The illusion of free will

[Sarkus]

That sounds good to me.

Ok, the question at this point seems to be whether there a 'chain of causation' that extends all the way back to the big-bang presumably, that absolutely determines every event that happens in the entire universe subsequently.

I'm skeptical about that.

As am I. I don't adhere to strict determinism. I'm certainly more along the lines of probabilistic determinism - the output being a probability function rather than a specific output.

For one thing, there's chaos and non-linear dynamics. Many dynamical processes appear to be very dependent on precise initial conditions. Even the slightest differences in these might lead to dramatic differences in how a physical system subsequently evolves. There's the so-called 'butterfly effects' and stuff.

It's possible to argue that chaotic dynamics is still entirely deterministic, with the subsequent evolution of the system still fully determined by the initial conditions. But even infinitesimal differences in initial conditions might make a huge difference in how the system evolves.

It's not just possible to argue that, but entirely relevant to do so.
Chaos is a separate matter entirely, and actually a bit of red-herring. Whether the system is chaotic or not is irrelevant: strict determinism merely says that if you have exactly the same inputs then you get exactly the same output.
I.e. chaos is only a consideration once you are not dealing with exactly the same inputs.

On the microscale, things might not be totally deterministic at all. Individual quantum events might arguably be better described as probabilistically deterministic. In other words, there might be a lack of clear and precise specification to all aspects of physical reality, down there on the very finest scale.

And there are lots of microscale events taking place. Later ones will presumably be causally dependent (in a probabilistic way) on earlier (probabilistic) ones. So whatever built-in imprecision that exists might compound over time.

Combining that with the chaos idea, suggests that perhaps there's some under-determination, some fundamental unpredictability, inherent in how at least some physical systems evolve.

As a result of these kind of thoughts, my speculation (that's all it is) is that while causality does seem to be pretty much universal, it may not be precisely deterministic for more than relatively short periods of time. The universe might be increasingly stochastic on the longer time-scales. (Entropy may or may not be associated with that.) There might conceivably be a fundamental unpredictability built into its physical nature.

Agreed. To all of this.

Returning to the free-will problem, our actions do seem to be fairly well determined on the shortest time-scale. Our decisions do seem to be determined by our present physical circumstances, by our desires, by our knowledge, by our values, by our memories, and by our past histories more broadly. But the further back in time we push that, the fuzzier it gets. Eventually it gets kind of ridiculous, as it seems to me to be when somebody insists that my personal choices today were already entirely determined by events that happened long before the Earth condensed from primordial dust and rock.[/QUOTE]I try not to argue from personal incredulity, other than in my practical life.
Philosophically I have no issue with the current state being just one of infinite possible outcomes, and randomness at the most fundamental level has given rise to it (although some may have issue that one can have a certain philosophical view without it impacting your practical life... but I'm not one of them).
Systems have developed from that initial stated= that provide some order out of the chaos - that can appear to dampen the chaos at gross levels - but this can all be done through purely deterministic processes that follow simple underlying rules.
I always like giving "Conway's Game of Life" as an example in this regard.

 

[Yazata]

Chaos is a separate matter entirely, and actually a bit of red-herring. Whether the system is chaotic or not is irrelevant: strict determinism merely says that if you have exactly the same inputs then you get exactly the same output.

I.e. chaos is only a consideration once you are not dealing with exactly the same inputs.

Yeah, that was basically my point.

The chaos aspect seems to me to be relevant because if the dynamics of the system was linear, then we could just shrug and say that small micro-variations in initial conditions will cause only small micro-variations in how the system subsequently evolves. If we want some arbitrary level of predictive accuracy in how the future is fated to unfold, then all we would need is a corresponding small margin of error when specifying initial conditions.

I was thinking that if we combine the quantum idea with the chaos idea, perhaps we could say that there's no such thing as infinitely precise initial conditions, at least some cases. If reality itself is at least partially probabilistic on the microscale, and if even infinitesimal differences in initial conditions can sometimes lead to dramatic variations in how a system subsequently evolves, then it might turn out to be the case that an initial physical state might be causally consistent with a whole assortment of subsequent outcomes.

 

[Magical Realist]

But this seems akin to saying: well, we know things are indeterminate, we deem freewill to be indeterminate, therefore freewill exists.
I have no issue with indeterminacy, but it is how freewill arises from that.

Indeterminacy arises as an issue in freewill to the exact extent that freewill is denied on the basis of causal determinacy. If the behavior of a brain is entirely reducible to the linear succession of previous neural states, then there is no freewill. If otoh there is indeterminacy in how the brain behaves such that it can act in a number of possible ways, then we have a basis for believing in free will. IOW, if the brain is a chaotic system it becomes possible for it to act in more than one way, selecting options based on its conscious assessment of its overall state.

Considering it an emergent processes is just another term for illusory: i.e. it exists as a property of some forms of matter but does not exist at lower forms but is still driven by the causal processes. This is what I would classify as defining freewill so as to include the illusion within its nature.

An emergent process by definition cannot be logically reduced to the states of its components. It is a property that only arises on a higher level in a holistic state. We see this all the time in chemistry and biology, where properties emerge that do not exist on the molecular level. This doesn't mean those properties are illusory either. They are as real as the properties that existed only at the molecular level. Hence if freewill is an emergent property, it will have a certain irreducible quality as well a realness that is not just illusory.

It may be indeterminate from its underlying causes, but that itself does not make it freewill.

How are you defining freewill? You say it is an illusion because it is determinate from its underlying causes, but then say it wouldn't be real either if it is indeterminate from its underlying causes. That seems contradictory to me. Indeterminacy is a precondition for freedom in that there are multiply probable outcomes for a single process. IOW, the process is no long solely dictated by the linear succession of past states.

