Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

ok....hmmm..
try dualism:

0 = x + (-)x
or
0 = infinity + (-)infinity
or
0 = everything
or
nothing = everything
if true then
everything, which sums to nothing, can be a cause as everything is something...

also try:
"The seating ticket prices in the theater were discounted on the night because some seats were empty."
Thus the existence of nothing ( the absence of something) caused the effect of discounted tickets.

that's exactly right, I came to the same conclusion in a completely different way, the conclusion that nothing exists, that is.

and that is this way right here:

look at this line, and imagine that it is 0 dimensional even though it actually has some width.
_________________________________________________________________________________

There is nothing between any 2 connected things because if there was the connected things would no longer be connected.

And so because every point on this line is a point between 2 connected things, there is nothing at every location on this line.


Because there is nothing at every location on this line the line is comprised entirely of nothing and therefore does not exist.


This is not limited to the line, it applies to everything, because everything can be divided into any 2 connected constituents which fully comprise it.


And so, nothing, and only nothing exists.

people often think that this is a denial of their own experience of things, but nothing is just every sort of absence, and 1 sort of absence is the absence of absence, which is presence, so the presence of things can exist as a sort of absence, and therefore things can exist as nothing, which is every sort of absence.

so, I suppose if everything is nothing and nothing is everything, then nothing could possibly be able to cause some things, but nothing being able to cause things, although apparently correct, is kinda rendered irrelevant if nothing is everything.

and also, everything being the cause of an event could be equivalent to something causing an event if you take non duality into account, which can be proven using the sentence:

everything=everything

if everything is the same as itself, then everything is every other thing and therefore there really is no such thing as a thing, and it could be said that anything being the cause of an event is the same as everything being the cause of it, which is the same as nothing being the cause of it.

and that therefore, every cause of every event is something, nothing, and everything.

actually, nothing is the absence of anything, or every sort of absence, and the absence of every sort of absence is a sort of absence so nothing is necessarily everything.

so, for an event to be caused by nothing is for it to be caused by everything.

any way to make this sound less ridiculous?
 
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What you can't seem to get you head around is that self determination in humans is fully predetermined well before they evolved.
Thus free will is fully predetermined by those starting conditions.

I even drew a simple diagram to demonstrate it all with only 5 human supplicants.
View attachment 2846

a human must be predetermined to perform an action, but they could be predetermined to do so by their past self, due to their present self.

what you don't seem to get your head around is that cause and effect does not have to be a past to future phenomenon all the time.

and there is empirical evidence which strongly suggests the existence of backwards in time effects, initiated by humans.
(IONS, Dean Radin)

I said free will must be a process of self influence, I did not mean self influence occurring purely in the present.

I decided to leave this backward in time stuff out the first time, lest it be criticized by meanies like you.

I would draw a diagram of my own but I don't really know how.
what this diagram would look like, though, is a circle with initial conditions written in it, lines coming off of it representing human paths through time, and then, instead of circles at the ends of them, little c shapes from the present moment in the humans time progressions back to a point in their pasts, and there, in those little cs, I would write, self determination.
 
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Post #938: "That something can exist in your hypothetical universe but have no observable impact upon it. That's a direct analog for free will, where, even if it doesn't impact a deterministic universe, that does not, itself, preclude its existence in one."
You persist in missing the "in your hypothetical universe" part. It's not "my" direct analogy (straw man), it's "a" direct analogy to your belief in illusory free will that can have no impact. And the fact that you think me accepting your premise and attempting to frame my point within a view you might understand was a "mistake" speaks volumes about your intellectual honesty. You've now been repeatedly told it is a straw man, and you have no reason other than intellectual dishonesty to harp on it.

I've already, repeatedly, stipulated that indeterminism can have no impact on said deterministic system. So it makes no sense that you would claim a special pleading to exclude the wholly deterministic Schrodinger equation. If your stipulations are consistent, there's no need for such special pleadings.
Nonsense.
"Blunt force trauma" or "getting shot on [sic] the head" are once again labels for a vast range of specific cases, some of which do cause death, some of which do not.
It is thus entirely acceptable, natural, and logical, to conclude that some cases we label as "blunt force trauma" cause death and some do not, since that would be the reality in a deterministic system.
If you group all those specific cases into the set, and try to argue that "blunt force trauma" is a single, specific cause, then that is your misconception with regards the deterministic system.
It isn't a single specific cause that is exactly repeated the next time you have "blunt force trauma", but rather it is a set of specific causes, no two of such cases being the same.
But if two identical cases ever do arise, the same result will occur.
I have explained all this to you repeatedly.
You only have two choices. Either "blunt force trauma" can never be said to cause death in a deterministic system, or probable causes are allowed. How hard is that to understand? You claiming that we cannot generalize classes of events literally means we cannot claim such events cause death. So you'd save yourself a bunch a weaseling about to simple concede the point. You're saying that only claims like "Joe hitting Jake in the head with a blunt object caused his death", and that no such statement can be any further generalized. Because as soon as you say "sometimes" it is a probabilistic statement.

