Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

[iceaura]

I would suggest you revisit your understanding of what it means to be deterministic.

I use your definition and explanation, here. I assume it. I'm trying to point your attention toward what it "means" - and in particular what it does not mean.

" Baldee and Sarkus and the rest have emphasized, loudly and repeatedly and with much insult, that their notion of freedom is a conclusion of their arguments rather than an assumption/premise/definition."
Because it is. Demonstrably. - -

Repeated and insistent self contradiction - what I pointed out in that post - is poor demonstration.

So we have nothing deterministic in the deterministic universe we've been assuming, then?

The opposite.

For the last time, we didn't assume "the physical world we have" but a deterministic universe!

Again: We have long assumed, for the sake of the argument here, throughout, that the physical world we have - the one we are talking about - is deterministic, that it exists as a deterministic universe, that using physical examples from our physical world (such as thermostats and drivers making decisions) does not change the entire subject of discussion.
I assumed that explicitly in agreement with you, in order to address your posts on your terms. That's settled.

They don't work on due to the probabilistic nature of the universe, but on perceived probability due to our subjective lack of knowledge of the initial conditions and the system governing the result.

(Once again: Notice the erosion of the language: - that sentence, for example, makes less sense the more carefully read. That's a recurrent symptom, an indication that the chain of reasoning has gone lost).
That's not true. And: That has been dealt with, set aside, several times.

Short version: Perfect knowledge changes nothing - quanta remain, chaos remains, Heisenberg remains, the unsolvable equations remain, and the calculation of exact effects remains impossible in theory as well as practice;

the probabilistic basis of all physical systems of cause and effect is a fact of our physics, the center of our mathematical analysis, the approach by which we most rigorously discover, assign, and describe, causes.

There's nothing "subjective" about it. Physical cause and effect - and therefore determinism as defined here - runs on chance. There is no conflict between probability and determination - the one establishes the other.

And yet on that all you have thus far is your appeal to complexity to support that the notion of freedom is anything more than that found in a thermostat

(Language erosion - sign of the times.)
That's not all - but it's enough.
Will you be addressing that central and key issue any time soon?

 

[Sarkus]

Seems you’re doing some housekeeping, so feel free to move this to the appropriate thread as well...

You're saying that casino games of chance don't rely on the "probabilistic nature of the universe"?

Correct. Because they don’t. They rely on the lack of knowledge people have of the starting conditions and their inability to calculate from them to the end result.
Do you think that they do rely on the probabilistic nature of the universe? Do you even know what you put in quotes means? Here’s a hint: if the probability you think exists is due to the subjective lack of knowledge (of starting conditions, for example) then you are not talking of anything inherent in the nature of the universe.

Do you think a coin toss is "unpropabilistic"?

In a deterministic universe it is absolutely unprobabilistic. There would be no probability involved in the outcome.If you knew the starting condition and knew the governing laws you could, theoretically, calculate the outcome.
In a probabilistic universe the outcome would be inherently probabilistic, i.e. no matter if you knew the initial conditions perfectly, and could do all the maths from there to the end result, you still wouldn’t be able to predict the outcome with certainty. At best you’d end up with a probability function governing the possible outcome.

This is all very different to the nature of probability that casinos operate on.
They couldn’t care less about the nature of the universe (unless their machines deliberately employ some quantum mechanics, for example) but instead they rely on our subjective inability to know the starting conditions. And if you don’t know the starting conditions then you can once again at best come to a probabilistic assessment of the outcome. But this is nothing to do with the inherent probabilistic nature of the universe, as it still applies to a deterministic universe.

For example: imagine a deterministic process that results in a number. You know that every time you start with condition A you end up with the same output (let’s say 1), starting condition B always leads to, say, 2. There are many billion different starting conditions, but they only ever result in an output from 1 to 6.
The system is deterministic, and there is no inherent probability within it: the same starting condition will always result in the same output.
You also know from repeated experimentation that, when you don’t know the initial starting condition, the outcomes appear with a flat probability distribution.
Welcome to the roll of a die in a deterministic universe. No inherent probability needed. This is what the casinos rely on: the probability that comes from our lack of knowledge. Not the inherent probabilistic nature of the universe (which doesn’t exist in a deterministic universe).
Does that explain things sufficiently for you?
Now, do you still think that the casinos rely on the probabilistic nature of the universe?

