Absolute vs. relative morality
- Thread starter James R
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I have seen a number of versions of the moral relativism argument from various people on sciforums, especially lately. So, I'd like to start the ball rolling with an argument for moral realism.
This is a post from another forum, shamelessly cut-and-pasted here.
Original Source: WarrenPlatts, here.
From the same poster, here's the main problem with moral realism:
Discuss...
This is a post from another forum, shamelessly cut-and-pasted here.
Original Source: WarrenPlatts, here.
A moral is a true sentence containing a moral predicate. Therefore, since the sentence 'it is morally acceptable to kill babies' is false, that sentence does not count as a genuine moral. Therefore, your counterargument does not apply to moral realism.
But OK, you've made it plain that you don't think that "morals" are true sentences containing moral predicates. Then I repeat my question: what are morals?
You say they are not concrete. You say they are not pie-in-the-sky. Are they abstract entities then? Platonic forms? If there were no humans, would absolute morals still exist? Where do they exist if not in this universe?
You say morals are not definable, yet they can be "reached" through logic and reason, but really, the only justification you've given so far is a pragmatic one: it's good for society if people believe in morals, and they are more likely to believe in morals if we say they are absolute. So basically, morality is in our enlightened self-interest, so we should believe in morals, and we call them "absolute" in order to get more people to believe in them. But enlightened self-interest has never been an adequate foundation for ethics, and pragmatism is but one step removed from relativism. Relativism says do what you want. Pragmatism says do whatever works--for you! So, until you can come up with better logic and reason, it seems you're stuck in the same boat as you say I'm in.
But I'm not stuck in the same boat as the relativists. Just because ancient cultures used to sacrifice babies, it does not follow that the moral realist position that the sentence 'it is wrong that someone tortures babies' is not objectively true. I can only speak from my position as a person raised in a modern, English-speaking civilization, but you are probably correct that if I was raised as an Aztec, I wouldn't have a problem with human sacrifice. Yet, according to moral realism, it would still be morally wrong that I participated in human sacrifice notwithstanding that I actually sacrificed humans. Like I said earlier, there are moral cripples. According to moral realism, a human-sacrificing Aztec would be a moral cripple--though not necessarily evil because they just didn't know the difference between right and wrong. If you were to say that human sacrifice was moral--for Aztecs--THAT is moral relativism. But surely that's not your position. . . .
To use your own analogy, just because someone is brainwashed into believing that 2 + 2 = 5, it does not follow that someone taught through repetition that 2 + 2 = 4 did not learn the truth. Similarly, if someone was raised to think that sacrificing babies to Satan is morally good, it does not follow that someone properly brought up to think that it is morally wrong to sacrifice babies did not learn the objective truth. Just because repetition is involved in learning falsities as well as truth, it does not follow that truth learned through repetition is not truth. Correct me if I'm wrong.
Regarding the indefinability of the moral predicates: as you say, words are intended to represent something. Some words represent simple things, and some words represent complex things. Thus words representing complex things can be defined using words that represent simple things. For example, I could define the word 'horse' as meaning the same as 'a large, solid-hoofed, herbivorous quadruped'.
Alas, it is not so easy with words that represent simple things. Take for example, the word 'yellow'. Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines 'yellow' as 'a color like that of egg yolk, ripe lemons, etc.' But what kind of a definition is THAT? Does 'yellow' mean the same as 'egg yolk', or does 'yellow' mean the same as 'ripe lemon'? I don't think it's either. Rather, if you want to know the definition of 'yellow' the dictionary instructs you to find an egg, crack it open, and look at the yolk, then find a ripe lemon and compare the two, and you will see for yourself the one thing that the egg yolk and the ripe lemon have in common: YELLOW!
Oh my God! Repetition! Again! !Que horrible!
In other words, the dictionary itself gives an ostensive definition (look it up!) for the word 'yellow'.
And so it is with the moral predicates. The predicate 'morally wrong' is intended to represent something. The problem is that something is simple, just like yellow is simple. So moral terms cannot be defined using nonmoral terms, in the way 'horse' can be defined using nonhorse terms. So, to say, as you have come close to saying, that 'that which is morally good is that which is conducive to survival' commits a logical fallacy, the naturalistic fallacy, first identified by G.E. Moore in his 1903 Principia Ethica. Similarly, some animal rights activists would like to define 'morally wrong' as 'causing suffering'. But this is like saying that 'yellow' means the same as 'lemon'.