In such a hypothetical universe, science would not exist, as science is all about generalization. I would have been happy just saying we couldn't make positive claims about external causes of death, but since you've pushed the point, the consequence is actually that science cannot exist in a wholly deterministic system.

As such, no inhabitant of such a universe would have anything other than their own personal experience of free will to go on. So whether it actually exists in such a universe or not, it would be universally believed to exist in such a universe.
"Blunt force trauma can cause death" is valid, as this means that the within the set we have labelled "blunt force trauma", the subset of specific causes that can cause death is non-zero.
No, "can cause" is equivalent to "sometimes cause." Both are equally an expression of probability. Quit trying to weasel out of the logical consequences of your own stipulations.
I have quite clearly stated that probabilistic causes are allowed where the "probabilistic cause" is not due to inherent indeterminism.
I have already clearly spelt this out to you.
This is not cherry-picking but rather a clear distinction between the probabilistc causation arising from inherent determinism within a single specific cause, rather than arising from the grouping of multiple specific causes under a single label.
No, it's pretty clear that you don't comprehend what you're on about. For one, no one has tried to introduce probability due to inherent indeterminism. And for another, why all the effort to argue against probabilistic causes? Make up your mind already. Probabilistic causes either exist or don't, with the aforementioned stipulation that indeterminism can have no impact on said system.
I have never stated otherwise, so please drop the strawman.
Then you concede that the Schrodinger equation is valid in such a system. Good...finally.
It is only when analysing the set as a whole that we talk of probabilistic causes.
And that is because we do not look at the specific cause, just the overall set that we labelled.
Since deterministic systems entail predictable outcomes (A always causes B), any event that cannot be faithfully predicted cannot be said to be a deterministic system. How would you even formulate such probabilistic sets in said universe? You seem to like bouncing between and conflating the rules of the real world with your hypothetical universe. That confusion, and lack of consistency, is yours alone.
I have been honest throughout.
I am merely being more specific with what I'm talking about as being causes than you are, recognising the actual cause not as the labelled set but as the specific member of that set.
I have no doubt that you think you've been honest, but honesty isn't the same as intellectual honesty.
You can't have it both ways. If every cause can only be specific, there can be no probability, and if there is any probability, there must be generalization to sets of causes. Again, make up your mind.
Please explain how the initial conditions are both crucial to a deterministic system and allow for free will.
Naturally it is the second of these that I am most interested in.
Why on earth would I expect any intellectual honesty from you on that when I've clearly not even gotten any on your own stipulations? I have zero intentions of honesty trying to accept your premise and having you simply dismiss everything I say as irrelevant, through special pleading and begging the question.
 
Why on earth would I expect any intellectual honesty from you on that when I've clearly not even gotten any on your own stipulations? I have zero intentions of honesty trying to accept your premise and having you simply dismiss everything I say as irrelevant, through special pleading and begging the question.
Maybe because he's not the only one reading.

And how you comport yourself re: honesty is a matter of your character - independent of how you perceive others behaving.
 
Why on earth would I expect any intellectual honesty from you on that when I've clearly not even gotten any on your own stipulations? I have zero intentions of honesty trying to accept your premise and having you simply dismiss everything I say as irrelevant, through special pleading and begging the question.
Maybe because he's not the only one reading.

And how you comport yourself re: honesty is a matter of your character - independent of how you perceive others behaving.
Well, there's no need to be coy. If you think my intellectual honesty is in doubt, by all means, do tell. Otherwise, you only seem to be chiming in to poison the well, perhaps sore about our last interaction. Meh.
 
any way to make this sound less ridiculous?
hmmmm... nope!:)

so... have you worked out what consciousness is yet? Therefore the key distinction between what is defined as "alive" and "dead"?

or what makes the difference between a self determining android and a free willed human being?


a meanie minion ....lol
minion-dave-3500-3500.jpg
 
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Well, there's no need to be coy. If you think my intellectual honesty is in doubt, by all means, do tell. Otherwise, you only seem to be chiming in to poison the well, perhaps sore about our last interaction. Meh.
I'm not trying to poison the well. I'm addressing why you might continue the discussion in good faith.
And I didn't call your honesty into question; that was you.
 
