Is disliking someone because of their sexual orientation or religion bigotry?

[Magical Realist]

Wikipedia defines "bigotry" as:

"Bigotry is the state of mind of a bigot: someone who, as a result of their prejudices, treats other people with hatred, contempt, and intolerance on the basis of a person's race, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, language, socioeconomic status, or other status."


Is thinking of religious people as "delusional" a form of bigotry? Is thinking of gay people as "immoral perverts" bigotry? Where do we draw the line in defining the morality of personal values? CAN merely having certain beliefs or values be legitimately judged immoral?

 

[Cowboy]

Disliking someone because of his or her sexuality or religion is bigotry.

But thinking someone's religious views silly or their sexual habits immoral is not the same as disliking that person.

 

[Tiassa]

(Insert Title Here)

Disliking someone because of his or her sexuality or religion is bigotry.

But thinking someone's religious views silly or their sexual habits immoral is not the same as disliking that person.

Taking the abstraction further, it is about the difference between disdaining conduct or label. I might dislike Joe Bob because he's a self-righetous prig who smells like goat muck and yogurt and just happens to be religious. And perhaps that religion feeds into the conduct I disdain. But how much of that is Joe Bob and how much of it is Christianity?

Christianity, Islam, Wicca, atheism ... the label doesn't matter insofar as anyone can behave poorly. True, certain labels do have observable effects that can be identified according to general trends. It is also true that some trends are more prevalent, and so on.

But in the end, is it really because Joe Bob is a Christian? That is, does it not matter a whit how he acts? Or is it because Joe Bob happens to be an annoying person, and would he be any less annoying behaving in the same self-righteous manner if he was of a different outlook on religious belief?

I can promise one and all that the (ahem!) "gay" stereotypes that people find so annoying are no more charming, nor even less not charming, when such flamboyance is displayed by heterosexual males.

To the broader question our neighbor presents—"Where do we draw the line in defining the morality of personal values?"—there is a reasonably common answer. The problem, of course, is that to say, "The line is drawn 'twixt theory and practice," is necessarily imprecise according to the transcendent axiom of being easier said than done.

From a psychoanalytical outlook, the morality of personal values is found emanating from the core of the psyche. To genuinely believe something will ultimately affect action according to its real priority as a neurotic function. Thus, one cannot simply hold a personal value that dark skin means lesser animal, for instance, and not expect that sentiment to bleed out in function. It radiates like a toxic aura, affecting every little question one considers, decision one makes, and action one does or does not undertake. That is to say, simply holding an "immoral" belief can be judged as "immoral" because the "immoral" aspect will affect other people regardless of the individual's intentions. But in the same moment, we must also note that the psychoanalytical outlook would be inherently reluctant to make "moral" assessments, and would view the question of "morality" as a question of function and utility. In that case, a discordant belief will affect all human communication one engages, thus empowering the neurotic conflict and lending it to the human experience. It is a degradation of functional efficiency, a dimunition of a variable influence within a behavioral formula. Or, morality aside, it promotes a disruptive effect within a cooperative species.

From a less mechanistic perspective, it's a much stickier question. In what ways do the ideas manifest in the human experience? That is, how much does it come up? And what is the magnitude of the effect?

For instance, let us imagine there is a bourbon I really like, and one day I find out the distiller whose imprimatur is on the label happens to believe that white people are inherently better than nonwhites. Do I continue to drink his whiskey?

One can certainly say, "No, I will not drink his whiskey, because he is a racist." Or one can say, "No, I will not drink his whiskey, because _____", and when we fill in the blank, what goes there? Really, if it's just the proverbial "he happens to believe", and we set aside the psychoanalytic outlook, there is no specific reason to not drink his bourbon. Does it emerge that he doesn't allow black people to work in the distillery? Now there's a problem. Does it emerge that he supports a white supremacist group in Idaho? Now there's a problem. If that belief that "he happens to believe" has observable negative effects on the community, one must begin to weigh the factors and recognize priorities.

Disregarding the psychoanalytic, which is essentially an impotent analysis in terms of morality, anyway, one can certainly devise criteria for resolving such functional questions.

 

[billvon]

Judging someone based on their religious beliefs or sexual orientations - PROVIDED that the people who hold those beliefs/orientations are not imposing those beliefs on others by force or other illegal means - is bigotry. Disliking someone for those reasons is not.

 

[C C]

Is thinking of religious people as "delusional" a form of bigotry? Is thinking of gay people as "immoral perverts" bigotry? Where do we draw the line in defining the morality of personal values? CAN merely having certain beliefs or values be legitimately judged immoral?

One might explore if this could even be made into a "universal law" in the context of Kant's ethics. That is, if it is forbidden to dislike certain groups or generalizations of people, then to truly be "moral in itself" (not dependent upon relations, consequences, etc) the rule would have to include all classifications of such human divisions (having contempt for Nazis thereby being unethical). The situation might be remedied, though, in the same way that Dan Gaskill below refers to the problem of lying being solved; i.e., that Kant himself was not always the best expert or interpreter of what actually fell or could fall out of his philosophical frameworks.