So, moral predicates like 'morally wrong' cannot be defined in nonmoral terms. All I can do is show you suffering, murdering, cheating, mutilating, raping, wasting, vandalizing, etc. But 'morally wrong' does not mean the same as 'suffering', nor does 'morally wrong' mean the same as 'murdering', etc., nor does 'morally wrong' mean all those things taken together. Rather, 'morally wrong' is that quality that all those things have in common, just as 'yellow' represents that quality that egg yolks, ripe lemons, and ripe bananas all have in common.
Sorry, that's the best I can do. But it's also the best anyone else can do. . . .
And a final note, the ostensive definition of 'morally wrong' is absolutely NOT based on a "gut reaction", as you have suggested. Of course feelings of outrage are present upon witnessing a man beat a cripple in a wheelchair. However, feelings of outrage are also present in situations where there is no reason to suppose that something immoral has happened, as when one is caught in a traffic jam.
...
So, the question is, how do you know that 'it is morally wrong to torture babies' is true? I maintain you know it's true the same way I do, and that is empirically. In past posts you have vaguely alluded to the fact that bad s*** has happened to you in the past (I think that's why you believe that mere survival is the highest good). So you don't need anyone to tell you what 'moral wrong' means, because you have directly experienced it for yourself. And there's no point in seeking a proof of this knowledge, any more than seeking a proof for the fact that dandelion flowers are yellow.
But OK, you've made it plain that you don't think that "morals" are true sentences containing moral predicates. Then I repeat my question: what are morals?
You say they are not concrete. You say they are not pie-in-the-sky. Are they abstract entities then? Platonic forms? If there were no humans, would absolute morals still exist? Where do they exist if not in this universe?
You say morals are not definable, yet they can be "reached" through logic and reason, but really, the only justification you've given so far is a pragmatic one: it's good for society if people believe in morals, and they are more likely to believe in morals if we say they are absolute. So basically, morality is in our enlightened self-interest, so we should believe in morals, and we call them "absolute" in order to get more people to believe in them. But enlightened self-interest has never been an adequate foundation for ethics, and pragmatism is but one step removed from relativism. Relativism says do what you want. Pragmatism says do whatever works--for you! So, until you can come up with better logic and reason, it seems you're stuck in the same boat as you say I'm in.
But I'm not stuck in the same boat as the relativists. Just because ancient cultures used to sacrifice babies, it does not follow that the moral realist position that the sentence 'it is wrong that someone tortures babies' is not objectively true. I can only speak from my position as a person raised in a modern, English-speaking civilization, but you are probably correct that if I was raised as an Aztec, I wouldn't have a problem with human sacrifice. Yet, according to moral realism, it would still be morally wrong that I participated in human sacrifice notwithstanding that I actually sacrificed humans. Like I said earlier, there are moral cripples. According to moral realism, a human-sacrificing Aztec would be a moral cripple--though not necessarily evil because they just didn't know the difference between right and wrong. If you were to say that human sacrifice was moral--for Aztecs--THAT is moral relativism. But surely that's not your position. . . .
To use your own analogy, just because someone is brainwashed into believing that 2 + 2 = 5, it does not follow that someone taught through repetition that 2 + 2 = 4 did not learn the truth. Similarly, if someone was raised to think that sacrificing babies to Satan is morally good, it does not follow that someone properly brought up to think that it is morally wrong to sacrifice babies did not learn the objective truth. Just because repetition is involved in learning falsities as well as truth, it does not follow that truth learned through repetition is not truth. Correct me if I'm wrong.
Regarding the indefinability of the moral predicates: as you say, words are intended to represent something. Some words represent simple things, and some words represent complex things. Thus words representing complex things can be defined using words that represent simple things. For example, I could define the word 'horse' as meaning the same as 'a large, solid-hoofed, herbivorous quadruped'.
Alas, it is not so easy with words that represent simple things. Take for example, the word 'yellow'. Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines 'yellow' as 'a color like that of egg yolk, ripe lemons, etc.' But what kind of a definition is THAT? Does 'yellow' mean the same as 'egg yolk', or does 'yellow' mean the same as 'ripe lemon'? I don't think it's either. Rather, if you want to know the definition of 'yellow' the dictionary instructs you to find an egg, crack it open, and look at the yolk, then find a ripe lemon and compare the two, and you will see for yourself the one thing that the egg yolk and the ripe lemon have in common: YELLOW!
