so what about all the people you know about who do believe God exists...?
Or all those scriptures, the Dead Sea scrolls that you haven't read yet (because you're brushing up on your ancient Hebrew and Aramaic)? What sort of non-evidence is all that stuff?

...the POSSIBILITY of the existence of A or B.

Implies the existence of A or B, like I said with: LACK OF BELIEF in A or B implies the existence of A or B.

P.S. You might want to define what this atheism thing is meant to be again. I maintain that atheism--the claim that theism is a belief in something that does not exist--is a belief. Disbelief requires belief, just like holding your breath requires oxygen.

P.P.S. "Assignation of meaning (even to something you believe has none), is belief."

 

[Frud11]

You are confusing "Non-Belief in A" with "Belief in Non-A".

If I don't believe there is a cake on the table (let's say I can't see one), this is different from believing there isn't a cake on the table?

Someone (like yourself) who says "I don't believe in...", is saying "I believe the existence of... is an incorrect view (or belief)".

I can't say: "I don't believe in non-magical non-connected unforces", because there is absolutely zero evidence that such things have ever existed, or ever will. If there is no evidence or suggestion, or hint, then belief, disbelief, non-belief, or anything at all to do with forming an opinion of such things, is not in the list of possibilities, i.e. has zero probability.

 

[Sarkus]

If I don't believe there is a cake on the table (let's say I can't see one), this is different from believing there isn't a cake on the table?

In this case, where you can see the table, the inference of "not believing there is a cake" is that you "believe there is not a cake".

But this is a very specific situation where your direct perception of the location of said cake makes the position binary (i.e. believe there is or believe there is not).

The situation with God is not the same:
For example - if I am not even in the same house, and am agnostic as to the bakery situation within the house - rationally I would not believe there is a cake on the table, and I would not believe there is not a cake on the table. I would choose NOT TO BELIEVE.


So - you answer me this:
You stand outside a house... You CAN NOT SEE THE KITCHEN.

Can you honestly say that you believe there is a cake on the table?
Can you honestly say that you believe there is NOT a cake on the table?


You don't know the following:
(a) if there is a table;
(b) if there is a kitchen;
(c) if the owner knows how to bake a cake;
(d) if a cake has been baked;
(e) where a baked cake (if one exists) is currently located in the kitchen.

You would be AGNOSTIC with respect to the kitchen bakery situation.
And thus you would (I hope) rationally be unable to have a belief on such matters.


Whether Agnosticism is a position of belief or not is a different matter - and where you might be getting confused.

Does this clarify the position?

 

[sowhatifit'sdark]

I think they hold that the "personal experiences" have more rational interpretations than that which leads the believer to God - and the inability of that person to be able to explain their "personal experience" adequately leads further to the rational position held by the atheist.

Which would certainly include beliefs. Beliefs such as 'I as a non-experiencer can adequately judge that your experience should not have led you to believe in God and your belief is not rational. Beliefs that the rationalist has in some way access to what the experience really was like and how the person's filters - cultural, psychological, etc. - contorted the interpretation. Notice that the rationalist is fairly certain about things that he has no access to in his paradigm.

Also, there are plenty of experiences one can have that cannot be proven to others or validated by science that have, much later, either been supported in the ways courts determine evidence or in the ways science does.

In fact I would argue that it is not rational to restrict ones beliefs to only those things that one can prove to others.

But bear in mind that a "rational position" is not necessarily a "correct position".

Yes, and good to mention it. But the assumption here is that people who believe in something based on personal experience that cannot be used as proof for others are always irrational even if it turns out they were correct. I see no reason to limit rationality, basically, to the ability of non-believers to understand or make use of my experiences.

The first Native Americans who have contact with Europeans. They tell members of another tribe about these pale humans who dress strange and smell very bad - which they did - came to land from canoes the size of hills, etc. The other tribe does not believe them. They say that it was some sort of vision and perhaps these were spirits - ie. hallucinations or dreams in rationalist terms - but they were not humans.

Only years later do the whites come again and the first tribe can show both artifacts belonging to the whites and finally the whites themselves.

