Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

[DaveC426913]

Well, that is true enough unless we get into quantum physics, which of course we should given the environment.

And QM is at the very core of the question of a deterministic universe.

 

[iceaura]

Yes, it is.

No, it isn't. That's not how or why moths fly to lights.

There was no actual free will there, there was a lot of stuff going on behind the scenes that we don't have access to about our own minds - that we interpret as free will.

When you have dropped the supernatural assumption, and paid more attention to exactly how and why the atoms's behaviors are determined (dreams and memories and so forth are included necessarily - as causal), you will discover a lot of "wiggle room" for the larger behavior patterns you have mistakenly excluded from your field of view.

Meanwhile, your assumption that everybody who observes and records and measures human decision making is that stupid and careless about what they record and observe and measure is unfounded.

 

[DaveC426913]

You can copy/paste from previous posting at least as easily as I can, if your amnesia is that bad.

If I knew what you were referring to, I wouldn't have had to ask.

Nothing you have said draws a connection from our (or at least my) argument to "supernatural". It is a non sequitur. I strongly suspect that there is no such justification for this assumption you hand to us. It's just a barb - designed to get under your opponent's skin. Like calling Dems "snowflakes".

And the atoms are reducible to quarks and so forth, and they are reducible to various equations that describe nobody knows what. Doesn't help - the larger patterns are still causal. As you carelessly posted, atoms (patterns of quark interactions) are causal - by the same logic, dreams (patterns of patterns of patterns of atom interactions) are causal.

OK. None of this actually addresses the issue of where this free will might come from.

So yes, everything is causal. That equates with no choice - no free will.

"Cause" only makes sense at the appropriate logical level.

Is that so?
Given the premise of a deterministic universe, when exactly is cause not appropriate? And why?

 

[DaveC426913]

When you have dropped the supernatural assumption

You're a troll.

 

[iceaura]

Obviously this is an over-simplified description, but the fact remains nowhere in there does any atom - or any consequence of any atom - get to go left instead of right.

As the driver approaches the traffic light, entire complexes of behavior patterns of billions of atoms that have the capability of changing one way or another await information from the traffic light. That information will not reach them directly, of course - it will not be the "cause" of the change in those patterns of behavior; that will be some other large pattern or pattern of patterns set to recognize and respond to the color of the light.
The degrees of freedom involved in analyzing that situation are not trivial.

If I knew what you were referring to, I wouldn't have had to ask.

You've been told what I am referring to more times than I can count offhand, in plain English addressed directly to you. There's no point in yet another repetition. If you read my posts, you can find out what I'm referring to. If you don't, why should I repeat the posting you won't register or remember anyway?

You're a troll.

So put me on ignore, and save yourself the bother of pretending to have read my posts.

 

[iceaura]

Given the premise of a deterministic universe, when exactly is cause not appropriate?

Cause is always appropriate, as I clearly posted.
It exists only at the logical level of the effect, is the point. You illustrated your vague and unexamined awareness of that yourself, by choosing a substrate level far above the bottom to locate your "causes" - and you still didn't get high enough: atoms do not cause/determine human decisions. They are substrate for the brain, the physical brain, which is in turn substrate for the patterns of patterns of behavior we label "mind". No particular atom or collection of atoms makes or causes a human decision - any atoms of the right kind handy will do, it's the pattern/pattern/pattern of their behavior that counts. The mind makes the decision, based in this case on information it registers from the external world, and determines the subsequent behavior of the substrate atoms.
- - -

So yes, everything is causal. That equates with no choice - no free will.

The supernatural assumption, reposted yet again.
As posted twenty times before: "Everything is causal" 'equates with' no supernatural freedom - of will or anything.
It does not 'equate with' no natural freedom, no nonsupernatural freedom. It is irrelevant to nonsupernatural freedom, and if you hadn't assumed supernatural freedom you would not even bring it up.

Nothing you have said draws a connection from our (or at least my) argument to "supernatural".

It's not "connected" to your argument, it's an assumption you make (you have to make) in order to draw the conclusion(s) you draw.

 

[James R]

After all: Nothing about the ability to do otherwise necessarily involves freedom - merely independence from natural law and cause/effect determinism and physics and so forth.

Who says so? The definition of “free” used doesn’t. It is only when you apply the second premise (in this case the deterministic universe) that one can assess what that notion of freedom would require. Thus it is a conclusion that such freedom does not exist in a deterministic universe. No assumption of it, just the conclusion. You are simply rolling the second assumption into the first and claiming that we’re assuming freedom to not exist.

Here's Sarkus's argument:

P1. Freedom is the ability to do other than it must.
P2. In a deterministic universe, nothing can do other than it must.
C1. Therefore, nothing has freedom in a deterministic universe.

In the quote above, he says that we can't know what "that notion of freedom would require" (i.e. the notion of freedom assumed in P1) before we've assumed P2 to be true. It follows that P1 and P2 are not, therefore, independent assumptions, but are entangled. But let's examine P1 in more detail.

Notice, first, that there's not even any mention of the "will" here. This is a general argument about things having any kind of freedom, as defined in P1. That's why it applies equally to human decision makers and to thermostats, presumably.

So, let's unpack P1 a bit. At first glance, it appears to encompass both of the following elements:
P1a. Freedom includes the natural ability to do other than it must.
P1b. Freedom includes the supernatural ability to do other than it must.

Now, we all agree, I think, that "determinism" means that natural things are bound to obey the laws of physics, so they can't do "other than they must", by the definition of "determinism". Thus, we could write:

P2a. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have a natural ability to do other than it must.

But we can't automatically assume that determinism binds supernatural things in the same way. This would be wrong:

P2b. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have a supernatural ability to do other than it must.

It's supernatural, so it doesn't have to follow the "rules" set by any "natural" determinism, presumably.

So now we have:

P1a. Freedom includes the natural ability to do other than it must.
P1b. Freedom includes the supernatural ability to do other than it must.
P2a. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have a natural ability to do other than it must.
C2. Therefore, natural freedom (the natural ability to do other than it must) does not exist in a deterministic universe.

This leaves open the question of whether things can have supernatural freedom in a deterministic universe, so we apparently have an unsolved problem.

But here's where things get interesting. Sarkus et al. (Baldeee, DaveC and various hangers-on, like dmoe, who seems to approve of their arguments) tell us that they rule out P1b as a live possibility. If we are to take them at their word, then we are left with the following definition of freedom:

P1a*. Freedom IS nothing other than the natural ability to do other than it must.

And the argument is reduced to:
P1a*. Freedom IS nothing other than the natural ability to do other than it must.
P2a. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have a natural ability to do other than it must.
C2. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have (natural) freedom.

If this is an argument against free will, it is a trivial one that is completely reliant on an unreasonably restrictive definition of "freedom". Moreover, it is a contrived argument, because the definition of "freedom" is deliberately finagled in anticipation of the introduction of premise 2.

