Vociferous
Valued Senior Member
No idea what you're on about.
Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?
- Thread starter Sarkus
- Start date
They're not.
Given any earlier condition/state, the subsequent condition/states of the system are written in stone and will happen just as certainly as the prior ones have.
And I stand by that.
Determinism itself isn't about what we are or are not capable of knowing.
But that doesn't mean we can't talk about it in the context of knowledge - and apply it to the situation of knowing.
Ours are, yes, if we ignore anything indeterministic.
Other than the first moment, if there was one, i.e. the initial conditions, I don't disagree, at least with regard our universe.
But, as stated and exampled, not all deterministic systems are so invariant.
So, now that we have resolved that much, are you now going to explain how initial conditions allow for free will in a deterministic system, a system in which everything that occurs is set in stone in those initial conditions?
.
Nothing is more rigidly and unavoidably determined than the outcomes of probability over time. Probability is mechanism, a deterministic universe is output. This has nothing to do with knowledge - it's common to draw a false equivalence between the heuristic setups of throwing dice etc, used to teach the basic concepts of probability ( as the assumption of a friction-free situation is often used to introduce basic physics, and the inherently probability governed situations (Darwinian evolution, quantum electrodynamics, various issues in thermodynamics), chaotic situations involving combinatorics and nonlinear feedback loops such as mental processes, and so forth) are introduced as they can be comprehended.
Chaos theory, quantum theory, Heisenburg uncertainty, evolutionary theory, relativity theory, deny that. In theory no "perfection" of knowledge is possible, and it it were it would not allow prediction.
Already done, several times, for you specifically. One simply disallows the supernatural (clearing the deck), posts a reminder on the computer screen that substrate does not determine pattern, and takes a good long look at the physical realities usually approximated or shorthanded as "cause and effect".
They are all - all of them - built on probability. That includes human decision making, which determines the reality of everything dependent on voluntary human behaviors. The causes of human behavior include such things as forgotten dreams of forty years ago.
So you have nothing else other than what has been addressed previously, to you specifically, repeatedly?
I guess not.
Thanks for playing, though.
And no supernatural has been, nor need be, invoked.
Other than by you, of course.
And it cripples you.
Shame.
Vociferous
Valued Senior Member
Good.
Good, so long as we agree that our perceptions or knowledge have no affect on determinism itself.
Good.
What deterministic system doesn't have time-symmetric laws? I was under the impression we weren't just talking about any old hypothetical that bolstered your position.
You seem to agree, but then seem to hedge your bets at the last moment. As soon as you clear up that last question, we can proceed.
If something, "will" then that is determined by definition (this will, that will.) How is it possible to state what "will"? Surely this is only possible if one can see the future, OR has travelled FROM the future. You WILL go to the shop, you WILL celebrate this Christmas, you WILL go to work in January.
To state what WILL is determined by definition. There is nothing free about it. Another definition is needed to define choice.
To state what WILL is determined by definition. There is nothing free about it. Another definition is needed to define choice.
Given that you seem to want to agree something that noone has even suggested, I presume you also agree that the price of eggs has no affect on determinism itself?
I gave an example of a very simple mathematical one: a system where the next answer is the square of the previous.
We're not, but I felt there was the need to recognise and remind that while a deterministic universe governed by what we might deem our classical laws might be time-invariant, this does not mean that all deterministic systems are so time-invariant.
Whether this is even relevant to the issue is yet to be seen, but I do find it better to be clear on such things up front.
If it helps, consider it a throwaway comment that speaks to the wider notion of deterministic systems than just the deterministic universe of our classical physical laws.
Further, as mentioned, it is also seemingly irrelevant (to me at least) whether a deterministic system is time-invariant or not, but presumably it continues your red-herring line of trying to get me to deem particular states as "special".
No hedge-betting on my part, just you continuing to argue red-herrings seemingly to avoid addressing the actual topic of the thread.
We have agreed, even if just for purposes of this discussion, that our classical physical laws are time-invariant.
So, to repeat: now that we have resolved that much, are you now going to explain how initial conditions allow for free will in a deterministic system, a system in which everything that occurs is set in stone in those initial conditions?
