wesmorris said:
How are ethics not cognitive?
This needs a little preparation. When we approach a phenomenon, we usually operate with three kinds of criteria cognitive (gnostic), ethical and emotive (so the constructivistic explanation).
We understand that there are three components to each phenomenon.
Unless we make a specific analytical distinction between them, in everyday life, we make our judgement of something using all three criteria simultaneously, and our judgement is a compund result of all of them. But typically, when clarifying, we do distinguish between the three.
To explain on an example: Take the film
Dogma (I chose it simply because it is well-known and I know enough details about it, there are no other implications here):
The cognitive (or gnostic) component is:
The main characters are: Bartelby, Loki, Metatron, (ah, what was her name) ... Bartleby and Loki receive a letter in which there is a hint to ... They decide to go to ... Simultaneously, ...
>> This is about the plot of the story, the characters, the events. Something that is interpersonally verifiable by those who have seen the film.
The ethical component: This is where it gets problematic. This is where it becomes apparent how an individual's own ethics interpret the ethics in the film. Was what Bartleby and Loki wanted morally right or not? Is this film merely a parody of the Catholic church with the intention to insult it? ... And so on. This is where we can argue about, on and on.
The emotive component: Is about the individual viewer's personal enjoyment or distaste at this film, his affectations at particular scenes. Once more something that there can be no interpersonal consensus about.
Now, to apply this approach to the Bible and religious faith:
When people argue that there is no evidence for the existence of God, or that the factual discrepancies in the text (Was Jesus riding a donkey or a calf?) discredit it, and so on, they are applying
only one criterium: the cognitive (gnostic).
They are reading the Bible the same way they would read a scientific paper. As if the Bible were some logico-philosophical tractatus,
and that alone.
From this perspective, religious faith, and any faith, is to be discarded, as there is no interpersonally verfiable and controlably repeatable observation possible.
If we would apply only this criterium, then ALL that
Dogma is about, for example, is Bartleby and Loki going to that church and the rest of the plot.
Reducing our observation only to the emotive component, then the Bible and religious faith are just about "feeling good", or "feeling bad" (for some). Once more a position that is hard to maintain consistently.
Often, and this is also the most immediately easy to do, next to cognitive reductionism, is to commit ethical reductionism. It's the "If you don't believe what I do, you are a bad person and you will go to hell" line of argument.
Most clashes between theists and non-theists happen because non-theists tend to argue from congitive reductionism (the "scientific arguments" against God; "you are just proving that you are insane"), and other times from ethical reductionism ("God is not all-good, if he were, he would not let bad things to happen").
There are of course also theists commiting ethical reductionism, the prime example was Proud Muslim.
Other clashes happen when the same phenomenon is viewed from incompatible perspectives (this isn't necessarily reductionism though, only a misunderstanding of the topic): one party views the cognitive component, while the other party views the ethical or emotive component.
Like:
Wes: You must study so you can get a degree, get a good job and earn a lot of money.
Water: School sucks.
Both statements are true, but the conversation can continue only if the parties settle to talk about the same component of the phenomenon. Either Wes shifts to the emotive component and talks about how school sucks, or Water shifts to the cognitive component and talks about how good it is to have a degree and all that.
In debates about God and faith, this sort of "component misunderstanding" is very frequently the case. we often argue about high theological issues for reasons that don't have something directly to do with them. Maybe we rationalize and intellectualize our disappointment or misery, and then wrap it all up into an "argument against God", and then a theist comes and addresses the arguments as it is -- theologically, cognitively, when the starter of the argument actually had emotional issues.
How does the "ethical sphere" apply to "acts of god"?
I hope that in the light of the above-said, this question is partly answered already.
For a moment forgetting what exactly is an act of God, the ethical component in an act of God is an estimation like "God is just" or "God doesn't tolerate sin".
Note here that talking about religious ethics is purposeful only as long as we are talking about actual historic religions, and not about a generic religion and generic gods.
For example, a generic religion does not have a set of commandments that come with sanctions. A generic religion is a philosophical construct that we can play with, but discard just as easily, it does not require commitment and active personal involvement.
(Of course, any actual historic religion can be *treated* as if it were a generic religion -- but this doesn't make it one.)
nly kuz tsunamis typically don't grow big enough to be able to reach any major residential areas and kill as many people as were killed with this particular one. Is there proof for this?