Co-Determinism and the Reality of Free Will

It's more that I find only a trivial sense of "freedom" within a deterministic system. I don't think anything is possible through supernatural means... the supernatural does not exist, thus nothing is possible through it. If there is a non-trivial sense of "freedom" to be found, then I have yet to come across it. As for what I mean by trivial, it is the same notion of freedom to be found in a thermostat, or other such examples that have been given, then I would deem it trivial.
Ahh now we can sort out this cross purpose debate that is going on.
You are correct in saying that the freedom you are referring can not be present.
It is not present, the entire deterministic system is entirely determined ( excepting quala chaos etc. which is another issue)

However,
Every choice our human decides and makes is equally fully co-determined. There is no freedom ( materially?) at that level or category of discussion.
However regardless, our human is able to self determine quite freely with in this completely deterministic system because he a "determiner" in that system.
Put it this way the universe also can not escape the co-determination of the human.

The cusp of the problem you are having is the term freedom.
Absolute freedom is non-existent.
In human terms absolute freedom is utter insanity which no human could possibly survive. ( utter chaos/disorder in physics)
In absolute terms freewill is an illusion.
However when discussing degrees of freedom, freewill, in relative terms becomes possible and not illusionary due to the learning of self-(co)determination by the identity doing the (co)determining.
 
It's more that I find only a trivial sense of "freedom" within a deterministic system. I don't think anything is possible through supernatural means... the supernatural does not exist, thus nothing is possible through it. If there is a non-trivial sense of "freedom" to be found, then I have yet to come across it. As for what I mean by trivial, it is the same notion of freedom to be found in a thermostat, or other such examples that have been given, then I would deem it trivial.
By now, at least two of us have tried several times to walk you through the relevant differences between a thermostat and a human being. If you haven't worked it out by now, I don't think you're going to get it. In any case, I think I'll stick to discussing QQ's idea in this thread. The other one is better for discussion your outstanding problems, if they need further discussion.
 
If that's what co-determination means, then I don't think I have much problem with it as description of what happens. But in my opinion it does nothing to resolve the problem of whether the will is "free" in a relevant sense. Of course, determining the relevant sense of the word "free" is part of the point of contention that I have with Sarkus's and Baldeee's position. For them, "free" is only possible through supernatural means, or maybe through some hypothetical, unidentified process they say neither of them can identify.
Free at the level they are wishing to post about is indeed impossible as the universe is entirely deterministic. What they fail to consider is that the human is also a (co)determiner and can do so freely depending on the limitations of his self development, education etc and environment that he has to deal with.
Further if a human being is not (co)determining or learning to (co)determine he is dead.
He can not live with out being a (co)determiner. The reason for this is that there can be no freedom from a deterministic universe as Sarkus, Baldee, Cap and a few others are correctly claiming.

Thus a human is born to (co)determine as he can not do other wise if he wishes to live.
I don't see how that removes the "problem" of the human's ego/psychology/psychiatry being determined by the wider circumstances of the universe, though.
The self is being co-determined by the wider circumstances and it isn't a problem but now we are talking about relative freedom obtained by self development.

My problem with your position is that it sounds to me like you think human beings can somehow escape the "system" of universal determinism somehow by applying the ego or identity. I don't think that's an escape from that system - I think ego and identity are things that happen within the system. Nevertheless, I hold that there is free will, because human beings, although determined, make choices that are their own and nobody else's, which I think is all that is necessary for free will (given that we can't have the supernatural kind).
There is no escape from the whole, one can only carve out a small part of it for oneself...

and ultimately the whole universe is a temporal illusion any how...( according to Buddhism, Non-Duality, Unity philosophy etc.. etc)
This image posted earlier:
Deterministic_universe_with_ human_selfdeterminism (2).png
sums it up rather nicely...IMO
 
