Something about onions
The expression depends on the culture. At the root of it may be something so pure as fear: We repent of and rebuke the violence we witness because we do not like to imagine ourselves suffering the same. The best explanation I have heard was passed to me through a portion of the Buddhist tradition that escapes memory, when someone explained about an old master of some sort that taught that
violence is inefficient. This is an attractive notion. It sounds rational, and for the most part it is. Rational consistency, however, demands rational classifications and assignations. For instance, to use a broad example: Wars solve very little, except in terms of individual human lives and suffering. We might choose to argue whether or not the tumbling of a dictator is good or bad, reduces or increases suffering, or even whether it is an event unto itself, or a portion of a longer process. But for the one who points out that Saddam Hussein is dead, and Iraq ... well, we hope Iraq lives free someday. But, anyway ... People who support the present American expedition in Iraq tend to ignore history inasmuch as they do not see the Saddam Hussein chapter as related to the Shah Reza Pahlavi chapter. But while invading Iraq and toppling Hussein may have seemed an efficient solution to a problem, it is by another view merely another chapter of a specific story cycle that began at least with the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. (
Click here for that story.) Of course, anyone could reasonably argue that the Pahlavi chapter is simply an inefficient symptom of a prior process, and they would be right or wrong depending on whether or not they chose that process from a rationally arguable version of history.
The point being, of course, that violence begets violence, suffering begets suffering. That violence on this scale is inefficient seems rather obvious. The smaller the violence, the greater the drag or disruption coefficient becomes.
And it is very possible that the species is aware of this. That fear may well be a manifestation of an evolutionary recognition of the futility of violence: it brings an ultimate, infinite cost in trade for rather a cheap outcome. Violence is inefficient and endangers the progress of the species. That violence itself is an instrument of evolutionary impact is an unstable thesis: the species-wide impacts of violence are too general, even through modern stratification, for such refined methods as those of nature.
In the end, we might simply say that "People are afraid of violence," and that could easily be sufficient. But as we know, the difference between fear and cowardice is not equally apparent to all people. There seems to be at least
a reason why people fear violence, and it turns out to suggest in our favor.