I suppose you would hold that when we say "the coin might land heads or tails, with equal probability" that is just a "perception" or an "illusion".

Not an illusion, no, as the coin will land on them with equal probability. One merely needs to understand what we are talking about when we talk of such probability: i.e. probability stemming from lack of knowledge of starting conditions, not the probabilistic nature of the universe.

You would say that at the moment the coin is tossed, the coin is not "free" to land heads or tails. You would say that it is destinedy to land heads or tails depending on the initial conditions of the toss, etc.

Correct. But because we don’t know the starting conditions we can at best conclude on a probability of outcomes. This is a practical matter, not a theoretical one.

True "freedom", in your view, would require the coin to break the laws of physics - i.e. the coin would need to have supernatural freedom for it to be random.

In a deterministic universe the coin would have no freedom. It would not be able to do otherwise. There is simply no need to bring the supernatural into the discussion.

Is it nonsensical, in your view, to talk about "games of chance", then?

Not at all, because they rely on our lack of knowledge of the starting conditions. They rely on the practical probability that stems from such lack of knowledge.
It is the same reasoning that we might consider ourselves “free” of will, because we aren’t aware of the initial conditions, of the processes involved, and we thus judge on the basis of appearance. Just because that is how it appears to us does not mean that that is the way of it.

It's amazing how many aspects of the natural behaviour of systems must be relegated to the realm of perception or illusion when you adopt the supernatural assumption.

There is no supernatural assumption, as has been explained to you, and others, at length. And rather than address that, you simply repeat the baseless accusation. Yes, you have posted your reasoning for why you consider it an assumption, and that post was responded to at greater length clearly explaining your fallacious reasoning. Yet rather than address that, you and others simply continue with the accusation. Hey ho.

As you dig a deeper and deeper hole for yourself, you are forced to adopt a more and more absurd stance about the nature of the world in which you live.

There is no hole being dug, there is no absurd stance about the nature of the world. This is a philosophical discussion that involves the very nature of the universe. It starts from that foundation and moves up. If it arrives at conclusions that appear at odds to the way we perceive it then that is worth exploring and understanding, not dismissing as being “absurd”, as that is to blinker yourself, to wilfully remain ignorant.
But hey, it’s good to know that you and iceaura have single-handedly resolved the in/compatibilist debate simply by accusation of a “supernatural assumption” and appeals to consequence (as being absurd). Well done. I await your published article on the matter.
In the meantime, please let the grown-ups continue. Better that than continuing to display your ignorance.

 

[Seattle]

It seems the question has already suggested the answer. If the Universe is deterministic then there is no free will in the absolute sense that you seem to be looking for.

Quantum physics seems to suggest that the Universe isn't deterministic. Classical physics seems to suggest that it is.

In any event this really isn't a yes or no question in the way that we usually use the term "free will". Ignoring whether the Universe is deterministic or not, we are made in such a way that free will is limited since much of what we do is initiated by the "pre-conscious". The unconscious part of our brain has already decided to do something a fraction of a second before we "decide" to do something. That's hardly "free will".

There is also the whole matter of our experience and environment. We may feel free to chose in certain circumstances but if our choices are limited by our prior experience/environment then they may be largely predictable. If that is the case, there's not a lot of "free will" going on.

If I grew up mainly eating hamburgers and today you offer me a wide variety of food and I still usually choose hamburger then my "free will" is severely limited by my past.

If I am free to turn left or right but my entire world is a small enclosed box, there's some free will involved and a lot of determinism involved.

This isn't a question that can be answered in reality unless you define the terms so narrowly that doing so also answers the question either yes or no.

