Suppose I want a slave, so I decide to clone someone and make the clone a slave. Since I'm feeling charitable, I'll let the clone go free after 30 years. I have no interest in making the clone if they can't/won't be my slave.
Most people would agree that this would be morally wrong, since people shouldn't be slaves and all that. But wouldn't the clone likely prefer slavery to non-existence? If we could somehow ask the clone (who didn't exist yet, so it's really impossible, but we can probably confidently predict what his answer would be) whether I should go through with my plan, wouldn't he probably say "Yes, by all means create me, even if I'll have to be your slave for 30 years!"
I think it's interesting that most people would agree that I shouldn't clone myself a slave because it would violate the rights of the clone, even though the clone -if he existed yet- would almost certainly beg to be created, preferring 30 years of slavery to nonexistence.
Most people would agree that this would be morally wrong, since people shouldn't be slaves and all that. But wouldn't the clone likely prefer slavery to non-existence? If we could somehow ask the clone (who didn't exist yet, so it's really impossible, but we can probably confidently predict what his answer would be) whether I should go through with my plan, wouldn't he probably say "Yes, by all means create me, even if I'll have to be your slave for 30 years!"
I think it's interesting that most people would agree that I shouldn't clone myself a slave because it would violate the rights of the clone, even though the clone -if he existed yet- would almost certainly beg to be created, preferring 30 years of slavery to nonexistence.