Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

[iceaura]

Both Baldeee, and I, have been at pains to say that if one starts from a definition different to the one proposed you end up with different conclusions.

On alternate days, you deny that it was a "definition". You even deny you assumed it.

Meanwhile, since it is in fact a definition of yours - an assumption of your arguments - that only the supernatural can be free, your "conclusions" just beg the thread question on a large scale. Everyone agrees with you that supernatural freedom does not exist - in any universe under consideration here, not just the assumed deterministic ones, nothing can do other than it must - and so you have no need to argue the matter.

Turning from that cul de sac to the thread's larger topic - free will in the natural world of deterministic cause and effect and so forth - we could in theory proceed; perhaps even along the lines suggested in so many posts earlier, as to how a nonsupernatural freedom might be identified and described and analyzed.

Both of us, Baldeee and I, have again been at pains to explain and clarify, ad nauseam, that we think the process of “choice” exists. No one has disputed that. Ever.

Nonsense. You have explicitly denied even the existence of choices, much less the capability of choosing. You claimed they were illusions. That was part of the idiocy you were forced into by assuming human decisions had the same "nature" as a thermostat's.

Not the will, not the process, but the freedom within it, taking freedom as defined as “ability to do otherwise”.

That assumption - that definition of freedom as supernatural only - is not granted.
You need an argument. And you need a good one, because you are battling a large body of research and observation on top of experience.

 

[iceaura]

As a practical matter we have free will just as we interact with computers using a high level language even though ultimately everything is binary.

Substrates do not determine patterns.
There is no "ultimately" involved.
"As a practical matter" = according to natural law, cause and effect, etc. Just extrapolate in the other direction.

 

[Sarkus]

The more I hear iceaura, JamesR, et al invoke this "supernatural" phrase, the more I think they've got it backwards. It is they who invoke supernaturalism, not us.

Invoke is the wrong word as that implies reliance upon it. They simply assert our use of a definition that places freedom as being supernatural.
Of course they’re wrong, as defining freedom as “ability to do otherwise” is saying nothing about its existence or otherwise, or whether it needs to be supernatural to exist. Both iceaura and James R know that it is only when coupled with the second premise of the deterministic universe that we conclude that freedom to not exist. Still no “supernatural” involved, other than by them to invoke a sense of “woo” about our argument.
But still they insist that we are assuming a supernatural freedom, much the same as they would no doubt claim the assumption of a mortal Socrates. Go figure. I’m sure iceaura is still rambling on about it.

My argument: In a deterministic universe, there can be no such thing as free will, anything that looks like it is illusory. (There's no invocation supernaturalism there. It is tantamonut to saying the universe is fabulously naunced machine - us included.)

That’s at least the conclusion.

The counter-argument (paraphrased): In a deterministic universe, free will can - and does exist - (though I still haven't heard how that could be so, given that every atom's trajectory follows directly from every previous determined interaction - all the way up to neurons). So, the counter-argument says: somewhere in there - amongst all those atoms with their predetermined trajectories - free will just magically - supernaturally - pops up.

Calling it an "emergent property" doesn't really explain it sufficiently.

The main counter argument pushed here is actually that freedom is not “the ability to do otherwise” but more akin to flexibility. So, as has been touted all along (and simply ignored by those unable to move beyond trying to attack my/your position), if they use a different notion of what it means to be free they can have a genuine “free” will (free as in their own notion, not the one we use). It’s not rocket science, and they could have simply bypassed our position by saying that they use a different notion, and they could have carried on their merry way. But oh, no, they have to try to knock down our argument, unable to tear themselves away from that.
Seriously, my involvement in these threads would have been 10% of what it has been if they had stopped attacking the position I hold and actually gone off and discussed what they wanted, or if they had ever asked how we might reconcile our position with moral responsibility etc. You know, actually want to have a discussion rather than just beat their fists against the wall.

 

[iceaura]

Of course they’re wrong, as defining freedom as “ability to do otherwise” is saying nothing about its existence or otherwise, or whether it needs to be supernatural to exist.

You employed it - as an assumption - to say exactly that.

Or even simpler: "the ability to do otherwise" in this context defines the supernatural, not the free, in the first place.