If one accepts the concept of emergent properties, then such an argument would require all emergent properties, by dint of their indeterminacy, to also be considered "freewill".

No..that is some kind of logical fallacy I don't have the time to look up now. It's saying that because freewill is an instance of an emergent state, then emergent states are all instances of freewill. That's ridiculous. No one is saying that here.

If one considers freewill to be more than just the chain of causation (whether the chain leads to indeterminate processes or not is irrelevant in the case in question) then to influence the chain with a decision that is itself not the outcome of a previous cause (i.e. not itself part and parcel of the chain) requires the influence to be uncaused.

I'm not sure that follows. Downward causation for instance would be an instance of a cause that may exist external to the linear chain of underlying causation. See:

http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/DOWNCAUS.html

Now while there do seem to exist uncaused events, these are just random - hence the need for freewill (other than when encapsulating within the term/definition the nature of its illusion) to require uncaused non-random events.

A strange attractor, which exerts causal agency or constraints on the course of a chaotic system's evolution, is certainly non-random. It has a structure in the probabilistic landscape that has freed itself to some extent from the determination of the bottom level processes. What if freewill was like that? See below:

http://sulcus.berkeley.edu/freemanwww/manuscripts/id1/88.html

 

[Sarkus]

Indeterminacy arises as an issue in freewill to the exact extent that freewill is denied on the bases of causal determinacy. If the behavior of a brain is entirely reducible to the linear succession of previous neural states, then there is no freewill. If otoh there is indeterminacy in how the brain behaves such that it can act in a number of possible ways, then we have a basis for believing in free will.

Only if you can show the outcome of the indeterminacy is anything but random.
If it is random then you still have indeterminacy but zero basis for believing in freewill other than wishful thinking.

IOW, if the brain is a chaotic system it becomes possible for it to act in more than one way, selecting options based on its conscious assessment of its overall state.

And it does that selection based on the inherent process of the underlying matter (whether that is indeterminate, probabilistic or strictly deterministic). It still does not allow for freewill as anything other than the perception by our consciousness of freedom to choose by that same consciousness.

An emergent process by definition cannot be logically reduced to the states of its components. It is a property that only arises on a higher level in a holistic state. We see this all the time in chemistry, where properties emerge that do not exist on the molecular level. This doesn't mean those properties are illusory either. They are as real as the properties that the existed only at the molecular level. Hence if freewill is an emergent property, it will have a certain irreducible quality as well a realness that is not just illusory.

It is not that they don't merely exist at the molecular level but that they can't be explained by or predicted from.
Be that as it may, there is a category difference between freewill as an emergent property and the emergence of mere chemical properties, in that chemical properties do not contradict the inherent nature of the underlying molecules. Freewill appears to: the ability to make a selection without the cause for selection itself being caused.
That is why freewill (when we say it exists) starts at the level of consciousness. And with such a definition, as I have said in this and many other threads, freewill undeniably exists.

How are you defining freewill? You say it is an illusion because it is determinate from its underlying causes, but then say it wouldn't be real either if it is indeterminate from its underlying causes. That seems contradictory to me. Indeterminacy is a precondition for freedom in that there are multiply probable outcomes for a single process. IOW, the process is no long solely dictated by the linear succession of past states.

It is not contradictory as I don't see indeterminacy as a precondition for freedom but for randomness. I do not equate the two. One could argue that a die is "free" to land on whichever face it wants. But does that level of freedom equate to or even allow for freewill? There has to be something other than randomness for such a genuine freewill to be non-illusory.
And I am defining it in this regard as the ability to make a selection without the cause of the choice itself being caused, for if it is caused (even probabilistically so) then it is either deterministic or probabilistic (which would equate to indeterminate).

No..that is some kind of logical fallacy I don't have the time to look up now. It's sayingthat because freewill is an instance of an emergent state, then emergent states are all instances of freewill. That's ridiculous. No one is saying that here.

Then perhaps I misunderstood you.

I'm not sure that follows. Self-causation for instance would be an instance of a cause that may exist external to the linear chain of underlying causation. I will post examples of this process from science after I post this.

How is self-causation both external and non-random? Don't think of a linear chain as being specific things (A leads to B leads to C leads...) but more that every position, motion etc of every bit of matter and energy at one moment is the cause for their motion, position etc in the next moment.

A strange attractor, which exerts causal agency on the course of a chaotic systems evolution, is certainly non-random. It has a structure in the probabilistic landscape that has freed itself to some extent from the determination of the bottom level processes. What if freewill was like that? See below:

http://sulcus.berkeley.edu/freemanwww/manuscripts/id1/88.html

How is it non-random and uncaused?


As for downward causation - I'm not sure that counters anything. Maybe you are considering causation as merely lower to higher, but I'm not. I consider it, as stated, one moment causing the next. The interconnectedness of things is too complex to just look at specific chains of A leads to B to C to D etc.

But as said, all this depends on how you define freewill from the outset.

 

[Magical Realist]

Only if you can show the outcome of the indeterminacy is anything but random.
If it is random then you still have indeterminacy but zero basis for believing in freewill other than wishful thinking.

As I've already pointed out, chaotic systems display indeterminate aspects that are not random but emergent. I've even posted some science articles supporting the view that the brain is such a chaotic system. And no, I do not have zero basis for believing in free will. I experience it all the time in my own deciding to take action. Even you yourself admit to this phenomenal demonstration of freewill but for some reason dismiss it as an illusion. Do you have anything other than Libet's disputed results proving this to be the case?

And it does that selection based on the inherent process of the underlying matter (whether that is indeterminate, probabilistic or strictly deterministic). It still does not allow for freewill as anything other than the perception by our consciousness of freedom to choose by that same consciousness.

In addition to the emergent properties and nonlinear variabilities that are typical of chaotic and "far from equilibrium" systems. So yes, it absolutely does allow for free will as perceived by consciousness itself. No illusion about it.