Ahh now we can sort out this cross purpose debate that is going on.
You are correct in saying that the freedom you are referring can not be present.
It is not present, the entire deterministic system is entirely determined ( excepting quala chaos etc. which is another issue)
Why accepting "quala chaos etc"? What exactly do you understand by that term? Why are you excepting it from the determinism of the system?
However,
Every choice our human decides and makes is equally fully co-determined.
Question begging. You can't simply say that things are co-determined, and thus conclude that co-determinism is a valid theory, or meaningful, or adds something that isn't already fully understood.
There is no freedom ( materially?) at that level or category of discussion.
So you accept that every choice a human decides has no freedom???
However regardless, our human is able to self determine quite freely with in this completely deterministic system because he a "determiner" in that system.
We both agree, and it has never been disputed, that a human is able to self-determine... but you have just agreed that there is no freedom... yet say they are able "to self determine quite freely". Offer something that supports this, QQ. You agree there is no freedom, then slip in that we have freedom... and you offer nothing by way of explanation.
Put it this way the universe also can not escape the co-determination of the human.
The watch is as dependent upon the moving of the cog as the cog is of the rest of the watch. You have rejected the analogy but here you are again simply describing it in other words. You don't actually have a clue what you're talking about, do you?
The cusp of the problem you are having is the term freedom.
Absolute freedom is non-existent.
In human terms absolute freedom is utter insanity which no human could possibly survive. ( utter chaos/disorder in physics)
You don't understand chaos. Chaos is no more an expression of freedom from a deterministic universe than anything else is. Chaos is simply the sensitivity of the output to the input.
In absolute terms freewill is an illusion.
However when discussing degrees of freedom....
So despite the insistence that this "co-determinism" is neither compatibilist nor incompatibilist but instead "resolves" the issue between them, you use a notion of freedom that is compatibilist. And all you are actually doing is describing how sub-parts of a system can be said to "co-determine" the output with the rest of the system. I.e. a rather irrelevant notion to the question of (in)compatibilism and the question of free-will.
, freewill, in relative terms becomes possible and not illusionary due to the learning of self-(co)determination by the identity doing the (co)determining.
Noone has disputed that if you use a trivial notion of freedom, as found for example within a thermostat (i.e. degrees of freedom), that freewill can be considered non-illusory. A thermostat has that freedom. Our will has that notion of freedom. But it is a trivial notion. And it doesn't show how our will is any more free than a thermostat in being able to do other than it must.

Does your "co-determinism" in any way resolve it? No.
Is it anything more than saying that a cog in a watch can be said to "co-determine" the time along with the rest of the watch? No.
Does it, in itself, address in any way the question of freedom? No.

So what does your "theory" actually do, other than provide a tortuous route to explain something that is pretty darn obvious, and also completely irrelevant to the question of free will?
 
Noone has disputed that if you use a trivial notion of freedom, as found for example within a thermostat (i.e. degrees of freedom), that freewill can be considered non-illusory. A thermostat has that freedom. Our will has that notion of freedom. But it is a trivial notion. And it doesn't show how our will is any more free than a thermostat in being able to do other than it must.
It is sad and disturbing that you fail to understand that freedom may be limited but never trivial.

Like comparing a prisoner who has been locked up in solitary confinement for 30 years then being released in to the wider prison community.... degrees of freedom with in an oppressive system are never trivial in fact quite the opposite.
I suppose it is humiliating that the prisoner may have to lower himself and co-operate ( co-determine) with the prisons security staff so that his relative freedom can be achieved and maintained and even hopefully improved upon.

It is sad that your obsession prevents you from seeing the folly of your position.

It is also sad you can not understand that you can not have self determination with out freedom to do so.

You agree that self determination is not in dispute and simultaneously refuse to accept that it takes freedom to self determine.
A load of contradictory nonsense yes?

Btw , when you discover a thermostat that can self determine let the board know...ok?

The thermostat says to the heater, "Uhm... what temperature do I want you to be today?"
And heater says, " I dunno, I am not a mind reader."B-)
 
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@Sakus,
A question you could ask that might help you understand the solution to your dilemma is:

How can the observed relative freedom be achieved in a absolutely deterministic universe?

There is only one answer that I know of....
 