 

[James R]

Baldeee (and this is also relevant to Sarkus):

”Degrees of freedom” is a technical term (statistics, chemistry, engineering etc) and can be found in a thermostat, for example.
If input is X, output is A.
If input is Y, output is B.
There is no ability to do otherwise: if the input is X it must do A, if the input is Y then it must do B.
But it has a “degree of freedom” because that is a different notion, and I have never disputed the existence of that notion.
I just find it trivial, given that it can be found in a thermostat.

Your labelling this idea as "trivial" is a big cause of the problem that you and Sarkus are both having.

Take your thermostat, for starters. If the temperature is below a set point, output is to switch on the heater. If the temperature is above the set point, output is to switch off the heater (approximately). You might say that once the set point has been dialed up, the thermostat has one "degree of freedom", in that one input leads definitely to a single output.

Now consider a coin toss. How do your rules go in that case? How many degrees of freedom are there that lead to an "output" - whether coin will land heads or tails when tossed? Can you write down a list of "If input is X, output is heads" and so on? How long would your list need to be to give a complete - or even useful - description that would allow prediction of the output?

Even at this level, we can talk about freedom. Is the thermostat "free" to switch on and off? I'm guessing you will say no. You will say that its output is completely determined by a single input, hence no freedom, or - to put it in your terms - that it has only the "trivial" freedom of being able to follow its input to produce an output.

Is the coin free to land heads or tails? Again, I'm sure you'll say it isn't free. This time you probably don't know exactly how the various inputs relate to the output of any given coin toss. But you will insist, without much in the way of justification, that although the coin has more "degrees of freedom" - i.e. more variables that can affect the final result - the fact that it can land heads or tails in what is a largely unpredictable way is still a "trivial" kind of freedom.

Then we get to the driver who is approaching the traffic light. How do you think you are you going to go if you start trying to make an "if/then" list of inputs leading to the "output" that is the driver's choice? Hopefully you can agree that the driver has even more relevant "degrees of freedom" than the coin, which vastly increases the level of complexity of the kind of analysis you're insisting on. Nevertheless, you still insist that the driver's freedom is "trivial", and you equate the human actor, for some reason, with the thermostat.

Sarkus admits that we lack the knowledge to predict the outcome of the coin toss. I assume he would not say that we lack the knowledge to say whether the heater will switch on or off (assuming we have, for instance, a thermometer handy). I wonder whether Sarkus will admit that we lack the information required to predict what choices a human actor will make by application of his or her will. And you? How is it, then, that the freedom of choice exhibited by human actors - and verified by observation - can be characterised by you as "trivial" and equivalent to that of a thermostat? I'm going to assume you can appreciate the difference in complexity in the "systems" involved.

What we see from these examples is that increase in complexity leads to greater unpredictability, determinism notwithstanding. But you and Sarkus still insist that none of the three systems discussed are "free" - not the thermostat, not the coin toss, and not the human will. Complexity, you both insist, is irrelevant to the discussion of freedom.

Why is this? Why are you both so keen to gloss over the rather obvious differences between a thermostat and act an act of human choice/will? The answer is that you both believe that no matter how complex a system becomes, "freedom" can never be an emergent property, at least as long as the system is deterministic, in the sense that only one outcome can ever result from the same set of "inputs".

What you both require for "true freedom" is that different outcomes result from the same set of inputs. In a deterministic universe governed by the laws of physics, we all agree that the same set of inputs (i.e. the same causes) will always result in the same outcomes (the same effects, including human choices). Therefore, it follows that the only way we can possibly have "true freedom" is either to throw away the idea that the universe is deterministic, or to throw away the governance of the laws of physics.

Since, for the purposes of this discussion, we have all agreed to accept the notion of a deterministic universe, your position (yours and Sarkus's) rests on the assumption that "true freedom" requires that systems do not obey the laws of physics - i.e. that they have supernatural powers. No supernatural powers means no true freedom. End of discussion.

