Sarkus said:
Whatever. How does this negate the idea that being provable to some suggests that God can be reduced to human understanding, which thus reduces his Anselm-based "greatness"?
Signal said:
Except that human understanding is expandable, and therefore, God's greatness is not actually reduced (by human understanding).
Assuming that human understandng is expandable won't rescue the ontological argument.
The OA suggests that if a concept (purportedly of God) is such that a 'greater' concept could be entertained, then the first concept isn't a concept of God at all.
The problem is that if human psychology, and with it our power of concept-formation, is limited and finite by its very nature, then no human concept can possibly be a concept of God. Implying that all actual religious language lacks reference and may even be meaningless (depending on how we construe meaning).
Arguing that some potential growth in our powers of religious conceptualization might someday allow humans to attain the ultimate conception of God, thus eventually giving our religious language a divine reference (a theologically doubtful assertion unless we accept the idea of human perfectability), doesn't lessen the highly subversive conclusion that our existing religious language lacks reference right now.
Our existing word 'God', the Hebrew word translated as 'Lord' in the Bible, all of the scriptures, church councils and holy catholic dogmas, in reality none of it actually refers to the unspeakable and unthinkable true (God).
Rendering the correct understanding of the word 'God' not unlike some of the Mahayana Buddhist spins on the idea of the 'void' I guess, defined by what it isn't rather than by what it is.
That might not be an argument for atheism precisely, but it's a very strong form of religious non-cognitivism that seems to come very close to atheism in practice.
I'm not saying that this was Anselm's intention. He would probably have been horrified by my spin on his pious argument. But I expect that many of his more intelligent contemporaries picked up on the implication, even if conditions of the time prevented them from writing about it openly. It was probably something that was discussed privately among the more avant-garde elements in the medieval schools. It's interesting to speculate about what connection, if any, this line of reasoning had on the medieval mystics who produced similar ideas about apophatic theology and religious non-cognitivism. It's a line of thought that's a lot older than Anselm of course, implicit in a lot of Christian Neoplatonism going back to late antiquity and figures like the pseudo-Dionysius.
On an entirely formal level, your objection is sound, but accepting it means we would have to ignore the OA's notion that human understanding is expandable, which would be inconsistent, at least.
Does the ontological argument include that notion? I don't recall it, but it's been decades since I last read Anselm's words. Even if Anselm did talk about that (I'm sure that he did somewhere, though perhaps not in the ontological argument) it would still seem to drain the argument of its seeming force.
Rav said:
One of the common criticisms of the ontological argument is indeed exactly that; that only God could use it to prove to himself that he exists.
Signal said:
And one of the common notions of God is that humans do not need proof of God ("proof" as in "empirical proof" or "complete philosophical understanding").
True enough, but making that move kind of shrugs off the idea that the ontological argument represents an a-priori conceptual 'proof' or 'argument' for the necessary existence of God.