How was Anselm's argument "thrashed asunder"??
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The ontological argument is infamous
The ontological argument doesn't withstand the mere shadow of genuine scrutiny, that's the problem. It only makes sense if one decides it must.
The thing is that Anselm's argument requires the existence of what it allegedly stems from. It does not prove an affirmative answer to the question quoted above; it presumes an answer because it must.
Nobody can make Anselm sound rational. It is a product of immense superstition in lieu of rational logic. The presuppositions are well-crafted to force the conclusion; everything in between is simply a bunch of words vaguely tying the key vocabulary together.
It is, in short, an argument that is true only because it presumes itself to be true at the outset.
Even more succinctly, it's a sham.
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Notes:
Rosen, Gideon. "Anselm's Ontological Argument". Princeton University. (n.d.) Princeton.edu. August 5, 2010. http://www.princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/ontological.html
The ontological argument doesn't withstand the mere shadow of genuine scrutiny, that's the problem. It only makes sense if one decides it must.
Anselm writes:
This is Anselm's definition. We might paraphrase it as follows:
As we've stressed, you do not need to agree that this is what the word "God" ordinarily means. Treat it as a stipulation. Clearly, if Anselm can establish the existence of a being of this sort, his conclusion would be of immense philosophical and theological significance.
This puts the question: Is there in fact a being with the properties our definition assigns to God?
(Rosen)
we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
This is Anselm's definition. We might paraphrase it as follows:
By "God" we mean an absolutely unsurpassable being, a being that cannot conceivably be improved upon.
As we've stressed, you do not need to agree that this is what the word "God" ordinarily means. Treat it as a stipulation. Clearly, if Anselm can establish the existence of a being of this sort, his conclusion would be of immense philosophical and theological significance.
Or is there no such nature, since the Fool has said in his heart, there is no God?
This puts the question: Is there in fact a being with the properties our definition assigns to God?
(Rosen)
The thing is that Anselm's argument requires the existence of what it allegedly stems from. It does not prove an affirmative answer to the question quoted above; it presumes an answer because it must.
The argument seems to proceed as follows.
(1) Suppose (with the fool) that God exists in the understanding alone.
(2) Given our definition, this means that a being than which none greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone.
(3) But this being can be conceived to exist in reality. That is, we can conceive of a circumstance in which theism is true, even if we do not believe that it actually obtains.
(4) But it is greater for a thing to exist in reality than for it to exist in the understanding alone.
(5) Hence we seem forced to conclude that a being than which none greater can be conceived can be conceived to be greater than it is.
(6) But that is absurd.
(7) So (1) must be false. God must exist in reality as well as in the understanding.
(ibid)
(1) Suppose (with the fool) that God exists in the understanding alone.
(2) Given our definition, this means that a being than which none greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone.
(3) But this being can be conceived to exist in reality. That is, we can conceive of a circumstance in which theism is true, even if we do not believe that it actually obtains.
(4) But it is greater for a thing to exist in reality than for it to exist in the understanding alone.
(5) Hence we seem forced to conclude that a being than which none greater can be conceived can be conceived to be greater than it is.
(6) But that is absurd.
(7) So (1) must be false. God must exist in reality as well as in the understanding.
This reading of the argument is amply confirmed by the final paragraph:
Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence there is no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.
(ibid)
Nobody can make Anselm sound rational. It is a product of immense superstition in lieu of rational logic. The presuppositions are well-crafted to force the conclusion; everything in between is simply a bunch of words vaguely tying the key vocabulary together.
It is, in short, an argument that is true only because it presumes itself to be true at the outset.
Even more succinctly, it's a sham.
____________________
Notes:
Rosen, Gideon. "Anselm's Ontological Argument". Princeton University. (n.d.) Princeton.edu. August 5, 2010. http://www.princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/ontological.html