It is sad and disturbing that you fail to understand that freedom may be limited but never trivial.
"Trivial" so as to distinguish one notion from another. "Trivial" as in also found in a thermostat. As far as it relates to the incompatibilist, such a notion of freedom is trivial with regard to the question of freewill. That you find it sad and disturbing is for you to resolve with yourself.
Like comparing a prisoner who has been locked up in solitary confinement for 30 years then being released in to the wider prison community.... degrees of freedom with in an oppressive system are never trivial in fact quite the opposite.
They are trivial if the only notion of freedom in freewill is that found in a thermostat. Yes, the range of such freedom is much greater, but the notion itself remains trivial.
It is sad that your obsession prevents you from seeing the folly of your position.
Anything to offer apart from such ad hominem attacks?
It is also sad you can not understand that you can not have self determination with out freedom to do so.
Don't dispute it... but it is the nature of that freedom that is in question: is it the type found in a thermostat, the trivial kind, or another type?
You agree that self determination is not in dispute and simultaneously refuse to accept that it takes freedom to self determine.
I have never disputed that it takes freedom. It is the nature of that freedom that is in dispute. You really should keep up with the discussions if you intend to summarise them.
A load of contradictory nonsense yes?
No. Reminder: it is the nature of the freedom involved that is disputed. Do you accept that the only nature of freedom that the will has is that also found in a thermostat?

And, to keep it on topic, you seem to have missed the question I asked of you:
So what does your "theory" actually do, other than provide a tortuous route to explain something that is pretty darn obvious, and also completely irrelevant to the question of free will?
 
@Sakus,
A question you could ask that might help you understand the solution to your dilemma is:

How can the observed relative freedom be achieved in a absolutely deterministic universe?

There is only one answer that I know of....
There is no dilemma, and the issue is not about the relative freedom, but the nature of the freedom.
The only freedom we have is of the same nature as found in a thermostat. Yes, the complexity of our brain gives us far greater degrees of freedom than found in a thermostat, but the natures of the freedoms in each case are the same.
And in a deterministic universe, the outputs of any process, whether that be the thermostat or the human brain, are predetermined from the outset. And from that sense, from that nature of freedom (to go against that predetermined course of events, for example), neither the will, nor the thermostat, has such freedom.
No dilemma.
No solution required.

So how does your "co-determination" aid the issue?
 
No. Reminder: it is the nature of the freedom involved that is disputed. Do you accept that the only nature of freedom that the will has is that also found in a thermostat?
No ... of course not....

A simple and obvious question to help you clarify the distinction between a human and a thermostat.

Does a thermostat self determine?
 
"Backwards causality"? Can you elaborate?
The silliest one was declaring the future color of a traffic light could cause some of the choices observed to be within the driver's capabilities now to be somehow not within the driver's capabilities now. But there were several others.
The only freedom we have is of the same nature as found in a thermostat. Yes, the complexity of our brain gives us far greater degrees of freedom than found in a thermostat, but the natures of the freedoms in each case are the same.
They aren't.
Difference in logical level is certainly difference in "nature", for example. Degrees of freedom in handling information are qualitatively different than those involved in reacting to physical impetus (as is seen immediately in the attempts to handle them mathematically). And so forth.
So show how complexity introduces a non-trivial freedom, support the claim
For the fiftieth time: a driver approaches a traffic light - - - - - -
Usain Bolt chooses shoes for a given race - - - - -
A sleeping dog is kicked in the middle of a dream - - - -
But this thread is to discuss QQ's enlightening notion of "co-determinism".
As far as I can tell, the net result is that he's trying to slide supernatural freedom in through a side door. He has accepted the central mistake - that straight determinism excludes freedom of will - but is trying to deal with the absurdities one immediately encounters by screwing around with the determinism itself rather than the perceptions of the reality involved. The muddle created resembles in some ways (snake eats tail) the one created by the attempt to render some observations of human mental processing "actual" and others "illusions" based on differences that do not exist and an observer that shares the same status - "actual" or "illusion"- as the observation.
 
