Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?

[Quantum Quack]

The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is also a matter of measurement, not reality itself.

why do you say that?

 

[Quantum Quack]

Noone refutes the existence of what we call self-determination, Quantum Quack.

By claiming that it is an illusion you are indeed refuting it's existence and to do so with out any evidence to support that claim is absurd. By definition self determination means freedom to self determine. Being disingenuous with your word use does you no justice what so ever Baldeee.

The term "self determination" clearly indicates the freedom to self determine. You claim that freedom to be an illusion therefore self determination is an illusion.
You have been repeatedly asked to provide evidence that supports your claim that it is an illusion as just saying so because the logic works for you simply doesn't cut it and you know it.
If you can not incorporate the freedom to self determine in your deterministic universe then there is something very wrong with your deterministic universe.
There is no sound reason why you would not include it any way...as the universe remains fully determined even if you do. Just not fully predetermined in the rock solid manner that you are postulating. Humanity providing a "wild card" so to speak.

 

[Baldeee]

By claiming that it is an illusion you are indeed refuting it's existence...

No, I don't.
I merely identify that what I perceive to be the case (in what I am observing) is not how it actually is.
A magic trick is an illusion.
But the trick still exists.
To call it an illusion is merely to say that what appears to be happening (e.g. a rabbit disappearing) is not what is actually happening.
Something is happening, though.
The process, the magician's performance, still happens.
Calling that process an illusion is merely to say that the consciousness is deceived into thinking it is one thing when it is actually something else.
So self-determination exists, just as the magician's performance exists.
And I have been consistent in why I have been referring to it as an illusion.

...and to do so with out any evidence to support that claim is absurd.

It rests on the logic of the argument, Quantum Quack.
If you dispute the premises, then by all means tell me which one.
So far you have yet to raise any concern with any of them.

By definition self determination means freedom to self determine.

No, if anything such a circular definition would simply be that self determination is defined as the ability to self determine.
You are begging the question by using the term "freedom".

Being disingenuous with your word use does you no justice what so ever Baldeee.

How am I being disingenuous with my word use, Quantum Quack?

The term "self determination" clearly indicates the freedom to self determine.

No, it doesn't, as explained.
It clearly indicates the ability to self determine.
Whether that ability is one that has any freedom within it is what we are discussing.
So please don't beg the question.

You claim that freedom to be an illusion therefore self determination is an illusion.

I claim any perceived freedom to be an illusion, but the ability to self-determine, the process, still exists.

You have been repeatedly asked to provide evidence that supports your claim that it is an illusion as just saying so because the logic works for you simply doesn't cut it and you know it.

If you accept the premises and you consider the logic valid, what more are you after from me, Quantum Quack?
If you don't think the premises sound, which did you have issue with and why?
If you don't think the logic valid, what fallacy do you see within it?

If you can not incorporate the freedom to self determine in your deterministic universe then there is something very wrong with your deterministic universe.

I do not appeal to the consequence in my argument, Quantum Quack.
If you have issue with the premises, or with the validity of the logic, then lay it out.
Let's hear it.
At the moment all I hear from you is "well, your conclusion says there is no freedom, so it must be wrong!"
Do you actually have a sensible rebuttal to the argument or not?

There is no sound reason why you would not include it any way...as the universe remains fully determined even if you do. Just not fully predetermined in the rock solid manner that you are postulating. Humanity providing a "wild card" so to speak.

So you believe, in the fully deterministic universe that we're considering, that humanity somehow stands outside the predetermined nature of determinism?
You think humanity is somehow a special case?

And you expect me to take you seriously?

 

[iceaura]

I have merely exchanged "not do other than it must" with "not free",

You have made explicit the fact that you have all along "merely" assumed only the supernatural has freedom in a physically deterministic system. You have explicitly written it into the premises.
After forty pages of insult and denial.
You have to admit that's kind of funny, from the point of view of someone subjected to those insults.

So you think that in a deterministic universe there can be a small part within it that can be indeterministic?

No. For the tenth or eleventh time, I have stipulated physically deterministic human behavior in this thread. I have been very clear about that. It's fundamental to my posting here. If you are going to insist on responding to my posts, please try to pay attention to what's in them.

