On the possibility of objective morality
Birch said:
your post is a perfect example of abstract relativism that is groundless, so therefore no different than imagination.
I would not pretend that the subjectivity of such words as "good" and "bad" have not been already introduced to this discussion. However, I would suggest that this subjectivity, this relativism, occurs in part because there is nothing firm against which such words might be compared. To wit, philosophers and scholars have suggested, quite reasonably, that something like
progress, which implies an attribute of goodness, can only be measured according to the desired
goal. That is, if I, living just north of Seattle, should wish to travel to Portland, Oregon, I might measure my progress according to how far south I have traveled. Certainly, I might travel the same number of miles east, and the journey be pleasant, but my progress, as such, would be more toward Portland,
Maine; indeed, following I-90 east would generally take me
farther from my goal, and this is no progress at all, but rather makes the intended journey more difficult.
Likewise with the generic concepts of good and bad. Against what standard do we compare such words?
Herein lies the difficulty of defining good and bad. As long as we agree on the standard by which such words are measured, we can generally agree on what is good or bad about a given outcome.
But, human diversity being as it is, such agreement only goes so far, and beyond that becomes difficult to establish or maintain.
These differences of perspective are, for instance, why I revile some fairly common political outlooks in my society as wrong, bad, or evil. That is, the greed inherent in the conservative or libertarian outlook on individual empowerment within society carries us farther from what I consider a reasonable goal.
And here we must entertain thoughts of how that goal is construed. Many would suggest that morality is presently without an objective goal. And insofar as morality reflects, say, "God's will", or some other arbitrary assignation, I would agree. Buth this anchorless condition need not be. While we cannot establish ultimate and unadulterated moral truth, we can cerainly observe the Universe as it is, and speculate or even hypothesize about the nature of that abstract truth.
Such as the idea of "survival of the fittest": implicit in this natural principle is the perpetuation of species. Without that driver, a species "goes the way of the dodo"; that is to say, if a species fails to adapt appropriately and sufficiently, it disappears into extinction. Indeed, examples of counterintuitive behavior among non-human animals abound. A certain species of walrus comes to mind, in which aged cows have been observed to sacrifice their individual lives to draw predators away from the young, who fled into the ocean. Enough examples exist that one can reasonably suggest that perpetuation of species, if not the true purpose of life, stands somewhere very near to it.
And in such a context, which can at least be
argued to be objective, as we can observe, hypothesize, test, and conclude various aspects thereof with some respectable degree of objectivity, we might discover some more fixed and utilitarian ground for defining right and wrong, good and bad, and various acceptable deviations therefrom.
Thus, my criticism of some of the politics of my human or, in a more local context, American neighbors derives from a perception that certain outlooks so elevate individual importance as to either ignore or subjugate the social tendencies of our species. We might apply such considerations to everything from tobacco smoking to taxes to war. Or corporate executive remuneration. Or abortion. Or even laws governing contracts and transactions.
I might, for the sake of clarity, posit that the problem with excessive elevation of the individual is that it might demand the hampering of our social endeavors, in the context of perpetuity of species, by subordinating or ignoring such considerations in pursuit of what is, ultimately, ephemeral gratification.
And while my opinion of such outlooks is hardly definitive or binding, I would hope it suggests something about the potentials within such an attempt to derive morality, right and wrong, good and bad, and other such ideas, from observable nature.
That we have no firm anchor for such comparisons is obvious. That it
must be so is less clearly established.