Were the members of this tribe irrational until they could provide proof to the other tribe?

If it bothers you that I have more than one person see the whites, make it just one person. I still think that it can be rational to accept both the phenomenon and the interpretation - here that they were not spirits but in fact other, if odd, humans - even when one cannot prove it and even when there are other more rational explanations - you were dreaming, some people in your tribe used chalk on their faces, etc.

I am not saying that the skepticism of the other tribe is being irrational by not accepting the interpretation. Nor am I saying they should accept it.

But this is not ATHEISM - this is AGNOSTICISM - and as we have tried many many times previously - the two are distinct matters.
I, for example, am an Agnostic Atheist.
My "absence of belief in God" (i.e. my Atheism) is due in no small part to the fact that I have no personal evidence of God (i.e. my Agnosticism).

But when you move into telling people that their interpretations of their experiences are probably wrong and are in any case irrational, are you not coming from a position that includes beliefs and I would say rather strong ones about your abilities and their abilities and what the limits of experience can possibly be?

I wonder if when you reread the sentence about the phrase 'I have no personal evidence of God' might come off odd to you as it did to me.

Where I am reacting perhaps differently from Fru11 is that I see atheist not as an abstract concept but as a sociological phenomenon that does not seem so clean and 'innocent' as pretty much every atheist likes to present it.

This is done throughout the forum.
That people have had personal experiences is not in question - but we do discuss the interpretation of those experiences - as it is the interpretation that is rational / irrational - not the experience itself.

And all these arguments would be based on the belief that these people MUST be misinterpreting their experiences and that their interpretation is incorrect - or perhaps better worded their interpreting is incorrect, though their conclusion might be coincidentally correct. And see above, Native American example. I do not think the 'I can come up with a more likely explanation' means that therefore you must be being irrational holds. And having been on the receiving end of some of these more likely explanations - not simply around supernatural phenomena, but around phenomena that were considered extremely unlikely, what others assume I would confuse, or anyone would confuse, what they say I 'probably' experienced with what I am saying I experienced has often seemed very silly and based on a need for all phenomena to fit with either 1) likely phenomena and 2) currently verified and understood by science phenomena. I think the irrationality of rationalists comes into play with this 'I know what that really probably was' game.

Almost - but I would say "if you can not prove it to me - for me to hold your belief would be unfounded / irrational".
I would only claim someone else's belief as generally unfounded / irrational if their interpretation of their evidence is clearly irrational (e.g. if their belief is founded on an interpretation that a four-wheeled vehicle is an edible fruit).

You haven't been to enough Florida parades. I have to say that often I have experienced the 're-interpretation' of skeptics to be just as ludicrous. And such confidence in their ability to know 1) my own ability or lack of in distinguishing between types of phenomena and 2) what can be identified via personal experience - the limits thereof.

I remember all the doctors and nurses who told people they were not really ill - when they had one of the now Epstein Barr virus related and testable for syndromes - like CFS or Fibromyalgia.

Were these people irrational for believing they were sick and not having psychosomatic symptoms? They could not prove it - there was no test then. There were more 'rational' and 'likely' explanations - they had emotional problems.

Is someone irrational now if they believe they are ill, even though they have never heard of the diseases I mentioned above before they are tested? And then after they are tested and told, yes, you have a disease, are they then rational when they believe?

 

[Frud11]

You stand outside a house... You CAN NOT SEE THE KITCHEN.

Can you honestly say that you believe there is a cake on the table?
Can you honestly say that you believe there is NOT a cake on the table?

I can't say anything about what's on a table in a kitchen, or anywhere else, if I can't see that there is a table.

But as to the existence of cakes, not the question of whether I can get to actually see one: this is moot if I know that they exist (they're made in bakeries, and in kitchens in residences).
So standing outside a house would yield a possibility of there being a cake inside somewhere. If it was a bakery, I could consider my chances of seeing one (if not getting some of it to eat), a better possibility, if I also assume that the bakery bakes cakes, there should be more than one (maybe they won't notice if I grab one).
It doesn't have anything to do with being unable to "have a belief" in the existence of cakes, but whether a house or bakery might have cake.
I can't believe there's cake somewhere 'til I actually see it, or I could get told about the (non)existence of cake in a particular place. This doesn't affect my belief in the existence of cake, or my belief that cakes get baked every day somewhere.