It is not that they don't merely exist at the molecular level but that they can't be explained by or predicted from.

Yes..I said they can't be logically reduced to their components.

Be that as it may, there is a category difference between freewill as an emergent property and the emergence of mere chemical properties, in that chemical properties do not contradict the inherent nature of the underlying molecules. Freewill appears to: the ability to make a selection without the cause for selection itself being caused.

Freewill doesn't entail noncausality. It only entails indetermination as to the outcome of a determinative process. With the addition of emergent properties at the systems level, we can easily imagine freewill as being the movement of ions across synapses at every point but whose overall pattern and direction of firing is modulated by the global properties of synchrony, backpropagation, and feedback networks.

That is why freewill (when we say it exists) starts at the level of consciousness. And with such a definition, as I have said in this and many other threads, freewill undeniably exists.

But it is an illusion too. Ok then..<shrug>

It is not contradictory as I don't see indeterminacy as a precondition for freedom but for randomness. I do not equate the two. One could argue that a die is "free" to land on whichever face it wants. But does that level of freedom equate to or even allow for freewill? There has to be something other than randomness for such a genuine freewill to be non-illusory.

The die has degrees of freedom that make many rolls equally possible. So yes, indeterminacy DOES allow for the freedom of realizing different outcomes other than just one. But that doesn't mean the dice is exerting freewill. There is no system level downward causation guiding it from above. It's randomness is all bottom up.

And I am defining it in this regard as the ability to make a selection without the cause of the choice itself being caused, for if it is caused (even probabilistically so) then it is either deterministic or probabilistic (which would equate to indeterminate).

Not if the there are so many causes going on that a certain indeterminacy emerges at the system level. Think about 100 billion neurons, each one connected to around a thousand others. If this isn't a pinball game of dynamic indeterminacy I don't know what is.

How is self-causation both external and non-random? Don't think of a linear chain as being specific things (A leads to B leads to C leads...) but more that every position, motion etc of every bit of matter and energy at one moment is the cause for their motion, position etc in the next moment.

I amended my claim to read downward causation rather than self-causation. But your point still applies. The problem is the motion of matter and energy in the brain isn't just determined by the position it had previously. Numerous other factors are coming into play involving the weighting of outputs, feedback loops, neurotransmitter secretions, interactive states, voltage levels, and synchronous wave forms that make the course of these movements chaotic and indeterminate. It's not as simple as tracing one event to the following one.

How is it non-random and uncaused?

Because it has a structure and a stability that exerts constraint on the process regardless of the inputs. That's how attractors work. They're really interesting things.

 

[iceaura]

Maybe you are considering causation as merely lower to higher, but I'm not. I consider it, as stated, one moment causing the next.

Of the many useful shorthand notions humans have invented to make a rough and ready useful sense of things, "cause" is one of the handier - but it's not some kind of be all and end all of reality.

Causation only makes sense within appropriate logical levels of analysis. Atoms do not cause snowflakes at all, much less particular shapes of them. Neurons to not cause ideas.

Patterns of mental activity - patterns of neuronal firing in time and space - cause each other. These patterns are entities in the world, independently of whatever neurons are their substrate at the moment - they can even jump between different brains altogether, and have their being supported by a completely different set of neurons.

The common error of those who deny freedom of the will is to overlook the level at which cause and effect explanations make sense in any given pattern of event.

 

[barcelonic]

My thought on "free will" is that it's one of those fields that for me is ultimately pointless to ponder. If I'm right (that we have free will, which one day may be demonstrated by our understanding of quantum mechanics), then I'm right and there's nothing left to say. We have choice, we have options and choices have consequences. If I'm wrong (that we are a bag of predestined particles whose trajectory was started with the Big Bang and whose culmination in our bodies is merely an exponentially more complex game of billiards with balls bouncing into each other), then pondering it doesn't matter either. I'm predestined to say it and think it.

It's an important thing to ponder for really cutting edge scientists/philosophers, but for the average person it's meaningless because -- regardless of which side is right -- it will have no meaning or impact. We either have free will or we don't. Even if proven tomorrow (that we don't), I will still happily go through my life, but only under the conclusion that I was destined to be happy and still be happy to be alive.

~String

Thanks String for your input,

I would suggest though that it is very important and here's why... there are killers right now who are in mental institutions because even a court of law determined they didn't belong in prison. The law established and agreed that these people should not be held accountable in the same way as other killers because their mental disorder led directly to committing the crime. It's my belief that there are other reasons why a person may not be accountable - some anatomical and others more neurological - and that these causes, if discovered and verified, would similarly exonerate these people and lead to a more modern way of diagnosing and treating them so we can be assured they won't kill again and do not need to be incarcerated.

I'm not suggesting any changes to the legal system right now, but imagining we understood motivations a lot better there is room for a major overhaul of our criminal justice system in the future. It troubles me that lots of people think the issue of free will has no practical importance - it does.

 

[Sarkus]

As I've already pointed out, chaotic systems display indeterminate aspects that are not random but emergent.

The two are not mutually exclusive.
Random merely means that it adheres to a probability function rather than a strictly determined outcome.

I've even posted some science articles supporting the view that the brain is such a chaotic system. And no, I do not have zero basis for believing in free will. I experience it all the time in my own deciding to take action. Even you yourself admit to this phenomenal demonstration of freewill but for some reason dismiss it as an illusion. Do you have anything other than Libet's disputed results proving this to be the case?