I'm not trying to poison the well. I'm addressing why you might continue the discussion in good faith.
For readers who post regularly but don't want to weigh in here, like you? Last I remember, you begged off a discussion with me. So not much incentive on your account.
Engage or don't. Don't whine about discussions you wish were occurring if you have no interest in pursuing them yourself.
And I didn't call your honesty into question; that was you.
No, just trying to guess why you'd interject with so much nothing.

Got any contribution at all to the actual topic of this thread?
 
For readers who post regularly but don't want to weigh in here, like you?

Engage or don't. Don't whine about discussions you wish were occurring if you have no interest in pursuing them yourself.
No, I think I'm perfectly content reading how it's going, thank you, with the occasional nudge to keep it honest.
 
You persist in missing the "in your hypothetical universe" part. It's not "my" direct analogy (straw man), it's "a" direct analogy to your belief in illusory free will that can have no impact.
Utter garbage on your part.
You stated it was an analogy, and thus you need to own that statement.
Hence it is quite right to call it your analogy, and it is not a strawman to refer to it as such.
It is not my analogy, as I didn't state it as such.
If you didn't intend it, or mean it, to be an analogy for a view you hold on how free will might exist but have no impact, then simply apologise for raising it and move on.
Furthermore, your "clarification" of what you did mean comes across as a pitiful effort to extract yourself from a hole of your own making, while merely confusing the matter: how is it an analogy to what you think is my belief in illusory free will?
But seriously, don't bother answering that; it would be painful to see you try to explain away the mess of your thinking.
And the fact that you think me accepting your premise and attempting to frame my point within a view you might understand was a "mistake" speaks volumes about your intellectual honesty. You've now been repeatedly told it is a straw man, and you have no reason other than intellectual dishonesty to harp on it.
You claiming something as a strawman does not make it so, no matter how many times you bleat on about it.
You have finally made an effort to clarify that what you typed wasn't what you meant, although you have not been honest enough to admit your initial mistake.
So don't talk to me of intellectual honesty.
I've already, repeatedly, stipulated that indeterminism can have no impact on said deterministic system. So it makes no sense that you would claim a special pleading to exclude the wholly deterministic Schrodinger equation. If your stipulations are consistent, there's no need for such special pleadings.
I haven't special pleaded about anything (straw man on your part).
I have merely provided clarification of when the equation can be relevantly discussed - i.e. when input and output to the equation are inherently indeterministic.
This isn't special pleading but clarification.
You only have two choices. Either "blunt force trauma" can never be said to cause death in a deterministic system, or probable causes are allowed. How hard is that to understand?
I have accepted, many pages ago, that probable causes are allowed.
I have merely provided clarification of what type of probable causes are allowed: i.e. those that exist when we consider a set of specific causes under a single label.
This is to differentiate it from probable causes from inherent indeterminism.
How hard is that for you to understand?
You claiming that we cannot generalize classes of events literally means we cannot claim such events cause death.
I'm not saying that we can't generalise classes of events.
Please stop erecting your straw men.
So you'd save yourself a bunch a weaseling about to simple concede the point. You're saying that only claims like "Joe hitting Jake in the head with a blunt object caused his death", and that no such statement can be any further generalized.
"that only claims like "Joe...""... what?
Have you missed a word that provides sense to what you intended?

Further, I'm not saying that no such statement can be any further generalized.
Put the straw men away.
Because as soon as you say "sometimes" it is a probabilistic statement.
Yes, one of the types that I have explicitly stated are acceptable within a deterministic universe.
You seem to be arguing for the sake of it here, despite there being no actual disagreement.
Bizarre.
In such a hypothetical universe, science would not exist, as science is all about generalization. I would have been happy just saying we couldn't make positive claims about external causes of death, but since you've pushed the point, the consequence is actually that science cannot exist in a wholly deterministic system.
Rubbish.
For (hopefully) the last time on the matter: probabilistic causes are entirely acceptable where the probability arises due to considering the generalised set of specific causes as being the cause, rather than considering the inidividual specific cause.
I have explained this to you many times now.
How hard is that for you to understand?
As such, no inhabitant of such a universe would have anything other than their own personal experience of free will to go on. So whether it actually exists in such a universe or not, it would be universally believed to exist in such a universe.
How would that differ whether the universe was deterministic or indeterministic?
No, "can cause" is equivalent to "sometimes cause." Both are equally an expression of probability. Quit trying to weasel out of the logical consequences of your own stipulations.
Enough with the strawmen!
The stipulation is nothing inherently indeterministic.
It is not, has never been, that probability is not allowed when considering generalised sets rather than the specific elements.
So quit with your dishonesty.
No, it's pretty clear that you don't comprehend what you're on about. For one, no one has tried to introduce probability due to inherent indeterminism.
Other readers and responders have, and do, hence the references along the way to QM.
You are complaining about nothing but a clarification of when probability is valid within a deterministic universe and when it is not.
And for another, why all the effort to argue against probabilistic causes?
You're the one who's mistaken a point of clarification as an argument against.
Everything since has just been you continuing that mistake.
 