 

[Sarkus]

Which would certainly include beliefs. Beliefs such as 'I as a non-experiencer can adequately judge that your experience should not have led you to believe in God and your belief is not rational.

This is not what is stated - but "I as a non-experiencer can judge that your experience would not have led ME to believe in God...".

Beliefs that the rationalist has in some way access to what the experience really was like and how the person's filters - cultural, psychological, etc. - contorted the interpretation. Notice that the rationalist is fairly certain about things that he has no access to in his paradigm.

No - the rationalist only needs to come up with something more objectively rational to thus discount the interpretation as given by the experiencer.

Also, there are plenty of experiences one can have that cannot be proven to others or validated by science that have, much later, either been supported in the ways courts determine evidence or in the ways science does.

Rationality says nothing about the accuracy of the claim - merely the thought process to arrive at the claim from the given evidence.
Many incorrect claims have been rational right up to the point that a new piece of evidence was introduced.

In fact I would argue that it is not rational to restrict ones beliefs to only those things that one can prove to others.

No - it is rational not to have beliefs where the evidence is, at best, inconclusive - and then it is not so much a matter of belief but one of probability.

Yes, and good to mention it. But the assumption here is that people who believe in something based on personal experience that cannot be used as proof for others are always irrational even if it turns out they were correct. I see no reason to limit rationality, basically, to the ability of non-believers to understand or make use of my experiences.

Again - rationality (or not) is about the thought process - not the claim being made.

The first Native Americans who have contact with Europeans. They tell members of another tribe about these pale humans who dress strange and smell very bad - which they did. The other tribe does not believe them. They say that it was some sort of vision and perhaps these were spirits - ie. hallucinations or dreams in rationalist terms - but they were not humans.

Only years later do the whites come again and the first tribe can show both artifacts belonging to the whites and finally the whites themselves.

Were the members of this tribe irrational until they could provide proof to the other tribe?

No - the other tribe was irrational if they believed that the whites were not human. The only rational position for the people being told would have been one of non-belief - and to ascertain further evidence in the matter.

If it bothers you that I have more than one person see the whites, make it just one person. I still think that it can be rational to accept both the phenomenon and the interpretation - here that they were not spirits but in fact other, if odd, humans - even when one cannot prove it and even when there are other more rational explanations - you were dreaming, some people in your tribe used chalk on their faces, etc.

One needs to assess the claim being made - and how extraordinary it is.
The more extraordinary the claim, the better the evidence needs to be.
The claim of "white people" is not so extraordinary - they are merely talking about humans of different variation to those that the tribe already knew existed. They must have known they were but a small part of a much larger world. They weren't claiming anything mystical or magical about the white people, or that they could somehow break the laws of physics. So the evidence would not have had to have been great.
One must also consider the person making the claim and weigh up your previous experiences with him - as this in itself is some evidence of propensity toward accuracy / truth.

I am not saying that the skepticism of the other tribe is being irrational by not accepting the interpretation. Nor am I saying they should accept it.

It would depend how far the skepticism went: if it went to belief of non-existence of the white people - this is irrational.

But when you move into telling people that their interpretations of their experiences are probably wrong and are in any case irrational, are you not coming from a position that includes beliefs and I would say rather strong ones about your abilities and their abilities and what the limits of experience can possibly be?

Few people on this site would say that interpretations are categorically wrong - as most would merely offer suggestions of alternatives that would appear more rational. To then accept the alternative as more rational but to then stick with the less rational suggestion is in itself irrational.

I wonder if when you reread the sentence about the phrase 'I have no personal evidence of God' might come off odd to you as it did to me.

Nope - should it appear odd? Why does it appear odd to you?
Are you saying that I DO have personal evidence of God?