We might save a lot of time by summarising the entire (slightly extended) "argument", as it applies to free will, as:

P1*. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have (natural) freedom.
C3. No-one can have natural free will in a deterministic universe.

This is as far as Sarkus et al. have got with their inquiries into free will. Hundreds of posts on the topic, and this is where they're at.

Are iceaura and I wrong to say that Sarkus et al. have made a "supernatural assumption" in their arguments against free will? I don't think so. Their "argument" to this point, boils done to P1*. That's all. Nothing beyond that has been advanced by them. And since we end up with P1* once we put their trivial lead-up argument to this through the wash, all further speculation about free will from this point on starts from there, for them.

Where did it all go wrong for Sarkus et. al?

It's right there are the top:

P1. Freedom is the ability to do other than it must.

Is this a reasonable working definition of "freedom"? I think not.

If Sarkus insists that, on the contrary, it is a perfectly reasonable definition, then here's what I ask:

What conceivable kind of thing has the ability to do other than it must?

Note that we're not necessarily restricted to deterministic universes here, and we're not necessarily restricted to natural things either. So, in that respect, I would suggest that maybe some kind of supernatural thing (a ghost, a god?) could by some magical process contrive to do other than it must. Such a thing could conceivably have freedom then, even in a deterministic universe.

But Sarkus and Baldeee et al. tell us that they are concerned with the real world here, and they tell us they are not interested in supernatural things. So, turning to natural things, which natural things could conceivably do other than they must?

I confess that I can't think of a single natural thing that could do other than it must, whether it were to exist in a deterministic universe or in an indeterministic universe. I can also say with some confidence that Baldeee can't think of a single such thing either, because I've asked him about this before. So, it looks like it's up to Sarkus to step in to save the day, if he can.

If there are no conceivable natural things that can do other than they must, in any conceivable universe, that suggests to me that starting your anti-free-will argument with P1 is silly. The best thing to do in the circumstances is to put P1 in the trash and start with a more realistic definition of "freedom" - for example, one that accords in some sense with commonly understood notions of freedom. In the real world, we observe that people use the word "freedom" to refer to various things that can conceivably exist in our observed universe. So, I humbly suggest that maybe Sarkus and Baldeee should consider trying to work one of those definitions into an argument about free will, instead of relying on a concept that nobody can instantiate, even hypothetically.

One last point about the term "supernatural assumption". Is it unreasonable for iceaura and I to say that Sarkus et al. make a supernatural assumption in their argument against free will? Remember, their argument boils down to this:

P1*. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have (natural) freedom.
C3. No-one can have natural free will in a deterministic universe.

Since P1* is the starting point for all further discussion of free will (a discussion that ends before it gets started, with C3), the only context in which the notion of freedom (let alone free will) remains relevant is a supernatural one, in which P1b is re-introduced as a live possibility after all. In other words, P1* is equivalent to the assumption that the only kind of free will worth having is supernatural free will. We can justifiably refer to this as the "supernatural assumption".

 

[James R]

Seattle:

I think you've made this a little too contrived to debate in the tidy manner that you are expecting.

If what you really are interested in addressing is whether, in a world with no free will, we can justify punishing someone for something that they had no choice in, why didn't you just start the thread that way?

I didn't start this discussion. The current thread was split from another thread, but this whole discussion started in yet another thread. Nor did I set the terms of the debate, such as it is. This is just the way the discussion has developed, with Sarkus et al. stuck with a bad definition of the word "free". (See my post above.)

It appears you are trying to be a little too clever by half (as they say) by trying to lead the horse to water so that you can then bring your premise to bear.

My premise? Which one?

In such a world, the answer would be, it doesn't have to be "fair". It has to be done for society. Regardless of whether it's your "fault" or not, we can't have "killers" running loose.

That's a fair response. But in that case, there shouldn't be any notion of punishment in criminal sentencing. Would you agree? It's one thing to lock a killer up to protect the community - we do that with the criminally insane, who can't control their actions, for instance. But it's another to say "Part of the reason you're getting extra jail time for your crime is because you freely chose to aggravate the violence", for instance. If they truly had no choice, like an insane person, there's no point in applying punishment like that. Similarly, there's no point in trying to use criminal sentencing to deter other potential criminals, because they will do what they will do regardless, in a world with no free will.

In other words, a whole bunch of common-sense notions suddenly make no sense at all once we decide there's no free will.

No one here is seriously arguing that there is that little free will.

Yes, they are. Read Sarkus's posts. Read Baldeee's posts. Read DaveC's. All of them are arguing there's NO FREE WILL AT ALL. They tend to say there's an "illusion" or "perception" of free will, but that's hardly the same thing.

I'm guessing they are arguing, similar to my argument, that popular conceptions of "free will" aren't quite as "free" as one might think.

You don't have to guess - or take my word for it. Read their posts if you want to see what they're arguing.

Again, it depends on degree and on how you define it. As a practical matter we have free will just as we interact with computers using a high level language even though ultimately everything is binary.

This thread is similar to having to decide if computers are just binary machines or if there is more nuance than that. On a practical level it certainly seems as if there is more nuance. Using a strict definition, there is no nuance, they just process 0 and 1.

Should we argue that "I don't see anyone typing 0 and 1 and yet they seem to be interacting with their computers. I don't see any 0 and 1 being output on my computer screen". What gives?

Actually, some of the argument here is a bit like that. For example, take Baldeee's argument that a human choice is equivalent to the operation of a thermostat. It's sort of like somebody looking at the computer source code for Microsoft Word and saying "I don't see any word processor there. There's just a bunch of directions to a computer to shuffle stuff around in memory and some loops and some branching statements etc. Where's the ribbon? Where's are the menus? Where's the ruler?"

 

[Sarkus]

Here's Sarkus's argument:

P1. Freedom is the ability to do other than it must.
P2. In a deterministic universe, nothing can do other than it must.
C1. Therefore, nothing has freedom in a deterministic universe.

Reasonable so far.

In the quote above, he says that we can't know what "that notion of freedom would require" (i.e. the notion of freedom assumed in P1) before we've assumed P2 to be true.

Not quite, I said that it is only in light of the second premise that one can "assess what that notion of freedom would require". Admittedly this is a tad ambiguous, but it "assess" was not meant as in "to know" - because we know what it requires, per the definition in P1 - i.e. it requires the ability to do otherwise. The "assess" was meant in the manner that we can not analyse whether it exists or not, or anything outside of what it requires, until we put it into the context of P2.

It follows that P1 and P2 are not, therefore, independent assumptions, but are entangled. But let's examine P1 in more detail.

Given the clarification above on the use of the word "assess", and your mistaken assumption that it meant "to know", I hope you see that this conclusion is wrong.

Notice, first, that there's not even any mention of the "will" here. This is a general argument about things having any kind of freedom, as defined in P1. That's why it applies equally to human decision makers and to thermostats, presumably.