... cont'd...

Vociferous said:
Make up your mind already. Probabilistic causes either exist or don't, with the aforementioned stipulation that indeterminism can have no impact on said system.
No, it is not a case of "probabilistic causes either exist or don't".
Hence the quite obvious need for clarification.
Probabilistic causes - due to generalisation of specific elements into labels - exist and are acceptable in a determinsitic universe.
Probabilistic causes due to inherent indeterminism do not exist in a deterministic universe.
If you want to be as simplistic as saying that "probabilistic causes either exist or don't" then you are potentially allowing the latter in through the back door, whether you appreciate that or not, hence the need for the clarification to cut it off.
Then you concede that the Schrodinger equation is valid in such a system. Good...finally.
I have conceded that many many pages ago.
If you weren't so intent on arguing and instead actually bothered to read and comprehend what is posted, we might actually get somewhere.
Since deterministic systems entail predictable outcomes (A always causes B), any event that cannot be faithfully predicted cannot be said to be a deterministic system. How would you even formulate such probabilistic sets in said universe? You seem to like bouncing between and conflating the rules of the real world with your hypothetical universe. That confusion, and lack of consistency, is yours alone.
Determinism is not about prediction.
Given all the knowledge about the starting conditions and the laws/rules of the system, yes, one can predict.
But determinism is simply that "if A causes B then A always causes B".
As soon as you start using generalised sets of specific causes rather than the specific causes then you open the door to probability.
This doesn't mean the system is not deterministic, only that our understanding of the starting condition, while not inherently indeterministic (where it can not even theoretically be known), is insufficient to be able to say with certainty what the outcome will be.
But had the initial condition actually been known (and the rules/laws) then the outcome would be known.
And if the initial condition that was actually present led to B then whenever one has that initial condition it will always lead to B.
That's it.
That's what it means for the system to be deterministic.
You seem to be stating that as soon as we talk about a generalised set rather than the specific elements, the system can not be said to be deterministic.
If so, this is simply incorrect on your part.
I have no doubt that you think you've been honest, but honesty isn't the same as intellectual honesty.
I have been neither dishonest nor intellectually dishonest.
You can't have it both ways. If every cause can only be specific, there can be no probability, and if there is any probability, there must be generalization to sets of causes. Again, make up your mind.
You are laying down a false dichotomy.
You are trying to say that you either have to look at it one way or the other.
This is false.
One can look at it while understanding both, and utilising both.
Looking at it via generalised sets does not destroy the system from being deterministic, because the determinism operates not at the level of the generalised sets but at the level of the specific elements within.
The generalised sets are convenient ways of grouping things, and leads to entirely valid discussions of probability.
But at no time is the system not deterministic.
If one wants to use the general labels, and then concludes the system as not being deterministic because "general cause A does not always lead to B" then that is the weakness of their understanding, not the system.
Why on earth would I expect any intellectual honesty from you on that when I've clearly not even gotten any on your own stipulations? I have zero intentions of honesty trying to accept your premise and having you simply dismiss everything I say as irrelevant, through special pleading and begging the question.
All I see here is feeble excuses to avoid engaging with the thread.
There has only ever been one explicit stipulation (deterministic universe - i.e. the universe as a deterministic system) and a hidden assumption that any notion of freewill being claimed must have an impact.
The rest has just been your hunt for an argument even where none actually exists, so as to avoid addressing the actual question asked by the thread.
There has only been one intellectually dishonest person in our discussions, and it has not been me.
 
Utter garbage on your part.
So even though you should be able to admit that I have been arguing this whole time for genuine, impactful free will, you really believe that I would make an analogy to free will having no impact at all, without that being a reference to any other view but my own? Well, that's really thick, but if you insist, I guess I'll have to take your word for being so obtuse. I never said I didn't make the analogy, only that it wasn't an analogy to my view of free will. Seeing as you believe free will cannot have an impact, most reasonable people would understand that any such analogy referenced your view. But I guess I shouldn't be making assumptions about your reasonableness. Again, I'll take your word that you couldn't grok the obvious.