You both insist that your assumption that there is no free will in a deterministic universe - no "true freedom" of any kind, when you boil it down - is a conclusion and not an assumption you both make. This is because you both implicitly and unthinkingly assume the premise that "true freedom" requires that a system can break the laws of physics - i.e. that it be supernatural. That assumption puts blinkers on both of you, because you are no longer able to consider the possibility of any relevant kind of freedom other than supernatural freedom. It's a crippling assumption that locks both of you in an impenetrable box of your own making.

As has been stated from the beginning, if you use a different notion of freedom you can reach a different conclusion.

You have never been willing to consider any alternative notion, other than the supernatural one. Sarkus, if anything, hasn't even admitted that other notions are possible, as far as I can tell.

So there is no contradiction, one simply needs to comprehend that “degrees of freedom” uses a different notion of freedom than is concluded to not exist.

Are you agreeing then, that the argument you've been having with iceaura and myself for hundreds of posts have been irrelevant? Ice and I agreed from the start that we wouldn't use a supernatural notion of freedom. It is only you and Sarkus who have been insisting on that, and that no freedom is possible unless it is supernatural.

 

[James R]

Seattle:

It seems the question has already suggested the answer. If the Universe is deterministic then there is no free will in the absolute sense that you seem to be looking for.

There's no free will in the supernatural sense that Baldeee and Sarkus are looking for, you mean.

Quantum physics seems to suggest that the Universe isn't deterministic. Classical physics seems to suggest that it is.

With respect, that's irrelevant to this thread. If you want to discuss free will in a non-deterministic universe, maybe start a new thread about that. Personally, I don't think that introducing indeterminism is a good way to save free will. Besides, there's no need.

Ignoring whether the Universe is deterministic or not, we are made in such a way that free will is limited since much of what we do is initiated by the "pre-conscious". The unconscious part of our brain has already decided to do something a fraction of a second before we "decide" to do something. That's hardly "free will".

No? Why isn't it free will?

There is also the whole matter of our experience and environment. We may feel free to chose in certain circumstances but if our choices are limited by our prior experience/environment then they may be largely predictable. If that is the case, there's not a lot of "free will" going on.

Now you're talking about degrees of free will. Bear in mind that Sarkus and Baldeee are both arguing that free will does not exist, full stop. They think it is just a "perception", or an "illusion".

This isn't a question that can be answered in reality unless you define the terms so narrowly that doing so also answers the question either yes or no.

The answer hinges on what you mean by "free". An overly restrictive definition, like the one that says "free" means "supernatural", leads to a pat answer that never gets to grips with the really important issues.

 

[James R]

Picking up on a quote from further back in the thread...

So your argument:

P1: Freedom is the ability to do otherwise
translates as "Freedom is the supernatural ability to break the laws of physics"

What do you not understand of such basic logic that you end up utterly butchering what I have said???
The translation you put here is simply absurd, as you can only conclude that once you have also premised the nature of the universe. Until you do that, how do you know what the laws of physics are, or how they operate (deterministically or indeterministically).
To continue this pathetic line that you are peddling is disappointing in the extreme. And you wonder why I get frustrated!

The order of the premises of Sarkus's argument, as he set it out, doesn't matter. We can equally set it out like this:

P1: A deterministic system does not allow the ability to do otherwise.
P2: Freedom is the ability to do otherwise.
C: A deterministic system does not allow freedom.

which is all well and good in terms of the logic. But if freedom is the ability to do otherwise, then what is it? If it exists as a valid concept at all, then it must either exist only in non-deterministic systems, since the alternative is ruled out by the argument above - or else it must somehow "break the rules" about what deterministic systems will or will not allow.

If freedom exists by definition only in non-deterministic systems, then the argument says nothing interesting. It's as trivial as saying that men are beings who, by definition, are mortal, in the classical syllogism about Socrates. And if, on the other hand, it breaks the rules, then it is "supernatural" in the sense of defying the "natural" rules of deterministic systems as assumed in P1.

Either way, the kind of "freedom" being used by Sarkus is a sterile kind, ruled out by assumptions of the given argument.