Where I am reacting perhaps differently from Fru11 is that I see atheist not as an abstract concept but as a sociological phenomenon that does not seem so clean and 'innocent' as pretty much every atheist likes to present it.

Fair enough - but that is like discussing the tenets of a religion (i.e. the specific beliefs) by talking about the church-goers.

And all these arguments would be based on the belief that these people MUST be misinterpreting their experiences and that their interpretation is incorrect - or perhaps better worded their interpreting is incorrect, though their conclusion might be coincidentally correct.

There is no MUST - at least I wish to think that I am not guilty of it.
I would merely raise alternative suggestions that, to me, would appear to be more rational, and thus form an opinion, through discussion, on whether the interpretation by the subject is more rational or not etc.

One can not openly claim "irrational" about an interpretation if one is not privvy to all the evidence.

I do not think the 'I can come up with a more likely explanation' means that therefore you must be being irrational holds.

It's not a question of "more likely" but more rational - generally per Occam's Razor.

I think the irrationality of rationalists comes into play with this 'I know what that really probably was' game.

This is being disingenuous. We do not state "I KNOW what that really probably was" - there is no need to.
If one can state and support the claim that an alternative interpretation is more rational then that is sufficient - whether it is ultimately the truth or not.

You haven't been to enough Florida parades.

What are they?

I have to say that often I have experienced the 're-interpretation' of skeptics to be just as ludicrous. And such confidence in their ability to know 1) my own ability or lack of in distinguishing between types of phenomena and 2) what can be identified via personal experience - the limits thereof.

You have to judge for yourself whether their "re-interpretations" are more rational for you or not. Noone can tell you. They can merely offer alternatives that, given their understanding and evidence, appear more rational to them.

I remember all the doctors and nurses who told people they were not really ill - when they had one of the now Epstein Barr virus related and testable for syndromes - like CFS or Fibromyalgia.

And now you're introducing personal / professional bias that might deter people from admitting things like "I don't know". So I can not answer for them or the reasons for doing what they did.

Rationality leaves room for "I don't know... but rationally I would conclude this." But one must also weigh up the consequence of being rational but incorrect in determining the appropriate course to take / answer to give.

 

[Sarkus]

I can't say anything about what's on a table in a kitchen, or anywhere else, if I can't see that there is a table.

Welcome to atheism!!!!!!!!!

But as to the existence of cakes, not the question of whether I can get to actually see one: this is moot if I know that they exist (they're made in bakeries, and in kitchens in residences).
So standing outside a house would yield a possibility of there being a cake inside somewhere. If it was a bakery, I could consider my chances of seeing one (if not getting some of it to eat), a better possibility, if I also assume that the bakery bakes cakes, there should be more than one (maybe they won't notice if I grab one).
It doesn't have anything to do with being unable to "have a belief" in the existence of cakes, but whether a house or bakery might have cake.
I can't believe there's cake somewhere 'til I actually see it, or I could get told about the (non)existence of cake in a particular place. This doesn't affect my belief in the existence of cake, or my belief that cakes get baked every day somewhere.

The analogy was "belief in God" = "belief there is a cake on the table".
There is one belief on either side (God / cake-on-the-table)

You are now changing the analogy to "belief in god" = "belief in cake (location irrelevant)".

All you are now doing is discussing one's position on knowledge of the subject matter (cake) - which is whether one is an AGNOSTIC (or not).
It is clear, now, that you confuse one with the other.
I have already stated that Agnosticism could be argued a belief, but the question is whether Atheism is or not.

And since you have fundamentally admitted your "atheist" position with regard the specific belief: "is there a cake on the table?" - I thank you for your time and efforts in this regard.

 

[Frud11]

Atheism per se is NOT a belief - it is a LACK OF BELIEF.

And as I've said before--this is not rational.

Lack of belief is due to lack of (zero) evidence. If there is evidence, then beliefs, opinions, or conjectures can be applied to it. Insufficient evidence is still evidence.