Yes, it applies to anything and everything within the context of deterministic framework.

So, let's unpack P1 a bit. At first glance, it appears to encompass both of the following elements:
P1a. Freedom includes the natural ability to do other than it must.
P1b. Freedom includes the supernatural ability to do other than it must.

No, there is no supernatural ability. We have all agreed this. No ability is supernatural as the supernatural does not exist. Any attempt to split the definition thus is due to an agenda that you have, and not the argument. Your subsequent analysis can thus be ignored, given that we all accepted that the supernatural does not exist, despite you and iceaura harking on about it, attempting to crowbar it into the argument.
[/quote]...
But here's where things get interesting. Sarkus et al. (Baldeee, DaveC and various hangers-on, like dmoe, who seems to approve of their arguments) tell us that they rule out P1b as a live possibility. If we are to take them at their word, then we are left with the following definition of freedom:

P1a*. Freedom IS nothing other than the natural ability to do other than it must.[/quote]"IF we are to take them at their word..."? You doubt that we are arguing in good faith???.
You can strike out the word natural. There is just the ability to do otherwise. If it is not natural then we have all accepted that it doesn't exist. To include the word "natural" is therefore redundant.

And the argument is reduced to:
P1a*. Freedom IS nothing other than the natural ability to do other than it must.
P2a. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have a natural ability to do other than it must.
C2. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have (natural) freedom.

"Nothing other than" is redundant.
"Nothing can have..." is equal to "there is no..."
So you're back to the original argument above, and your analysis has thus far got you nowhere other than showing you (hopefully) how the claim of a "supernatural assumption" by us is wholly unwarranted. Will that stop you and iceaura from making such claims?

If this is an argument against free will, it is a trivial one that is completely reliant on an unreasonably restrictive definition of "freedom".

That is your view, yet it is the definition of freedom (worded as "ability to do otherwise", but they are equivalent) used in the standard debate on the issue, which involves around that definition and what constitutes a "genuine alternative". If you think it is "unreasonably restrictive" then feel free to elaborate on that, to introduce a different notion and argue from that, which as nearly everyone has said: if you use a different notion you will reach different conclusions. But instead of that you seem simply intent on trying to knock down the argument, an argument that I have zero doubt you actually concur with, given the definition of freedom. Do you accept the definition of "freedom"? No. But given the premises, you do accept the conclusion. Everything you have otherwise offered seems simply to be a show of bravado to stop yourself from accepting that and moving on. It is your rut, your obsession, your crippling position.

Moreover, it is a contrived argument, because the definition of "freedom" is deliberately finagled in anticipation of the introduction of premise 2.

Unfortunately you are not hiding your own agenda here. There is nothing in the argument that is deliberately finagled by either myself, Baldeee, DaveC, or anyone else here. The accusation is wholly unwarranted and is simply you wishing to promote your own agenda that our argument is somehow dishonest or devious, that we are guilty of underhanded tricks. You have been proven wrong, by your own analysis, with your claim that the definition of freedom assumes anything supernatural, and now you're attempting to poison the well with simple lies. You're better than that.

We might save a lot of time by summarising the entire (slightly extended) "argument", as it applies to free will, as:

P1*. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have (natural) freedom.
C3. No-one can have natural free will in a deterministic universe.

We could, but then we'd also need to summarise a similar argument thus:
P1*: In a universe where all men are mortal, Socrates is mortal.
C3: Socrates is mortal in a universe where all men are mortal.
You haven't addressed this weakness in your "analysis", by which you effectively relegate all deductive conclusions to being question-begging assumptions.

This is as far as Sarkus et al. have got with their inquiries into free will. Hundreds of posts on the topic, and this is where they're at.

No, it's not "where we're at". It is where you are still at in trying to attack it: i.e. nowhere. You have tried 2 things here: the claim of the supernatural assumption (shown above to be a hollow claim), and now reformulating the argument to relegate all deductive conclusions to assumptions. Well done. Impressive stuff.
We have got to a valid logical conclusion that informs our understanding of processes such as the will, that might appear to be free.

Are iceaura and I wrong to say that Sarkus et al. have made a "supernatural assumption" in their arguments against free will? I don't think so.

Despite not being able to show it above; despite you not having any argument that actually reaches that conclusion? No, it is simply a non sequitur on your part. You want it to be true. You think putting the word "supernatural" into the mix enough times will make it true of our argument. It doesn't.

Their "argument" to this point, boils done to P1*.

P1*: Socrates is mortal in a universe where all men are mortal.

That's all. Nothing beyond that has been advanced by them.

What do you expect to be advanced? Perhaps ask questions of those who put forth such an argument, who have reached such a conclusion, how it impacts other matters. Otherwise, in a debate where the question is whether free will (as in a will that is free) exists in a deterministic universe, what more do you want than a rather concise argument that concludes such that we can answer the question with a "no"?
If you feel it needs to advance beyond that, ask the questions of it.

And since we end up with P1* once we put their trivial lead-up argument to this through the wash, all further speculation about free will from this point on starts from there, for them.

P1*: Socrates is mortal in a universe where all men are mortal.

 

[Sarkus]

Cont'd...

Where did it all go wrong for Sarkus et. al?

Wrong? There is an argument put forth that you are now simply asserting is "wrong". You certainly haven't shown it to be invalid. You haven't shown there to be any "supernatural assumption". You have simply asserted it is wrong. Or maybe you actually thought your "analysis" above is convincing?

It's right there are the top:

P1. Freedom is the ability to do other than it must.

Is this a reasonable working definition of "freedom"? I think not.

If Sarkus insists that, on the contrary, it is a perfectly reasonable definition, then here's what I ask:

What conceivable kind of thing has the ability to do other than it must?

In a deterministic universe, nothing, as the argument concludes.
In a probabilistic universe, one could argue that the inherent probability allows for some element of there being no "must" to consider, but I would hazard that we are mostly in agreement that the random nature of the selection from within the probability function does not allow any meaningful "freedom".
In another non-deterministic universe, it would depend on the nature of the non-determinism. For example, it could be that humans genuinely are causal agents that actually do initiate causal chains, i.e. are wholly uncaused up to that point, and that the universe is thus dualistic, with the human "soul" (for want of a better word) being able to absolutely initiate matters. There would be significant questions to answer with such a scenario, especially given that our understanding, and our ability to understand perhaps, is intrinsically linked to the nature of our own universe. In such a universe, freedom would be completely in line with the nature of that universe.

Note that we're not necessarily restricted to deterministic universes here, and we're not necessarily restricted to natural things either. So, in that respect, I would suggest that maybe some kind of supernatural thing (a ghost, a god?) could by some magical process contrive to do other than it must. Such a thing could conceivably have freedom then, even in a deterministic universe.

No, in a deterministic universe, as argued, there is no freedom. If it doesn't exist then it is not supernatural: it simply does not exist. Your obsession is crippling.