Vociferous
Valued Senior Member
And what does that have to do with your stipulated deterministic universe, or the price of tea in China?
You really should be able to say if it's relevant (considering how many things you're so quick to say aren't), rather than hedging in case you need an out.
Quite the opposite. I'm glad you have affirmed no moment is special.
Then whether time has a beginning or not, there are no initial conditions. Initial conditions rely on some prior moment somehow being especially causative of later moments. But if all moments are as equally set in stone, all of time is a singular effect of whatever ultimate cause of time itself there may be. I will presume a beginning of time, so that time itself is not uncaused (undetermined).
If you can't accept the explanation for the comment, that's on you.
I have explained why the point was made.
I have not said that no moment is special.
In fact I have categorically stated that the initial moment is special.
As per #1062: "Other than the first moment, if there was one, i.e. the initial conditions, I don't disagree, at least with regard our universe."
The subsequent bolding here is by me for emphasis.
You seemed to miss it the first time.
Nonsense.
If time has a beginning, that represents a rather special initial condition with regard a time-invariant system, as it is, among other things, the start of any time-invariance within the system.
After all, one can not meaningfully speak of a process being time-invariant if there is no time.
So for as long as there is time, the system can be said to be time-invariant.
If there is no time, that time-invariance is as meaningless as asking what was before the beginning of time.
Any moment that introduces time would thus be special.
It would also be the initial moment with regard any system that can meaningfully be said to "start".
But importantly those initial conditions of the system in question are not causally dependent on the system in question.
The universe, the deterministic system, is the effect.
If those initial conditions are the start of time, then to state that the start of time relies on some "prior" (i.e. temporally earlier) moment is nonsense.
Excuse me while I yawn waiting for you to actually explain how you think initial conditions are important with regard the matter of freewill.
Vociferous
Valued Senior Member
If all moments are equally as set in stone, there is nothing to differentiate the first from any other, in a causative sense. Now if you want to call the ultimate cause of time itself an initial condition, fine. But that has no bearing on the first moment being special, as every moment is simultaneously realized.
No, a beginning in time is only special if you subscribe to a theory of time in which every moment in time is NOT equally real (set in stone), e.g. growing block universe or presentism. The growing block theory holds that the past and present are real but the future is not, and presentism holds that only the present is real. Neither presume that the future is as equally set as the tenses they deem real. Only eternalism holds that the future is "already there" in any real sense. And if every moment is "already there" from the beginning of time, they are all equally dependent upon the cause of time itself rather than each other.
Our human perception and intuition of the passage of time are immaterial. If the first moment is causally special, the future is not determined in a way we can call "real". Just a logical consequence. Now you could argue that the future is still just as determined as the present, but then I could just as readily claim the present to be just as causally special as you claim the first moment to be, and under presentism or growing-block, I'd be wholly justified in doing so.
Like I just said, you're free to call the ultimate cause of time itself the initial condition, but doesn't differentiate the first from any other moment without the justification of a specific theory of time.
- Eternalism - the first moment is not causally special compared to any other moment. At best, the cause of time itself is the cause of every moment equally.
- Growing block - the first moment may be causally special. The past and present are real, but the future is not set in stone, so the present may be as causally special as the first moment.
- Presentism - only the present is real, with the past only being the record that exists in the present. The first moment may or may not be causally special, as the past may only be a consistent history to account for the present.
As stated, excuse me while I yawn through your irrelevant post.
Are you actually going to explain how you think the initial conditions are important with regard the matter of freewill?
Or are you just intending to continue to evade the issue entirely?
Your choice.
But I only have so much time to waste.
Are you actually going to explain how you think the initial conditions are important with regard the matter of freewill?
Or are you just intending to continue to evade the issue entirely?
Your choice.
But I only have so much time to waste.
No I could put thousands of dollars into the argument that we don't actually have free will.
People wouldn't be struggling and suffering so much or even killing themselves outright if there was such a thing as free will.
It can be argued that only very very wealthy people have some free will but even that's highly debatable.
People wouldn't be struggling and suffering so much or even killing themselves outright if there was such a thing as free will.