There is no proof either way. Any experiment can be argued for either case. And I have not relied on Libet or anything other than the assumed principles of cause and effect, and of interactions being probabilistically determined (as previously described).
Sure, dispute those assumptions, I have no issue with that.
And I do not dispute the demonstration as an illusion if that is what you define as freewill.
The illusion only applies to when you define freewill as a genuine ability to influence the chain of cause and effect without that influence itself being similarly caused and part of a chain, and that the interactions remain bound by the assumptions previously given.
If this is how you define freewill then it is an illusion.
As I have said, a mirage is not an illusion per se. It exists. But what it appears to show is illusory if we take that appearance at face value.

In addition to the emergent properties and nonlinear variabilities that are typical of chaotic and "far from equilibrium" systems. So yes, it absolutely does allow for free will as perceived by consciousness itself. No illusion about it.

"As perceived by consciousness itself" is your qualification for defining freewill only as it appears to the consciousness. If that is your definition then you are merely saying that the mirage exists. And I have no issue with that. Never have,

Freewill doesn't entail noncausality. It only entails indetermination as to the outcome of a determinative process.

So you think a die roll has freewill.
A determinative process, if strictly determined, is not indeterminate. Period.
If the process is probabilistically determined then there is inherent indeterminism due to the randomness of outcome within the probability function.
Neither of these allow for freewill, other than as an appearance at the conscious level: your emergent property.
To think otherwise does, as far as I can tell, entail non-causality for the reasons explained: you require an event to alter the course of the deterministic/random process that is not itself part of the deterministic/random process.
If it is part, then all you have is the deterministic/random process. No freewill.
If it is not part of the process then it must be uncaused, due to the assumption of cause and effect applying (and the only uncaused agents being random).

With the addition of emergent properties at the systems level, we can easily imagine freewill as being the movement of ions across synapses at every point but whose overall pattern and direction of firing is modulated by the global properties of synchrony, backpropagation, and feedback networks.

We can indeed, and the apparent freedom within that is illusory: in that the reality of it being deterministic/random is hidden from us, perhaps unfathomable. And all you are left with is the appearance of the ability to exercise freedom.

But it is an illusion too. Ok then..<shrug>

As is a mirage.
As are optical illusions that you can observe on the internet. They exist. Yet they are illusory. The illusion merely means that what we perceive is merely a perception.

The die has degrees of freedom that make many rolls equally possible. So yes, indeterminacy DOES allow for the freedom of realizing different outcomes other than just one. But that doesn't mean the dice is exerting freewill. There is no system level downward causation guiding it from above. It's randomness is all bottom up.

Ive never disputed indeterminacy allows for freedom of output (even if within the probability function) but merely having degrees of random freedom does not equate to freewill: the ability to exert influence over the output that is not itself part of the causal chain.

Not if the there are so many causes going on that a certain indeterminacy emerges at the system level. Think about 100 billion neurons, each one connected to around a thousand others. If this isn't a pinball game of dynamic indeterminacy I don't know what is.

I don't dispute that. And from that we get the appearance of the ability to make choice. I have always stated this from the outset.
Anyone who argues for the existence of freewill does so from the starting point of it being the appearance of... even if they don't realise it or admit it.

I amended my claim to read downward causation rather than self-causation. But your point still applies. The problem is the motion of matter and energy in the brain isn't just determined by the position it had previously. Numerous other factors are coming into play involving the weighting of outputs, feedback loops, neurotransmitter secretions, interactive states, voltage levels, and synchronous wave forms that make the course of these movements chaotic and indeterminate. It's not as simple as tracing one event to the following one.

Ive said as much myself, that it is not a matter of tracing a chain from A to B to C etc.
That every moment is caused by the preceding moment. All those things you list are captured within that.
I am not considering a causal chain of one atom interacting with another, but with every influence on every aspect causing the output of every aspect.

Because it has a structure and a stability that exerts constraint on the process regardless of the inputs. That's how attractors work. They're really interesting things.

Attractors are a product of the system, not separate from it. They are merely our interpretation of the dynamics of the system at work.

 

[Sarkus]

Of the many useful shorthand notions humans have invented to make a rough and ready useful sense of things, "cause" is one of the handier - but it's not some kind of be all and end all of reality.

Causation only makes sense within appropriate logical levels of analysis. Atoms do not cause snowflakes at all, much less particular shapes of them. Neurons to not cause ideas.

Patterns of mental activity - patterns of neuronal firing in time and space - cause each other. These patterns are entities in the world, independently of whatever neurons are their substrate at the moment - they can even jump between different brains altogether, and have their being supported by a completely different set of neurons.

Don't disagree with regard the patterns of mental activity. But with our perception of time, causation is a fundamental assumption.
Atoms do not cause snowflakes, but the dynamics of the system (of which atoms are a part) do, and the dynamics are driven one moment at a time, even if it is all interconnected.

And I do not deny freewill: I have the appearance of making choices all the time. I consciously make choices, and exert my freewill. But I am content that my consciousness hides from me the infinite complexity of interactions that led to me making the choice I did, and instead tells me that "I" made the choice. It may tell me of the gross influences, but it can not tell me of the infinitely complex interactions that lead to those, because consciousness itself only operates at a level above those interactions.

 

[barcelonic]

Why can't causation be the "be all and end all of reality"? Everyone of us perceive it, much like reality, and just like reality not one of us has found anything to suggest we are wrong about it.
Of course, we could still doubt it, but we could doubt reality too. I would say that causation is as solid a concept as reality.

I tend to think of it as an infintely long abacus: the balls in the middle don't cause anything directly, and so if atoms don't cause snowflakes then surely it isn't too much of a stretch to think that patterns in the brain don't cause anything either. After all, something had to cause them and we could easily attribute whatever caused the cause of the cause to the end result, as well as the cause of the cause of the cause of the cause and so on..

To find the first ball in the abacus would be to find the first cause, and yet also the first result. It could be said that the big bang is the only real cause, but I personally don't believe that nothing caused that.