After all: Nothing about the ability to do otherwise necessarily involves freedom - merely independence from natural law and cause/effect determinism and physics and so forth. Supernatural. To take that for a definition of "free" is to define - assume - freedom as supernatural.

Both iceaura and James R know that it is only when coupled with the second premise of the deterministic universe that we conclude that freedom to not exist.

You "concluded" - at most - only that supernatural freedom does not exist. That was an easy conclusion, because you had built it into your definitions.
Nobody was arguing otherwise, everybody had granted that to begin with, so the trouble you took for such a banal and invalid conclusion could have been puzzling.
But you clarified the situation.

if they use a different notion of what it means to be free they can have a genuine “free” will (free as in their own notion, not the one we use).

Once again we approach slapstick.

Assumption, not conclusion. Explicitly. In black and white, on the screen: Assume a "different notion" of free will, and the conclusion does not follow. Different conclusions become possible.

Everybody can see that, everybody follows along and nods their heads - unless the actual assumed notions involved are identified. Unless the differences between the different notions being employed in the arguments posted are made clear. Then we have a problem, all of a sudden.

 

[Sarkus]

You employed it - as an assumption - to say exactly that.

That is you making an unwarranted assumption that there is an agenda behind the definition. That is your mistake.

Or even simpler: "the ability to do otherwise" in this context defines the supernatural, not the free, in the first place.

Context being when we apply the second premise of the deterministic universe, and such context creates the conclusion that such freedom does not exist in a deterministic universe.

After all: Nothing about the ability to do otherwise necessarily involves freedom - merely independence from natural law and cause/effect determinism and physics and so forth.

Who says so? The definition of “free” used doesn’t. It is only when you apply the second premise (in this case the deterministic universe) that one can assess what that notion of freedom would require. Thus it is a conclusion that such freedom does not exist in a deterministic universe. No assumption of it, just the conclusion. You are simply rolling the second assumption into the first and claiming that we’re assuming freedom to not exist. Much like you would roll being mortal into the definition of “man” and claim we’re assuming up front that Socrates is mortal.

Supernatural. To take that for a definition of "free" is to define - assume - freedom as supernatural.

The definition used says nothing about whether it is supernatural or not, nothing about whether it is possible or not, just a definition of what is required for something to be free. It is not until you compare those requirements to what is possible in the second premise that you can conclude that such freedom is not possible.
Tell you what, please show how “able to do otherwise” or “able to do other than one must” is assuming that free will is supernatural, and do it without mention of the our laws of physics, a deterministic universe, etc. If you can do that you may actually be on to something, but so far you haven’t. You simply come up with this same rubbish.

You "concluded" - at most - only that supernatural freedom does not exist. That was an easy conclusion, because you had built it into your definitions.

Where? Please, show how that definition builds in it being supernatural, without putting it in context afforded by the second premise?

Nobody was arguing otherwise, everybody had granted that to begin with, so the trouble you took for such a banal and invalid conclusion could have been puzzling.

Nobody was arguing otherwise an argument that nobody was arguing. Your whole “supernatural assumption” shtik is just a red-herring from you in that regard.

Assumption, not conclusion. Explicitly. In black and white, on the screen: Assume a "different notion" of free will, and the conclusion does not follow. Different conclusions become possible.

Indeed, different assumptions will lead to possibly different conclusions, but there is still no supernatural assumption within the nature of freedom that was used. The fact that it is concluded to not exist in a deterministic universe does not make it that non-existence part of the assumption.

Everybody can see that, everybody follows along and nods their heads - unless the actual assumed notions involved are identified. Unless the differences between the different notions being employed in the arguments posted are made clear. Then we have a problem, all of a sudden.

The assumed notion of my, Baldeee’s, Capracus et al, is clearly stated. We have no problem. You seem to ‘cos you can only see within it an assumption that the freedom defined is supernatural, but that is you jumping ahead to the conclusion when in the context of a deterministic universe, and thus seeing it inherent within the definition. Again, that is your mistake. If you stop making that mistake everything will become a lot easier for you.