Oh my God! Repetition! Again! !Que horrible!
In other words, the dictionary itself gives an ostensive definition (look it up!) for the word 'yellow'.
And so it is with the moral predicates. The predicate 'morally wrong' is intended to represent something. The problem is that something is simple, just like yellow is simple. So moral terms cannot be defined using nonmoral terms, in the way 'horse' can be defined using nonhorse terms. So, to say, as you have come close to saying, that 'that which is morally good is that which is conducive to survival' commits a logical fallacy, the naturalistic fallacy, first identified by G.E. Moore in his 1903 Principia Ethica. Similarly, some animal rights activists would like to define 'morally wrong' as 'causing suffering'. But this is like saying that 'yellow' means the same as 'lemon'.
So, moral predicates like 'morally wrong' cannot be defined in nonmoral terms. All I can do is show you suffering, murdering, cheating, mutilating, raping, wasting, vandalizing, etc. But 'morally wrong' does not mean the same as 'suffering', nor does 'morally wrong' mean the same as 'murdering', etc., nor does 'morally wrong' mean all those things taken together. Rather, 'morally wrong' is that quality that all those things have in common, just as 'yellow' represents that quality that egg yolks, ripe lemons, and ripe bananas all have in common.
Sorry, that's the best I can do. But it's also the best anyone else can do. . . .
And a final note, the ostensive definition of 'morally wrong' is absolutely NOT based on a "gut reaction", as you have suggested. Of course feelings of outrage are present upon witnessing a man beat a cripple in a wheelchair. However, feelings of outrage are also present in situations where there is no reason to suppose that something immoral has happened, as when one is caught in a traffic jam.
...
So, the question is, how do you know that 'it is morally wrong to torture babies' is true? I maintain you know it's true the same way I do, and that is empirically. In past posts you have vaguely alluded to the fact that bad s*** has happened to you in the past (I think that's why you believe that mere survival is the highest good). So you don't need anyone to tell you what 'moral wrong' means, because you have directly experienced it for yourself. And there's no point in seeking a proof of this knowledge, any more than seeking a proof for the fact that dandelion flowers are yellow.
From the same poster, here's the main problem with moral realism:
My main problem with moral absolutism is two-fold: (1) it doesn't provide an account as to how we know the truth of morals like 'it is wrong to torture babies'; and (2) the excess baggage of the connotations of totalitarianism and unrevisability that 'absolutism' carries with it.
For example, Osama bin Laden exemplifies this two-fold problem perfectly. He starts off on the wrong foot when he uses the Koran, instead of everyday experience as his moral foundation, and then climbing the ladder of logic and reason, concludes the moral that it's OK to nuke Americans by the millions is absolute and true. Now that he's arrived at his freakish moral philosophy that he believes is absolute, he has kicked down the ladder of reason and logic because he has no use for them anymore since he knows the absolute truth. So there is no use in reasoning or arguing with him anymore. On the other hand, while recognizing the reality of moral truth, moral realism retains a certain humility in that its truths are as provisional as the truths of science. For bin Laden, the truths of the Koran are absolute and unrevisable, and this leads to enslavement, chaos, death, and destruction.
For example, Osama bin Laden exemplifies this two-fold problem perfectly. He starts off on the wrong foot when he uses the Koran, instead of everyday experience as his moral foundation, and then climbing the ladder of logic and reason, concludes the moral that it's OK to nuke Americans by the millions is absolute and true. Now that he's arrived at his freakish moral philosophy that he believes is absolute, he has kicked down the ladder of reason and logic because he has no use for them anymore since he knows the absolute truth. So there is no use in reasoning or arguing with him anymore. On the other hand, while recognizing the reality of moral truth, moral realism retains a certain humility in that its truths are as provisional as the truths of science. For bin Laden, the truths of the Koran are absolute and unrevisable, and this leads to enslavement, chaos, death, and destruction.
Discuss...
morality is relative. And your discussion is soooo long.
A person decides himself what is moral to him or not. Its just that many things that people see as moral or as immoral are also seen by others the same ways, thus comes the misconception that morality is objective.