A Problem for Kant’s [Ethical] Theory

Kant’s view is that lying is always wrong. His argument for this is summarized by James Rachels as follows:

(1) We should do only those actions that conform to rules that we could will be adopted universally.

(2) If we were to lie, we would be following the rule “It is permissible to lie.”

(3) This rule could not be adopted universally, because it would be self-defeating: people would stop believing one another, and then it would do no good to lie.

(4) Therefore, we should not lie [even in the case of protecting someone from a murderer that was pursuing them, which thereby causes many to condemn Kant's system as too strict].

The problem with this argument is that we can lie without simply following the rule “It is permissible to lie.” Instead, we might be following a rule that pertains only to specific circumstances, like “It is permissible to lie when doing so will save a life.” This rule can be made a universal law without contradiction. After all, it is not as though people would stop believing each other simply because it is known that people lie when doing so will save lives. For one thing, that situation rarely comes up—people could still be telling the truth almost all of the time. Even the taking of human life could be justified under certain circumstances. Take self-defense, for example. There appears to be nothing problematic with the rule “It is permissible to kill when doing so is the only available means of defense against an attacker”.

It is not necessary to interpret Kant’s theory as prohibiting lying in all circumstances (as Kant did). Maxims (and the universal laws that result from them) can be specified in a way that reflects all of the relevant features of the situation. Consider the case of the Inquiring Murderer (as described in the text). Suppose that you are in that situation and you lie to the murderer. Instead of understanding the universalized maxim as “Everyone Always lies” we can understand it as “Everyone always lies in order to protect innocents from stalkers”. This maxim seems to pass the test of the categorical imperative. Unfortunately, complicated maxims make Kant’s theory becomes more difficult to understand and apply.
www.csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/Kantian Ethics.htm

It should also be remembered that one could simply choose to be "immoral" in the context of Kant's system, under certain circumstances. Which everyone does at one time or another with their system of choice, anyway. Even in practical-appearing utilitarianism, once "what's good for the greatest number" had been determined in regard to a specific circumstance, that conclusion becomes as idealized an "ought" as any, which the individual will still choose to violate sometimes. The "idealized rule" ultimately serves as a reference point for alerting someone as to when they have strayed too far from the sight of the "moral" shoreline, into deep waters; rather than turning them into a perfect robot.

 

[spidergoat]

Disliking someone because of their religious choices is not bigotry. You can control it, unlike sexual orientation or race.

 

[kx000]

One guy claims his sex is to rape, another wont look away. Yes, hating one for his sex is not necessarily wrong. Like as well, some people get religious without reason, and in un-proper means.

 

[Magical Realist]

One might explore if this could even be made into a "universal law" in the context of Kant's ethics. That is, if it is forbidden to dislike certain groups or generalizations of people, then to truly be "moral in itself" (not dependent upon relations, consequences, etc) the rule would have to include all classifications of such human divisions (having contempt for Nazis thereby being unethical). The situation might be remedied, though, in the same way that Dan Gaskill below refers to the problem of lying being solved; i.e., that Kant himself was not always the best expert or interpreter of what actually fell or could fall out of his philosophical frameworks.

A Problem for Kant’s [Ethical] Theory

Kant’s view is that lying is always wrong. His argument for this is summarized by James Rachels as follows:

(1) We should do only those actions that conform to rules that we could will be adopted universally.

(2) If we were to lie, we would be following the rule “It is permissible to lie.”

(3) This rule could not be adopted universally, because it would be self-defeating: people would stop believing one another, and then it would do no good to lie.

(4) Therefore, we should not lie [even in the case of protecting someone from a murderer that was pursuing them, which thereby causes many to condemn Kant's system as too strict].

The problem with this argument is that we can lie without simply following the rule “It is permissible to lie.” Instead, we might be following a rule that pertains only to specific circumstances, like “It is permissible to lie when doing so will save a life.” This rule can be made a universal law without contradiction. After all, it is not as though people would stop believing each other simply because it is known that people lie when doing so will save lives. For one thing, that situation rarely comes up—people could still be telling the truth almost all of the time. Even the taking of human life could be justified under certain circumstances. Take self-defense, for example. There appears to be nothing problematic with the rule “It is permissible to kill when doing so is the only available means of defense against an attacker”.

It is not necessary to interpret Kant’s theory as prohibiting lying in all circumstances (as Kant did). Maxims (and the universal laws that result from them) can be specified in a way that reflects all of the relevant features of the situation. Consider the case of the Inquiring Murderer (as described in the text). Suppose that you are in that situation and you lie to the murderer. Instead of understanding the universalized maxim as “Everyone Always lies” we can understand it as “Everyone always lies in order to protect innocents from stalkers”. This maxim seems to pass the test of the categorical imperative. Unfortunately, complicated maxims make Kant’s theory becomes more difficult to understand and apply.
www.csus.edu/indiv/g/gaskilld/ethics/Kantian Ethics.htm

It should also be remembered that one could simply choose to be "immoral" in the context of Kant's system, under certain circumstances. Which everyone does at one time or another with their system of choice, anyway. Even in practical-appearing utilitarianism, once "what's good for the greatest number" had been determined in regard to a specific circumstance, that conclusion becomes as idealized an "ought" as any, which the individual will still choose to violate sometimes. The "idealized rule" ultimately serves as a reference point for alerting someone as to when they have strayed too far from the sight of the "moral" shoreline, into deep waters; rather than turning them into a perfect robot.