 

[Quantum Quack]

What is it that makes a particular choice unique and the only one that is predetermined to be taken?
(I am sure the USA military would love to know )

 

[Sarkus]

On alternate days, you deny that it was a "definition". You even deny you assumed it.

We deny that the definition assumes that it is supernatural. It doesn’t. Period.

Meanwhile, since it is in fact a definition of yours - an assumption of your arguments - that only the supernatural can be free...

The definition is the one we use, and it it’s an assumption, what you fail to comprehend is that it does not assume anything supernatural. It is only when coupled with the premise of determinism can one conclude that the notion of freedom assumed does not exist. No assumption of it, just a conclusion.

…your "conclusions" just beg the thread question on a large scale.

Sure, if it is to beg the question that Socrates is mortal by defining him as a man, ‘cos after all we’re dealing in that syllogism in a universe where all men are mortal. And if it is therefore to beg the question in any deductive argument, given that the conclusion can be found among the premises.
You can’t have it both ways: either every deductive conclusion begs the question, in which case it becomes a meaningless concept, or your analysis is flawed, and there is no question-begging, ‘cos the form is quite clear, and there is also zero inherent supernatural in the definition of freedom used.

Everyone agrees with you that supernatural freedom does not exist - in any universe under consideration here, not just the assumed deterministic ones, nothing can do other than it must - and so you have no need to argue the matter.

Since there is no supernatural freedom under discussion, your comments here are irrelevant.

Turning from that cul de sac to the thread's larger topic - free will in the natural world of deterministic cause and effect and so forth - we could in theory proceed; perhaps even along the lines suggested in so many posts earlier, as to how a nonsupernatural freedom might be identified and described and analyzed.

So what’s stopping you? Your obsession with supernatural freedom, perhaps? Your inability to tear yourself away from the line of discussion you claim you don’t want to discuss? Beggar’s belief, sometimes.

Nonsense. You have explicitly denied even the existence of choices, much less the capability of choosing. You claimed they were illusions. That was part of the idiocy you were forced into by assuming human decisions had the same "nature" as a thermostat's.

And once again you choose to ignore what has been written many times across many threads, by myself, by Capracus, by Baldeee. You simply aren’t paying attention. No one has denied the existence of choices, or the capability of choosing. What is denied, what is considered as being illusory, is the freedom within those processes.

That assumption - that definition of freedom as supernatural only - is not granted.

There is no assumption of freedom as supernatural only. There is just the assumption put forward by of freedom as “ability to do otherwise”, or “ability to do other than one must” etc. In a universe where there is no “must”, for example, such freedom might well exist. It is only when coupled with a second premise, a universe that shows that there is a “must” to everything we do, for example, that leads to the conclusion that such freedom does not exist.
I can’t set it out any clearer for you. But any subsequent claim by you that we have assumed freedom to be supernatural is simply trolling on your part, if it hasn’t been for almost the entirety of the past four threads or so.
Of course, and I’ll repeat it here for the umpteenth time: if you want to use a different notion of freedom, go for it. No one but yourself is stopping you.

You need an argument. And you need a good one, because you are battling a large body of research and observation on top of experience.

Nope, we really aren’t. But if you want to start with a different notion of freedom, no one is stopping you from going down that path, other than yourself. I’ve told you before that I have no interest in a notion of freedom found in a thermostat, so won’t be following you along that path, and yet you, and James R, have been trying to put the fault of you not treading that path down to us. Oh, the irony!

 

[Sarkus]

What is it that makes a particular choice unique and the only one that is predetermined to be taken?
(I am sure the USA military would love to know )

In a deterministic universe: the physics.

 

[Quantum Quack]

In a deterministic universe: the physics.

Great answer, that says nothing as usual. Maybe you don't have an answer beyond the call to authority?
Why only one choice?

 

[Quantum Quack]

In a deterministic universe: the physics.

It's easy to see that this issue of not being able to do otherwise is not supported by either physics or sound logic to begin with. All this debate, pages and pages of it over a presumptious uninvestigated and unexpained limitation.
Surely you can do better than just claim "Physics" and expect respect for doing so.
So....uhm why only one choice?

 

[DaveC426913]

The only supposed "argument" so far presented here in support of that assertion is that in the assumed universe nothing can do other than it must, therefore (the conclusion) nothing has freedom - and that argument is based on the supernatural assumption.

