And you seem to think that I can't "know" the future. Well, let's see who knows the future. I predict you will respond further in this thread.
Odd, now you can either spite me and change the future, or prove me right and post further. You have that free choice. You know your urges. You are conflicted. You get to pick which influences win.
That's a valid position, but it's not obviously true, and that's the problem. Perhaps he has the freedom to choose. Perhaps his brain is hardwired to sort out the competing options based on preferences that resulted both because of the hardwiring in the brain and accumulated data picked up over the course of decades.
That your prediction alters his action doesn't change anything. That others affect what I will do next is no different than the weather affecting whether my sprinklers will turn on to water the grass tomorrow morning. (My sprinklers are computer controlled, and if there has been rain or sufficient dew, the sensors will note that and my sprinklers won't activate.)
Strangely, for all the talk of determinism, you clearly adopt the compatibilist view that seems unpersuasive to me. To say something is "deterministic retroactively" is to say that you don't really believe in determism, in my opinion.
Causal Determinism says that the state of the world at any one time can be completely determined by the prior states of the world. Because "choices" arises as a spontaneous creation not controlled by the prior physical states of the brain, though, that is not the case in your model (or in any compatibilist model) in any situation where someone makes a choice.
In a truly causally deterministic world, if Al hates Bob and Al buys a gun, you should, in principle, be able to determine whether Al is going to shoot Bob eventually and the trajectory of the bullet. It doesn't matter whether the event has already happened or not. The timing doesn't matter. Obviously, making that prediction is a practical impossibility, but so is determining the precise orbit of three celestial bodies in the classic three-body problem (unless you assign certain very special orbits to each).
In the compatibilist view (and in yous, I take it), because Al has a choice in his actions, human actions cannot be said to be entirely "caused" by pruior events and circumstances. In retrospect, you can say what a person
actually did...but that is true of non-deterministic events as well in many cases. If I set up a detector to determine which of two slits an electron passes through, a priori I cannot say which slit the electron will take. After the fact, my detector will reliably have told me which way the electron went. Beforehand, which slit the electron went through was non-deterministic and randomly determined. After the event the fact was fixed, but that doesn't make quantum mechanics "retroactively" deterministic because there was no underlying mechanical feature of the world that "caused" the electron to go through one slit or the other...it was still randomly determined. (Here I am ignoring Bohm's interpretation or other hidden variable theories of quantum mechanics, which would preserve determinism.)
In short if you believe in a causal chain, then whenever you insert an uncaused event into the causal chain, you really do make it impossible for the world to be truly causally deterministic. Assuming determinism works at the macroscopic level, I can look at a arrow flying through the air use that information to calculate where it came from. However, if I open up the scenario to include the possibility that God willed the arrow to make a right-angle turn mid flight, then I cannot reliably predict the path of the arrow in the past prior to the moment I observed it. To be clear, assuming God caused such a mid-flight turn in the arrow's path, that is a "fact" that is now fixed in history...if I know God did that I can calculate around it, but only on the assumption that God didn't do that multiple times. Further, without the exogenously arrived at knowledge of what God did, I'd never be able to trace the path of the arrow.
The reason compatibilism doesn't seem sensible to me is that it says, in effect, "the world is causally deterministic, except for certain times when it isn't, based on human choice." You mentioned your dislike of redefinition above, but imo compatibilism requires requires the same sort of gamesmanship with the definition of "determinism."
In defending free will, I personally would prefer to chuck determinism as a concept than to assume that the entire universe is deterministic (at least at a macroscopic level), except for human choice. The human ability to choose is (for some reason not well explained) the
one thing that is not causally determined in that view.
The truth is determinism is already on shaky ground because of quantum mechanics. It already has the status of, at best, a rule of thumb that usually but not always applies. Truth is that there is a non-zero chance that the Moon will vanish tomorrow under the rules of quantum mechanics, even though it is macroscopic in size. The odds of that are so low we can (and rightly do) functionally ignore it, but we know there is the theoretical possibility.
As we discussed, quantum mechanics doesn't rescue free will in and of itself (since rolling dice to arrive at an action is not the same as choosing an action), but at least it gives us pause over our simplistic view of the universe as strictly deterministic. Compatibilists seem merely to be on a mission to save this naive view of the world by redefining determinism in a very silly way.