But Sarkus and Baldeee et al. tell us that they are concerned with the real world here, and they tell us they are not interested in supernatural things. So, turning to natural things, which natural things could conceivably do other than they must?

No, not the "real world" but with a deterministic universe. One may think the "real world" is deterministic, but the important thing is that the argument is in relation to the deterministic universe.

I confess that I can't think of a single natural thing that could do other than it must, whether it were to exist in a deterministic universe or in an indeterministic universe.

Your inability to think that is no "proof" for there not being anything. If you are blind as to what a set might contain, that does not mean that it is empty.

I can also say with some confidence that Baldeee can't think of a single such thing either, because I've asked him about this before. So, it looks like it's up to Sarkus to step in to save the day, if he can.

I'm sure he would concur that none of us are an arbiter of what is actually possible or not in this regard. Your reliance on him, me, or anyone else, not being able to know something that may for us be unknowable, is something I think you need to address if you're to be taken seriously in this matter.

If there are no conceivable natural things that can do other than they must, in any conceivable universe, that suggests to me that starting your anti-free-will argument with P1 is silly.

The argument was begun with that notion because, historically and currently, the debate on the matter in philosophical circles generally begins with that notion. I'm sure your assessment of it as "silly" works for some, though.

The best thing to do in the circumstances is to put P1 in the trash and start with a more realistic definition of "freedom" - for example, one that accords in some sense with commonly understood notions of freedom.

You don't think "ability to do otherwise / other than one must" is a reasonable definition of freedom? If one is not able to do otherwise, to me that seems like someone that is not free. They may not be aware of their limitation in this regard, but that doesn't negate the lack of freedom they inherently have. We would thus need to distinguish between the notion of freedom that they inherently / actually have, and the notion of freedom that they merely think they have. They are different, of course, and as stated an exaggerated million times before: different notions lead to different conclusions. But starting with the notion of "ability to do otherwise / other than one must" one is able to at least get an understanding of that inherent freedom (or lack thereof).

In the real world, we observe that people use the word "freedom" to refer to various things that can conceivably exist in our observed universe.

In the real world people use words differently than they might in philosophical discussions. Get used to it. Heck, even here some use the term "determinism" as if it is applicable to an indeterministic nature.

So, I humbly suggest that maybe Sarkus and Baldeee should consider trying to work one of those definitions into an argument about free will, instead of relying on a concept that nobody can instantiate, even hypothetically.

We do work one of those definitions into an argument, and we come to the conclusion that such definitions are merely illusions of having an ability to do otherwise.

One last point about the term "supernatural assumption". Is it unreasonable for iceaura and I to say that Sarkus et al. make a supernatural assumption in their argument against free will? Remember, their argument boils down to this:

P1*. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have (natural) freedom.
C3. No-one can have natural free will in a deterministic universe.

P1*: Socrates is mortal in a universe where all men are mortal.
Well done, relegating all deductive conclusions to question-begging assumptions. Impressive.

Since P1* is the starting point for all further discussion of free will (a discussion that ends before it gets started, with C3), the only context in which the notion of freedom (let alone free will) remains relevant is a supernatural one, in which P1b is re-introduced as a live possibility after all.

That is you introducing the possibility of the existence of the supernatural. That is your assumption, James R, not mine, not Baldeee's, not DaveC's. But yours. Please stop doing that, and your troubles will disappear in this regard.

In other words, P1* is equivalent to the assumption that the only kind of free will worth having is supernatural free will. We can justifiably refer to this as the "supernatural assumption".

If one is convinced by flawed analysis that relegates all deductive conclusions to question-begging assumptions, and if one is prone to adding in a premise, as DaveC suggested earlier was the case of your/iceaura's analysis, that the supernatural exists, despite everyone explicitly agreeing that it doesn't, then I guess you might be convinced to lend me your life savings so that I could invest it safely for you. So if you could send me your bank account number, passwords etc...

 

[Sarkus]

Actually, some of the argument here is a bit like that. For example, take Baldeee's argument that a human choice is equivalent to the operation of a thermostat. It's sort of like somebody looking at the computer source code for Microsoft Word and saying "I don't see any word processor there. There's just a bunch of directions to a computer to shuffle stuff around in memory and some loops and some branching statements etc. Where's the ribbon? Where's are the menus? Where's the ruler?"

It's not like that at all. There is nothing in the code that is contrary to the operation or notion of a word processor. This thus breaks down as an analogy, since when we refer to freedom as an "illusion" it is where the subjective appearance of such freedom is contrary to the fundamental workings of the system.
If the system is inherently deterministic yet appears indeterministic (due maybe to lack of knowledge of the system for example) then that indeterminism can similarly be deemed illusory - as it appears to be contrary to the fundamental workings of the system.

 

[Sarkus]

I specifically and explicitly excluded any "agenda" on your part.

You at least think you did. Actions speak louder than words, though.

I observed instead that you and the rest of the naive materialist cadre were apparently not even aware of your assumptions - to the point that you could not recognize them.

We are aware of what we assume. You thinking you have identified an implied assumption, or even an explicit one, is an error you keep making, as explained and justified numerous times.

I repeated many times the observation that you were oblivious and self-contradictory in your postings.

I am neither oblivious nor self-contradictory. Your misunderstandings are simply getting in the way.

That is the opposite of assuming you had an agenda. The direct opposite. And I posted that direct opposite over and over and over, in dozens of different wordings, with multiple explanations and examples. Right in front of you.

All of which were shown to be flawed. Which I have explained over and over and over, in dozens of different wordings etc. Your flaw in this matter is crippling.

That kind of idiotic misreading,
that continual demand on my typing for correction of your latest bizarre failure to paraphrase or recount or reply to even the simplest of many times repeated postings -
is why, when you declare that you know what I am claiming and what my argument is and so forth, I remind you that you don't. By all the evidence here, you don't have a clue. None of the naive materialists seem to.

Ironic. When you declare that you know what I am assuming, and what my argument is and so forth, I remind you that you don't. By all the evidence here, you don't have a clue. Explanations seem to wash over you, and all you can do is simply revert to your crippling obsession.

But it does, see. I quoted and pointed. I explained. James explained, at length and patiently. Several times.

And each time the "explanation" has been rebutted, almost line by line. Addressing each and every criticism, each and every claim, showing you your/his flaw in the analysis. Yet still you're here, peddling the same garbage.

It's fundamental to every argument you make here, and most of your assertions, claims, etc. "Able to do other than it must" - that notion, which defines the supernatural here - is ubiquitous in your posting.

The notion is, yes, but it does not define the supernatural. Period. Not until you couple it with a deterministic universe and arrive at the conclusion, see. Look, here again I have had to explain it to you. Here again you will undoubtedly let it wash over you, and later I will have to explain it again. And undoubtedly again after that. Read the response to James R's analysis. Read the dismantling of it.

And yet another repetition of that confused irrelevancy.