OK, colour me obtuse, but can you just connect those dots from 'since nothing has freedom' to ' therefore supernatural'?

It seems to me, the only way to get from one to the other is to hold the prior assumption that free will does exist, and you're just looking for a mechanism. But that's not an assumption (I) hold, since my conclusion is that there is no free will (and so nothing to apply supernaturalism to).

So could you just shorthand walk me through the logic (again, if you must).

 

[Sarkus]

It's easy to see that this issue of not being able to do otherwise is not supported by either physics or sound logic to begin with. All this debate, pages and pages of it over a presumptious uninvestigated and unexpained limitation.
Surely you can do better than just claim "Physics" and expect respect for doing so.
So....uhm why only one choice?

Why always 2 or 3 replies from you on the same post that you quote? Is one your knee-jerk reaction, and the second supposed to be your more considered response? Ever tried just editing your first?

As to your claim: if it is easy to see then please by all means show it. Talk us through your thinking. Again, remember that we are discussing a deterministic universe (even stated as much in the thread title this time) and not necessarily reality. So we are not talking about probabilistic matters, quantum matters that draw quantum indeterminacy into it, etc. Just plain straight determinism. Okay?
Right: in a deterministic interaction, the cause is sufficient to completely determine the effect, which despite protestations by others means that each time you get a certain cause you must have the same singular specific outcome as a result. No other will suffice. If you have A as the cause you will always get B as the effect. Period. Nothing to dispute. If you think that if you have A as the cause you might get B or you might get C then, despite protestations to the contrary, the cause is not completely determining the outcome.
So, the cause always leads to the same effect. The cause determines the effect. Fully.

With me so far? I’ll just assume that you are, and apologise later if it’s apparent that you’re not.

The rest is a matter of creating a causal chain, from cause to effect which becomes the next cause, creating the next effect etc. Cause A leads to effect B, which becomes cause B which leads to effect C. And since we know that for each individual interaction we know that A always leads to B, and B always leads to C, we end up with cause A always ending up with C, albeit one link further along the chain than B. Extrapolate all the way to Z and we know that if we have cause A then we will ultimately end up with Z. No ifs, no buts, just certainty. No opportunity for deviation.

Thus, if someone knew cause A, and how causes become, through the governing laws (e.g. physics) effects, then knowing A means you can predict with certainty effect Z further down the line. No opportunity for any other effect.
That is what it means to be deterministic, and since that is the nature of the universe we are discussing here, that is why there is only ever a single path, even if we consciously think and believe there are more.

If I’ve lost you, just let me know where.

 

[Sarkus]

So could you just shorthand walk me through the logic (again, if you must).

I’ll give it a go:

P1... X is Y
P2... Z doesn’t allow X to exist (naturally)
C1... Z doesn’t allow Y to exist (naturally)... note that this is where you, I and others stop.

P3... but Y does exist... which as you’ve said is not a premise we hold.
C2... Y must exist supernaturally
C3... Y must be being assumed as being supernatural in P1


Alternatively it is as simple as this:
P1: Socrates is a man
P2: All men are mortal
C1: you are therefore assuming in P1 that Socrates is mortal (because the context of P1 is where all men are indeed mortal) and thus begging the question.

But using this analogy would only get you to fallaciously assuming that free will is non-existent, not supernatural. So you’d still need a further premise to assume that everything non-existent is supernatural, or something like that.

It’s hogwash, though, whichever way it is swilled in the trough.

 

[DaveC426913]

But using this analogy would only get you to fallaciously assuming that free will is non-existent, not supernatural. So you’d still need a further premise to assume that everything non-existent is supernatural, or something like that.

Yes, I'd really like to see how exactly iceaura et al connects those dots.

 

[Quantum Quack]

The rest is a matter of creating a causal chain, from cause to effect which becomes the next cause, creating the next effect etc. Cause A leads to effect B, which becomes cause B which leads to effect C. And since we know that for each individual interaction we know that A always leads to B, and B always leads to C, we end up with cause A always ending up with C, albeit one link further along the chain than B. Extrapolate all the way to Z and we know that if we have cause A then we will ultimately end up with Z. No ifs, no buts, just certainty. No opportunity for deviation.