 

[Waiter_2001]

If you're telling me something "WILL", then I cannot change that, making such a thing deterministic. We are without such a thing as "free"-will. Anything "willed", WILL happen. However I am never willed to anything, meaning I do have free-will. Life for the majority is deterministic, free-will is for the minority.

 

[superstring01]

Thanks String for your input,

I would suggest though that it is very important and here's why... there are killers right now who are in mental institutions because even a court of law determined they didn't belong in prison. The law established and agreed that these people should not be held accountable in the same way as other killers because their mental disorder led directly to committing the crime. It's my belief that there are other reasons why a person may not be accountable - some anatomical and others more neurological - and that these causes, if discovered and verified, would similarly exonerate these people and lead to a more modern way of diagnosing and treating them so we can be assured they won't kill again and do not need to be incarcerated.

I'm not suggesting any changes to the legal system right now, but imagining we understood motivations a lot better there is room for a major overhaul of our criminal justice system in the future. It troubles me that lots of people think the issue of free will has no practical importance - it does.

I just spent five days at a conference on drug addiction.

Quick story -- I'm a recovering meth addict who dabbled heavily in cocaine, ecstasy and ketamine. Meth was my thing. I'm very hyper-active and ADHD. Uppers have a powerful effect on me that are light-years away from your average joe. They focus me, they hone me. I get a sense of calm and stability inside my head. I self medicated for 4 years. When my other friends were losing teeth or picking through their skin, covered in sores, I was out running around, clear-skinned, without paranoia. And my tolerance to uppers is staggering. I've told other recovering addicts how much meth I was ingesting towards the end and I regularly get called a liar. A single sixteenth of an ounce would cause you to be strung out for days. I was smoking and snorting more than an 8th of an ounce per day.

Anyway, one of the things I've maintained is that addiction was not a disease. Maybe I was wishful thinking. But one of the great presentations from a neuroscientist and a psychiatrist at this conference was the compelling evidence on the disease of drug addiction. Many people confuse the meaning of disease with moral equivalency. "How can it be a disease if you have will power?" Or, "Sure, it's not your fault because it's a disease."

But those are straw-man arguments and patently non-sequitur lapse of logic. The two discussions don't belong together. Nothing about a thing being a disease excuses it or removes individual accountability from the equation. And that's where this whole point addresses your implied question.

Free will is complicated. Our logical side is like the passenger in the car. It bickers with the driver, it tells the driver where to go. It yells at the driver. But your mid-brain, the primitive parts (containing the amygdala) is the driver. It's the driver for a good reason in that it's usually far better at making decisions when they count (life/death) than a logical thinker. The mid-brain is responsible for the next 15 seconds of your life and in that you really don't have much free will. Our emotional reactions and our impulse control are all factors of the primitive brain. NOW, this doesn't mean we're not responsible, because there is a way to curtail the midbrain and it's when it doesn't exert its full control.

We do this by -- when talking with others, when engaging our families -- asking for help. Our mid-brain isn't in control in those situations because there's no existential threat to our bodies at those moments (presumably). And we logically know if we're addicted. In those moments we say to a family member, "I have to get help. When I'm alone or when temptation is near me, I cannot say no." That's how we win over the mid-brain.

But otherwise we're slaves to our emotional predestination. This doesn't mean we're not responsible (nor should be held responsible), but it points out the quintessential human weakness and why -- in this world -- we should pay more attention to this factor in our being (i.e. companies that manipulate the bliss-point of foods to trap our mid-brain into addictive behaviors).

~String

 

[Waiter_2001]

All your base are belong to us!

 

[barcelonic]

I just spent five days at a conference on drug addiction.

Quick story -- I'm a recovering meth addict who dabbled heavily in cocaine, ecstasy and ketamine. Meth was my thing. I'm very hyper-active and ADHD. Uppers have a powerful effect on me that are light-years away from your average joe. They focus me, they hone me. I get a sense of calm and stability inside my head. I self medicated for 4 years. When my other friends were losing teeth or picking through their skin, covered in sores, I was out running around, clear-skinned, without paranoia. And my tolerance to uppers is staggering. I've told other recovering addicts how much meth I was ingesting towards the end and I regularly get called a liar. A single sixteenth of an ounce would cause you to be strung out for days. I was smoking and snorting more than an 8th of an ounce per day.

Anyway, one of the things I've maintained is that addiction was not a disease. Maybe I was wishful thinking. But one of the great presentations from a neuroscientist and a psychiatrist at this conference was the compelling evidence on the disease of drug addiction. Many people confuse the meaning of disease with moral equivalency. "How can it be a disease if you have will power?" Or, "Sure, it's not your fault because it's a disease."

But those are straw-man arguments and patently non-sequitur lapse of logic. The two discussions don't belong together. Nothing about a thing being a disease excuses it or removes individual accountability from the equation. And that's where this whole point addresses your implied question.

Free will is complicated. Our logical side is like the passenger in the car. It bickers with the driver, it tells the driver where to go. It yells at the driver. But your mid-brain, the primitive parts (containing the amygdala) is the driver. It's the driver for a good reason in that it's usually far better at making decisions when they count (life/death) than a logical thinker. The mid-brain is responsible for the next 15 seconds of your life and in that you really don't have much free will. Our emotional reactions and our impulse control are all factors of the primitive brain. NOW, this doesn't mean we're not responsible, because there is a way to curtail the midbrain and it's when it doesn't exert its full control.

We do this by -- when talking with others, when engaging our families -- asking for help. Our mid-brain isn't in control in those situations because there's no existential threat to our bodies at those moments (presumably). And we logically know if we're addicted. In those moments we say to a family member, "I have to get help. When I'm alone or when temptation is near me, I cannot say no." That's how we win over the mid-brain.