No, you judge that it is the actual ability to do otherwise by its appearance.
What you then do is measure, describe, discover its appearance.

And by the reasoned necessity of its existence. We are in the happy state of finding our reasoning in complete agreement with our observations.

Everyone agrees that the driver is able to stop or go depending on the color of the light. You insist on that - you insist that the color of the light is a key factor. And observation, experiment, etc, verifies that fact. Hello?

At no point does anything you have offered actually address whether it is more than its appearance, whether it is the actual ability to do otherwise.

We observe, measure, describe, and verify by experiment the actual, natural, physically determined and deterministic abilities of the driver we have reasoned must exist, for the driver's decision and willed behavior to depend on the future color of the light.

Decision making is just the name of a process.
Unless you wish to beg the question, you'll have to offer more than a label.

The orbiting Tesla, like the brick, lacks the ability to engage in some of the processes a human being engages in, in particular at the higher logical levels of human mental engagement. So none of the degrees of freedom characteristic of those processes are available to it. Better?

I think it's unnecessarily vague - we are talking about human decision making and willed behavior, after all; why generalize?

 

[Baldeee]

You have made explicit the fact that you have all along "merely" assumed only the supernatural has freedom in a physically deterministic system. You have explicitly written it into the premises.

If I say that there are no cats in my house, does that mean that I consider cats to be supernatural?
No.
Just as I assume there is no freedom in deterministic interactions, or deterministic systems, does not mean that I assume that freewill is supernatural.

After forty pages of insult and denial.

After forty pages of you seeing things that aren't there, presenting red-herrings, and failing to present any substance behind your handwaving.

You have to admit that's kind of funny, from the point of view of someone subjected to those insults.

Insults such as?
What is funny is that after 40 pages you're still waffling on and hand waving, and still failing to grasp simple logical constructions.

No. For the tenth or eleventh time, I have stipulated physically deterministic human behavior in this thread. I have been very clear about that. It's fundamental to my posting here.

Stipulating it and then arguing from that position are two very different things.
You do one.

If you are going to insist on responding to my posts, please try to pay attention to what's in them.

I am paying attention.
That's why I respond as I do.

And by the reasoned necessity of its existence. We are in the happy state of finding our reasoning in complete agreement with our observations.

What reasoning?
What necessity?
Yet more handwaving and no substance.

And yes, our reasoning is in complete agreement with our observations:
- Our observations are of appearance.
- We judge and refer to freewill by that appearance.
- But that does not mean that it is actually the ability to do otherwise, only that it appears to be that ability.

Everyone agrees that the driver is able to stop or go depending on the color of the light. You insist on that - you insist that the color of the light is a key factor. And observation, experiment, etc, verifies that fact. Hello?

It verifies the fact that the driver thinks they have the ability.
No observation or experiment will confirm anything other than the appearance of that ability rather than the actuality of that ability.
To do the latter they must start with the exact same inputs and arrive at the exact same output (deterministic system.
But every time they re-run the experiment in the lab the same inputs are not there.
And of course, as Sarkus explained, if you consider the simplistic "driver, car, light" setup to be the same input and same system, and you get different results from the same inputs, then you are claiming the system to be indeterministic - by definition.
You can not have it both ways.

We observe, measure, describe, and verify by experiment the actual, natural, physically determined and deterministic abilities of the driver we have reasoned must exist, for the driver's decision and willed behavior to depend on the future color of the light.

Of course it depends on the future colour of the light - the colour being predetermined.
Noone disputes that the process takes inputs and provides output.
The question is whether there is the ability to do otherwise.
Not whether there is the perceived ability in the future to do otherwise, basing that perception on unknown variables at the present time.
It is whether, at the time of the decision, there is any ability to do other than what it does.
Why don't you address that for once, rather than the matter of how things appear.
I have repeatedly, Sarkus has repeatedly, shown how with this argument you are merely addressing the appearance.

The orbiting Tesla, like the brick, lacks the ability to engage in some of the processes a human being engages in, in particular at the higher logical levels of human mental engagement. So none of the degrees of freedom characteristic of those processes are available to it. Better?

Nope.
Just more handwaving.
Just special pleading for the human.
No argument in there at all.