 

[wegs]

In a determined universe, why would we not have free will? Even if we believe in a determined universe, from a philosophical perspective and not a super natural one, why would humans lack free will?

The various daily/weekly/yearly outcomes of our lives can be determined, yet we awaken everyday with the task of making choices, that affect our day. Maybe when things don't go our way, despite our best efforts or decisions that arise from our free will, that is the universe showing itself to be deterministic. We use our free will, but the determined universe has a ''destiny'' in mind, and simply overrides our decision.

I don't really like the word ''destiny,'' but for want of a better word...

 

[DaveC426913]

In a determined universe, why would we not have free will? Even if we believe in a determined universe, from a philosophical perspective and not a super natural one, why would humans lack free will?

The various daily/weekly/yearly outcomes of our lives can be determined, yet we awaken everyday with the task of making choices, that affect our day.

In a deterministic universe, we don't have the ability to make choices. Every thought we have is part of that determinism.

Think of it this way:

We roll the universe back one day and replay it.
All the same events happen to you, and your thoughts are also the same.
So when you wake up in the morning the second time, you make exactly the same "choices" as you did last time.

If you are doomed to make the same choices every time, then you don't have free will.

 

[Baldeee]

Your labelling this idea as "trivial" is a big cause of the problem that you and Sarkus are both having.

No problem for me, I assure you.

Take your thermostat, for starters. If the temperature is below a set point, output is to switch on the heater. If the temperature is above the set point, output is to switch off the heater (approximately). You might say that once the set point has been dialed up, the thermostat has one "degree of freedom", in that one input leads definitely to a single output.

In a deterministic universe, the one being assumed, and not any probabilistic version thereof, this is true of all inputs: they only lead to a single output.

Now consider a coin toss. How do your rules go in that case? How many degrees of freedom are there that lead to an "output" - whether coin will land heads or tails when tossed? Can you write down a list of "If input is X, output is heads" and so on? How long would your list need to be to give a complete - or even useful - description that would allow prediction of the output?

More inputs than anyone could ever write down, although I’m sure there are probably mathematical models that could come close.
But that doesn’t change the principle: each input leads to a single specific output.
Whether we can usefully list all the possible inputs and their respective outputs is irrelevant to the matter.

Even at this level, we can talk about freedom. Is the thermostat "free" to switch on and off? I'm guessing you will say no. You will say that its output is completely determined by a single input, hence no freedom, or - to put it in your terms - that it has only the "trivial" freedom of being able to follow its input to produce an output.

Correct.
We can indeed talk of freedom, and I have always acknowledged that if you change the notion you are referring to then you can conclude differently.

Is the coin free to land heads or tails? Again, I'm sure you'll say it isn't free. This time you probably don't know exactly how the various inputs relate to the output of any given coin toss. But you will insist, without much in the way of justification, that although the coin has more "degrees of freedom" - i.e. more variables that can affect the final result - the fact that it can land heads or tails in what is a largely unpredictable way is still a "trivial" kind of freedom.

I would say the coin toss has no more degrees of freedom than a thermostat, at least if we are only considering heads and tails, and not things like where it lands, or how long it takes to land etc.
That there are more variables at play doesn’t alter that there are only two possible outcomes, like the thermostat.
But in essence, you are correct, although the justification that it is trivial is that that notion of freedom can be found in a thermostat.
Show that the notion of freedom can not be found in that and you’d start to have something.

Then we get to the driver who is approaching the traffic light. How do you think you are you going to go if you start trying to make an "if/then" list of inputs leading to the "output" that is the driver's choice? Hopefully you can agree that the driver has even more relevant "degrees of freedom" than the coin, which vastly increases the level of complexity of the kind of analysis you're insisting on. Nevertheless, you still insist that the driver's freedom is "trivial", and you equate the human actor, for some reason, with the thermostat.

Is this an appeal to complexity I see before me?

Sarkus admits that we lack the knowledge to predict the outcome of the coin toss. I assume he would not say that we lack the knowledge to say whether the heater will switch on or off (assuming we have, for instance, a thermometer handy). I wonder whether Sarkus will admit that we lack the information required to predict what choices a human actor will make by application of his or her will. And you?