I never said it was your analogy either, so that's just a blatant straw man. I said it was an analogy to your belief in illusory free will. And why you feel the need to drag this out this long, instead of simply accepting when I told you it wasn't my view, is beyond me. I guess you think it somehow helps your case, albeit only by fallacious argument.
I have merely provided clarification of when the equation can be relevantly discussed - i.e. when input and output to the equation are inherently indeterministic.
This isn't special pleading but clarification.
Since the Schrodinger equation only has an indeterministic relationship to observations when observing quantum phenomena, and I've already agreed to stipulate no indeterminism, any further objection to that equation in a deterministic system is, indeed, a special pleading. You can either keep making such a fallacious argument or withdraw your objection. Which will it be?
I have accepted, many pages ago, that probable causes are allowed.
I have merely provided clarification of what type of probable causes are allowed: i.e. those that exist when we consider a set of specific causes under a single label.
This is to differentiate it from probable causes from inherent indeterminism.
And as I've long since agreed to stipulate no indeterminism, your "clarification" is completely unnecessary chin wagging, which only muddies what you're agreeing to.
probabilistic causes are entirely acceptable where the probability arises due to considering the generalised set of specific causes as being the cause, rather than considering the inidividual specific cause.
I'll hold you to that.
Make up your mind already. Probabilistic causes either exist or don't, with the aforementioned stipulation that indeterminism can have no impact on said system.
No, it is not a case of "probabilistic causes either exist or don't".
Try reading that bolded bit again. Why do you keep repeating a clarification that I obviously, explicitly, and repeatedly agreed to? With that bolded bit, it's a simple yes or no.
If you want to be as simplistic as saying that "probabilistic causes either exist or don't" then you are potentially allowing the latter in through the back door, whether you appreciate that or not, hence the need for the clarification to cut it off.
Quit trying to argue points I've never made and already agreed not to.
Then you concede that the Schrodinger equation is valid in such a system. Good...finally.
I have conceded that many many pages ago.
Where?
You seem to be stating that as soon as we talk about a generalised set rather than the specific elements, the system can not be said to be deterministic.
Yes or no? Is "if A causes B, then A must always be followed by B" the only valid causal statement in a wholly deterministic system? If yes, how can such a system define a probabilistic causal statement, and if no, how can probabilistic causal sets abide by "if A causes B, then A must always be followed by B"? Is it not a wholly deterministic system, or have you just erroneously tried to make the whole universe such a system without understanding the consequences?




But here's a bone for ya. When are the initial conditions?
 
So even though you should be able to admit that I have been arguing this whole time for genuine, impactful free will, you really believe that I would make an analogy to free will having no impact at all, without that being a reference to any other view but my own? Well, that's really thick, but if you insist, I guess I'll have to take your word for being so obtuse.
Given that you haven’t actually provided any argument at all on the matter, despite numerous invites to do so, and given that all you have thus far tried to do is argue about how you think I and/or others are not being consistent in application of the stipulations of a deterministic universe, the only honest thing for me to do is to admit that I still have zero idea of what you think free will is, whether you agree that free will is possible in a deterministic universe, and whether, if you think it is possible, it is impactful or not.
You have simply failed to actually put a case forward, or take a position, other than one of believing the matter, or the way others are arguing, to be question-begging and/or inconsistent.
I never said I didn't make the analogy, only that it wasn't an analogy to my view of free will.
A view you have yet to give, and thus not unreasonable that when you make an analogy...
But thanks for the clarification.
What exactly is your view of free will?
Seeing as you believe free will cannot have an impact, most reasonable people would understand that any such analogy referenced your view. But I guess I shouldn't be making assumptions about your reasonableness. Again, I'll take your word that you couldn't grok the obvious.
What you wrote in no way referenced my view, and in no way is an analogy for my view, one which you clearly have no idea about.
Your analogy, need you be reminded, was of something that exists but has no impact.
Where, for example, have I expressed that free will exists but does not have an impact?
That is why you making the analogy that you did would, by all reasonable people, be seen as you making an analogy about your own view.
But you have finally clarified the matter.
Thanks.
So what exactly is your view of free will, and do you think it is possible in a deterministic universe?
And is your view of whether it is possible or not simply a matter of question-begging?
I never said it was your analogy either, so that's just a blatant straw man. I said it was an analogy to your belief in illusory free will. And why you feel the need to drag this out this long, instead of simply accepting when I told you it wasn't my view, is beyond me. I guess you think it somehow helps your case, albeit only by fallacious argument.
You can guess what you want.
You seem to have been guessing most of the way so far, so one more won’t make a difference.
You made an analogy of what you have clarified is not of your view, and it certainly isn’t of mine, so let’s put it down as nothing but a strawman on your part and move on.
I have invited you to state your own view on the matter several times, and each time you have refused thus far.
What is your view on the issue?
Since the Schrodinger equation only has an indeterministic relationship to observations when observing quantum phenomena, and I've already agreed to stipulate no indeterminism, any further objection to that equation in a deterministic system is, indeed, a special pleading. You can either keep making such a fallacious argument or withdraw your objection. Which will it be?
I haven’t objected to the equation in a deterministic system since it was first clarified that it could be used for other than quantum mechanics.
That you think I have, and continue to think I have, is your mistake.
As said, I have merely provided clarification - for myself and others who might be reading - on its applicability in line with the above.
You have issue with that?
Why?
And as I've long since agreed to stipulate no indeterminism, your "clarification" is completely unnecessary chin wagging, which only muddies what you're agreeing to.
There is no chin wagging, nor muddying.
It is quite clear, and remains such.
Are you struggling to keep up?
I'll hold you to that.
Please do.
Try reading that bolded bit again. Why do you keep repeating a clarification that I obviously, explicitly, and repeatedly agreed to? With that bolded bit, it's a simple yes or no.