I think it's unnecessarily vague - we are talking about human decision making and willed behavior, after all; why generalize?

So you think humans stand outside of the nature of the universe, that they have an ability to do otherwise at the point of making a decision (same input leading to different output) while everything else fails to be able to?
So you think humans are an indeterministic system within a deterministic universe?
Oh, no, that's right, you say you accept the premise here that the universe is deterministic - just a pity your arguments don't actually abide by that.

My patience with you has pretty much run out, though.
Offer something of substance, offer a rebuttal that isn't irrelevant, show at least that you understand the argument you're trying to rebut.
And if you're simply not here to discuss the ability to do otherwise, but instead only the appearance of the ability to do otherwise (based on our perception of possible futures depending on as yet unknown information) then just tell me and I can ignore you from the outset.

 

[iceaura]

If I say that there are no cats in my house, does that mean that I consider cats to be supernatural?

If you say the only way a cat can exist in anyone's house is to weigh nothing, walk through walls, and dematerialize at will, then yes.

So you think humans stand outside of the nature of the universe, that they have an ability to do otherwise at the point of making a decision (same input leading to different output) while everything else fails to be able to?

I said the exact opposite, in detail, repeatedly.
Your comprehension problems appear to stem from your assumption that freedom in a physically deterministic universe must involve contravention of the laws of nature (to be "actual" freedom).
- - - -

Of course it depends on the future colour of the light - the colour being predetermined.

By the universe. If you are arguing from bottom up determinism via chains of cause and effect over time. (No problem - but note that you are introducing time, cause/effect, and so forth. That introduces what you were pleased to term "pragmatic considerations".)
So we agree that a deterministic universe has no free will of its own. So?

Stipulating it and then arguing from that position are two very different things.
You do one.

I do both. You don't pay attention.
- - - -

Just as I assume there is no freedom in deterministic interactions, or deterministic systems, does not mean that I assume that freewill is supernatural.

It means you assume that in physically deterministic interactions.
Such as every situation, example, hypothetical, in this thread - beginning with the OP.
As these are the situations at hand over the past forty pages, in all my posting and all the examples you are trying to dismiss and and all your replies to my posting and so forth, there's no point in wandering off now. If you - like most naive determinists - have some kind of private reservation involving miraculous interventions via quantum theory or whatever, some unspecified loopholes in the laws of physics, they are irrelevant.

Noone disputes that the process takes inputs and provides output.
The question is whether there is the ability to do otherwise

You have answered that question: yes. The decision maker takes inputs over time, and provides outputs accordingly - different outputs for different inputs, as they are put in. That necessarily implies the ability to provide different outputs for whatever different inputs may arrive - the ability to do otherwise.

You are muddling two different systems acting at two different times. The "input" from the light does not exist when or where the ability to do otherwise in response to other colors exists - it hasn't happened yet.

 

[Write4U]

The decision maker takes inputs over time, and provides outputs accordingly - different outputs for different inputs, as they are put in. That necessarily implies the ability to provide different outputs for whatever different inputs may arrive - the ability to do otherwise.

Question; If we apply this logic to a computer, then can we not also argue that computers are able to do otherwise from what they do, depending on input?

But we know that computers are strictly deterministic and what you are describing is determinism, where causal input may be variable but each causal input can only result in a specific caused output.

 

[Baldeee]

If you say the only way a cat can exist in anyone's house is to weigh nothing, walk through walls, and dematerialize at will, then yes.

The initial formulation said nothing about whether the analogous cats exist outside of the house, so your extension of the analogy is flawed.
The initial formulation said nothing about whether the universe was deterministic or otherwise.
It allowed for the ability to do otherwise to exist, just (by conclusion) outside of a deterministic system.
In short, you're still wrong.

I said the exact opposite, in detail, repeatedly.

You have.
But just because you deny a conclusion of your argument by stating the opposite doesn't change it from being a conclusion of your argument.
The contradiction is something you need to address.

Your comprehension problems appear to stem from your assumption that freedom in a physically deterministic universe must involve contravention of the laws of nature (to be "actual" freedom).