It's not irrelevant when it's a response to a direct question from QQ! Are we now not allowed to respond to questions? Not only are you flawed in your claim but now you're the policeman of what can and can not be responded to? Get over yourself!

Notice that James is right - again - when he finds significance in the strangeness of that obsession with something nobody is arguing about, and everybody agrees with. What is going on in your heads? Typing is that much fun for you?

What is going on in my head is that I am responding to someone's specific query on the matter. Is that no longer allowed, iceaura? You are responding to my posts with your continued fallacious claim, no matter how many times rebutted, and all you can do is quibble that I'm responding to a specific request on a matter that you think is irrelevant? To be honest I'd rather converse with someone on an interesting irrelevancy than someone who simply seems unable to get over their obsession with their fallacious interpretation of an argument.

{Agrees with, that is, aside from the deceptive rhetorical reliance on "a cause" in a universe where almost nothing happens from just one cause or any definable single cause, in a context in which significant causes such as quantum probabilities have been denied deterministic causal status by these posters, for some reason,

and aside from the deceptive implication that prediction is relevant here, when predictability has almost nothing to do with the causal determinism involved (and a good thing, too, because it is usually impossible - regardless of knowledge, in theory and in practice, impossible. The equations cannot be solved exactly, the nature of the causation does not allow perfect knowledge to be exact in the first place, and so forth) }

There is no deceptive rhetorical reliance on "a cause" - the cause might be singular or multiple, but whatever it is that gives rise to the specific effect is the cause. In a deterministic universe that effect is completely determined by the cause (or causes, if you have issues with just using the singular). Quantum probabilities are thus not applicable in such a universe given that the causes to not completely determine the effect. Another error you continually make, despite correcting you again and again and again.
There is also no deceptive implication that prediction is relevant here, just a correctness of what is or is not applicable in a deterministic universe. If you wish to hide the correction in such matters behind an accusation of deception, that is your prerogative, but it is as incorrect as your understanding of determinism. There is a distinction, as you have been informed, between inherent unpredictability due to an indeterministic universe (such as the probabilistic variety) and unpredictability due to limited knowledge. Your apparent lack of understanding in this regard certainly does you no favours, whether you think it relevant or not.

 

[Sarkus]

And QM is at the very core of the question of a deterministic universe.

If you mean it's at the very core of the question about a deterministic universe then not really. Either there are hidden variables, in which case the universe can be said to be deterministic but the hidden nature of those variables (i.e. lack of perfect knowledge) leads to the uncertainty, or there aren't and the universe is inherently indeterministic (at least with regard our local universe) which leads to the uncertainty. If the former then QM is simply akin to the colliding snooker balls of classical physics, and if the latter then we can discount QM for not being in scope (as we're discussing a deterministic universe). Either way, we can treat the deterministic universe akin to colliding snooker balls, even if there is a practical lack of absolute knowledge (i.e. hidden), and thus we may as well discount QM entirely from the picture.

But if you mean it's at the very core of the question of whether the universe is deterministic or not, then yes, I would agree that it is, with the answer seemingly dependent upon one's interpretation of QM.

Looking at your wording again I suspect you meant the latter, but I'll leave what i've written in case.

 

[James R]

Sarkus:

Your reply confirms that nothing in my analysis of your argument is incorrect.

Not quite, I said that it is only in light of the second premise that one can "assess what that notion of freedom would require". Admittedly this is a tad ambiguous, but it "assess" was not meant as in "to know" - because we know what it requires, per the definition in P1 - i.e. it requires the ability to do otherwise.

And so, at this point in the argument, it could be a supernatural ability or a natural ability you're discussing, right? It's only later that you decide that you're going to rule out the possibility of supernatural freedom. Or are you telling me that you rule it out from the start? Either way, it doesn't really matter, because at some point in your argument you rule it out. Then, you construct your argument so that the kind of freedom you've ruled out is the only possible kind of freedom in a deterministic universe.

As iceaura points out, your "able to do other than it must" is equivalent to saying "has supernatural powers". When you rule out the supernatural powers, you simultaneously rule out freedom. How convenient for you.

The "assess" was meant in the manner that we can not analyse whether it exists or not, or anything outside of what it requires, until we put it into the context of P2.

In other words, you construct your definition of freedom in anticipation of your introduction of determinism, plus the assumption that the supernatural is not a live option. Like I said.

Given the clarification above on the use of the word "assess", and your mistaken assumption that it meant "to know", I hope you see that this conclusion is wrong.

It's not wrong, and I'm not mistaken.

Yes, it applies to anything and everything within the context of deterministic framework.

No. Standing on it's own, as you insist that it does, your definition of freedom applies to all conceivable kinds of freedom in all kinds of universes. Your deterministic framework only arrives in premise 2, or so you say.

No, there is no supernatural ability. We have all agreed this.

As I wrote, it appears at first glance that your defining freedom as the "ability to do other than it must" would encompass supernatural freedom as well as natural freedom. But, as you make clear here, you explicitly exclude supernatural freedom. Hence, we can reformulate your definition to be more accurate: "Freedom is the ability to do otherwise, within the laws of nature" or something equivalent to that, such as "P1a*. Freedom is nothing other than the natural ability to do other than it must", as I explained above.

No ability is supernatural as the supernatural does not exist. Any attempt to split the definition thus is due to an agenda that you have, and not the argument. Your subsequent analysis can thus be ignored, given that we all accepted that the supernatural does not exist, despite you and iceaura harking on about it, attempting to crowbar it into the argument.

Here's where the rubber meets the road.

It is clear that you aren't even aware that you're making an assumption. You make it unconsciously. You actually deny making it when it is clearly pointed out to you, based on your own words.

Your definition of freedom as "ability to do other than it must" would, on the face of it, allow supernatural freedom as well as natural freedom. But you assume - and you write this assumption down for us over and over again, in case there is any doubt - that the only kind of freedom considered in your deterministic argument is natural freedom.

When you later conclude that there is no freedom, you pat yourself on the back and congratulate yourself because you've discovered that all natural freedom has been ruled out by your arguments, but you don't acknowledge that this means the only possible kind of freedom that you haven't ruled out is supernatural freedom. You then go on to apply your trivial insight to the difficult problem of free will, and thus falsely conclude that free will is impossible in a deterministic universe. That conclusion is really just a veiled version of the conclusion that the supernatural is impossible in a deterministic universe, but that should really not be so surprising, because you decided the supernatural was impossible right from the start.

"IF we are to take them at their word..."? You doubt that we are arguing in good faith???

No, I don't doubt you're arguing in good faith. It's more that you're oblivious to the implications of the assumptions in your own argument, which means that you tend to ignore the nuances. Like here:

P1a*. Freedom IS nothing other than the natural ability to do other than it must.

You can strike out the word natural. There is just the ability to do otherwise.