But if you were looking for a direct answer then here it is:
1) What is moral is defined by individual not by society
2) Many views in morality are shared by society, thus comes misconception of seeing whats moral by society as a whole
3) Also morals are a cultural construct which vary according to time and/or place, based on specific coltures
A person decides himself what is moral to him or not. Its just that many things that people see as moral or as immoral are also seen by others the same ways, thus comes the misconception that morality is objective.
But if you were looking for a direct answer then here it is:
1) What is moral is defined by individual not by society
2) Many views in morality are shared by society, thus comes misconception of seeing whats moral by society as a whole
3) Also morals are a cultural construct which vary according to time and/or place, based on specific coltures
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James R said:
Everyone knows what love is. Unconditional love is love without conditions. All people are capable of loving unconditionally. Not only are they capable, they loved unconditionally when they were young children.
It is absolutely right to love unconditionally. Unconditional love is the only moral truth. When unconditional love is challenged that moral judgment come into play. If unconditional love is ignored or obfuscated, morality can only be relative.
Raphael said:
Unconditional love is moral nihilism, the mindless expectation of a spoiled child.
Morality is a matter of consequence and condition.
With no conditions it is all up for grabs, anarchy and chaos.
---
perplexity said:
How can morality based on unconditional love be nihilism unless you reject that unconditional love exists? A spoiled child wants, unconditional love gives. Unconditional love is not just about the "me", it is about "the you and the me".
Nature is a matter of consequence and condition. Cause and effect. The ability to understand that life is more than the natural order, is what morality is all about. What seperates humans from animals is self awareness. But self awareness is not simply "I think therefore I am," but also I feel therefore I am.
Without consideration of the whole person, thought and emotion, and other people, morality of any kind is only "What can I get away with." If we condition myself not to feel guilt or outrage over some act, anything goes and anarchy and chaos follow; soon to be replaced by rule of the strongest. But other emotions are indicators of a failure or success in unconditional love. If they are ignored unconditional love is ignored. Again, when unconditional love is ignored, morality is always relative.
Raphael said:
But how often is unconditional love realized?
Wouldn't you say that most claims of it are not it?
And regardless, though I find your approach interesting, I'm interested to see how you argue that unconditional love is not moral nihilism...
I think it can be done, but I want to see where you go with it.
OH SHIT, I just noticed you already reponded to that charge... will read and edit more in a bit.
Okay... lemme start with the original bit, then I'll look at the comment above again:
Raphael said:
I'm not so convinced. Why would you presume such a thing? Some people know only of brutality, as it is all they have experienced. If nothing else, all people have at least a slightly different idea of what love is. Presuming everyone would cite the same definition from the same dictionary, love has a different conceptual place for all of them, though perhaps with some overlap for the bulk of them. Such variation however, as realized and interacted amongst one's social experience, can lead to strong dissodence (hmm I don't think that's spelled right, hopefully you can infer my meaning).
Sure. Two things come to mind. First, the notion of conditions. What I think of as a "unconditional" may in fact, not be. There may exist a strong argument that "unconditional" is a theoretical maximum of sorts and can't actually exist, as all that does exist is conditional upon existing.
The requirement for "unconditional" would actually require absolute mental discipline, and such a thing is impossible to expect amongst a varied populous.
Secondly, I don't think what comprises "love" is universal. We can discuss that if you'd like.
Clearly incorrect. Sociopaths simply haven't the ability, people with brain injuries, brain diseases, people who are damaged beyond the capacity for it... blah blah. Lots of examples to the contrary IMO.
Not necessarily correct, no. Some children are tortured and beaten. Some are twisted. Some are chemically fucked up. A lady recently told me of a two year old child who expressed the intention of murdering his mother, and holds it to this day... 5 or 7 years later. I'm not exactly sure I understand exactly the object of the term "love" as you use it, it would perhaps be helpful if you'd expound a bit. I have my own ideas as to what it is, and doubt they really compare.. so please share.
I'm sorry, but that is clearly incorrect. What is right depends upon the desired outcome... the "profit function" if you will. You feelin it? Get me? I'll explain more if you ask me to do so.
There is something about your argument that I find interesting though, cool approach. I see what you're trying to get at, I think.. but it seems to me that you've missed a big point about the profit function thingy. Maybe it's me, perhaps we'll see. I think I see your argument as circular, starting with the premise it concludes. For unconditional love to be absolutely right, you have to assume that it is, basically.. (that love is the right thing for what? to what end?). If my objective is to rule the world by force, "unconditional love" might not be right for me, know what I mean?