Quit trying to argue points I've never made and already agreed not to.
Because what you think you have agreed to is woolly and vague, given that a deterministic system can appear indeterministic - such as rolling a dice etc - and it is important to get full understanding of what is being agreed to.
You may not have argued the points, but if your understanding of what has been agreed allows those points to later be made, by either you or anyone else, then it is important to address them now, so that we can go forward with an aligned understanding of what is actually agreed.
Post #986.
Although admittedly not “many many pages ago”.
It just felt like it at the time, and continues to.
Yes or no? Is "if A causes B, then A must always be followed by B" the only valid causal statement in a wholly deterministic system? If yes, how can such a system define a probabilistic causal statement, and if no, how can probabilistic causal sets abide by "if A causes B, then A must always be followed by B"? Is it not a wholly deterministic system, or have you just erroneously tried to make the whole universe such a system without understanding the consequences?
As already explained, when dealing with sets of specific causes, the valid claim is “A can cause B”.
If the input of the system is deemed to be a set of individual specific causes, then the output is similarly a set of individual specific effects.
That same set as input will always lead to the same set as output.
Determinism.
Not inherently indeterministic, though.
Just the appearance of indeterminism (I.e. the same set can lead to different possible outputs) due to lack of understanding/knowledge of the specific element of the set that is actually in play.
The system remains wholly deterministic, although our perception of it, due to our lack of understanding/knowledge, leads to the appearance of indeterminism, such as probabilistic outputs.
One is not mutually exclusive with the other: a deterministic universe, and the appearance of probability when we lack knowledge/understanding of the element in play.
But here's a bone for ya. When are the initial conditions?
The initial conditions of a deterministic system are the state of the system at any prior moment.
Once the system starts all moments lead to the same place - I.e. one prior moment is as good as any other for determining the subsequent future of the system.
 
Just the appearance of indeterminism (I.e. the same set can lead to different possible outputs) due to lack of understanding/knowledge of the specific element of the set that is actually in play.
The system remains wholly deterministic, although our perception of it, due to our lack of understanding/knowledge, leads to the appearance of indeterminism, such as probabilistic outputs.
Probabilistic outputs are all current theory provides. We may perceive cause and effect, but theory shows that is impossible. We may have the appearance of causality, but that is an illusion, a shortcut our brain finds useful - as careful experiment has verified at the quantum level, and better understanding from more careful attention has verified at all levels up to and including Darwinian evolution.

Fortunately, the laws of probability are deterministic in the real world - nothing is more inevitable than their consequences (example: the reflection of light from a mirror). So the assumption of a deterministic universe remains valid, and the discussion can continue.
 