I have a longstanding aversion to deontological ethics due primarily to my early experience with religion. I belonged to a church that seriously taught that all morality could be derived from mere obedience to the ten commandments. I have long since come to be skeptical of ANY rule being able to absolutely dictate all human behavior in all situations. Every ethical dilemma is tied directly to the specific structure of a situation. The only source for moral action comes from being existentially IN the situation such that we can reason and judge our course freely and to the best of our ability. Freedom to self-determine becomes in a way a metaethical value that needs to be preserved in the moral action. What is right for you may not be right for someone else. What is good one day may not be good on another day. Morality has to be a dynamic interaction with the logistics of the situation and can only be decided from the actor themselves. This ofcourse makes morality enormously more complicated since it's difficult to generalize duty and responsibility beyond a particular situation. As for Kant's imperative, I find myself more inclined to his second formulation than to his first one:

"Act only according to that maxim by which you can also will that it would become a universal law."
"Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."

 

[Magical Realist]

Disliking someone because of their religious choices is not bigotry. You can control it, unlike sexual orientation or race.

I was thinking that same thing. Disliking someone for their attitude or beliefs is disliking them for something they freely chose and so have moral responsibility for. Disliking someone for something inborn and involuntary like their race or sexual orientation or ethnicity is more akin to true bigotry because they are not morally responsible for that. It is a form of hating a person for who they are instead of for what they do.

 

[Tiassa]

Mental Health

Disliking someone for their attitude or beliefs is disliking them for something they freely chose and so have moral responsibility for.

There is, however, another consideration. While I, too, draw a line between chosen and inherent behavior, one can also construe religious belief as a form of mental illness. Certainly, many advocates of atheism do.

And in that sense, no, we do not hold people's mental illness against them.

Then again, as I understand it, religionists really don't like the mental health consideration, and as there are so many people of faith in the world, religion as mental illness isn't a transformation that will occur anytime soon.

 

[Fraggle Rocker]

There is, however, another consideration. While I, too, draw a line between chosen and inherent behavior, one can also construe religious belief as a form of mental illness. Certainly, many advocates of atheism do. And in that sense, no, we do not hold people's mental illness against them. Then again, as I understand it, religionists really don't like the mental health consideration, and as there are so many people of faith in the world, religion as mental illness isn't a transformation that will occur anytime soon.

Jung says that belief in the supernatural is an archetype, an instinct we're born with that is programmed into our synapses by our DNA. Unlike most instincts (such as fleeing from a large animal with both eyes in front of its face) it is not obviously a survival trait, but surely some useless or even dangerous instincts have been passed down through genetic bottlenecks or genetic drift.

Obviously some of us have a mutation that turned off this instinct: My entire family are atheists going back three generations. I never heard of religion until I was seven. At first it made me laugh, then it turned me into a cynic. I was never in any danger of being wooed by its seductive illogic. To accept religion would feel as wrong to me as wearing women's clothes.

But it does seem that supernaturalism is an inherent behavior in most people. I suppose something that is an inherent behavior could still be a mental illness: everything from dyslexia to sociopathy.

 

[Balerion]

Jung says that belief in the supernatural is an archetype, an instinct we're born with that is programmed into our synapses by our DNA. Unlike most instincts (such as fleeing from a large animal with both eyes in front of its face) it is not obviously a survival trait, but surely some useless or even dangerous instincts have been passed down through genetic bottlenecks or genetic drift.

Obviously some of us have a mutation that turned off this instinct: My entire family are atheists going back three generations. I never heard of religion until I was seven. At first it made me laugh, then it turned me into a cynic. I was never in any danger of being wooed by its seductive illogic. To accept religion would feel as wrong to me as wearing women's clothes.

But it does seem that supernaturalism is an inherent behavior in most people. I suppose something that is an inherent behavior could still be a mental illness: everything from dyslexia to sociopathy.

I disagree with Jung on this. Belief in the supernatural, at least it seems to me, is simply a manifestation of superstition. Certainly you wouldn't claim to have no superstition, would you? Never a moment when you think the fates are conspiring against you? I'm fairly certain everyone experiences this to some extent, and religion comes from that impulse.

 

[billvon]

Disliking someone because of their religious choices is not bigotry. You can control it, unlike sexual orientation or race.

Disliking anyone for any reason is not bigotry. Judging them based purely on any characteristic (religion, race, sexual orientation) is.

 

[spidergoat]

Disliking anyone for any reason is not bigotry. Judging them based purely on any characteristic (religion, race, sexual orientation) is.

Then call me a bigot against rapists, bullies, and racists.