No, I can't strike out the word "natural". It's important to appreciate that you don't include supernatural freedom in this definition of freedom. On the contrary, you equate freedom with the "natural ability to do otherwise". Later, that causes all kinds of problems for you, because it becomes clear that the "natural ability to do otherwise" is a non-existent concept, unable to be instantiated. So, what you've effectively done is to define freedom to be something that is non-existent, from the start. After that, it is only a little surprising that we find you congratulating yourself for showing that a non-existent thing doesn't exist by taking a largely irrelevant detour through determinism.

If it is not natural then we have all accepted that it doesn't exist.

Hold that thought. It follows, if that is true, that any freedom that might hypothetically exist would have to be natural freedom, wouldn't it? Therefore, it's pointless to define "natural freedom" as something that is non-existent on the face of it, like "the natural ability to do other than it must".

To include the word "natural" is therefore redundant.
"Nothing other than" is redundant.

As you can see, neither of those is redundant.

So you're back to the original argument above, and your analysis has thus far got you nowhere other than showing you (hopefully) how the claim of a "supernatural assumption" by us is wholly unwarranted.

I'm back to what my objection to your supernatural assumption has been all along: that the only conceivable freedom is supernatural freedom.

That is your view, yet it is the definition of freedom (worded as "ability to do otherwise", but they are equivalent) used in the standard debate on the issue, which involves around that definition and what constitutes a "genuine alternative". If you think it is "unreasonably restrictive" then feel free to elaborate on that, to introduce a different notion and argue from that, which as nearly everyone has said: if you use a different notion you will reach different conclusions.

I'm not sure how much of the "standard debate" on the issue you have read, but I'm inclined to disagree with you that the "ability to do otherwise" is equivalent to "ability to do other than it must". I previously introduced one possible alternative definition of freedom into the discussion, which I think I discussed with Baldeee to some extent, before he went all hard line to side with you. iceaura has introduced you to yet another notion, repeatedly, but you don't even acknowledge that it exists, instead tortuously equating thermostats with human decision makers.

The "standard debate" on the issue of free will, incidentally, encompasses a wide range of possible positions. The naive materialism you espouse is only one alternative. Compatibilism, for instance, comes in many different varieties. Maybe you should read up, or at least try to get an idea of the philosophical landscape you're so keen to restrict to the tiny box you've made for yourself.

But instead of that you seem simply intent on trying to knock down the argument, an argument that I have zero doubt you actually concur with, given the definition of freedom. Do you accept the definition of "freedom"? No. But given the premises, you do accept the conclusion.

Sure, I accept your conclusion, in the same way that Baldeee accepts mine. I regard your conclusion as a trivial one that rests entirely on an unrealistic assumption, namely the assumption that the only kind of freedom worth having is supernatural freedom. Baldeee's objection to iceaura's and my arguments, by the way, is that he does not believe that a system can gain freedom as a result of complexity and a multitude of separate causal factors. He doesn't believe in degrees of freedom, essentially. To him, a human decision maker is the same as a thermostat. He keeps reminding us of this equivalence.

Unfortunately you are not hiding your own agenda here. There is nothing in the argument that is deliberately finagled by either myself, Baldeee, DaveC, or anyone else here. The accusation is wholly unwarranted and is simply you wishing to promote your own agenda that our argument is somehow dishonest or devious, that we are guilty of underhanded tricks.

Let's be clear. I am not accusing you of dishonesty at all. Your problem is that you're blind to your own assumptions, that's all. But, as iceaura says, it's not to late to fix that problem.

 

[James R]

(continued...)

You have been proven wrong, by your own analysis, with your claim that the definition of freedom assumes anything supernatural, and now you're attempting to poison the well with simple lies. You're better than that.

I'm wondering whether you really still don't understand what iceaura and I mean when we refer to your supernatural assumption. You're not assuming that freedom is supernatural. I think it's quite reasonable to assume that the supernatural doesn't exist, which is what you're doing. The "supernatural assumption" isn't that. It's not the assumption that free will has supernatural causes.

Your supernatural assumption is that the starting point of your argument against free will is to set things up in such a way that all possible kinds of freedom are ruled out a priori, apart from supernatural freedom. Then, you make a song and dance about ruling out supernatural freedom, and you think you've solved the problem of free will (i.e. you conclude that it doesn't exist).

If you drop the supernatural assumption - the assumption that the only kind of freedom worth having is supernatural freedom - then you can start to consider the problem from a perspective that goes beyond naive materialism.

We could, but then we'd also need to summarise a similar argument thus:
P1*: In a universe where all men are mortal, Socrates is mortal.
C3: Socrates is mortal in a universe where all men are mortal.
You haven't addressed this weakness in your "analysis", by which you effectively relegate all deductive conclusions to being question-begging assumptions.

That's not what I have done. Again, the blindness to your own assumptions is clear.

If you like, you could add in another premise to make a standard syllogism in your free will argument:

P1*. In a deterministic universe, nothing can have (natural) freedom.
P2. Natural free will has natural freedom.
C. Natural free will does not exist in a deterministic universe.

This is not relegating a deductive conclusion to a question-begging assumption. There's no problem with the structure of this argument as a logical syllogism. It's valid in the sense of logic. But as far as it applies to the real world, it's garbage in, garbage out. By starting with P1*, you've pre-determined that free will can't exist, unless it is supernatural. In other words, the problem is not with the argument's validity; it is with the soundness of the argument.

You seem to spend a lot of your time fixated on the validity issue. Nobody is arguing with your ability to reason logically from premises to a conclusion. We are arguing that your premises are unrealistic.

No, it's not "where we're at". It is where you are still at in trying to attack it: i.e. nowhere. You have tried 2 things here: the claim of the supernatural assumption (shown above to be a hollow claim), and now reformulating the argument to relegate all deductive conclusions to assumptions. Well done. Impressive stuff.

You've done two things here: 1 misunderstood what we've been talking about with your "supernatural assumption", for literally hundreds of posts, and 2 misconstrued my objections as ones about trivial matters of logic rather than substantive objections to your assumptions. Well done. Impressive stuff.

Despite not being able to show it above; despite you not having any argument that actually reaches that conclusion? No, it is simply a non sequitur on your part.

You keep making the assumption without realising it. You deny making it every time it is pointed out where and how you are making it. So far, you've been completely blind to it. Your latest post shows confusion about what iceaura and I even mean when we refer to your supernatural assumption. In light of what I've written above, are you still blind to it, or are you starting to see it?

What do you expect to be advanced?

By you? Well, if you're going to keep beating a dead horse, then I hope you can come up with something that would fit the description of a natural thing that can "do other than it must", even if only hypothetically.

 

[James R]

Next part...

Wrong? There is an argument put forth that you are now simply asserting is "wrong". You certainly haven't shown it to be invalid.

Like I said, logically valid, bad premise, so unsound. Therefore wrong.

You haven't shown there to be any "supernatural assumption". You have simply asserted it is wrong. Or maybe you actually thought your "analysis" above is convincing?

You can lead a horse to water...

