Concerning the matter of animal rights, I ultimately "side" largely with James here--and such have been my convictions for the better part of my lifetime;
however, I find the arguments of James (whose views seem mostly compatible with Peter Singer's), as well of those arguments addressing the issue from certain other persectives, such as those of Tom Regan and a number of contemporaries, unfortunate--precisely because they
are "arguments." In fact, I find most such "arguments" pertaining to ethical concerns coming from those steeped in a predominantly Analytical tradition to be rather weak and ineffectual.
In my opinion, far more effective--insofar as forming convictions by things other than "personal experience"--is certain literature (particularly J.M. Coetzee's
Elizabeth Costello and
The Lives of Animals, among others), song and verse, and the writings of thinkers somewhat less concerned with "verifiable assertions" and "propositional attitudes" and whatnots (or at least voicing a more nuanced take on such). For those interested especially in matters pertaining to (non-human) animals, and frustrated or bored by Singer's brand of utilitarianism, Regan's neo-Kantianism, etc., amongst the best are Derrida's
The Animal That Therefore I Am (as well as
Points... and
Of Spirit), Giorgio Agamben's
The Open, and most anything by Donna Haraway, Cary Wolfe, or Vicki Hearne.
But most pertinent to this thread (and that thread from a few days back which this seems almost a continuation of) are some of Cora Diamond's thoughts. Over the past 30-odd years, Diamond has addressed animal rights, animal welfare, and the varied cominglings and confusions thereof from a sort-of neo-wittgensteinian perspective. In "Anything But Argument?" she quotes from Onora O'Neill's review of Stephen Clark's
The Moral Status of Animals:
Yet if the appeal on behalf of animals is to convince those whose hearts do not already so incline them, it must, like appeals on behalf of dependent human beings, reach beyond assertion to argument.
Of this view of how ethical discussions ought proceed, Diamond remarks:
It rests on a conception of moral thought which is not merely false, but which also renders unaccountable and incomprehensible the moral force of many kind of literature.
When making a moral plea, whom are we trying to "convince"? Well, obviously
everyone, but
realistically we can only hope to convince those with the requisite capacities for being convinced in the first place, i.e., those capable of "following the argument" and entertaining it's implications. Diamond, in discussing those
not capable of being "convinced" of something through, say, reading a novel, names certain particular incapacities: "a very limited moral imagination; an intelligence inadequately trained and incapable of recogninzing irony." Of the latter, one has to wonder about the persons who came up with the PETA campaigns featuring naked, second-rate "celebrities." And while being amenable to reason and receptive to new, and possibly "controversial," information are certainly requisite capacities, they are hardly the
only--or even the most important--essential qualities. (And here I'll refrain from a critique of "reason" and those zealously beholden to some such curious notion of a pure, impartial, and objective reason, and wholly blind and oblivious to the litany of atrocities committed in the name of this much vaunted "reason"--Foucault and Karl Popper, among others, having done a fine job at this already.)
Rather, having a
heart... already so inclined would seem the more pertinent quality. But, lacking this, is an "argument" really going to convince those not so inclined? I mean, to reasonably bright and worldly folks, that animals have interests, desires, a will, the capacity to feel pain and/or anxiety, unique and comparable intelligences and proclivities, etc. should hardly be much of a revelation. And even if it is for some,
most reasonably intelligent individuals (whatever is meant by that) will likely be receptive to such knowledge. Sure, such things may be hard to digest for some, but I've personally found that those sorts tend not to satisfy my criteria for being "reasonably educated and worldly" anyways. We can debate particularities regarding "consciousness" (as per Dennett, Donald Davidson, John Searle, et al), capacity for language or metacommunicative/metalinguistic capabilities (Bateson, et al), orientation towards or cognisance of death, the ability to form (and abide) "moral contracts," whether animals are
weltarm or not
weltbildung, until we are blue in the face; but I don't think that these matters really factor for most people into their determination of how animals ought to be regarded. Just as those of us who are pro-choice do not
deny that a fetus is alive, and those of us who favor decriminalization or legalization do not
deny that sometimes drugs are "dangerous," or make people do "bad things"...
But what does it really mean to have a "heart... so inclined"? More recently Diamond has refined her position, as she expresses in "The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy." The essay includes a reading of Coetzee's
The Lives of Animals, in which the (fictional) novelist Elizabeth Costello is invited to give a lecture at a college. Her lecture addresses our treatment of animals, but her approach is far removed from what many would expect of a philosopical discourse: "She sees our reliance on argumentation as a way we may make unavailable to ourselves our own sense of what it is to be a living animal." I can't know for certain what it is like to be a bat, but I also have no idea as to what it is like to be
you--or even if you in fact really
do think/feel/exist... In fact, being rather autistic, I've long struggled in the same fashion as did Wittgenstein:
We tend to take the speech of a Chinese for inarticulate gurgling. Someone who understands Chinese will recognize language in what he hears. Similarly I often cannot recognize the humanity of another human being.
(
Culture and Value)
What I find especially odious about arguments from the likes of Singer, et al, is the idea of making categorical determinations of "worthiness" based on our rather limited understandings and some rather arbitrary and nebulous "attributes" which
someone determines to be more valuable or meaningful. While acquiring as much knowledge and understanding of others is certainly a "good thing," frankly, I make my determinations of "worthiness" based upon
who matters the most to me--and more often than not, my dog means a hell of a lot more to me than do most people. YMMV.
Diamond writes of the ways in which the thinker's understanding of the issue becomes
deflected when framed in the language and modalities of philosophical scepticism. In our efforts to ponder, fathom, or embrace a difficult reality--or the difficulty of reality--we become further deflected from the reality, not unlike being thrown out of that which we wish to inhabit. And this is very much what the philosophizing of many an animal rightist accomplishes: turning the reality into a set of "facts." And it is for this reason that Wittgenstein emphasizes
showing, or
demonstrating, by bringing words back from the metaphysical to their everyday use. I suppose that one might argue, perhaps, that this is what PETA is
trying to do. I'm sceptical; but if such is in fact the case, I would suggest that even a mediocre advertising agency has a better grasp on this than do the folks at PETA.
I do realize that I am introducing a non-argument, and what can essentially be construed as an appeal to the
heart, on what is ostensibly a science forum; but I find the idea of arguing about
ethics in a rigid, scientific manner somewhat amusing anyways.