There is no comprehension problems on my part.
And the "assumption" you claim I have simply doesn't exist.
It never did.
The initial argument was not limited to a deterministic universe (hence the assumption wouldn't apply there, despite you claiming from the get go that it did), and secondly it would remain a conclusion, not an argument.
To simplify the syllogism:
- Deterministic interactions have no freedom.
- The universe is deterministic.
- Therefore the universe has no freedom.
Is that dumbed down enough for you, or are you still going to claim it an assumption rather than a conclusion?

By the universe.

By what is irrelevant.
It is predetermined.

If you are arguing from bottom up determinism via chains of cause and effect over time.

No bottom-up with me.
I share Sarkus' view on this.
I used to subscribe to the bottom-up notion but find the hollistic variety much more appetising.

So we agree that a deterministic universe has no free will of its own. So?

We probably agree that Trump isn't a particularly pleasant person, but that would be about as relevant as your comment here.
It's not about having no free will, but of whether a deterministic system is able to do otherwise.
I assert no, as argued from the principles of determinism, and you disagree, although I am still waiting for any actual argument in support of your own position.

I do both. You don't pay attention.

You think you do both, but you are mistaken.
And I say that precisely because I do pay attention.

It means you assume that in physically deterministic interactions.

Yes.

Such as every situation, example, hypothetical, in this thread - beginning with the OP.

Not in my original formulation, I don't, precisely because it allowed for non-deterministic interactions.
And yet you decried it for assuming that freedom was supernatural.
But hey, you haven't grasped this for the past 40 pages, so I'm not holding my breath now.

As these are the situations at hand over the past forty pages, in all my posting and all the examples you are trying to dismiss and and all your replies to my posting and so forth, there's no point in wandering off now.

There's every point in wandering off if you have nothing left to offer.
I don't do this out of charity.

If you - like most naive determinists - have some kind of private reservation involving miraculous interventions via quantum theory or whatever, some unspecified loopholes in the laws of physics, they are irrelevant.

So now I'm naive?
How quaint.
Yet I am not a determinist, either.
Go figure.
I'm certainly an incompatibilist, though.

You have answered that question: yes. The decision maker takes inputs over time, and provides outputs accordingly - different outputs for different inputs, as they are put in. That necessarily implies the ability to provide different outputs for whatever different inputs may arrive - the ability to do otherwise.

Just like the ability to do otherwise that a Tesla in space has, yes, I'm well aware of what you consider "ability to do otherwise" is.
Oh, wait, don't I have to handwave about logical levels and complexity within humans first?

The thing is, iceaura, those inputs that you are waiting for are already predetermined.
You can not change them from being what they are predetermined to be.
So any freedom you think or feel you have is due to lack of knowledge of that predetermination.
It is an illusion.

But as was expressed repeatedly you and others in the past: different notions, different conclusions.
You are trying to rebut one notion with arguments for an entirely different notion.
And you wonder why I consider your posts irrelevant.

You are muddling two different systems acting at two different times. The "input" from the light does not exist when or where the ability to do otherwise in response to other colors exists - it hasn't happened yet.

No, I am not muddling anything.
In a deterministic system the colour of the light at any given moment is already predetermined.
The input from the light is already set in stone.
The fact that the driver isn't aware of it and thinks they are acting freely, or thinking they have the ability to do otherwise (due to being able to imagine what they think are possible futures), is all part of the inputs to the system, inputs that were and are set in stone.
There is no escaping that.

But I guess you're happy in your orbital Tesla, eh.

 

[Quantum Quack]

Question; If we apply this logic to a computer, then can we not also argue that computers are able to do otherwise from what they do, depending on input?

But we know that computers are strictly deterministic and what you are describing is determinism, where causal input may be variable but each causal input can only result in a specific caused output.

but what of creativity? Can computers be creative?

 

[Write4U]

but what of creativity? Can computers be creative?

Absolutely, with the right algorithm. Ever seen a computer create a fractal zoom? The emergent artistry is awesome.

Mathematics are the foundation of the arts and nature provides the algorithm and is the teacher.
------------------ Natura Artis Magistra--------------------.

and here is how nature makes algorithms.

p.s. note that all these patterns can exist in the abstract and emerge as reality when expressed in physical form.