It can be argued that only very very wealthy people have some free will but even that's highly debatable.
Vociferous
Valued Senior Member
Aw, didn't mean to talk over your head. Maybe you're completely unfamiliar with the various theories of time.
Simple, depending on which theory of time you choose to subscribe to.
- Presentism - the only reality/initiating condition is now, so there are zero constraints on free will. Our current records of the past may only be a coalesced consistent history, which may explain things like The Mandela Effect.
- Growing block universe - the future being undetermined suggests a causal input other than initial conditions, with the present being the only other candidate. Otherwise, the future is undetermined because all causation is inherently probabilistic.
- Eternalism - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#DetHumAct
- Physics, particularly 20th century physics, does have one lesson to impart to the free will debate; a lesson about the relationship between time and determinism. Recall that we noticed that the fundamental theories we are familiar with, if they are deterministic at all, are time-symmetrically deterministic. That is, earlier states of the world can be seen as fixing all later states; but equally, later states can be seen as fixing all earlier states. We tend to focus only on the former relationship, but we are not led to do so by the theories themselves.
Nor does 20th (21st) -century physics countenance the idea that there is anything ontologically special about the past, as opposed to the present and the future. In fact, it fails to use these categories in any respect, and teaches that in some senses they are probably illusory.[9] So there is no support in physics for the idea that the past is “fixed” in some way that the present and future are not, or that it has some ontological power to constrain our actions that the present and future do not have. It is not hard to uncover the reasons why we naturally do tend to think of the past as special, and assume that both physical causation and physical explanation work only in the past present/future direction (see the entry on thermodynamic asymmetry in time). But these pragmatic matters have nothing to do with fundamental determinism. If we shake loose from the tendency to see the past as special, when it comes to the relationships of determination, it may prove possible to think of a deterministic world as one in which each part bears a determining—or partial-determining—relation to other parts, but in which no particular part (region of space-time, event or set of events, ...) has a special, privileged determining role that undercuts the others.
- Physics, particularly 20th century physics, does have one lesson to impart to the free will debate; a lesson about the relationship between time and determinism. Recall that we noticed that the fundamental theories we are familiar with, if they are deterministic at all, are time-symmetrically deterministic. That is, earlier states of the world can be seen as fixing all later states; but equally, later states can be seen as fixing all earlier states. We tend to focus only on the former relationship, but we are not led to do so by the theories themselves.
Oh, good grief.
Your patronising attitude is, while adorable, wholly unwarranted.
What you incorrectly perceive to be a “sudden lack of interest” in the thread is in actuality a growing frustration that you simply aren’t addressing the issue, and that even with this latest post of yours you continue your failure.
It would honestly be nice to think that there really was an effective argument coming from you, but until you can actually show what any theory of time has to offer on the matter of the importance of initial conditions to a deterministic system with regards the question of free will, as you previously stated there to be, all you’re actually offering is a possible future recipe for an omelette, once you’ve adequately discussed the price of your eggs.
So, again, for the umpteenth time: what is the importance of the initial conditions of a deterministic system with regard the question of free will?
And if you’re going to refuse to answer that question, and leave your statement to that effect hanging without any support or argument whatsoever, then at least try to explain why you think the theories of time are important to the matter, given that you don’t seem to think the matter is just a red herring?
Or are you content to argue with yourself about why the price of eggs have gone up?
Your choice.
It excludes the possibility of supernatural freedom of will.
So the discussion could proceed - given good faith and reasonable intelligence - on the basis of natural degrees of freedom, the nature of "cause and effect" at high logical levels of pattern (including, say, the causative role of choice between alternatives and decision based on criteria, the evolution and current status of mental capabilities such as "will", etc).
Or it could stall out while the naive materialists deny causation to any pattern level higher than whatever they have decided is "real" and not "illusion" - typically, patterns of atomis interactions are "real" and can cause things, patterns of patterns of neural firings are "illusions" and cannot cause things.
The evolution of self determination ( learned ) and the freedom that entails with in a closed system as described, is totally dependent on those starting conditions.
We have those starting conditions to thank for our freedom...