Given that...
I have repeatedly told you that I think free will has an impact (not merely illusory) and not only possible in a deterministic universe but requires determinism to have any significant impact at all. If you missed those, that's on you. So your bellyaching just seems like an empty justification for your continued straw man. If you STILL can't manage to discern my view of free will, you may be far too obtuse, willfully or not. People seem to miss the simple fact that intellectual dishonesty is more often than not a matter of negligence or ignorance rather than one of intent.
Where, for example, have I expressed that free will exists but does not have an impact?
Never said, nor implied, that you did. Only that a lack of impact is not the same as nonexistent. This really should be uncontroversial. No idea why you would dispute it, especially knowing (hopefully by now) that I think free will has an impact, so it has no affect on my argument. It's more of a test of your intellectual honesty than anything else, and so far you've failed it.
And is your view of whether it is possible or not simply a matter of question-begging?
Pray tell, how would it be? Hopefully you actually mean question begging here and not the oft-conflated raising the question. For begging the question, you'd have to show how my premises presume a single conclusion.
You made an analogy of what you have clarified is not of your view, and it certainly isn’t of mine, so let’s put it down as nothing but a strawman on your part and move on.
The straw men, plural, are you claiming it was my view and you now claiming I straw manned yours. I've shown both to be untrue.
I have invited you to state your own view on the matter several times, and each time you have refused thus far.
What is your view on the issue?
Asked and answered.
I haven’t objected to the equation in a deterministic system since it was first clarified that it could be used for other than quantum mechanics.
That you think I have, and continue to think I have, is your mistake.
You responded:
Rubbish.
There is no cherry-picking, just recognition of what the equation is being applied to.
If one applies it to something that is inherently indeterministic, it doesn't matter that the process is deterministic, you are still in the realms of indeterminism, and that is outside the scope of the deterministic universe.
Even after I clearly stipulated no indeterministic inputs to the system. If these weren't meant to be objections, or at least hedging, it's on you for continuing to undermine your own "no issue". If it's really no issue, have the good sense to leave it at that.
Are you struggling to keep up?
Nah, just you struggling to be clear and consistent.
Please do.
Good. Then why can't free will be a "generalised set of specific causes"? Why isn't free will the probability of individual causes in a set tending to turn out one way rather than another? An ensemble free will, where it may not operate over each individual choice but operates over ensembles of similar choices. A tilting rather than a hard turn. How could ensemble free will violate a deterministic system? How could ensemble free will be said to have no real impact?
You may not have argued the points, but if your understanding of what has been agreed allows those points to later be made, by either you or anyone else, then it is important to address them now, so that we can go forward with an aligned understanding of what is actually agreed.
Quit tilting at windmills.
Post #986.
As pointed out above, that very post, and one since, both continue to hedge and/or object to the Schrodinger equation.
The initial conditions of a deterministic system are the state of the system at any prior moment.
Once the system starts all moments lead to the same place - I.e. one prior moment is as good as any other for determining the subsequent future of the system.
What makes any prior moment special?
 
Then why can't free will be a "generalised set of specific causes"? Why isn't free will the probability of individual causes in a set tending to turn out one way rather than another? An ensemble free will, where it may not operate over each individual choice but operates over ensembles of similar choices.
If I translate the above correctly you are suggesting multiple choices, grouped together (ensembles), come together and produce a singular output

If this is your suggestion, sounds, to me, weird and unworkable

:)
 