Check out the fractal nature of nature.

https://www.google.com/search?q=fractals in nature&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwifwMyp2M3fAhUHTt8KHc8hAMcQ_AUIDigB&biw=1280&bih=648#imgrc=8mTNi7qu78triM:

 

[Sarkus]

but what of creativity? Can computers be creative?

What do you take to be an example of creativity? And what relevance to the question of "the ability to do otherwise" do you think it has?

 

[iceaura]

Question; If we apply this logic to a computer, then can we not also argue that computers are able to do otherwise from what they do, depending on input?

To a degree, until the input comes in: of course. They are built that way.

But we know that computers are strictly deterministic and what you are describing is determinism, where causal input may be variable but each causal input can only result in a specific caused output.

Yep. As are human beings, in my posting.
- - - -

But just because you deny a conclusion of your argument by stating the opposite doesn't change it from being a conclusion of your argument.

I have made no other argument than my postings include, and they include no such idiotic "conclusions", or any reasoning that would lead to them. You are not paying attention.

"Such as every situation, example, hypothetical, in this thread - beginning with the OP"
.Not in my original formulation, I don't, precisely because it allowed for non-deterministic interactions.

Your "original formulation" (early posts? whatever) contained no situation, example, or hypothetical, that was not physically deterministic. You have alluded to their existence, but presented none - possibly for the very good reason that they are irrelevant here. Your argument concerned deterministic setups only, as specified in your premises. It's the OP setup, as well, and that of every single post by everyone else here. Other situations have not come up, and if they did they would be completely irrelevant to my posting and any replies to my posting.

So any freedom you think or feel you have is due to lack of knowledge of that predetermination.

Now you are being silly: The degrees of freedom are observed - not "felt" or "thought". If you leave them our of your calculations you will get wrong answers even about bricks and Teslas, let alone more complex systems, as even the most elementary of educations in statistics will teach you.

Oh, wait, don't I have to handwave about logical levels and complexity within humans first?

Yes. If you don't, you will say very stupid things - such as that the ability to make decisions based on criteria is an illusion that humans have.
You are claiming, with a straight face, that decisions are never made because the universe has predetermined what they are going to be.

The thing is, iceaura, those inputs that you are waiting for are already predetermined.

Ok.

You can not change them from being what they are predetermined to be.

As I stipulated, yes.

So any freedom you think or feel you have is due to lack of knowledge of that predetermination.

Slippery (remember the quantum switch - we're dealing in information, some of which is inherently unknowable), and remarkably arrogant about what other people feel and think - but doesn't matter except as a clue to where you are about to step on your dick, which is right here:

It is an illusion.

Uh, no, it's not. It's a physical fact. A decision is a physical event that has consequences. The ability to make a decision is no more an illusion than the ability to walk.
- - - - --

It allowed for the ability to do otherwise to exist, just (by conclusion) outside of a deterministic system.

So?
That's irrelevant to my posting, including my objections to your arguments above.
Read carefully, please:

It means you assume that in physically deterministic interactions.
Such as every situation, example, hypothetical, in this thread - beginning with the OP.
As these are the situations at hand over the past forty pages, in all my posting and all the examples you are trying to dismiss and and all your replies to my posting and so forth, there's no point in wandering off now. If you - like most naive determinists - have some kind of private reservation involving miraculous interventions via quantum theory or whatever, some unspecified loopholes in the laws of physics, they are irrelevant.

 

[TheFrogger]

Computers having free-will? When playing a game a computer keeps score. At the end of the game that is your score. If you could fault a computers logic in this way, it could be one way for a computer to develop free-will...

 

[James R]

It's been a while, but I'll dip a toe back into this discussion. It seems that Baldeee and Sarkus both remain stuck on the same point.

Just as I assume there is no freedom in deterministic interactions, or deterministic systems, does not mean that I assume that freewill is supernatural.

Okay. Let's run with what you say. In your picture, tell me how could free could possibly be anything other than supernatural.

You've told us that you assume that you define "freedom" in this context to mean "the ability to do otherwise". You've also told us that you assume that no deterministic system can have "freedom" of this type. You've told us you assume that acts of will are deterministic. You've told us that you therefore conclude that acts of will have no "freedom" in the relevant sense. Case closed, you tell us.