What conceivable kind of thing has the ability to do other than it must?

In a deterministic universe, nothing, as the argument concludes.

You missed the point. We're talking about the premise of your argument, before we get to the part about the deterministic universe. That is, we're talking about your definition of freedom. What I am asking you is what kind of thing in any universe (or possible world, to put it in the usual philosophical jargon) has the ability to do other than it must?

In a probabilistic universe, one could argue that the inherent probability allows for some element of there being no "must" to consider...

... which doesn't help us if we're looking for things that can do other than they must.

..., but I would hazard that we are mostly in agreement that the random nature of the selection from within the probability function does not allow any meaningful "freedom".

That's a different discussion. Let's deal with the first open can of worms before opening another.

In another non-deterministic universe, it would depend on the nature of the non-determinism. For example, it could be that humans genuinely are causal agents that actually do initiate causal chains, i.e. are wholly uncaused up to that point, and that the universe is thus dualistic, with the human "soul" (for want of a better word) being able to absolutely initiate matters. There would be significant questions to answer with such a scenario, especially given that our understanding, and our ability to understand perhaps, is intrinsically linked to the nature of our own universe. In such a universe, freedom would be completely in line with the nature of that universe.

That sounds to me a lot like a supernatural process you're describing there.

Let me make it easier for you. Isn't it a contradiction in terms for something to do "other than it must"? After all, if something must act in a particular way, for whatever reason (even supernatural forcing, perhaps), then how could it possibly do anything else? The only way I can think of is some kind of "magic" that breaks the rules (whatever they are - in an extreme case, possibly the rules of logic itself).

No, in a deterministic universe, as argued, there is no freedom. If it doesn't exist then it is not supernatural: it simply does not exist. Your obsession is crippling.

All I was putting to you was the idea that a supernatural thing could break the rules in a deterministic universe, if such a thing were to exist in such a universe. If, therefore, we do not rule out the supernatural as a live option, then logically freedom is possible in a deterministic universe. Do you agree?

In fact, this appears to be the only possible path to freedom in such a universe, since you can't come up with any natural thing that could conceivably do other than it must, under any circumstances.

Your inability to think that is no "proof" for there not being anything. If you are blind as to what a set might contain, that does not mean that it is empty.

It doesn't speak well of your definitions if you can't point to even one thing that would be an exemplar of the class of things you're defining (in this case, the set of free things).

For instance, when we say "All men are mortal", we can immediately point to lots of men who have been proven mortal, before we start to consider the problem of Socrates's mortal status. That is, we know from the start that at least one mortal man exists.

But where are we to find all the things that can do other than they must? You can't say. Baldeee can't say. Nobody can point to a single one, apparently.

I'm sure he would concur that none of us are an arbiter of what is actually possible or not in this regard. Your reliance on him, me, or anyone else, not being able to know something that may for us be unknowable, is something I think you need to address if you're to be taken seriously in this matter.

Consider it addressed. Are you ready to take the objection to your definition of freedom seriously yet?

The argument was begun with that notion because, historically and currently, the debate on the matter in philosophical circles generally begins with that notion. I'm sure your assessment of it as "silly" works for some, though.

It might well begin with that notion. But it sure doesn't end there. Pretty quickly, philosophers work out that the naive materialist definition of freedom is a dead end, and they move on. How's that going for you?

You don't think "ability to do otherwise / other than one must" is a reasonable definition of freedom?

I don't think "doing other than it must" is a good definition, for reasons that ought to be clear by now. "Ability to do otherwise" can work as long as you don't try to hide your supernatural assumption in that one, too.

Consider the driver approaching the traffic light, for instance. I'd say he cannot do other than he must, yet he has the ability to do otherwise nonetheless. That is, at the point of decision, he has the capacity/ability to choose to stop or to choose to go. I'm sure you'll disagree, even though this capacity is observable and has causal power.

If one is not able to do otherwise, to me that seems like someone that is not free.

I agree, but you take it one step further, to the point where you insist, in effect, that the only way somebody could be free would be if they could act supernaturally to "do other than they must".

 

[Sarkus]

Your reply confirms that nothing in my analysis of your argument is incorrect.

Except all the bits that are, or course.

And so, at this point in the argument, it could be a supernatural ability or a natural ability you're discussing, right?

No. There is no supernatural ability. It doesn't exist. Period. Anywhere. We all accepted that, agreed it. Nothing supernatural. Just because X doesn't exist in a deterministic universe, and supernatural ability doesn't exist anywhere - by accepted definition/agreement that it doesn't - does not make X a supernatural ability. Their only commonality is that they don't exist in a deterministic universe, and that is because we have concluded that freewill doesn't, and we have all accepted that supernatural abilities don't exist anywhere. Your logic here is simply fallacious.

It's only later that you decide that you're going to rule out the possibility of supernatural freedom.

No, it is up front, and was only needed to be stated because you and iceaura can't comprehend simple logical analysis.

Or are you telling me that you rule it out from the start? Either way, it doesn't really matter, because at some point in your argument you rule it out. Then, you construct your argument so that the kind of freedom you've ruled out is the only possible kind of freedom in a deterministic universe.

Again you are asserting an agenda that simply is not there. I started with a definition and simply follow the logic. That what was defined doesn't happen to exist in a deterministic universe is not due to an agenda but because of the premises and the logic. You are also simply relegating deductive conclusions to be an agenda-driven implicit question-begging assumption. The same way someone with an agenda to call Socrates mortal might implictly assert within the definition of man that it is a mortal creature, right?

As iceaura points out, your "able to do other than it must" is equivalent to saying "has supernatural powers". When you rule out the supernatural powers, you simultaneously rule out freedom. How convenient for you.

When you rule out man being immortal, calling Socrates a man is to simultaneously call him mortal. Go figure.
By doing this you and iceaura simply twist conclusions back into premises, demonstrably so, and you think people are going to take what you say seriously?

In other words, you construct your definition of freedom in anticipation of your introduction of determinism, plus the assumption that the supernatural is not a live option. Like I said.

There you go asserting an agenda simply because you don't like, or want to deal with, the conclusion. Try accepting that people are actually arguing in good faith. Can you do that? Or are you simply so set upon an appeal to consequence - i.e. anyone who possibly reaches that conclusion must have preloaded everything to reach that conclusion.
It's pathetic, James R, and it really is beneath you.

It's not wrong, and I'm not mistaken.

It is, and you are.

No. Standing on it's own, as you insist that it does, your definition of freedom applies to all conceivable kinds of freedom in all kinds of universes. Your deterministic framework only arrives in premise 2, or so you say.

Sure, the definition applies to all kinds of freedom that are an ability to do otherwise, yes. But the argument applies to everything within a deterministic universe. That includes the will within a deterministic universe, as I said.