But otherwise we're slaves to our emotional predestination. This doesn't mean we're not responsible (nor should be held responsible), but it points out the quintessential human weakness and why -- in this world -- we should pay more attention to this factor in our being (i.e. companies that manipulate the bliss-point of foods to trap our mid-brain into addictive behaviors).

~String

Great post, thanks

The amygdala doesn't make a decision, though; it's a cog and merely does the only thing it knows how to which is save you. Never for a moment will your amygdala decide differently; were you suicidal the amygdala would have no way of knowing about your depression, and so in any case it would try to save you.

In those clear moments when you are able to admit to being addicted and ask for help, you would still need to know that help was available. The knowledge that there are people in your life who care for you enough to do that is dependent on other people letting you know this throughout your life. Nobody would go to a self-help group if there were no self-help groups, so you are beholden to the 'decisions' of others. I myself would say here that if the conditions are right AND you have become the type of person that would do this when, say you perceive it to be 86% necessary and that is where you subconsciously sense it to be, then you would do it. And if you were to rewind the clock on time you would do it again ad infinitum.

My story is a little different but I too dabbled a lot with a similar set of substances, and now when I look back with a clear head I'm able to try to assess why I did the things I did. I suffer from a disease called ME and although I got it in my early teens it didn't affect me much until my early twenties. The effect it did have was subtle and largely unnoticeable but reduced my energy levels quite significantly over time. I dropped out of two colleges (aged 17 and 19) because I couldn't keep up with the work. Once I knew that I had ME I began to come to terms with how growing up in my teens every single task I did, no matter how small, was a little bit (and later significantly) harder than it was for other people to do. It was strange but explained an awful lot. I also was in more pain and discomfort than others but i had no other subjective experience with which to compare it so I did not even know.
I hadn't known this and neither had anyone else so I was called 'lazy' so much I eventually began to believe and accept it as a part of who I was.

Then I began to consider if there was a reason why I always felt myself so drawn to being high and I realised that sobriety has just always much harder for me. It makes perfect sense that I would spend more of my time trying to escape it than my like-minded friends. I feel as culpable today as I did back then; I just believe now that I was always going to do that unless a circumstance was changed. I mean to say that whatever the action, any assosciated guilt remains. I don't think we can escape our conscience through critical thinking and a change of philosophy. I just like to know why things happen and understand myself a bit better.

However, the illusion of free will does, as i see it, offer some benefits and in the case of drug use or addiction it can help enormously to motivate people to do better - telling somebody their behaviour is a disease does, in some cases, lead to reduced efforts against it. I believe things such as this can help us better understand why in a world with no free will such an illusion would be necessary.

 

[Yazata]

It seems to me that a big part of the problem in the free-will/determinism debate is that the phrase 'free-will' remains kind of undefined. People typically have a vague intuition of what it means, and may believe that they experience it in their own volition, but there's nothing precise or concrete.

It certainly doesn't mean 'random' or 'uncaused'. Convulsions aren't examples of free-will. In order to qualify as an example of free-will, an action would seem to have to have been willed, it would have to be an expression of the actor's own motivations, purposes and choices. It would have to have arisen from an actor's own internal decision-processes in other words. That's consistent with causality.

And an actor's decision processes don't just emerge from nowhere. They in turn are shaped by the actor's current situation, and by his/her previous experiences, knowledge and decisions. That's consistent with causality too.

We might even say that if we know everything about what a particular individual's goals and purposes are, about what his/her fears and concerns might be, and about how he/she perceives the existing situation, we could make a very accurate prediction of what that person is going to do. That's consistent both with causality and with how people think about others in real life.

One of the things that people often say about free-will is something along the lines of 'I could have done something different, if I had chosen to do so'. That's kind of fundamental to what most people mean when they talk about free-will. But it doesn't seem to me to imply any violations of causality. It does imply the existence of a different motivation, which in turn implies some relevant difference in the internal decision process, which suggests some difference in the individual's previous history. We might have chosen differently if we were in a different situation, if we had different knowledge, if we were in a different mood, or something.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to interpret the 'I could have done something different, if I had chosen to do so' intuition as a requirement that one's choices are in fact the product of one's own internal decision process, and not forced on one from outside.

And perhaps that's what the free-will/determinism argument comes down to. Is the universe itself an outside usurping force in that sense?

I've argued that we aren't typically bothered by that when it's local. We all make our decisions in response to the situations that we find ourselves in, in accordance with our own cognitive and emotional states, value assessments and so on. And we don't typically have any problem in acknowledging that all of these things have histories.

The place where determinism starts to get seriously implausible for most people (including me) is when it's suggested that the initial state of the universe at the big-bang or whatever somehow predetermined everything that will ever happen, every-where and every-when. It's especially implausible when that's expanded into a kind of fatalism, as it so often is, when it's suggested that our own internal decision processes are merely illusory and that all we really are is marionettes, with implacable universal fate pulling our strings.

My own speculation is that there's probably lots of underdetermination in how the universe evolves. I picture causal determination as something like the weather, easy to predict with considerable accuracy on short timescales, but increasingly imprecise for all but the simplest systems as timescales expand. Which suggests that what's happening to individual people right now might not have been predetermined at the beginning at all. People's internal decision-processes do seem to me to be important, since people find themselves in the position of constantly having to improvise in response to local events.

 

[Magical Realist]

"An alternative possibility avoiding many of the difficulties exhibited in the chaos+quantum mechanics approach is suggested by the research on far-from-equilibrium systems by Ilya Prigogine and his Brussels-Austin Group (Bishop 2004). Their work purports to offer reasons to search for a different type of indeterminism at both the micro and macrophysical levels.