Thus, if someone knew cause A, and how causes become, through the governing laws (e.g. physics) effects, then knowing A means you can predict with certainty effect Z further down the line. No opportunity for any other effect.
That is what it means to be deterministic, and since that is the nature of the universe we are discussing here, that is why there is only ever a single path, even if we consciously think and believe there are more.

So why is there only one choice?
You see, you have waffled on about everything but the actual question. Why only one choice?
Your answer allows for the possibility of millions of genuine alternative choices. It offers no logical reason to limit the range of choice available.

That is what it means to be deterministic, and since that is the nature of the universe we are discussing here, that is why there is only ever a single path, even if we consciously think and believe there are more.

A single path that you have to arbitrarily create... ( sound familiar?)

If cause A leads to effect B and B is an infinite number of genuine alternative choices then what?

What logic do you use to restrict determinism to only one choice?

 

[DaveC426913]

What logic do you use to restrict determinism to only one choice?

Because there is no choice in determinism.
Every atom of every molecule - including the ones in our neurons - is directly determined by other atoms and by photons - which are in-turn directed by other atoms and photons before them, all the way back to the Big Bang.

Our neurons fire when stimulated - say by seeing or hearing something in the distance - but they are only stimulated by other atoms and photons, which, again, were determined by previous atoms and photons.

I may think I "decide" to duck when I see a lion running at me, but my atoms - and their photons - can only do as they must. My neurons have their settings for "how dangerous a lion is" by interactions with other atoms and photons - all of which were determined previously.

Wherein lies the "choice"?

 

[Quantum Quack]

Because there is no choice in determinism.
Every atom of every molecule - including the ones in our neurons - is directly determined by other atoms and by photons - which are in-turn directed by other atoms and photons before them, all the way back to the Big Bang.

Our neurons fire when stimulated, but they are only stimulated by other atoms and photons, which, again, were determined by previous atoms and photons.

I may think I "decide" to duck when I see a lion running at me, but my atoms - and their photons - can only do as they must. My neurons have their settings for "how dangerous a lion is" by interactions with other atoms and photons - all of which were determined previously.

Wherein lies the "choice"?

If you are surrounded by no choice choices and happen to choose one of them who determines which non-choice to make?

Context:
"I have no choice. I must choose from millions of non-genuine choices"

 

[DaveC426913]

If you are surrounded by no choice choices and happen to choose one of them who determines which non-choice to make?

Context:
"I have no choice. I must choose from millions of non-genuine choices"

I'm not sure this is a serious question.

But you're missing the point. Whatever action or inaction ultimately follows from the stimulus you received, you didn't have a choice in it. Your neurons, made of atoms, were doing the only thing they could do.

The fact that there are countless atoms involved does not mean any of them of free to do something other than what they do. And the fact that your mind is an emergent property of those atoms, doesn't mean your mind suddenly has free will.

 

[Seattle]

Because there is no choice in determinism.
Every atom of every molecule - including the ones in our neurons - is directly determined by other atoms and by photons - which are in-turn directed by other atoms and photons before them, all the way back to the Big Bang.

Our neurons fire when stimulated - say by seeing or hearing something in the distance - but they are only stimulated by other atoms and photons, which, again, were determined by previous atoms and photons.

I may think I "decide" to duck when I see a lion running at me, but my atoms - and their photons - can only do as they must. My neurons have their settings for "how dangerous a lion is" by interactions with other atoms and photons - all of which were determined previously.

Wherein lies the "choice"?

Neurons don't have "settings for lions".

When you know (chemically speaking) what one is thinking one second you may be able to determine what they will be thinking the next second and you can call that deterministic. Or, we may be wrong it it might not be that simple.

Neurons don't have settings for lions however.

 

[DaveC426913]

Neurons don't have "settings for lions".

It is a simplification, to be sure. To write out the entire process would be onerous, but ultimately, your brain contains all the structures and potentials - all made of atoms and photons - coupled with the atoms and photons you receive from a distance - that determine if you duck.

Where in there does an atom get to "decide" to go left instead of right?