Baldeee:
I left this thread for quite a while because it seemed to me that you and Sarkus were just paddling in useless circles. I thought that just for giggles I'd read the most recent few pages of the thread to see if you'd made any progress. What do I find? I discover that you're
still stuck exactly where you were 1000 posts ago.
iceaura has been doing a marvelously patient job of repeatedly directing your attention to your errors. In response, all you have managed is some outraged bluster and denial, as far as I can tell.
Possibly against my better judgment, I thought I might post, not to add anything new (because you haven't progressed beyond where you were stuck last time I looked), but merely to put essentially the same observations to you that iceaura has been going on about. My hope is that a different voice might help to shake you out of the rut you currently find yourself stuck in. One piece of advice: it might be more useful if you drop the angry outrage out of your responses and take time to actually consider what iceaura has been putting to you, in light of your own arguments, which he has extensively referred to. It's just
possible that the problem is at your end and not at his. Rightly, you ought to at least consider that possibility, and try to be as objective as you can about it.
A little above this post, iceaura referred to post #319 in which your argument was summarised - not for the first time in the thread, but it will do. It looked like this:
P1: deterministic interactions are not free.
P2: a system built from deterministic interactions is not free.
P3: the will is such a system.
C: the will is not free.
The problem with your entire argument, throughout the thread, lies right there in premise P1. Can you see that? Here's the problem: your premise P1 has the effect of
defining the word "free" to mean "non-deterministic". That happens right at the start, before anybody mentions the universe or the will or any of it.
Now, recall that the thread question is "Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?" You will notice that the question includes the words "free" and "deterministic universe". A deterministic universe, as we have all agreed from the start, allows only deterministic interactions. And you have told us that your P1 is that
you assume (from the start) that deterministic interactions are not free.
The rest of your logic follows automatically, and nobody here has disputed it. To put your reasoning into my own words, it goes like this:
Deterministic interactions are not free, by definition.
A deterministic universe only allows deterministic interactions.
Therefore, nothing in a deterministic universe is free.
The matter of free will then is nothing more than a trivial victim of this argument. You dispense with it as follows:
The will involves interactions in a deterministic universe (by agreement in this thread).
Nothing in a deterministic universe is free.
Therefore the will is not free.
This is the entirety of your logical argument against free will (in a deterministic universe), if I understand it correctly. As it stands, it's not particularly interesting. There's nothing to disagree about in terms of its logical validity. The only issue that iceaura and I have ever had with it involves a dispute over the soundness of the premises, premise P1 in particular.
Early on in the thread, we considered what kinds of things
could conceivably be free, in light of your definition of freedom. Your definition of freedom is a negative one. It tells us directly that certain things definitely are
not free, but it doesn't say anything about what things are or could be free. But we can look at what the definition does
not encompass for some guidance.
Deterministic interactions are not free, but you leave open the possibility that non-deterministic actions might be free. In light of that, what can be said of a universe in which free will might or might not exist? Clearly, any universe in which free will exists (free
anything, when it comes down to it) must have some kind of non-deterministic interactions. Conceivably, these non-deterministic interactions might be natural features of the universe or supernatural features.
We then come back to the question of the thread, which is about free will in a deterministic universe. A deterministic universe only allows deterministic interactions. I would assume that we're talking about a
natural universe here - one governed by natural laws and the like, at least for the most part. This would appear to entirely rule out the possibility of
natural non-deterministic interactions. If we were to relax our definition of "deterministic universe" far enough to admit the possibility of natural non-deterministic interactions taking place in that universe, it would make a nonsense of the whole idea of deterministic universe. We could hardly call it a deterministic universe if the
natural laws of the universe were to permit non-determinism. On the other hand, the
supernatural is "allowed" to break the "rules" of nature. That's what the word "supernatural" means - the power to override natural law. It follows that supernatural powers might permit things (such as the will) to be free
even in a "naturally deterministic" universe.
To summarise the "supernatural argument": we are all assuming in this thread a universe that is
naturally deterministic - governed by natural laws of physics, cause and effect etc. Natural free will is ruled out by your argument as soon as you make the assumption of premise P1, as I have set out above. The
only potential escape clause to this is if you are willing to soften your definition of "free" far enough to encompass supernatural non-determinism.
In the last thousand posts of this thread, you have repeatedly insisted that you are
not willing to allow supernatural freedom into your deterministic universe. So where does that leave you? You have ruled out any possibility of natural freedom (of anything, the will being the most immediate item of interest) in your deterministic universe
by assumption. We have all agreed to rule out the possibility of natural non-determinism for the purposes of this discussion. So the only possible sense in which the word "free" could make any kind of sense in the deterministic universe is if it refers to things that are non-deterministically, supernaturally free.
To summarise: your
assumed definition of the word "free" and related terms like "freedom" allows
at the most the possibility of supernatural non-determinism. Your argument that there is no free will in a deterministic universe, such as it is, boils down to your dual assumptions that (a) nothing can be naturally free, and (b) only the supernatural could ever possibly allow anything to be free. The effect of eliminating the supernatural option (b), as you say you do, is to render the word "free" meaningless in the universe we are discussing, because it leaves us only with assumption (a) (there is no freedom).
All your objections to iceaura's descriptions of freedom rely on you basically turning a deaf ear to any suggested definition of "free" or "freedom" that would involve natural deterministic interactions in a natural deterministic universe. Your repeated and irritated-sounding response to all such suggestions is that any such "freedom" is "illusory" or "not genuine".
There is no confusion as to why you insist on that line.
Of course things like the "degrees of freedom" that iceaura has explained to you don't count as "freedom" as far as you're concerned, because as soon as you see the word "free" or "freedom" in a sentence, your brain automatically serves up "Deterministic interactions are not free. Period." At that point, you figure you're done and there's nothing else to talk about.
For the discussion of free will to ever progress beyond this sticking point, you will have to be able to move beyond ruling out any possibility of (natural) freedom by initial assumption. Given that we're now 1000 posts into this thread, I can't say I hold out high hopes that you'll even acknowledge that you're making a bad assumption. Still, I thought it was worth a try to walk you through where you're going wrong one more time.