I would say that our personal prediction due to lack of knowledge is irrelevant to the issue, as the issue is not whether we are aware of whether we could do otherwise but of whether we are actually able to do otherwise.
And not otherwise than what we think we are capable of doing, but otherwise than what we end up doing.

How is it, then, that the freedom of choice exhibited by human actors - and verified by observation - can be characterised by you as "trivial" and equivalent to that of a thermostat?

Because in as much as one is referring to degrees of freedom, it is trivial, and while certainly more complex is predicated solely on our lack of knowledge.
The simpler the system (e.g. thermostat) the easier it is to have perfect knowledge of the system.
And with that perfect knowledge we can observe that lack of freedom.
The more complex the system, the less accurate our knowledge of it (both starting conditions and operation) such that we lose visibility and awareness of the lack of freedom.
But the lack of freedom doesn’t disappear.
Only our awareness of it does.
And until someone can show how the will is notionally any different to the thermostat in this regard, albeit a system complex enough that we don’t have perfect knowledge, then I will continue to deem it trivial.
Because that is how I see it.
Not the system itself, but the notion of freedom that is claimed to be within it.

I'm going to assume you can appreciate the difference in complexity in the "systems" involved.

Of course.

What we see from these examples is that increase in complexity leads to greater unpredictability, determinism notwithstanding.

Practical unpredictability due to lack of knowledge, not an inherent unpredictability due to something like an inherent probabilistic nature.

But you and Sarkus still insist that none of the three systems discussed are "free" - not the thermostat, not the coin toss, and not the human will. Complexity, you both insist, is irrelevant to the discussion of freedom.

Not free as in having an ability to do otherwise, no.
Free as in able to exhibit different outputs if the inputs allow?
That notion exists, and I consider it trivial.
E.g. thermostat.

Why is this? Why are you both so keen to gloss over the rather obvious differences between a thermostat and act an act of human choice/will?

I for one am not glossing over it.
I have considered it, and found that notion of freedom in a thermostat, and considered it trivial.
I have yet to see anything other than an appeal to complexity by way of explanation how the notion of freedom differs between a thermostat and anything more complex.
It is therefore not me glossing over this, but rather those who wish to make the claim that complexity introduces a non-trivial notion of freedom are glossing over the matter of support for that claim.

The answer is that you both believe that no matter how complex a system becomes, "freedom" can never be an emergent property, at least as long as the system is deterministic, in the sense that only one outcome can ever result from the same set of "inputs".

It’s certainly not that I believe “freedom” can never be an emergent property.
The logic certainly concludes that freedom (ability to do otherwise) can not exist (and if you go on about “supernatural assumption” then we are done here) but if one wishes to introduce complexity as giving rise to an ability to do otherwise then that is for you, or whoever, to support.
Provide that support, a convincing argument, and the logic that suggests it is not possible would need to address its emergence.

What you both require for "true freedom" is that different outcomes result from the same set of inputs.

That would seem to be necessary, but not sufficient.

In a deterministic universe governed by the laws of physics, we all agree that the same set of inputs (i.e. the same causes) will always result in the same outcomes (the same effects, including human choices).

If only we did all agree.
It seems someone (I have them on ignore so I only see what people write when replying to them - or at least I assume it is iceaura) doesn’t share that view of what determinism means, and invokes inherent probability as still being deterministic.
But for now at least lets you and I agree as to what we mean by determinism.

Therefore, it follows that the only way we can possibly have "true freedom" is either to throw away the idea that the universe is deterministic, or to throw away the governance of the laws of physics.

Or simply admit that we don’t have true freedom in a deterministic universe?
...

 

[Baldeee]

... cont’d

Since, for the purposes of this discussion, we have all agreed to accept the notion of a deterministic universe, your position (yours and Sarkus's) rests on the assumption that "true freedom" requires that systems do not obey the laws of physics - i.e. that they have supernatural powers. No supernatural powers means no true freedom. End of discussion.

