So you assume causation without predetermination just as I do and that indeterminacy is inherent in the universe? I have no problem with that.
We agree on something??? But... that's impossible!!
I already explained that.
No, you haven't (as far as I can see). You've just said "Indeterminacy... therefore freewill".
Unless you're talking about a definition of freewill that is limited to one's conscious perception. But then I've never had an issue if that is what people define it as, as long as they understand it as such.
If you have some evidence of another cause for my raising my arms other than my own decision to, then lets hear it. I'd certainly be open to some other factor if you could show it being more efficacious than my own willpower. So far I've not heard one suggestion of what it would be.
It's not a matter of pinpointing specific causes, but of showing how everything is built upon the principle of cause and effect.
As said, from the outset, the conclusion follows from the premise (that cause and effect holds). That I can't specify a cause for a given effect is irrelevant. The alternative is that your decision to is uncaused - uncaused not only by your own thoughts, but by the subconscious causes of your thoughts.
Unless, as said, you hold your thoughts to be uncaused?
But that would go against the assumption, and also against every notion of science (that the only uncaused effects are random).
We can do that with any cause. Say the wind knocked over a vase. But did the wind really cause the vase to fall? The wind afterall was created by certain heat differences and pressure differences in air. But what caused that? Well, the sun actually. But what caused the sun to do this? A nuclear fusion process of hydrogen and helium. And so on and so forth, reducing us to an absurdity of endless causal regressions.
To consider it an absurdity is to argue from consequence. "Oh, I find the consequence absurd... it must be wrong!"
Yes, the conclusion is that it regresses to the start of time. If we were in a strictly deterministic then a re-run from t=0 would result in exactly the same as now, but in a probabilistically deterministic, or otherwise indeterministic, universe then things might play out differently.
Why do you consider this absurd, other than your own bias/personal incredulity on the matter?
If you accept the premises then this is the conclusion, as far as I have been able to fathom.
And I have yet to hear anything, from you or others, to suggest that either the assumptions are incorrect or that the assumptions can lead to a freewill that is anything other than illusory (or else defined as limited to a matter of perception).