I have repeatedly told you that I think free will has an impact (not merely illusory) and not only possible in a deterministic universe but requires determinism to have any significant impact at all. If you missed those, that's on you.
Stating what you think free will is is not the same as providing argument for it.
Is that also too much for you to comprehend?
So your bellyaching just seems like an empty justification for your continued straw man.
No strawman on my part.
You have since clarified your position, explained what you meant, so move on.
Never said, nor implied, that you did. Only that a lack of impact is not the same as nonexistent. This really should be uncontroversial. No idea why you would dispute it, especially knowing (hopefully by now) that I think free will has an impact, so it has no affect on my argument.
I have never disputed, and your initial raising of it as if countering something I said was a strawman of your own making at the time, and remains one now.
It's more of a test of your intellectual honesty than anything else, and so far you've failed it.
Being tested by you on intellectual dishonesty is like being tested on mathematics by someone who can't add up.
So you thinking I have so far failed it is really of little concern to me.
Pray tell, how would it be?
By concluding something assumed in a premise, perhaps.
How else do you think one begs the question?
Hopefully you actually mean question begging here and not the oft-conflated raising the question. For begging the question, you'd have to show how my premises presume a single conclusion.
Well, when you finally get round to providing any actual argument on the matter, rather than simply stating what you think free will is, then we can start to investigate whether you are question begging or not.
The straw men, plural, are you claiming it was my view and you now claiming I straw manned yours. I've shown both to be untrue.
You have certainly clarified what you claim you intended to initially say.
Just a shame you couldn't have said it in the first place.
Asked and answered.
You have stated that you think it exists, but there is no argument to support what you say.
Care to offer any?
Even after I clearly stipulated no indeterministic inputs to the system. If these weren't meant to be objections, or at least hedging, it's on you for continuing to undermine your own "no issue". If it's really no issue, have the good sense to leave it at that.
I'm not clarifying the issue for you, but for anyone else who might happen to be following the thread.
If you, or I, say something that, without such clarification, can be taken differently to what is intended with the clarification, it makes sense to provide the clarification.
Apologies if you don't want that.
Nah, just you struggling to be clear and consistent.
I have been both, despite your protestations.
And you have singularly failed to provide any example of where I have not.
Good. Then why can't free will be a "generalised set of specific causes"?
Free will can be anything you want it to be, I guess.
All it needs to be is your definition for what you see as free will.
Why isn't free will the probability of individual causes in a set tending to turn out one way rather than another?
So the probability of smoking causing death is free will?
An ensemble free will, where it may not operate over each individual choice but operates over ensembles of similar choices. A tilting rather than a hard turn.
You'll need to clarify just exactly what you think free will is, as at the moment you have defined it, per above, such that it is exampled by the probability that smoking causes death.
How could ensemble free will violate a deterministic system?
Using your definition it wouldn't.
But then it's simply a probability.
You're going to have to actually clarify and expand on what you mean, 'cos at the moment it's, well, nonsense.
How could ensemble free will be said to have no real impact?
Ditto to the above.
Quit tilting at windmills.
I'm sorry that's how you see it.
Not that it will change anything.
As pointed out above, that very post, and one since, both continue to hedge and/or object to the Schrodinger equation.
No it doesn't!
What is it that you don't comprehend in what I have written???
I have not objected to the equation but the inputs, and thus the use to which it is put.
Do you not get how that is not having issue with the equation?!
So quit with the strawmen.
Be honest.
What makes any prior moment special?
Are you asking what makes one prior moment more special than any other prior moment?
If so, the answer is nothing.
The only truly special moment in that regard is the one for which there are no prior moments.
Otherwise, once a deterministic system is in motion, any moment prior to moment X is as good as any other in determining moment X+1.
If this is not what you were asking, please feel free to clarify what you did mean.
 
Stating what you think free will is...
Wading through the bullshit.
Free will can be anything you want it to be, I guess.
All it needs to be is your definition for what you see as free will.
A definition is "what it is", not an argument for its existence. Already answered, except every time I do you then complain about wanting an argument instead of the "what it is" you asked for. If you finally comprehend my view on what free will is, maybe we can eventually get to arguments about why it exists in such a system.
What makes any prior moment special?
Are you asking what makes one prior moment more special than any other prior moment?
If so, the answer is nothing.
The only truly special moment in that regard is the one for which there are no prior moments.
Otherwise, once a deterministic system is in motion, any moment prior to moment X is as good as any other in determining moment X+1.
If this is not what you were asking, please feel free to clarify what you did mean.
No, what makes any/all prior moments special? Why is X special compared to X+1? Why is the moment without any prior moment more special than any other moment?
 
Wading through the bullshit.
Of your own making.
A definition is "what it is", not an argument for its existence.
I'm sure you'll point out where I have suggested otherwise, or is this just more of your strawman building?
Already answered, except every time I do you then complain about wanting an argument instead of the "what it is" you asked for.
I'd quite like both, if that's okay with you.
The former is just a trivial opinion without the latter.
You have provided a definition, and now seemingly ignored any questioning of it.
If you finally comprehend my view on what free will is, maybe we can eventually get to arguments about why it exists in such a system.
No, I don't comprehend your view on what free will is, for the reasons previously stated and subsequently ignored by you.
Unless you really do see free will as being exampled by smoking possibly causing death.
I'm going to be generous and suspect not, in which case I have concluded that I do not comprehend, from what you have written, what your view on free will is.
Care to clarify?
No, what makes any/all prior moments special?
Compared to what?
Why is X special compared to X+1?
In a deterministic system X determines and predicts X+1, such that if you know X and the governing laws you can know X+1 and all subsequent moments.
But knowing X+1 does not necessarily mean you can know X, or any prior moment.
Why is the moment without any prior moment more special than any other moment?
Only in as much that in a deterministic system it is the only moment that can not possibly be predicted by that system.
Every other moment can, given knowledge of a prior state and the governing laws.
 
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