Sigh.
And you were doing so well.
We have concluded that “true freedom” requires (as a minimum) either a non-deterministic universe, or a breach of the governing laws of that universe.
There is no such assumption, just the conclusion.

You both insist that your assumption that there is no free will in a deterministic universe - no "true freedom" of any kind, when you boil it down - is a conclusion and not an assumption you both make. This is because you both implicitly and unthinkingly assume the premise that "true freedom" requires that a system can break the laws of physics - i.e. that it be supernatural.

No more than one “implicitly and unthinkingly” assumes Socrates to be mortal, simply by defining him as human in a universe in which all humans are indeed mortal.

That assumption puts blinkers on both of you, because you are no longer able to consider the possibility of any relevant kind of freedom other than supernatural freedom. It's a crippling assumption that locks both of you in an impenetrable box of your own making.

Since there is no assumption, despite your butchering of logic to try and show such, your comments are pretty worthless in this regard.
There is no box, impenetrable or otherwise.
There is no crippling assumption, although I can see you crippling yourself trying to fathom it.

You have never been willing to consider any alternative notion, other than the supernatural one. Sarkus, if anything, hasn't even admitted that other notions are possible, as far as I can tell.

There is no supernatural notion, only a notion (“ability to do otherwise”) that is concluded to not be possible in a deterministic universe.
I am happy to say that it does not exist in a deterministic universe, as that is what I conclude from the logic.
Why can’t you be?
Other notions have been considered, and considered, and found to be trivial (as in found in a thermostat).
Apologies if I don’t pander to appeals to complexity as being arguments for an alternative notion to consider.
As for Sarkus, he has also explicitly accepted that other notions do exist.
He quite vociferously began by saying that different notions bring different conclusions, and seems quite accepting of the notion of degrees of freedom.
He, like me, seems to consider that a trivial notion in the question of freewill.
If someone, you perhaps, wishes to put a case forward for a notion of an emergent property, please do so.
Three or four threads and there is nothing yet.

Are you agreeing then, that the argument you've been having with iceaura and myself for hundreds of posts have been irrelevant? Ice and I agreed from the start that we wouldn't use a supernatural notion of freedom. It is only you and Sarkus who have been insisting on that, and that no freedom is possible unless it is supernatural.

Utter rubbish.
I have not been insisting upon anything.
I have used a notion of freedom, and I have considered and justified for why I consider alternative notions trivial.
I have never offered an assumed supernatural freedom, only a notion that one can conclude does not exist in a deterministic universe.
If you, iceaura, or others, wish to discuss an alternative notion, no one has stopped you.
Not I, not capracus, not Sarkus.
Instead what Sarkus and I have been subjected to has been false accusation after false accusation regarding the “assumption of supernatural freedom”.
It has been one attack after another of our positions, and all the while we have both stated quite categorically and repeatedly that if you use different notions of freedom then you will reach different conclusions.
Has anyone actually started to go down the path of exploring other notions beyond just trying to tell us that they are worth considering?
Not really, no.
All the time it just comes back to attacks on the incompatibilist position that Sarkus and I have put forth, no apparent intent to move on to alternative arguments.
And yes, Sarkus and I defend our position.
But if you don’t like it, don’t agree with it, and want to move on to something else...

So yes, it has been utterly irrelevant, because nothing you nor iceaura have offered has been relevant to that which you are trying to tear down.
It seems iceaura doesn’t even understand the fundamentals of the assumption of the deterministic universe.
You don’t want anything to do with what you wrongly see as a “supernatural assumption”, yet here you once again are.

 

[DaveC426913]

Instead what Sarkus and I have been subjected to has been false accusation after false accusation regarding the “assumption of supernatural freedom”.

Oh my God, is this still happening after all this time??

I gave up on this discussion months ago because of this exact accusation, and yet it's still happening?

 

[Baldeee]

Oh my God, is this still happening after all this time??

I gave up on this discussion months ago because of this exact accusation, and yet it's still happening?

