Refuting the agnostic argument from uncertainty?

wynn

˙
Valued Senior Member
There is an argument from uncertainty that concludes that agnosticism is the best option. It goes like this:


The more important it is to be right about a matter, the more cautious we should be in forming our beliefs. If a matter is of great importance, as religion is, then our evidential standards concerning it should be set high, we should demand strong evidence before settling on what we believe.

In fact, religion is of unquantifiable importance—there is nothing more important than being right about the question of God’s existence—and we should therefore set our evidential standards infinitely high.

If this is correct, then the standard of evidence required for justified religious belief is so high that it can never be satisfied; we can never have enough evidence to form beliefs about such questions as whether God exists. In this way, the importance of religion works to suggest that we can never have religious knowledge, that we ought to remain agnostic.


http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/arguments-for-agnosticism/the-argument-from-uncertainty/


Is there a way to refute this argument, also in favor of theism?
 
There is another way to say that- extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and can therefore be dismissed in the absence of evidence. I disagree that the importance of something has any bearing on the evidence required. However, since there is no evidence of a God, this extraordinary claim can be dismissed, which is atheism.
 
There is another way to say that- extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, and can therefore be dismissed in the absence of evidence. I disagree that the importance of something has any bearing on the evidence required. However, since there is no evidence of a God, this extraordinary claim can be dismissed, which is atheism.

But what would be extraordinary evidence, how would we recognize it?
 
Something more than a personal anecdote? Maybe a statistical correlation between prayer and something measurable?
 
But what would be extraordinary evidence, how would we recognize it?

That is the problem with the idea of god and evidence of such.

You could use the fact that we are here, in this grand universe as evidence. Could you not. I mean, how did it all happen ? God did it, god is everywhere and in everything. In that sense how do you separate out the evidence.

When we look at the texts, the opposite occurs, because the evidence points away from any particular religions god.

But God doesn't have to be represented by any particular religion.

So whose god and what god would we be referring to.

So it is a very good question. What would be extrodinary evidence and how would we recognize it.

You could say that such evidence would put all doubt aside for all.
 
There is an argument from uncertainty that concludes that agnosticism is the best option. It goes like this:





Is there a way to refute this argument, also in favor of theism?
Sure.....

the knowledge of the belief exists. Can't deny it.

Has the knowledge affected mankind? Yes!

That means it is a part of the evolution of knowledge.

In favor of theism? Which one? That is the deluting issue of the matter; chosing a God. Which material shares the rendition best descibing God?

I say, the sciences!

The conflict is not so much between atheist or theist but the opinion of what 'the' god is.

Science has a god too: Mother Nature!
 
You could use the fact that we are here, in this grand universe as evidence. Could you not. I mean, how did it all happen ?

It's interesting that you start with a statement but then end with a question. If you're asking "how did it all happen", you can hardly then say that it's evidence that a god did it.

Basically you're using argument from ignorance, (I don't know thus a god did it), and/or god of the gaps, (we don't know therefore god did it). Where in there is this supposed 'evidence' that a god did it?
 
There is an argument from uncertainty that concludes that agnosticism is the best option. It goes like this:
...
Is there a way to refute this argument, also in favor of theism?
Without refuting it, but taking a slightly different emphasis, it can lead to Pascal's Wager:

The question of God is of the utmost importance - and the reward so high for being right about one's belief - that it is surely far better to believe than not.

After all, you have to be in it to win it.

That sort of thing.


The difference, I guess, is in the perceived effect of "not believing"... with Pascal's Wager, not-believing is the same as believing in the wrong thing. In the argument from uncertainty there is no harm in not believing - hence it is the safest option.

However, the whole issue of harm / no harm already assumes the existence of the god at the heart of the matter - and so is flawed in that regard.
 
There is an argument from uncertainty that concludes that agnosticism is the best option. It goes like this:

The more important it is to be right about a matter, the more cautious we should be in forming our beliefs. If a matter is of great importance, as religion is, then our evidential standards concerning it should be set high, we should demand strong evidence before settling on what we believe.

In fact, religion is of unquantifiable importance—there is nothing more important than being right about the question of God’s existence—and we should therefore set our evidential standards infinitely high.

If this is correct, then the standard of evidence required for justified religious belief is so high that it can never be satisfied; we can never have enough evidence to form beliefs about such questions as whether God exists. In this way, the importance of religion works to suggest that we can never have religious knowledge, that we ought to remain agnostic.

Is there a way to refute this argument, also in favor of theism?

When refuting an argument a good starting point is its over assumptions, in this case:

1) The more important it is to be right about a matter, the more cautious we should be in forming our beliefs.

A vague truism which as Doreen likes to point out, is not true. Caution in and of itself does not necessarily improve the quality of a decision. There is an upper limit to the amount of caution which is productive.


2)If a matter is of great importance, as religion is, then our evidential standards concerning it should be set high, we should demand strong evidence before settling on what we believe.

Assumption: religion is of great importance and religion directly relates to the question of god.

3) In fact, religion is of unquantifiable importance—there is nothing more important than being right about the question of God’s existence—and we should therefore set our evidential standards infinitely high.

The actual importance of religion and its actual relevance is not established.

The importance of being right about god is not established. God might be a jolly old forgiving guy who couldn't care less if you god the question of his existence right.

Exaggeration: Setting standards "impossibly" high is unjustified.

4) If this is correct, then the standard of evidence required for justified religious belief is so high that it can never be satisfied; we can never have enough evidence to form beliefs about such questions as whether God exists.

Sure set the standards impossibly high for anything and you can't meet them, making this a tautology.

Beliefs don't require evidence.

5) In this way, the importance of religion works to suggest that we can never have religious knowledge, that we ought to remain agnostic.

Um, do you know anything about these people? This seems like a caricature made by religious people to avoid the actual questions posed by agnostics. I can't imagine any serious agnostic posing this.

Any way, the importance of religion has yet to be established, its relevance to the question of god's existence is not established, they did not discuss religious knowledge in general, the argument they did present was faulty, remaining agnostic is not the only possible conclusion.

I hope that helps.
 
...
However, the whole issue of harm / no harm already assumes the existence of the god at the heart of the matter - and so is flawed in that regard.

Why would it be flawed to presume the existence of God in this case? The whole argument from uncertainty addresses the possibility of deciding about God, and as such it cannot but incorporate the notion that God exists.


What I see as a problem both with Pascal's Wager as well as with the agnostic argument from uncertainty is that they both try to account for the possibilities 1. that God is evil, and 2. that the Vedas are wrong; and then they try to figure out a way around that.
 
Back
Top