So, running with your argument, there can be no free will unless one of your premises has a hole in it. Agree?

Could it be that acts of will aren't deterministic? iceaura has all along conceded that they are (and I do too, for the purposes of this discussion). Although you keep questioning him on this point, as if he had ever said anything different, it is clear that he and I both agree with you that acts of will are deterministic. So, that premise in your argument is solid (or, at least, undisputed in this discussion). Agree?

Your only other premise is that no deterministic system ever displays "the ability to do otherwise". This would therefore appear to be the point of contention in the debate. So, we need to carefully unpack what you mean by "the ability to do otherwise". Relevant questions include:

• When, exactly, does the "ability to do otherwise" become relevant in an act of will? Before the decision is taken (and, if so, how long before)? During the making of the decision? Once the consequences of the decision have become apparent?
• How are we to distinguish a real "ability to do otherwise" from merely an apparent "ability to do otherwise"? After all, we all apparently think we can either stop at a traffic light or drive through it.
• Would the "ability to do otherwise" require that the laws of physics be broken?

The argument that you (Baldeee and Sarkus) have been running in this thread is that a person deciding (carrying out an act of will) whether to stop at a traffic light or drive through it never has "the ability to do otherwise" at any relevant time.

Let's look at the timing issue. Before the decision, you would presumably tell us that the atoms in the person, the electrical impulses in the brain, the atoms in the traffic light and so on, are all inevitably rushing towards the point where they "make" the person choose either to stop or go. This is dictated by the laws of physics. At the point of decision, the worldlines of all the relevant particles converge to produce a mental state in the human driver that is totally determined by the past configurations of the relevant particles. After that time, the particles continue their merry dance, as dictated by the physics, and the driver inevitably either hits the brake or the accelerator. During this whole process, the driver's mind is inevitably reconfigured so that he believes, after the event, that he made a "free" choice to stop the car (or not).

We might ask the following question of the driver: "What caused you to stop the car?" He would tell us a rationalisation of the sequence of events that would somewhere, no doubt, include words like "... and then I decided to stop" or whatever. Are we to take this at face value, being the smart people we are? No! Pull out the electrotrodes and fetch the machine that goes "ping" to measure his brain waves as the decision is made. Oh look! The brain analysis shows the act of making a decision. How about that? His brain actually made a decision. But was that the "real" cause of stopping the car? How about the following explanation instead: "In the beginning, there was a big bang, then came recombination, and ...[insert billions of years of detailed specifications of particle behaviour] ... and then the car stopped."? What happened to the act of will in that explanation? Where did it go? Are we still talking about the will at all, in this explanation? Let's not confuse freedom of the "universe" to do other than it must with freedom of an individual human being to make a choice. We need to discuss this at the right level.

This brings us to the second issue: in making his choice to stop the car, was the driver making a "real" choice, or was he under some kind of mistaken impression, due to an illusion created by all those dancing particles, that he was making a choice? Did he have a real "ability to choose to stop", or merely an apparent ability to choose to stop? If his stopping the car was not due to his actual choice, whose choice was it? Was there any choice at all?

It seems to me that it is meaningless to talk about the driver's decision in any way other than saying he made a choice. If that was not what was happening there, at the relevant high level of description, then what was happening? It would make a mockery of the language to say that the driver did not choose what action to take, in my opinion. All the relevant evidence - the only available evidence - says that the driver made a choice, or else the word "choice" itself is meaningless.

At this stage, the questions are as follows:
1. Do you (Baldeee and Sarkus) agree that the driver made a choice to stop (or not to stop)?
2. Do you agree that the car's stopping (or not) was a direct result of the choice that the driver made?
3. Would it be fair to describe the driver's will (as expressed through his choice) as a proximate cause of the car's stopping (or not)?
4. Do you agree that, if the driver had made the "opposite" choice, the outcome would have been the opposite to the one that was actually observed?

Bear in mind that we could repeat this experiment many times and ask the same questions.

I would like you to answer all four questions. I would like to assume that your answers to all of them would be "yes", but you never know. If you answer "yes" to all four questions, then we can move on to the final step.

