So you are DENYING our perception of the tree is based on our projection of "virtual properties" or qualia like color, texture, and solidity, or accepting it?
I"m not denying it, I'm stating it. We do indeed project our subjective experience onto the tree, which is why and how we perceive it the way we do. But I would, of course, say that this is something that happens in the mind and not something that happens to the tree. You, on the other hand, seem to be suggesting that it's something that happens to the tree. So why is it, then, that when I encounter a tree after you have already perceived it, that the tree doesn't force
your perception of it onto me? Or are there as many unique versions of this tree, out there in the world, as there are people who have perceived it?
What about Grand Canyons? Are there as many of them in Arizona as there are people who have ever visited?
"A particular configuration of matter that persists for a time" doesn't characterize anything about the tree worth defining. I might as well be talking about a million other things in the universe.
Of course it doesn't
characterize the tree in a satisfying way. That's what
we do, in our minds, when we look at it, or think about it. I was talking about the object itself. You accept that it must in some sense exist independently of our perception of it. But again, why invoke problematic ideas such as your "eigentree"? I mean, what happens when two people are perceiving it simultaneously? Does it then collapse into
two definite states? Why dismiss the much simpler idea that the object we call a tree is simply a configuration of matter that persists for a time, and that the richer characterization only happens to a
representation of the tree imported into our minds via our senses?
Ofcourse it is. A phenomena that is both physical and non-physical can interact with both and thus provide the link in their interaction. The question of it's origin is not my concern.
You can't solve the interaction problem simply by positing the existence of a compatible interface, because the interaction problem exists
within the interface. I certainly understand why you may
want to skip over it with mere pronouncements, but that does nothing to overcome the legitimacy of this objection to dualism.
Quantum physics demonstrates a direct effect of the non-physical on the physical in the form of the measurement problem in which the act of measurement collapses the wavefunction. This a linkage between the probablistic and the physical. I think energy is involved in this sort of contact between these two levels of reality. That's my conclusion.
This really is a huge leap on your part, because we are largely dealing with mathematical models of reality that may or may not (and if so, to varying degrees) accurately describe the way physical events
actually play out. In other words, QM demonstrates nothing of the sort.
Why are you so worried about WHAT I believe? Does it threaten your worldview somehow that I am dualist?
Worried? Threatened? I don't get it. If you're not here to discuss your world-view, and be challenged on it, why do you spend so much time here discussing your world-view and defending it, as well as challenging that of others? Isn't that why we're
all here?
The reason I am dualist is because AS given in my experience qualia and consciousness are as irreducible as physical matter is. They are BOTH essential and cosubstantial elements of reality, one never really being present without the other. Like outside and inside. To ontologically reduce one to the other is to trap oneself in a solipsistic mirage where nothing is real anymore. For the materialist it is in the form of consciousness being illusory because it is really just matter and physical processes. For the idealist it is also in the form of consciousness being illusory since without physical existence there wouldn't be anything to be conscious OF. Dualism preserves the reality of both the mental AND the physical as given datum of our experience. That is my view.
It is not necessary for a physicalist to view consciousness as illusory. I don't. In fact a physicalist
has to believe that consciousness is something that matter can be, otherwise they'd be forced to admit that they wouldn't be here to think about it. Pretty obvious stuff, huh? That's why characterizing it as "
just matter", as if it's nothing more than properties like spin, charge and mass, is inaccurate. It has to be more phenomenal than that. The seeds of the dimension of consciousness simply
have to be present, or else how could a collection of it give rise to the richness of human experience? By waving a wand and pulling it out of a hat? Of course not.
But isn't endowing matter with such properties still dualism? Aren't I effectively saying that matter is part matter, and part something else? No. I'm talking about what matter itself actually is. When you're talking properties such as spin, charge and mass, you may be describing certain features, but you're not encapsulating the whole. I mean, what
is a particle? What
substance is there to it? String theorists would say that it's a string, or filament of energy. But what is energy? You may be able to talk about how it oscillates in multiple tiny dimensions, but
what is it? I don't know. But whatever it is, it's phenomenal enough to become everything we see. One substance, all phenomena. Why not?
It only seems impossible when you impose artificial limitations, like you seem to be doing. But to be fair, I do realize that you are, to some extent, parroting some of the less imaginative, less inspired characterizations of physicalism (usually put forward by people who are so cautious that they wont publicly engage in any speculation or extrapolation at all, which is totally boring if you ask me).
To summarize, I don't see how
any feature of the world forces one to adopt a dualist stance, and I still think it's a far more problematic way to go about trying to make sense of everything.