Consider a system of particles. If the particles are distributed uniformly in position in a region of space, the system is said to be in thermodynamic equilibrium (e.g., cream uniformly distributed throughout a cup of coffee). In contrast, if the system is far-from-equilibrium (nonequilibrium) the particles are arranged so that highly ordered structures might appear (e.g., a cube of ice floating in tea). The following properties characterize nonequilibrium statistical systems: large number of particles, high degree of structure and order, collective behavior, irreversibility, and emergent properties. The brain possesses all these properties, so that the brain can be considered a nonequilibrium system (an equilibrium brain is a dead brain!).

Let me quickly sketch a simplified version of the approach to point out why the developments of the Brussels-Austin Group offer an alternative for investigating the connections between physics, consciousness and free will. Conventional approaches in physics describe systems using particle trajectories as a fundamental explanatory element of their models, meaning that the behavior of a model is derivable from the trajectories of the particles composing the model. The equations governing the motion of these particles are reversible with respect to time (they can be run backwards and forwards like a film). When there are too many particles involved to make these types of calculations feasible (as in gases or liquids), coarse-grained averaging procedures are used to develop a statistical picture of how the system behaves rather than focusing on the behavior of individual particles.

In contrast the Brussels-Austin approach views nonequilibrium systems in terms of nonlinear models whose fundamental explanatory elements are distributions; that is to say, the arrangements of the particles are the fundamental explanatory elements and not the individual particles and trajectories.[8] The equations governing the behavior of these distributions are generally irreversible with respect to time. In addition focusing exclusively on distribution functions opens the possibility that macroscopic nonequilibrium models are irreducibly indeterministic, an indeterminism that has nothing to do with ignorance about the system. If so, this would mean probabilities are as much an ontologically fundamental element of the macroscopic world as they are of the microscopic and are free of the interpretive difficulties found in conventional quantum mechanics.

One important insight of the Brussels-Austin Group's shift away from trajectories to distributions as fundamental elements is that explanation also shifts from a local context (set of particle trajectories) to a global context (distribution of the entire set of particles). Systems acting as a whole may produce collective effects that are not reducible to a summation of the trajectories and subelements composing the system (Bishop 2004 and 2008). The brain exhibits this type of collective behavior in many circumstances (Engel, et al. 1997) and the work of Prigogine and his colleagues gives us another tool for trying to understand that behavior. Moreover, nonlinear nonequilibrium models also exhibit SDIC, so there are a number of possibilities in such approaches for very rich dynamical description of brain operations and cognitive phenomena (e.g., Juarrero 1999). Though the Brussels-Austin approach to nonequilibrium statistical mechanics is still speculative and contains some open technical questions (Bishop 2004), it offers an alternative for exploring the relationship between physics, consciousness and free will as well as pointing to a new possible source for indeterminism to be explored in free will theories."--http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chaos/

 

[Magical Realist]

The two are not mutually exclusive.
Random merely means that it adheres to a probability function rather than a strictly determined outcome.

No, stochastic and chaotic systems are not the same:

http://www.math.tamu.edu/~mpilant/math614/chaos_vs_random.pdf

There is no proof either way. Any experiment can be argued for either case. And I have not relied on Libet or anything other than the assumed principles of cause and effect, and of interactions being probabilistically determined (as previously described).

Enough phenomenal proof for you to dismiss it as a brain generated illusion. As if the brain would go thru all the trouble of generating an illusion of freewill, along with a contrasting sense of being determined or out of control, for no reason at all. What for instance would be the survival advantage of running a brain thru of mere game of preconceived and selected options when such would only delay response time? How could an illusion of freewill contribute to our own survival?

And I do not dispute the demonstration as an illusion if that is what you define as freewill.

Freewill ISN'T demonstrated "as an illusion." It's demonstrated as a reality, one that cannot even be denied in living our everyday lives. You fail to show how this phenomenal reality is an illusion and how you have managed to see thru the illusion as being "just an illusion." You just sort of assume it for no reason whatsoever. What other phenomenal contents of consciousness may we hand wave away? Is the conscious experience of the outer world an illusion too?

The illusion only applies to when you define freewill as a genuine ability to influence the chain of cause and effect without that influence itself being similarly caused and part of a chain, and that the interactions remain bound by the assumptions previously given.
If this is how you define freewill then it is an illusion.

That's how YOU define freewill. I say freewill is the reciprocal downward causation of the system on the chains even as the chains are influencing the course of the system's behavior. That's what chaos theory is about: systems that are totally determinate and yet unpredictable at the same time. And it's not an unpredictability that arises only out of our ignorance of initial conditions. It is a factual unpredictability and indeterminacy that inheres in the structure of the system itself--in the interaction of component level chains and system level emergent patterns. IOW, the indeterminacy, or more precisely underdeterminacy, is real and not just illusory.

As I have said, a mirage is not an illusion per se.

What?!! Have you ever drank water from a mirage. No? Then yes, a mirage IS an illusion per se.

It exists. But what it appears to show is illusory if we take that appearance at face value.

If it exists, then it exists precisely AS an illusion and nothing else. Merely appearing to be real doesn't confer upon it some new ontic status as an illusion that is not an illusion.

"As perceived by consciousness itself" is your qualification for defining freewill only as it appears to the consciousness. If that is your definition then you are merely saying that the mirage exists. And I have no issue with that. Never have,

Since consciousness is always consciousness of something real, otherwise it'd be mere hallucination, then yes, "as perceived by consciousness" equates to the reality of an actual state. You experience all reality as perceived by consciousness itself. Does that mean reality is a mirage? I hope not..

So you think a die roll has freewill.

Why would you say that when I specifically denied it having freewill?

"But that doesn't mean the dice is exerting freewill. There is no system level downward causation guiding it from above. It's randomness is all bottom up."