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As far as I can tell, the net result is that he's trying to slide supernatural freedom in through a side door. He has accepted the central mistake - that straight determinism excludes freedom of will - but is trying to deal with the absurdities one immediately encounters by screwing around with the determinism itself rather than the perceptions of the reality involved.
With all due respect....

oh ... dear what nonsense...
What is it with you guys and the super natural any how....
So scared of the God word so it seems to me...

The same question I asked of Sarkus I will ask you...
In a fully deterministic universe how can relative freedom be achieved?

There is only one answer I know of....

I have already given the answer but alas it seems you all have to work it out for yourselves.
see post #164 for background.
 
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The silliest one was declaring the future color of a traffic light could cause some of the choices observed to be within the driver's capabilities now to be somehow not within the driver's capabilities now. But there were several others.
They aren't.
Difference in logical level is certainly difference in "nature", for example. Degrees of freedom in handling information are qualitatively different than those involved in reacting to physical impetus (as is seen immediately in the attempts to handle them mathematically). And so forth.

For the fiftieth time: a driver approaches a traffic light - - - - - -
Usain Bolt chooses shoes for a given race - - - - -
A sleeping dog is kicked in the middle of a dream - - - -

As far as I can tell, the net result is that he's trying to slide supernatural freedom in through a side door. He has accepted the central mistake - that straight determinism excludes freedom of will - but is trying to deal with the absurdities one immediately encounters by screwing around with the determinism itself rather than the perceptions of the reality involved. The muddle created resembles in some ways (snake eats tail) the one created by the attempt to render some observations of human mental processing "actual" and others "illusions" based on differences that do not exist and an observer that shares the same status - "actual" or "illusion"- as the observation.
I can tell you all now, that when the penny finally drops you are going to kick yourselves for how simple it all really is..
 
The same question I asked of Sarkus I will ask you...
In a fully deterministic universe how can relative freedom be achieved?
As described long ago, and illustrated with examples - it emerges from the workings of the deterministic universe, which create decisionmakers of increasing complexity over time.
There is only one answer I know of....
You keep bringing up "self" determination. While that does happen - and is significant in the case of human beings - it is not necessary or central. What is central is the freedom involved in making a decision. The decision - not the self - is what is determined by the decisionmaker.
 
As described long ago, and illustrated with examples - it emerges from the workings of the deterministic universe, which create decisionmakers of increasing complexity over time.
there fore even if infinitely complex the causation behind the decision will always be the universe. therefore no freedom from said universal causation is present.
You keep bringing up "self" determination. While that does happen - and is significant in the case of human beings - it is not necessary or central. What is central is the freedom involved in making a decision. The decision - not the self - is what is determined by the decisionmaker.
The actor (self) and how the actor deals with the universes causations is paramountly important to this issue.

This is why I am not a compatabilist and also why I am not a fatalist determinist.

As an aside, why do you think this unresolved debate has been ongoing for over 3000 years by some of the most profound thinkers humanity has ever procreated?
 
As described long ago, and illustrated with examples - it emerges from the workings of the deterministic universe, which create decisionmakers of increasing complexity over time.

You keep bringing up "self" determination. While that does happen - and is significant in the case of human beings - it is not necessary or central. What is central is the freedom involved in making a decision. The decision - not the self - is what is determined by the decisionmaker.
The question for you is how does a compatibilist position avoid the necessary causations impacting on the actor, therefore the actors decisions?
 
I am only asking these questions because they appear to have been missed, I am not trying to trap or insult any one.
 
No ... of course not....

A simple and obvious question to help you clarify the distinction between a human and a thermostat.

Does a thermostat self determine?
The ability to self-determine is not the issue. The nature of the freedom is. How many times does one have to tell you that noone has disputed the existence of a process of self-determination? 'Cos let's add one more to that number of times: noone has disputed the existence of a process of self-determination.
 
The ability to self-determine is not the issue. The nature of the freedom is. How many times does one have to tell you that noone has disputed the existence of a process of self-determination? 'Cos let's add one more to that number of times: noone has disputed the existence of a process of self-determination.
Perhaps you could expain self determination with out refering to freedom?
I am mystified by the contradiction you seem oblivious to.
 
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