The third and final question is whether actually having the "ability to do otherwise" would require the driver to break the laws of physics. Notice, by the way, that question 4, above, says nothing about breaking the laws of physics. It speaks only to outcomes.

Let's say that, in one observed instance of this experiment, the driver chose to stop the car at the light. If you hold that he could not conceivably have chosen to go through the light, other than by breaking the laws of physics, then it would seem obvious that you hold the opinion that the "ability to do otherwise" would require a supernatural intervention.

Which brings us to the inevitable conclusion: if I have summarised your argument accurately, then you believe that free will (encompassing an "ability to do otherwise") is only possible via supernatural causes. It follows that, since neither of you believe in supernatural causes, neither of you believe in free will either.

The only puzzle that remains is why both of you keep denying that you regard the supernatural as the only possible way the will could be free.

 

[James R]

I'd like to quote iceaura here, for emphasis. This really is the crux of the dispute:

But we aren't discussing the freedom of will of the universe, whatever that would be.
As soon as the focus narrows to the entity of interest - a human being, making decisions in real time according to information acquired in real time - we observe that this entity is in fact making decisions and acting on them in real time according to information acquired in real time. That is among its abilities. Necessarily, then, it has the ability to make decisions according to information - meaning at least two different courses of action are within its abilities prior to its becoming informed.
So whichever way it is going to decide, it possesses an ability to do otherwise meantime. It actually decides according to the information it acquires, in other words. (Which points to yet another location of your assumption of supernatural freedom - this ability to do otherwise, bound as it is by natural law and never to result in doing, is not in your view freedom).

Notice that all three issues arise here: (1) the relevance of timing in the "ability to do otherwise", (2) the reality of choices vs the "illusion" of choice, and (3) whether "free will" is assumed only to be possible if the supernatural is allowed into the discussion.

 

[TheFrogger]

I wouldn't bother trying to clarify the situation JamesR. They will just feign ignorance and pretend they do not know what you mean. Exactly when the decision to become an ignoramus was made is highly relevant here. For example in a closed system, should we install chips into robots so that should they kill a human being, they, "shut-down" then at the moment of, "will"; the moment the decision is made to kill, the robot shuts down. This is what, "will" is; the decision to bring something into being. That "thing," then "will."

Another example to prove I am the dogs b@ll#cks. Last night while walking to the shop I crossed a car park. A car was leaving a space so I walked through the space. Had that driver not made the decision to leave the space then it would have been impossible for me to walk there. My decision to walk through the space was only made because the car departed (left) the space. Free-will!

 

[TheFrogger]

Another example. A man discovers time-travel. He then imparts this knowledge to someone else, who then uses their new ability to traverse time, to prevent their teacher from discovering said time-travel. However should the teacher not discover the traversion, then the student cannot inherit the ability. My point is this: the moment the decision is made to rob the teacher, is the moment the students abilities disappear. The student does not have to actually, "fool" the teacher: as soon as the, "will" is enforced, the student disappears.

This is just as a decision can be made to ALWAYS hate, or never forgive. Both are acts of will which prevent freedom.

 

[James R]

TheFrogger:

Can you please run away and play somewhere other than in this thread? Let the adults continue their discussion. Thanks.

 

[TheFrogger]

Thank you for proving my point.

Should you possess the will to run down the street and, "bang me clean out," I will die and your taxi ride is over. THE MOMENT the will is enforced is the moment I die.

 

[Speakpigeon]

You've told us that you assume that you define "freedom" in this context to mean "the ability to do otherwise". You've also told us that you assume that no deterministic system can have "freedom" of this type. You've told us you assume that acts of will are deterministic. You've told us that you therefore conclude that acts of will have no "freedom" in the relevant sense. Case closed, you tell us.
So, running with your argument, there can be no free will unless one of your premises has a hole in it. Agree?
Could it be that acts of will aren't deterministic?

Sorry to interject in your discussion with Balddeee but this seems relevant. He claimed in another thread that the physical world might be non-deterministic.
In my thread where I assume that the conscious mind would be the state of a group of neurons, he claimed that the same state of a group of neurons at two different times might not necessarily result in the same outcome, outcome that could be for example what a person does.
Nothing more specific than that and he declined to support his claim by any hard science.
See what you can make of that in the context.
EB