Saying "Athieism is not a belief", implies that it's based on non-observation. You simply cannot form any sort of opinion or form any idea at all about something that doesn't exist. Saying "it doesn't exist", when there are observations of existence of the thing in question, even if they aren't your personal observations, is an opinion.

i.e. I don't believe certain things because I understand what they're supposed to be. Astrology, for example, is something I disbelieve, not because there is zero evidence and zero observation, but because there are other explanations for the (non-empty set of) observations.

Atheism is a belief. It's the belief that there is insufficient evidence. As I say insufficiency is not absolutely nothing. If there's no observation (nothing to observe), then there's nothing to believe or disbelieve.

 

[Sarkus]

And as I've said before--this is not rational.

And you are confusing atheism with agnosticism.

Lack of belief is due to lack of (zero) evidence.

Aye - my atheism is due to my agnosticism - my lack of (zero) evidence regarding God.

If there is evidence, then beliefs, opinions, or conjectures can be applied to it. Insufficient evidence is still evidence.

If. Big word, that is. If.

Saying "Athieism is not a belief", implies that it's based on non-observation. You simply cannot form any sort of opinion or form any idea at all about something that doesn't exist. Saying "it doesn't exist", when there are observations of existence of the thing in question, even if they aren't your personal observations, is an opinion.

I don't say "it doesn't exist." I, and others, have explained this to you time and time again.
Some atheists do say "it doesn't exist".
I don't. I'm an agnostic atheist - so how can I possibly claim "it doesn't exist" - just as much as I can not possibly claim "it does exist".

To me it is currently logically consistent with something that does not exist, but this does not mean that I believe it does or doesn't exist.

Atheism is a belief. It's the belief that there is insufficient evidence.

No. That is an element of AGNOSTICISM (i.e. whether one holds personal knowledge of the matter at hand).
Atheism is a simple position of whether or not you hold the belief that God exists. If you do not hold it, it says nothing about whether you hold the other belief that god does not exist.

As I say insufficiency is not absolutely nothing. If there's no observation (nothing to observe), then there's nothing to believe or disbelieve.

Disbelieve is not the same as "believe not".

Come back to this once you have established the agnostic atheist position. Then we'll have another crack, okay?

 

[Frud11]

Atheism is a simple position of whether or not you hold the belief that God exists. If you do not hold it, it says nothing about whether you hold the other belief that god does not exist.

"The simple position" of whether God exists or not, based on the idea that not having this belief says nothing about believing God does not exist... looks irrational.

So if you don't believe elephants exist, this says nothing about whether they exist or not? To who?

 

[Sarkus]

"The simple position" of whether God exists or not, based on the idea that not having this belief says nothing about believing God does not exist... looks irrational.

It might "look" irrational to you - but it is not - for the reasons I have tried to explain in the numerous e-mails beforehand.

So if you don't believe elephants exist, this says nothing about whether they exist or not? To who?

Should it? Beliefs are irrelevant in comparison to the objective truth.
But what has this to do with anything I've said?

Belief in A: the positive assertion that A is the truth;
Belief in not-A: the positive assertion that A is not the truth;
Non-belief in A: no positive assertion regarding A as truth or not.

Three separate positions regarding A.

I really don't know how to explain it any simpler.

 

[sowhatifit'sdark]

This is not what is stated - but "I as a non-experiencer can judge that your experience would not have led ME to believe in God...".

So you would not say I was being irrational.

No - the rationalist only needs to come up with something more objectively rational to thus discount the interpretation as given by the experiencer.

This assumes they know the nature of the experience. They know that if they had that experience - not simply one of a variety of experiences that might be described using similar words.

No - the other tribe was irrational if they believed that the whites were not human. The only rational position for the people being told would have been one of non-belief - and to ascertain further evidence in the matter.

Perhaps my spirits remark was a poor thing to toss in. What if they simply said: the ones who saw the whites were being fooled or were dreaming.

One needs to assess the claim being made - and how extraordinary it is.
The more extraordinary the claim, the better the evidence needs to be.
The claim of "white people" is not so extraordinary - they are merely talking about humans of different variation to those that the tribe already knew existed.

