Critics of theistic philosophy, such as Wesley Salmon, are not particularly concerned with logical inconsistency within theism as much as they are with its implausible nature. For them, the problem remains not one of the illogical but whether theism can offer a reasonable explanation of evil.
Given that evil appears to exist in the world, Salmon has argued that “an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good god does not exist” has a much higher probability than the statement “An omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good god exists”.
Criticisms of this reasoning have been raised by Plantinga and Nancy Cartwright. Salmon has used mechanically created entities as a basis for his propositions, since it is clearly impossible for him (or for that matter, anyone else) to evaluate the situation of evil that appears in all divinely created universes. However by doing so he begs the question in advance. Namely, comparing this universe to a mechanical model insinuates that the universe has no divine origin. Furthermore, statistical techniques are not capable of approaching metaphysical issues (the existence of god, etc).
Not undaunted however, critics have rallied behind what could be the greatest objection against what is sometimes termed “natural evil” (or the evil that appears to be caused for no reason): Ok, so an evil may be required to exist under certain conditions, but how are we to understand evils that seem utterly meaningless or over the top? If an omniscient, all powerful, loving and reasonable god actually exists, certainly he would not allow for gratuitous evil. Advocates of theism suggest that no matter how severe an evil may appear, there is a purpose and/or ultimate benefit from it.
As opposed to allowing this argument to reach a stalemate, which would tend to lean in favour of the critics, some theists have conceded that god may indeed allow for gratuitous evil. Theists hope that this will weaken the above refutation
One simple approach is to indicate that evil is a necessary contrast to the good; without evil we would be bereft of the means to determine what is true goodness. A straight forward response is to suggest that a much smaller dose of evil would be sufficient to teach the same lesson. A further refutation is that evil is god’s punishment for the evil. As he rewards righteousness, he condemns the opposite. Fair enough, critics reply, but how may we explain the wholesale destruction of entire civilizations or the death of a new born baby?
Thinkers like Leibniz have entertained yet another view, that god deeply ruminated over the value of evil before creating the best of all possible worlds, and conclusively found that certain goods outweigh their corresponding evils. Critics have attacked Leibniz from many sides. First of all, the statement “best of all possible worlds” appears to be logically incoherent. How do we know that what we have here is the best of all possible worlds? Secondary, moral judgment dictates that we always aim and work to improve our world; Leibniz appears to deny this possibility. And finally, why did god bother to create a world at all if this is the best that could be done?
Yet another take on the problem of evil is “ultimate harmony”, which has two distinct approaches:
a) That all is well with the world from god’s perspective, or
b) That all will be well in the long run.
Those who support the first approach advocate that only an infinite, wise god can comprehend and determine ultimate good in the conglomerate of good and evil events, whereas we finite beings are unable. This approach is fallible on two accounts:
a) it frustrates the nature of human moral judgment, and
b) If the traditional Christian concept holds true that humans are made in the image of god, then it should also follow that reasonable moral judgments are not beyond humans.
A variant of the all’s well option is that since god’s morality is so much greater than ours we are unable to apply the same perfect moral judgment in evaluating events as god does. Once again, the weakness of this is that it underscores human moral judgment, and, since God’s morality is so much greater than ours, how could we ever comprehend it, let alone call upon it as a useful tool to solve the problem of evil? As J. S. Mill accurately concludes, taking the approach of higher divine morality suggests that one might as well abandon reason altogether.
Advocates of the alternative division of ultimate harmony (the all’s well that ends well persuasion) claim that all evils ultimately culminate in higher goods in the future, in this world or the next. This viewpoint is open to those attacks made against “ alls well in god’s sight”. But there are other specific criticisms as well. For example, how can future welfare be accurately evaluated to justify the present occurrence of related evils? It is quite a conceptual jump from Going from the notion of a good outweighing an evil is quite a conceptual jump, what to speak of the notion of a good justifying the existence of an evil. Those attempting to answer this refutation fall back on the mediocre response that we, as limited humans, will never be able to fully understand what god’s unlimited wisdom accomplishes.....
While there are quite a few solutions that address moral evil, there is one outstanding solution that specifically deals with the problem of natural evil. This natural law explanation establishes that god created a world that operates according to a certain predictable natural order, one that enables a moral order in which free choice allows humans the opportunity to make deliberations. But this natural system also accommodates natural evil. Critics such as H. J McCloskey argue that god could easily reduce or eliminate such natural evils by divine intervention or by creating a greatly improved alternative system. Richard Swinburne effectively counters that, saying that a natural order suggests god has no need to constantly intervene. On the whole, god has created a good and natural system that does not require the need of adjustment from outside
In short.....
The Personality of Godhead is perfect and complete, and because He is completely perfect, all emanations from Him, such as this phenomenal world, are perfectly equipped as complete wholes. Whatever is produced of the Complete Whole is also complete in itself. Because He is the Complete Whole, even though so many complete units emanate from Him, He remains the complete balance.