A determinative process, if strictly determined, is not indeterminate. Period.
If the process is probabilistically determined then there is inherent indeterminism due to the randomness of outcome within the probability function.
Neither of these allow for freewill, other than as an appearance at the conscious level: your emergent property.
To think otherwise does, as far as I can tell, entail non-causality for the reasons explained: you require an event to alter the course of the deterministic/random process that is not itself part of the deterministic/random process.
If it is part, then all you have is the deterministic/random process. No freewill.
If it is not part of the process then it must be uncaused, due to the assumption of cause and effect applying (and the only uncaused agents being random).

No, we are not reduced to such a black and white either/or scenario. Freewill can certainly be to more or lesser degrees determined from the bottom up, while at the same time opened up to multiple possibilities arising out of more or lesser degrees of indetermination from the top down. (see below quote). Take the case of the driver of a horse-drawn carriage. There is not total determination of the horse's movements like robots, but neither is there totally indetermination as in letting the horses go whenever they want. There is an iterative and loose reigning on the horse's bits that guides the horse movements according to the will of the driver. Same with freewill--a middle ground of determinative chains interacting with determinative effects of system-level attractors resulting in an overall underdeterminacy of the course of the system.

"Indeterminists do not have to deny that causes exist. Instead, they can maintain that the only causes that exist are of a type that do not constrain the future to a single course; for instance, they can maintain that only necessary and not sufficient causes exist. The necessary/sufficient distinction works as follows;

If x is a necessary cause of y; then the presence of y necessarily implies that x preceded it. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.

If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the presence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the presence of x.

As Daniel Dennett points out in Freedom Evolves, it is possible for everything to have a necessary cause, even while indeterminism holds and the future is open, because a necessary cause does not lead to a single inevitable effect. Thus "everything has a cause" is not a clear statement of determinism."---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indeterminism

We can indeed, and the apparent freedom within that is illusory: in that the reality of it being deterministic/random is hidden from us, perhaps unfathomable. And all you are left with is the appearance of the ability to exercise freedom.
As is a mirage.

The underdetermination is not illusory. The system really cannot in principle be reduced to the behavior of its units. This is due to the emergence of new constraining factors and properties that did not exist at the component level and that operate from outside of those causal chains.

As are optical illusions that you can observe on the internet. They exist. Yet they are illusory. The illusion merely means that what we perceive is merely a perception.

An illusion is not a perception of anything. That is why it is called an illusion. The illusion exists AS an illusion, but not as anything real in itself.

Ive never disputed indeterminacy allows for freedom of output (even if within the probability function) but merely having degrees of random freedom does not equate to freewill: the ability to exert influence over the output that is not itself part of the causal chain.
I don't dispute that. And from that we get the appearance of the ability to make choice. I have always stated this from the outset.

Chaotic indeterminacy is not equivalent to randomness. The indeterminacy is itself determinative of the system to the point of constraining its evolution in a typical and replicable way. A purely random process has no such directionality. It will not repeat the same behaviors over and over again.

Anyone who argues for the existence of freewill does so from the starting point of it being the appearance of... even if they don't realise it or admit it.

Anyone who argues for the existence of anything does so from the starting point of it being an appearance--an appearance of something real otherwise it wouldn't be an appearance but only a hallucination. The burden falls on you to show how consciousness generates an illusion in the case of freewill while not generating illusion in its other perceptions (ie. of our environment, of our own chemical changes in our brains, of pain, or tiredness, of hunger, of thirst, etc.)

Ive said as much myself, that it is not a matter of tracing a chain from A to B to C etc.
That every moment is caused by the preceding moment. All those things you list are captured within that.
I am not considering a causal chain of one atom interacting with another, but with every influence on every aspect causing the output of every aspect.

Every y is caused by x iow. I'm not disagreeing with that. But that doesn't mean every x causes y. x could also cause z as well. This goes back to the necessary but not sufficient argument of indeterminism. IOW, in the brain a certain event may always be caused by a preceding event, yet that preceding event might also cause different events as well.

Attractors are a product of the system, not separate from it. They are merely our interpretation of the dynamics of the system at work.

Attractors are a product of the system as a whole but not of the system at the component level. That's why they have an emergent quality.They exert a top down influence that lessens the determination of the causal chains at the component level.

 

[barcelonic]

@MR Actually a mirage is not an illusion, it's a hallucination. Wishful thinking is what makes people run toward it. If they took stock for a moment they'd know it's not real, unless they are delerious, in which case they'd be suffering from both hallucinations and delerium.These are essentially medical disorders, for which one would ideally seek treatment.

 

[Magical Realist]

@MR Actually a mirage is not an illusion, it's a hallucination. Wishful thinking is what makes people run toward it. If they took stock for a moment they'd know it's not real, unless they are delerious, in which case they'd be suffering from both hallucinations and delerium.These are essentially medical disorders, for which one would ideally seek treatment.

"Under a baking sun, a weary traveller trudges across a seemingly never-ending expanse of desert. Looking up, he suddenly spots something in the distance: a sparkling lake. He rubs his eyes. It’s still there. Picking up the pace in glee he strides ahead… only for the water to melt into thin air.

You might think our traveller was hallucinating, but mirages are a naturally-occurring optical illusion. In cartoons, a mirage is often depicted as a peaceful, lush oasis lying in the shade of swaying palm trees, but in reality it is much more likely to look like a pool of water.

The illusion results from the way in which light is refracted (bent) through air at different temperatures. Cold air is denser than warm air, and therefore has a greater refractive index. This means that as light passes down from cool to hot air, it gets bent upwards towards the denser air and away from the ground (see diagram).

To your eyes, these distorted rays seem to be coming from the ground, so you perceive a refracted image of the sky on the ground. This looks just like a reflection on the surface of a pool of water, which can easily cause confusion."---http://www.physics.org/article-questions.asp?id=45

 

[barcelonic]

My apologies MR - I stand corrected