I.
1. Any proposition is meaningless or meaningful.
1.1. A meaningless proposition equals to a pure contradiction (for instance, "A = no A").
1.2. Any meaningful proposition is true or false.
1.2.1. I define "truth" as non-contradiction ("my mother is old"), and "falsity" as partial contradiction (["my mother gave birth to me" + "my mother was never born"] = "my mother was never born").
1.3. The simplest meaningful proposition is a tautology, which shows the adequation between a subject and a predicate (let's say, "A = A").
1.3.1. A tautology is always true.
1.4. On the other hand, non-tautological propositions express the relationship between propositions themselves (gramatical propositions) or between the different events in the world (factual propositions).
1.4.1. Gramatical propositions only affect language and they are neither true nor false. Being merely consensual, they don't need a reason.
1.4.2. Factual propositions concern reality and they are described as true or false.
1.4.2.1. I define "reality" as possibility of being, that is, as intelligibility.
1.4.2.1. A factual proposition can be contradictory or non-contradictory.
1.4.2.1.1. Every contradictory (meaningful) proposition is partially unintelligible. Therefore, it is false rather than true.
1.4.2.1.2. Every non-contradictory proposition is intelligible. Therefore, it is true rather than false.
1.4.2.2. A true proposition can be actual or unactual.
1.4.2.2.1. I define "actual" as being in this world, and "unactual" as not being in this world.
1.4.2.2.2. Then: How can we know unactual propositions if they are not in this world?
II.
My conclusion is that we know them because they share the same logical status. Furthermore, two propositions may be both real and true, while only one of them is postulated "a posteriori" as an actual true proposition. Nevertheless we can't know "a priori" why this proposition is actual rather than unactual: To be certain, we must look for a reason.
And that is a good argument to believe in a Supreme Mind, which, by means of the Principle of sufficient reason, makes only the best became actual.
So, we must accept that:
1) Everything exists according to a reason (by the axiom "Nothing arises from nothing");
2) Everything which exists has a sufficient reason to exist;
3) Everything which exists is better than anything non-existent (by the first point: since it is more rational, it also has more reality), and, consequently, it is the best possible being in the best of all possible worlds (by the axiom: "That which contains more reality is better than that which contains less reality").
Thus, if God wanted to avoid evil, He would have to interact constantly with His creation (and that would prove that it isn't the best possible) or He would have to change the rules, sacrificing the Principle of sufficient reason and, then, losing the best of all possible worlds.
Greetings.
Daniel.
Theological Miscellany (in Spanish):
http://www.gratisweb.com/irichc/MT.htm
1. Any proposition is meaningless or meaningful.
1.1. A meaningless proposition equals to a pure contradiction (for instance, "A = no A").
1.2. Any meaningful proposition is true or false.
1.2.1. I define "truth" as non-contradiction ("my mother is old"), and "falsity" as partial contradiction (["my mother gave birth to me" + "my mother was never born"] = "my mother was never born").
1.3. The simplest meaningful proposition is a tautology, which shows the adequation between a subject and a predicate (let's say, "A = A").
1.3.1. A tautology is always true.
1.4. On the other hand, non-tautological propositions express the relationship between propositions themselves (gramatical propositions) or between the different events in the world (factual propositions).
1.4.1. Gramatical propositions only affect language and they are neither true nor false. Being merely consensual, they don't need a reason.
1.4.2. Factual propositions concern reality and they are described as true or false.
1.4.2.1. I define "reality" as possibility of being, that is, as intelligibility.
1.4.2.1. A factual proposition can be contradictory or non-contradictory.
1.4.2.1.1. Every contradictory (meaningful) proposition is partially unintelligible. Therefore, it is false rather than true.
1.4.2.1.2. Every non-contradictory proposition is intelligible. Therefore, it is true rather than false.
1.4.2.2. A true proposition can be actual or unactual.
1.4.2.2.1. I define "actual" as being in this world, and "unactual" as not being in this world.
1.4.2.2.2. Then: How can we know unactual propositions if they are not in this world?
II.
My conclusion is that we know them because they share the same logical status. Furthermore, two propositions may be both real and true, while only one of them is postulated "a posteriori" as an actual true proposition. Nevertheless we can't know "a priori" why this proposition is actual rather than unactual: To be certain, we must look for a reason.
And that is a good argument to believe in a Supreme Mind, which, by means of the Principle of sufficient reason, makes only the best became actual.
So, we must accept that:
1) Everything exists according to a reason (by the axiom "Nothing arises from nothing");
2) Everything which exists has a sufficient reason to exist;
3) Everything which exists is better than anything non-existent (by the first point: since it is more rational, it also has more reality), and, consequently, it is the best possible being in the best of all possible worlds (by the axiom: "That which contains more reality is better than that which contains less reality").
Thus, if God wanted to avoid evil, He would have to interact constantly with His creation (and that would prove that it isn't the best possible) or He would have to change the rules, sacrificing the Principle of sufficient reason and, then, losing the best of all possible worlds.
Greetings.
Daniel.
Theological Miscellany (in Spanish):
http://www.gratisweb.com/irichc/MT.htm