Was the one guy who saw the whites irrational when he decided they were white humans in ships vastly larger than any seen before who smelled back wore strange cloths and so on?

You are shifting it to the persective of the other tribe, I think, above. I am talking about the experiencer. The experiencer cannot prove it and can be told that other phenomena are VASTLY more likely. Which they had been up until the period of contact.

They must have known they were but a small part of a much larger world.

As a matter of fact some did not see/could not see the ships because they did not fit their worldview.
But this is all besides the point. The point is the experiencer was not being irrational to trust their interpretation, despite dream and hallucination being vastly more likely.

They weren't claiming anything mystical or magical about the white people, or that they could somehow break the laws of physics. So the evidence would not have had to have been great.

Actually the whites could break the laws of physics that the natives knew with some of their technology. You are viewing the situation from here and now. Imagine some future scientist viewing looking at now and saying that psychic phenomena were not breaking any laws - which they know in that future time - and so people who believed were not making extraordinary claims, etc.

I feel you are being slippery here. Not consciously, but in any case.

One must also consider the person making the claim and weigh up your previous experiences with him - as this in itself is some evidence of propensity toward accuracy / truth.

More beliefs in your own ability.

It would depend how far the skepticism went: if it went to belief of non-existence of the white people - this is irrational.

I am not concerned about the second tribes rationality or not. My point is that it can be rational to believe one's experiences and one's interpretation of them despite not being able to prove that interpretation and despite other people having 'more likely' interpretations.

Few people on this site would say that interpretations are categorically wrong - as most would merely offer suggestions of alternatives that would appear more rational. To then accept the alternative as more rational but to then stick with the less rational suggestion is in itself irrational.

That is assuming that you the non-experiencer really can get and understand all the subtle nuances of the experience via language. Some dreams are very mundane and accurate reality wise and yet I can tell these apart from memory. There are very subtle differences and to presume that you know I was not, in that instance capable of discerned between these differences, is presumptuous.

Fair enough - but that is like discussing the tenets of a religion (i.e. the specific beliefs) by talking about the church-goers.

Yes, and...?
I do believe that actions are beliefs. I am not interested in what a Platonic atheist would do given the definition of atheism. The ideal form of the atheist.
For example, you and I could get into an argument, in person say, about God. It starts with you saying you are an atheist in answer to me asking. I say, Oh so you think there is no God. You go through all the explaining about what an atheist is as you have in this thread. We go back and forth. And then the next day I overhear you say to another person: there is no God.

sorry. I shouldn't have used the second person in the above.

Anyway. That is a bit of my experience of atheists as a group. If we have a discussion about the definition and nature of atheism, well nobody believes there is no God. However if we are talking about theists beliefs, the snide and missionary approaches of atheists does not fit, for me at least, with this more humble position.

My point is that on the sociological level atheists bear some of the responsibility for non-atheists taking them as strong atheists as a group. As discussions go right now, atheists seem to think the theists are simply stupid for thinking atheists have a belief.

There is no MUST - at least I wish to think that I am not guilty of it.
I would merely raise alternative suggestions that, to me, would appear to be more rational, and thus form an opinion, through discussion, on whether the interpretation by the subject is more rational or not etc.

A suggestion cannot be more rational. A process is more rational. I think drawing conclusions, even those that go against current knowledge, for oneself, can be rational based on personal experience. I do not, however, think this would constitute proof for others.

One can not openly claim "irrational" about an interpretation if one is not privvy to all the evidence.

And I do believe that language is limited and you as the non-experiencer as not privvy to the facets of experiencers experience that can constitute evidence - or often lack of reasons to doubt, for example that they are actually dreaming - and so the non-experiencers lack evidence. And they certainly lack the ability to know if their alternatives fit as well as they seem to FROM THE OUTSIDE. In some ways your position seems to me to assume the problem of other minds does not exist.

It's not a question of "more likely" but more rational - generally per Occam's Razor.

OR was a proposal about how to approach things methodologically, not as a rationality tester (or liklihood meter). How should we go about testing and in what order.