I have ignored the main perpetrator for a long while, but James R seems willing to join him in the nonsense.
And in the “co-determination” thread I think iceaura seems to have little else to say, going by Sarkus’ responses to him.
Seems they think if they say it often enough that it will become true?
Bless.

 

[wegs]

In a deterministic universe, we don't have the ability to make choices. Every thought we have is part of that determinism.

Think of it this way:

We roll the universe back one day and replay it.
All the same events happen to you, and your thoughts are also the same.
So when you wake up in the morning the second time, you make exactly the same "choices" as you did last time.

If you are doomed to make the same choices every time, then you don't have free will.

Interesting. So, how would I ever really know that, though? When we wake up, we believe that we are in control of our actions, and the new day ahead.

Are you saying that free will at best, can merely nothing more than an illusion?

 

[DaveC426913]

Interesting. So, how would I ever really know that, though?

We wouldn't. Which is why this is a philosophical question, not a scientific question.

But it's the implication of a deterministic universe.

Are you saying that free will at best, can merely nothing more than an illusion?

That's the argument. If one starts with the premise of a deterministic universe.

 

[Seattle]

No? Why isn't it free will?

It's not free will if the action was first determine unconsciously and then you "decided" to do it. You could take away your consciousness in that scenario as your actions would be the same. You weren't really "free" in your decision making.

 

[Seattle]

Why start with the premise of a deterministic Universe and then ask if there can be free will? Determinism and free will don't go together. You've already answered you question before the thread even begins.

 

[iceaura]

As you say, the issue has always been one of the definition of “freedom”, as “ability to do otherwise/ other than what one must” or words to that effect.
This definition in itself is not an assumption of the supernatural.

Given a deterministic universe, it is.

In a deterministic universe it is absolutely unprobabilistic.

That is a false statement.
The laws of chance, probability, are central determinants - mechanisms of determination - in the deterministic universe we have assumed here (causal, governed by physical "natural" law).

Determinism and free will don't go together.

That assumption is not granted.

It's not free will if the action was first determine unconsciously and then you "decided" to do it.

It's you, making a decision and acting on it. Consciousness has nothing to do with it.

You are invited to consider the example of the driver approaching a traffic light, which has been neglected so far - it was chosen carefully and set up to prevent that confusion among others (obviously many driving decisions are made unconsciously).

 

[Sarkus]

That is a false statement.
The laws of chance, probability, are central determinants - mechanisms of determination - in the deterministic universe we have assumed here (causal, governed by physical "natural" law).

Once again putting your ignorance on display for all to see. Causal determinism is the philosophy that any state is... and here's the word your probabilistic universe doesn't grant... completely determined by prior states. As explained, and as ignored by you, if a given cause can result in more than one specific outcome then, by definition, the resultant state is not completely determined by the prior one.

"If A then B... or it could be C."
"So which is it: B or C?"
"Don't know, 'cos A can't completely determine which it is to be.... but we can tell you the probability of each, if that helps!?"

Heck, let's see what the Oracle of Wiki has to say:
Ahem... are we settled... then I'll begin...

"In science, most specifically quantum theory in physics, indeterminism is the belief that no event is certain and the entire outcome of anything is probabilistic." - link

Woah. Whodathunkit!

That assumption is not granted.

You really do struggle distinguishing assumption from conclusion, don't you.

 

[Quantum Quack]

But it's the implication of a deterministic universe.

only if one arbitrarily limits that deterministic universe..as is currently the case...
If ones stops placing limits on a deterministic universe, that universe can and has evolved humans capable of learning to self determine...the degree of which is determined by how well they learn ...

 

[Quantum Quack]

"In science, most specifically quantum theory in physics, indeterminism is the belief that no event is certain and the entire outcome of anything is probabilistic." - link

re-read your quote carefully...

• belief
• uncertain
• entire
• speculative probability...

Perhaps if you look deeper into Heisenberg's Uncertainty (imprecision) Principle and apply a little Zeno logic you will find some enlightenment.