As I wrote, it appears at first glance that your defining freedom as the "ability to do other than it must" would encompass supernatural freedom as well as natural freedom. But, as you make clear here, you explicitly exclude supernatural freedom. Hence, we can reformulate your definition to be more accurate: "Freedom is the ability to do otherwise, within the laws of nature" or something equivalent to that, such as "P1a*. Freedom is nothing other than the natural ability to do other than it must", as I explained above.

Which makes "within the laws of nature" a redundancy given that we have excluded the supernatural from consideration. So you are left with premise 1, as initially stated.

Here's where the rubber meets the road.

It is clear that you aren't even aware that you're making an assumption. You make it unconsciously. You actually deny making it when it is clearly pointed out to you, based on your own words.

It hasn't been pointed out. Period. That's not me not being aware of it, that's you never having pointed it out. It's clear that you aren't even aware that you haven't pointed it out. You think you have, and you deny that you haven't when your lack of having done so has clearly been pointed out to you, based on your own words.
No, James R, all you have ever done is twist the logical form to ensure that Socrates being defined as a man is to also assume up front that he is mortal. As said, it's pathetic.

Your definition of freedom as "ability to do other than it must" would, on the face of it, allow supernatural freedom as well as natural freedom.

No, because the supernatural doesn't exist.

But you assume - and you write this assumption down for us over and over again, in case there is any doubt - that the only kind of freedom considered in your deterministic argument is natural freedom.

When you later conclude that there is no freedom, you pat yourself on the back and congratulate yourself because you've discovered that all natural freedom has been ruled out by your arguments, but you don't acknowledge that this means the only possible kind of freedom that you haven't ruled out is supernatural freedom.

Because we have all agreed that there is nothing supernatural. It is sufficient to say that something does not exist. If it doesn't exist it doesn't exist. It's simply not a consideration. At all. Period. You are simply looking at the conclusion, seeing that it concludes that natural freedom does not exist, and saying that we must therefore have assumed it to be supernatural. No, we didn't assume that. It just happens that the freedom assumed does not exist. That's it.

You then go on to apply your trivial insight to the difficult problem of free will, and thus falsely conclude that free will is impossible in a deterministic universe.

The conclusion is that such freedom as defined does not exist. The will, as a process within such a universe, is thus not free, as defined. That is the conclusion. It has been stated repeatedly that if you use a different definition of what it means to be free you will end up with a different conclusion. Go figure.

That conclusion is really just a veiled version of the conclusion that the supernatural is impossible in a deterministic universe, but that should really not be so surprising, because you decided the supernatural was impossible right from the start.

Not at all. It is only when you combine the definition of freedom with the deterministic universe that you can conclude that such freedom does not exist. It really is no more complicated than that. It is only when you combine Socrates being a man with all men being mortal can you conclude that Socrates is mortal. You, and iceaura, are choosing to butcher that logic and relegate deductive arguments to question-begging nonsense, where the word "conclusion" becomes irrelevant.

No, I don't doubt you're arguing in good faith.

Yet you assume an agenda in the definition of freedom used. Ah, well.

It's more that you're oblivious to the implications of the assumptions in your own argument, which means that you tend to ignore the nuances. Like here:
...
No, I can't strike out the word "natural". It's important to appreciate that you don't include supernatural freedom in this definition of freedom.

There is no supernatural freedom. Supernatural is nothing here but a word for non-existent. I do not assume that the defined freedom is non-existent. Period. We have all accepted the supernatural to not exist. So swap "supernatural" for "non-existent" in your analysis and see how absurd you are being.

On the contrary, you equate freedom with the "natural ability to do otherwise".

Since the question at hand is whether such freedom exists or not, and to exist it must be natural, to define freedom as the natural ability to do otherwise makes the word "natural" not redundant, per se, but simply meaningless. If it is concluded to exist it MUST be natural. If it is concluded not to exist then it doesn't exist. You are the one insisting the assumption is about "natural ability". There is either just the ability or not. Period.

Anyhoo - I must be off to a formal dinner
I'll try and respond to the rest when I return, but I suspect it will be much of the same nonsense from you.

 

[James R]

One loose end...

It's not like that at all. There is nothing in the code that is contrary to the operation or notion of a word processor. This thus breaks down as an analogy, since when we refer to freedom as an "illusion" it is where the subjective appearance of such freedom is contrary to the fundamental workings of the system.

No. The analogy holds up, like this:

The person staring at a running copy of Microsoft word says "That's not a ruler on the screen. Rather, it's just an illusion of a ruler. The fundamental workings of the system lie in the source code of the program, and there are definitely no rulers in the source code. I checked. Twice! When you claim you see a ruler on the screen, that's just a subjective appearance of a ruler that you're seeing. As we all know, no computer code can produce an actual ruler. The code is just symbols arranged in a particular way. What you see is the illusion of a ruler. No matter how convincing it seems to you, there's nothing real about it."

While we're at it, we could write a logical argument that person might use to "prove" that the Microsoft ruler doesn't exist:

P1. A ruler is a physical object produced by computer code.
P2. No computer code can produce a physical object.
C. Therefore, no computer code can produce a ruler.

This is a perfectly valid logical argument that tells us that Microsoft Word (which is computer code) can't produce a ruler. And yet, there's a ruler on the screen. But wait! - you complain. It's not a physical ruler, so it's not really a ruler at all; see premise P1. The only rulers worth having are physical rulers, and I insist on defining them that way. I also insist that I have now shown conclusively that no computer code can produce a ruler, so realise that any rulers you see on computer screens from now on are mere illusions, despite how they might appear to you!

 

[iceaura]

Here's Sarkus's argument:

Sarkus endorsed Baldeee's clarification and explication of the argument, which exists in two versions that both Baldeee and Sarkus (and indirectly Dave et al) have declared to be exactly equivalent.

Here they are, quoted word for word:

I haven't altered anything dramatically.
From post #130:
P1: if something is determined then it can not do other than it must.
P2: systems built from determined interactions are themselves determined.
P3: the mind and will are systems built from determined interactions.
Conclusion: the mind and will can not do other than they must.
- - - -
Okay, so let's dumb it down enough for you:
P1: deterministic interactions are not free.
P2: a system built from deterministic interactions is not free.
P3: the will is such a system.
C: the will is not free.

And Baldeee continued, removing any uncertainty about the second version, making his intent and meaning clear:

My original formulation used the phrase "can not do other than it must" but they are equivalent.
So no, I don't rephrase in a manner that alters meaning.

That is, nobody has to guess, reason, argue, or persuade anyone, that in their posting "determined", "cannot do other than it must", and "not free" are equivalent - equivalent conclusions, equivalent assumptions, equivalent in their posts. They have explicitly stated that, declared that to be the case. Their practice of interchanging those terms is legitimate, in their arguments, and means exactly what such interchange implies.

 

[iceaura]

The notion is, yes, but it does not define the supernatural. Period.

Yes, it does. That is literally a definition of "supernatural" - you could use it in a dictionary. It is not a definition of "free" except by your assumptions here.