This is being disingenuous. We do not state "I KNOW what that really probably was" - there is no need to.
If one can state and support the claim that an alternative interpretation is more rational then that is sufficient - whether it is ultimately the truth or not.

More rational for you, but not necessarily for the experiencer. It is as if having the experience has zero affect. It can offer no evidence to the experiencer. And I find that absurd. I actually cannot see the difference above between my wording and yours. Mine is more blunt.

And now you're introducing personal / professional bias that might deter people from admitting things like "I don't know". So I can not answer for them or the reasons for doing what they did.

It was not individuals. It was a systematic resistance to accepting the patients' own interpretations. The disease had bascially not been discovered yet. I am sure some doctors said 'I don't know' but the general, rational, objective alternative presented was that the patients were suffering psychosomatic ailments or were malingerers/hypochondriacs. Nevertheless the patients turned out to have been correct as was later discovered by scientists to their own satisfaction when the Epstein Barr virus was found and doctors began connecting the stories and symptoms of patients. Again: let me be clear. My point is not that the doctors were irrational - perhaps on the jump to conclusions bandwagon, but I really don't care about that issue. My point is the patients were rational. They believed they had an illness and were not 1) malingering (a common charge) or 2) suffering psychosomatic symptoms. They ransacked and evaluated their experience accurately. They were rational. Even though they could not convince doctors - for quite a number of years - or the medical community.

I know one of the first people who got Lime disease personally. She was told that it was psychosomatic by a vast range of medical personal for several years. She just kept going to new doctors. She evaluated her own psyche and decided that no, she was not suffering something psychosomatic. After those key years, the disease had spread enough to be noticed and she found one of the first front line professionals to get some treatment. My point is not that the doctors were bad or irrational. My point is that it is absurd to see her as having been irrational even though she based her conclusion on personal experience and alternatives that were deemed and in fact were statistically incredibly more likely were pointed out to her.

I do not judge her as having been irrational but as it turns out coincidentally correct.

Rationality leaves room for "I don't know... but rationally I would conclude this." But one must also weigh up the consequence of being rational but incorrect in determining the appropriate course to take / answer to give

An excellent point. Not one I am focusing on. I do, however, think that rationalists overestimate their ability to guess the liklihood or extraordinariness of phenomena and their own cultural and psychological biases. And often forget the fact that we are simply in a certain period of history where we have managed to prove fairly solidly these things and that later many more things will be included, some perhaps as strange as Einstein's theories first were or some of the wild things they have found so far in QM.

To sum it up:
What you are saying means that you, the non-experiencer, are in as good a position to judge the accuracy of the experiencers interpretation as the experiencer in all cases. The fact that they experienced it - in all the subtle nuances of it - offers them nothing more than what can be found in the words they use to describe it. The experience had nothing more to offer than those words. Now you, the non-experiencer, can evaluate those words using deductive logic and with comparison to current facts and theories based on empirical evidence. If you can find phenomena that fit those words - or what might have made you say those words - as well as those words, and these phenomena are statistically more likely to have taken place,
the experiencer would be irrational to continue believing their own interpretation.
They may be correct, but it would be irrational for them to continue believing given what you have shown them.

I think that is hubris and also not very practical. I think it is also naive about the limits of language.

Another example where this approach seems problematic to me would be thinking of a teenager being sexually abused by her father - in the 50s - and how she was counterinterpreted.

I do not think these girls were merely coincidentally correct, despite the fact that according to statistics and Freudian theory at the time it was vastly more likely they were making it up, fantasizing, hallucinating, etc. I think those brave few who spoke up were rational - in believing it happened and that it was indeed their father and that they themselves, for example, did not want or intitiate it nor was it a fantasy etc.

Again, the issue for me is not to blame the professionals of the time, but to point out that it can be rational to believe in personal experience despite seemingly good alternatives and the lack of evidence for you, the non-experiencer.

And I realize that my examples are from situations that you are going to consider the claims likely to be true or certainly true in some cases. But that's point. I am trying to convince you that your system is fallible by using example that fit, I think, your criteria, but are much harder to say the experiencers were irrational but randomly correct.