Ha! You're a perspective, and can necessarily only assert the subjective!
Actually, IMO, the simple assertion that unconditional love is the only moral truth somewhat negates itself in the assertion! It does not necessarily in the act, but in the assertion I think so..
I kind of like what you're doing with it, but I don't think it's really quite correct, as to claim it sort of ruins the magic.. if you can see what I mean.
Raphael said:
Such a statement presumes one can concieve of such a thing, which you cannot apply to "any perspective".
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Raphael said:
Your so called unconditional love is therefore conditioned by the other emotions.
---
Morals are all relative.
Different people have different types of morals. What was once considered good is now considered bad and what was once considered bad it now considered good. Morals change depending on what the majorities viewpoint is, and sometimes the minorities viewpoint.
Hell, just let everyone do whatever they want so long as it doesn't harm anyone against their will and it should be fine. If a person is a masochist and likes people to beat em up, let others beat the crap out of em if that person consents, heh, rather than locking that person up for breaking a law despite the other consenting to it.
- N
Different people have different types of morals. What was once considered good is now considered bad and what was once considered bad it now considered good. Morals change depending on what the majorities viewpoint is, and sometimes the minorities viewpoint.
Hell, just let everyone do whatever they want so long as it doesn't harm anyone against their will and it should be fine. If a person is a masochist and likes people to beat em up, let others beat the crap out of em if that person consents, heh, rather than locking that person up for breaking a law despite the other consenting to it.
- N
wesmorris said:
Not often enough. But yet, it exists within each of us obfuscated by thought and other emotions.
Like all claims, it is if it has been tested. Words are only words until acted upon.
perplexity said:
Unconditional love is part of who a person is and is not dependant on other emotions. One need only learn to recognize when conditions have been placed on love. Other emotions aid in this recognition.
I believe the choice of absolute or relative morality is an artificial limitation. Is there any functional purpose to morality? If not, then perhaps absolute and relative are the only choices once we cut through the rhetoric. But what if there is an objectively demonstrable, rational basis for a moral assesrtion?
The problem with relative morality is that people assess the conditions of relativity differently. The problem with absolute morality is its inflexibility. Theoretically, at least, there seems to exist a middle ground: a flexible morality with overwhelmingly-persuasive objective and rational bases. The question naturally arises, then, as to what constitutes an objective reality. After all, the fact of life, or even basic existence can be philosophically doubted. I cannot prove to any of you that I exist, nor can I prove to any of you that you, in fact, exist. At least not in any specifically common experience: we might agree on an expression, but that expression still holds unique values for each of us.
And perhaps that aspect of absurdity is necessary to understanding the primary moral definer.
Personally, I go with the observable facts of life and species, and build from there. Maybe this doesn't translate for others. Sparta seems to make an apparent example: would it be healthier for the species to manage the gene pool by terminating "substandard" humans? After all, our technology allows us to see these problems in utero, so it's not like we have to leave the baby on the mountainside. But what if we throw in a recorded fact of history? Planned Parenthood was originally a eugenic organization aiming to control the birth rate among nonwhites. Subjectively, is that not a little creepy? But would deliberate selective breeding to reduce the occasion of dark skin be a good idea for humanity? Should we tinker with genes for vanity's sake? ("I want a blonde-haired, blue-eyed child who stands six feet even, has fast-twitch muscles, and a blood chemistry that optimizes starches. Oh, and I want it to be a boy, and I want him to be gay." Tweak a gene, administer hormonal regulators ... presto!)
By this consideration, one can wonder at the evolutionary utility of religion,for instance. After all, humans seem to do better in organized communities, and religion to this day wields tremendous influence over communal structure.
Is it better for humanity to artificially restrain blacks, or women, or homosexuals? Does overpopulation give homosexual adoption more credence? After all, gays aren't contributing to the overpopulation problem; rather, they're contributing to its relief if allowed to be parents. Is that form of family healthy? Is the communist notion that nuclear family is inefficient in its social utility correct? Would we be better giving our children up to a regulated, equalized education and shaping? Does NAMBLA have a point that it's not sex with children that's the problem, but social attitudes toward such unions?
