Magical Realist
Valued Senior Member
Can any examination of the facts every recommend a course of action or a judgement of value? At what point does a description legitimately turn into a prescription? Hume didn't think this was possible. Here's what he had to say about it:
"Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his book, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739):
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."
Hume asks, given knowledge of the way the universe is, in what sense can we say it ought to be different?
Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how exactly can an "ought" be derived from an "is"? The question, prompted by Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is impossible.[2] This complete severing of "is" from "ought" has been given the graphic designation of Hume's Guillotine."---http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is–ought_problem
Wittgenstein made a similar point with his Big Book thought experiment:
"No statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value. Suppose one of you were an omniscient person and therefore knew all the movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive and that you also knew all the states of mind of all human beings that ever lived, and suppose you wrote all you knew in a big book, then this book would contain the whole description of the world; and what I want to say is, that this book would contain nothing that we would call an ethical judgment or anything that would logically imply such a judgment."--- Lecture on Ethics (1997) Ludwig Wittgenstein - Printed in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, “Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches, New York: Oxford University Press, pg. 67
"Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his book, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739):
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."
Hume asks, given knowledge of the way the universe is, in what sense can we say it ought to be different?
Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how exactly can an "ought" be derived from an "is"? The question, prompted by Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is impossible.[2] This complete severing of "is" from "ought" has been given the graphic designation of Hume's Guillotine."---http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is–ought_problem
Wittgenstein made a similar point with his Big Book thought experiment:
"No statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value. Suppose one of you were an omniscient person and therefore knew all the movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive and that you also knew all the states of mind of all human beings that ever lived, and suppose you wrote all you knew in a big book, then this book would contain the whole description of the world; and what I want to say is, that this book would contain nothing that we would call an ethical judgment or anything that would logically imply such a judgment."--- Lecture on Ethics (1997) Ludwig Wittgenstein - Printed in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, “Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches, New York: Oxford University Press, pg. 67