-Sri Isopanisad
Given that evil appears to exist in the world, Salmon has argued that “an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good god does not exist” has a much higher probability than the statement “An omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good god exists”.
Criticisms of this reasoning have been raised by Plantinga and Nancy Cartwright. Salmon has used mechanically created entities as a basis for his propositions, since it is clearly impossible for him (or for that matter, anyone else) to evaluate the situation of evil that appears in all divinely created universes. However by doing so he begs the question in advance. Namely, comparing this universe to a mechanical model insinuates that the universe has no divine origin. Furthermore, statistical techniques are not capable of approaching metaphysical issues (the existence of god, etc).
Not undaunted however, critics have rallied behind what could be the greatest objection against what is sometimes termed “natural evil” (or the evil that appears to be caused for no reason): Ok, so an evil may be required to exist under certain conditions, but how are we to understand evils that seem utterly meaningless or over the top? If an omniscient, all powerful, loving and reasonable god actually exists, certainly he would not allow for gratuitous evil. Advocates of theism suggest that no matter how severe an evil may appear, there is a purpose and/or ultimate benefit from it.
As opposed to allowing this argument to reach a stalemate, which would tend to lean in favour of the critics, some theists have conceded that god may indeed allow for gratuitous evil. Theists hope that this will weaken the above refutation
One simple approach is to indicate that evil is a necessary contrast to the good; without evil we would be bereft of the means to determine what is true goodness. A straight forward response is to suggest that a much smaller dose of evil would be sufficient to teach the same lesson. A further refutation is that evil is god’s punishment for the evil. As he rewards righteousness, he condemns the opposite. Fair enough, critics reply, but how may we explain the wholesale destruction of entire civilizations or the death of a new born baby?
Thinkers like Leibniz have entertained yet another view, that god deeply ruminated over the value of evil before creating the best of all possible worlds, and conclusively found that certain goods outweigh their corresponding evils. Critics have attacked Leibniz from many sides. First of all, the statement “best of all possible worlds” appears to be logically incoherent. How do we know that what we have here is the best of all possible worlds? Secondary, moral judgment dictates that we always aim and work to improve our world; Leibniz appears to deny this possibility. And finally, why did god bother to create a world at all if this is the best that could be done?
Yet another take on the problem of evil is “ultimate harmony”, which has two distinct approaches:
a) That all is well with the world from god’s perspective, or
b) That all will be well in the long run.
Those who support the first approach advocate that only an infinite, wise god can comprehend and determine ultimate good in the conglomerate of good and evil events, whereas we finite beings are unable. This approach is fallible on two accounts:
a) it frustrates the nature of human moral judgment, and
b) If the traditional Christian concept holds true that humans are made in the image of god, then it should also follow that reasonable moral judgments are not beyond humans.
A variant of the all’s well option is that since god’s morality is so much greater than ours we are unable to apply the same perfect moral judgment in evaluating events as god does. Once again, the weakness of this is that it underscores human moral judgment, and, since God’s morality is so much greater than ours, how could we ever comprehend it, let alone call upon it as a useful tool to solve the problem of evil? As J. S. Mill accurately concludes, taking the approach of higher divine morality suggests that one might as well abandon reason altogether.
Advocates of the alternative division of ultimate harmony (the all’s well that ends well persuasion) claim that all evils ultimately culminate in higher goods in the future, in this world or the next. This viewpoint is open to those attacks made against “ alls well in god’s sight”. But there are other specific criticisms as well. For example, how can future welfare be accurately evaluated to justify the present occurrence of related evils? It is quite a conceptual jump from Going from the notion of a good outweighing an evil is quite a conceptual jump, what to speak of the notion of a good justifying the existence of an evil. Those attempting to answer this refutation fall back on the mediocre response that we, as limited humans, will never be able to fully understand what god’s unlimited wisdom accomplishes.....
While there are quite a few solutions that address moral evil, there is one outstanding solution that specifically deals with the problem of natural evil. This natural law explanation establishes that god created a world that operates according to a certain predictable natural order, one that enables a moral order in which free choice allows humans the opportunity to make deliberations. But this natural system also accommodates natural evil. Critics such as H. J McCloskey argue that god could easily reduce or eliminate such natural evils by divine intervention or by creating a greatly improved alternative system. Richard Swinburne effectively counters that, saying that a natural order suggests god has no need to constantly intervene. On the whole, god has created a good and natural system that does not require the need of adjustment from outside
In short.....
The Personality of Godhead is perfect and complete, and because He is completely perfect, all emanations from Him, such as this phenomenal world, are perfectly equipped as complete wholes. Whatever is produced of the Complete Whole is also complete in itself. Because He is the Complete Whole, even though so many complete units emanate from Him, He remains the complete balance.
-Sri Isopanisad