There are answers that, in most cases, reflect vital aspects of what becomes a cultural opinion. Yes, gay parents adopting otherwise-unwanted children brings relief to the situation. No, there doesn't seem to be any tremendous ill effect to the idea, except of course for the bigots trying to make an issue; it does not seem unhealthy for the species. Yes, nuclear family is problematic; no, such a regulated breeding and rearing does not seem the answer; humanity thrives on the freedom to screw up. No, NAMBLA does not have a point. Sexual mores in this culture are screwed up, to be sure, but the simple health risks ought to be enough to nullify the boylove movement's moral argument.
Or, at least, so says me. But we are human beings, and we are alive and existing. That is the reality that defines the moral center.
Again, so says me.
The problem with relative morality is that people assess the conditions of relativity differently. The problem with absolute morality is its inflexibility. Theoretically, at least, there seems to exist a middle ground: a flexible morality with overwhelmingly-persuasive objective and rational bases. The question naturally arises, then, as to what constitutes an objective reality. After all, the fact of life, or even basic existence can be philosophically doubted. I cannot prove to any of you that I exist, nor can I prove to any of you that you, in fact, exist. At least not in any specifically common experience: we might agree on an expression, but that expression still holds unique values for each of us.
And perhaps that aspect of absurdity is necessary to understanding the primary moral definer.
Personally, I go with the observable facts of life and species, and build from there. Maybe this doesn't translate for others. Sparta seems to make an apparent example: would it be healthier for the species to manage the gene pool by terminating "substandard" humans? After all, our technology allows us to see these problems in utero, so it's not like we have to leave the baby on the mountainside. But what if we throw in a recorded fact of history? Planned Parenthood was originally a eugenic organization aiming to control the birth rate among nonwhites. Subjectively, is that not a little creepy? But would deliberate selective breeding to reduce the occasion of dark skin be a good idea for humanity? Should we tinker with genes for vanity's sake? ("I want a blonde-haired, blue-eyed child who stands six feet even, has fast-twitch muscles, and a blood chemistry that optimizes starches. Oh, and I want it to be a boy, and I want him to be gay." Tweak a gene, administer hormonal regulators ... presto!)
By this consideration, one can wonder at the evolutionary utility of religion,for instance. After all, humans seem to do better in organized communities, and religion to this day wields tremendous influence over communal structure.
Is it better for humanity to artificially restrain blacks, or women, or homosexuals? Does overpopulation give homosexual adoption more credence? After all, gays aren't contributing to the overpopulation problem; rather, they're contributing to its relief if allowed to be parents. Is that form of family healthy? Is the communist notion that nuclear family is inefficient in its social utility correct? Would we be better giving our children up to a regulated, equalized education and shaping? Does NAMBLA have a point that it's not sex with children that's the problem, but social attitudes toward such unions?
There are answers that, in most cases, reflect vital aspects of what becomes a cultural opinion. Yes, gay parents adopting otherwise-unwanted children brings relief to the situation. No, there doesn't seem to be any tremendous ill effect to the idea, except of course for the bigots trying to make an issue; it does not seem unhealthy for the species. Yes, nuclear family is problematic; no, such a regulated breeding and rearing does not seem the answer; humanity thrives on the freedom to screw up. No, NAMBLA does not have a point. Sexual mores in this culture are screwed up, to be sure, but the simple health risks ought to be enough to nullify the boylove movement's moral argument.
Or, at least, so says me. But we are human beings, and we are alive and existing. That is the reality that defines the moral center.
Again, so says me.
James R said:
You could say that morality is relative, in the sense that there are no Universal morals deducable from the laws of our universe. So animals have a different moral system (you could say that they have no morality at all, but that is debatable, and as I recall, in an old thread, you had given some example of morality among animals) from that of humans. But I think for humans, morality is absolute (which was the actual question here). I've made a very very long post in <A href= "http://www.sciforums.com/showthread.php?t=48083">this</A> thread (in the first page itself). So please take a look at it, everyone.
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James R said:
Actually since I understood the sentence in question the first time reading I obviously and not cognitively impaired. However since your question seemed to make no snese what so ever in light of the sentence I had to ask. Unfortunately since you have still failed to understand the original sentence your 'no' should really be a yes. Which is really sad, as it will make all your future arguemnts even harder now.