Not "judge". Measure, describe, discover, etc.
Also by experiment, and description of mechanism, and theoretical analysis, and so forth.
Of course.
No, you judge that it is the actual ability to do otherwise by its appearance.
What you then do is measure, describe, discover its appearance.
At no point does anything you have offered actually address whether it is more than its appearance, whether it is the actual ability to do otherwise.
There is no ability for the universe to do otherwise. OK. That's irrelevant.
We are not talking about the universe having freedom of will.
So you think that in a deterministic universe there can be a small part within it that can be indeterministic?
Because it is the deterministic nature of the system that means that it is set in stone.
Any deterministic system, be it the universe or a small part within it.
No, it doesn't. It lacks such abilities as decision making at the human level.
Decision making is just the name of a process.
Unless you wish to beg the question, you'll have to offer more than a label.
Now you have altered the original argument dramatically, by explicitly throwing the deterministic exclusion of freedom into the premises. You even have the word "free" spelled out in the premises.
I haven't altered anything dramatically.
From post #130:
P1: if something is determined then it can not do other than it must.
P2: systems built from determined interactions are themselves determined.
P3: the mind and will are systems built from determined interactions.
Conclusion: the mind and will can not do other than they must.
Compare that to the above:
P1: deterministic interactions are not free.
P2: a system built from deterministic interactions is not free.
P3: the will is such a system.
C: the will is not free.
I have merely exchanged "not do other than it must" with "not free", and a few inconsequential differences.
So I again question whether you ever read the initial formulation, or ever understood it.
Humorously enough, you just spent forty pages denying you were assuming that - including directing all manner of insults at me for noting that you were in fact assuming that.
You, from the outset, assumed I was assuming that freedom was supernatural.
There was, and is, nothing in the original formulation - which says nothing about the nature of the universe - that assumes as you claim it does.
Only when discussing specifically the deterministic universe can one claim that the premises make that assumption, and even then they do not, although it would be a conclusion.
You have failed to grasp this over the past 40 pages.
The argument I am dealing with assumes freedom in a physically deterministic system must be supernatural. I'm not trying to rebut that - if someone wants to stand by that assumption, then there is no rebuttal to the argument. It's valid.
But if they don't - - - - there is another way to look at the situation.
Then you are arguing a strawman, since no argument yet presented assumes that freedom in a physically deterministic system must be supernatural.
It is, of course, a conclusion one can reach from the first two premises, as the original formulation does with regard the will.
Then it offered room for the ability to do otherwise ("freeedom") to not be contrary to the laws of nature.
Thus one can simply not claim that there is an assumption that such freedom must be supernatural.
But as I thought, for you not to recognise this shows how woeful your understanding is, and continues to be.
And I'm still reading it. You're stuck rather badly.
The only thing I'm stuck with is reading responses from someone who clearly doesn't understand the logic that they're discussing.
That's not necessarily the case in a physically deterministic universe - quantum theory objects, as does chaos if carefully treated, Heisenberg uncertainty, a few other factors - but it doesn't matter if you are responding to my posts.
Quantum theory does not object in any way, because either one assumes that it is wholly deterministic (e.g. Bohmian mechanics, as Write4U offered above) or it is assumed to be indeterministic and thus simply not a consideration if one is assuming a physically deterministic universe.
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is also a matter of measurement, not reality itself.
As such it only affects our practical ability to know beforehand what the future is, whether in a deterministic universe or as part of an indeterministic one.
The theoretical predetermination of the deterministic universe remains in tact: reality would be on a course set in stone.
So yes, it would be the case in a physically deterministic universe, and it is thus something you are going to have to deal with.
I have stipulated to a physically determined universe, and it makes no difference to my posting whether such a universe is "set in stone" or not.
No, because you are only concerned with the degrees of freedom akin to a Tesla in space, not whether something is able to do otherwise.
Hold that thought. Strike "nothing but" (it's confusing you). Note that the assessment is accurate - until the driver receives more information, in the future, they have the ability to stop and the ability to go depending on what that information will be. That's two mutually exclusive doings - no matter which is going to be done, the ability to do otherwise exists at that moment.
No, it doesn't exist at the moment.
It's like a train on a track coming up to a junction.
You would argue that on seeing the junction the train has the ability to go in either direction.
But the direction it takes is already set in stone.
The train might not yet know which path it will take, but reality does, the universe does, the direction set in stone.
You see that as the train having freedom.
I don't.